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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Dynamics in social networks and financial decision making
In many societies around the world, adolescents are socialized to become consumers. Teenagers draw
on their social network structures to select and adapt their financial decision-making practices. At the
same time, teenagers are using these practices to form and modify their social network structures.
In their social environment, adolescents can build many types of social networks, which are highly
interdependent. Each type of social networks - along with its unique nature - might serve as a pool for
the creation and maintenance of further social networks with different functions. The structures within
these social networks are not exogenous, but depend on a variety of attributes and behaviors, including
practices of financial decision-making. Every society on the planet has unique stereotypes for boys
and girls, including specific assumptions about things that are important for them, or things for which
they use their financial resources. Gender stereotypes such as these might be very salient for children to
initiate relationships, but as they grow older, teenagers are learning to differentiate- and construct multi-
dimensional prototypes of their ideal self-concepts. Eventually, these prototypes can include attributes
such as demographics and values or behaviors such as financial decision-making practices, which might
be used to build and shape social network structures accordingly.
But how are adolescents socialized to become consumers? First, teenagers might be intrinsically
motivated to spend their financial resources instead of entrusting them to financial- or charitable insti-
tutions. In early adulthood, when people’s values - and their underlying motivational goals - are fully
formed, intrinsic motivations for people to choose certain purposes for financial resources are regarded as
exogenous. However in adolescence, people are drawing on their social network structures to form these
intrinsic motivations. In their quest to form their self-identity, teenagers might look to their peers and
adopt consumption related values, including the motivation to express or enhance their self-concepts, to
seek variety or understand different aspects of reality or to maintain harmony in their social networks.
Second, adolescents might also be extrinsically motivated to use their financial resources for specific
purposes. In the process of validating their ideal self-concepts, teenagers are negotiating the correspond-
ing prototypes with members of their social groups and thus establish norms in their social networks.
As group identities are forming, they might even feature brands with matching identities, through which
group membership can be expressed. The strength of extrinsic motivations such as these depends on
teenagers’ need for group affiliation, their dependence on social support and the degree to which these
norms restrict teenagers in their freedom. Teenagers, whose consumption patters deviate from the cor-
responding group norms are at risk of being socially excluded. Therefore, teenagers need to learn the
importance of remaining socially connected with friends and advisors who can provide emotional- and
instrumental forms of social support.
Third, the teenage market is significant in terms of both size and spending volumes. Attracted
by the abundance of opportunities in this growing market, organizations are designing campaigns with
marketing activities specifically tailored to preoccupy teenagers’ attention. As a result, adolescents are
continuously and ubiquitously tempted with opportunities to spend their financial resources. Given the
abundance of opportunities-, as well as the variety of intrinsic- or extrinsic motivations to spend financial
resources, it is not easy for adolescents to cut back on their consumption patterns by evading or resisting
such temptations, but deliquefying their financial resources in savings accounts instead. Therefore, it is
very important to teach adolescents the capacities and skills that are necessary to manage their financial
resources effectively.
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Figure 1.1: Framework adapted from the theory of structuration [Giddens, 1984]
Study 1: Values in Adolescent Friendship Networks (Chapter 2) 
Research questions 
(1)  How are adolescents' value priorities 
reflected in their life satisfaction? 
(2)  How salient are specific attributes 
for homohpily in friendship 
selection across different stages of 
the relationship's lifetime? 
(3)  Does additional similarity on 
specific attributes provide 
increasing, diminishing or no 
marginal utility compared to 
similarity on single attributes? 
Core contributions 
-  Investigation of values in the dynamic 
context of social networks in school 
classes. 
-  Applying stochastic actor oriented 
network models (SAOMs) to account 
for the endogenous nature of values in 
adolescence. 
-  Differentiating between various types 
of homophily and the corresponding 
multi-dimensional interactions in 
consequitive stages of friendship 
network evolution. 
Data 
Longitudinal design: Three 
waves of adolescents' 
friendship network structures 
and value priorities based on a 
sample of 3'793 pupils in 160 
school classes across two 
countries 
Main results 
-  Adolescents in pursuit of growth related values such as openness to change or self-transcendence are more satisfied 
with their lives. 
-  Gender homophily is only salient in the friendship initiation stage, whereas value homophily gains inportance in the 
friendship maintenance stage. 
-  Self-transcendence and self-enhancement values are completely subsumed in gender stereotypes, whereas the 
marginal utility is increasing if adolescents are similar on openness to change values and diminishing if they are 
similar on conservation values. 
Figure 1.2: Overview of study 1: Values in Adolescent Friendship Networks
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Study 2: Financial Decision-Making in Adolescent Friendship Networks (Chapter 3) 
Research questions 
(1)  What are intrinsic motivations for 
adolescents to change financial 
decision-making practices of saving, 
spending and donating money? 
(2)  How effective are social norms 
regarding financial decision-making 
practices? 
(3)  What is the effect of specific skills 
and abilities on adolescents' self-
efficacy to evade or resist 
temptations of spending money and 
put more financial resources in 
savings accounts instead? 
Core contributions 
-  Applying stochastic actor oriented 
network models (SAOMs) to account 
for the respective endogeneity in the 
dynamics of financial decision-making 
practices and social network structures. 
-  Introduction of framework based on 
self-efficacy and goal-directed action 
to explain motivations, abilities and 
social contexts facilitating changes in 
financial decision-making practices. 
-  Adding the concepts of basic human 
values, self-efficacy and goal-directed 
action to consumer research. 
Data 
Longitudinal design: Three 
waves of adolescents' 
financial decision-making 
practices, friendship network 
structures, value priorities and 
abilities based on a sample of 
3'793 pupils in 160 school 
classes across two countries 
Main results 
-  We find evidence for three types of motivations to spend money: Variety-seeking, self-expression and social 
harmony, two types of motivations to donate money: Altruism and Self-expression as well as individualistic 
motivations to save money. 
-  Social norms regarding priorities to spend- and save money are highly effective, while social norms regarding 
donations have no effect. 
-  We find evidence that self-control, future oriented time preferences and cognitive abilities increase adolescents' self-
efficacy to eliminate or resist temptations for spending and put more money to savings and that failure to do so 
increases adolescents' efforts in future trials. 
Figure 1.3: Overview of study 2: Financial Decision-Making in Adolescent Friendship Networks
Study 3: Finding Social Support in Adolescent Friendship and Advice Networks (Chapter 4) 
Research questions 
(1)  Does adherence to social norms 
prescribing financial decision-
making practices for adolescents 
reduce life satisfaction? 
(2)  Are friends and advisors providing 
better social support if they are 
selected based on a good match on 
attributes reflecting the nature of the 
corresponding relationship? 
Core contributions 
-  Applying stochastic actor oriented 
network models (SAOMs) to account 
for endogeneity in social norms and 
social network structures. 
-  Introduction of framework based on 
the typology of social networks with 
salient homophily dimensions and the 
corresponding impact on life 
satisfaction. 
-  Adding the concept of social support to 
consumer research. 
Data 
Longitudinal design: 3 waves 
of adolescents' financial 
decision-making practices, 
friendship- and advice 
network structures, value 
priorities and life satisfaction 
based on a sample of 3'793 
pupils in 160 school classes 
across 2 countries 
Main results 
-  Adherence to social norms prescribing financial decision-making practices for adolescents does not significantly 
reduce life satisfaction. 
-  Assuming that the quality of social support is reflected in life satisfaction, friends provide better social support if 
they are selected based on the same gender but with different age levels, whereas advisors provide superior social 
support if they are selected based on similarities on self-monitoring capabilities. 
-  Assuming that life satisfaction measures the quality of social support, showing homophily based on self-
transcendence and self-enhancement values is more adequate for the selection of friends, while homophily based on 
openness to change and conservation values is more appropriate for the selectin of advisors. 
Figure 1.4: Overview of study 3: Finding Social Support in Adolescent Friendship and Advice Networks
The theory of structuration [Giddens, 1984] is encompassing each of the three empirical research
papers contained in this dissertation, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. Teenagers draw on their social network
structures to adapt their financial decision-making practices along with the underlying motivational goals
and simultaneously use attributes and practices such as these to form and modify their social network
structures. All papers are based on data from surveys commissioned in school classes.
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Figures 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 are summarizing each paper with regard to research questions, core contribu-
tions to consumer research, data and main findings. The first study (Figure 1.2) provides a framework
explaining the endogenous nature of teenagers’ motivational goals as well as their social network struc-
tures, which are both important drivers of financial decision-making. The second study (Figure 1.3)
introduces a specific set of skills and abilities and investigates how motivational goals and abilities co-
determine teenagers’ self efficacy for evading or resisting temptations to spend their financial resources.
The third study (Figure 1.4) provides a framework explaining the impact of selecting friends and advi-
sors with a good match on attributes that best reflect the nature of the corresponding relationship on
teenagers’ life satisfaction.
An additional commonality linking the papers in this dissertation is the application of stochastic
actor oriented network models (SAOMs) to investigate our research questions in Figures 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4.
Thus, the following paragraphs provide a brief introduction to stochastic actor oriented network models,
the terminology of which is used throughout this dissertation.
1.2 Modeling dynamics social network structures and financial
decision making practices
Social network structures in school classes can be described in graphs. In social network analysis, graphs
are mathematical- and visual representations illustrating how nodes are affiliated with each other, as
represented through ties. Most approaches to model dynamic network structures focus on fitting a
model to a specific series of observed networks. Depending on the research context as well as the
research questions under investigation, there are two approaches that are predominantly used to model
dynamics in social network structures.
[Robins and Pattison, 2001] and [Hanneke and Xing, 2007] introduced an exponential random graph
model (ERGM) framework capturing the transition from a network observed at time t to a network
observed at time t+1. ERGMs treat each network as a single observation and model the probability of
observing a network with a specific structure of ties in relation to every possible alternative network -
meaning every possible permutation of ties in a network with the same number of nodes - given a set of
statistics on the network. In this framework, the evolution of network structures across time is modeled
through stepwise ERGMs. The set of statistics can measure effects endogenous to the networks under
investigation (endogenous processes) as well as the effects of exogenous covariates (exogenous processes).
An alternative approach to model network dynamics was introduced by [Snijders, 2001], which is
commonly referred to as stochastic actor oriented network models (SAOM). As the terminology implies,
this approach is based on the idea that actors are nodes, which have agency, and thus evaluate network
structures in an effort to obtain a configuration of ties with the highest possible utility. In other words,
actors are assumed to pursue their own objectives under the restrictions of their social context, and in
doing so, actors themselves are part of each others’ changing contexts. Similar to the ERGM frame-
work, the utilities driving actors’ decisions in SAOMs are determined by a set of statistics representing
endogenous- or exogenous effects. In contrast to the ERGM framework, actors in SAOMs make their
choices based on the present state, without using a memory of earlier states. Moreover, when using the
SAOM approach, actors’ choices are not restricted to the evolution of network structures, but include
choices regarding changes in both network- and behavior space, as illustrated in Figure 1.5.
Both the research context - as well as the research questions this dissertation aims to investigate
- call for the SAOM approach, whereby pupils are regarded as the primary agents pursuing their own
goals under the constraints of social network structures in their school classes. The following paragraphs
are devoted to a discussion of both approaches and their respective suitability to investigate research
questions such as those listed in Figures 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4.
Unlike ERGMs, SAOMs are very qualified to model behavioral dynamics, as agents can make decisions
regarding changes in behaviors. Financial decision-making practices allocating discretionary financial
resources to specific purposes can be viewed as behaviors, which pupils can increase, decrease or keep at
the current state, as suggested in Figure 1.5. Furthermore, pupils can increase or decrease the emphasis
they place on specific values or keep their current motivations to achieve the corresponding goals. As
such, these models are particularly appropriate to investigate intrinsic motivations, and their impact on
decisions to change financial decision-making practices, as shown in Figure 1.3.
Both ERGMs and SAOMs are similarly qualified to capture the dynamic nature inherent in social
networks. While ERGMs model the probability of observing networks with specific structures, SAOMs
allow actors to make decisions regarding their social network structures and thus modify the structure of
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Figure 1.5: Actor’s choices in the framework of stochastic actor oriented network models (SAOMs)
the relationships with their peers. In research contexts, where ties are affiliations between nodes without
agency, or where the emergence and persistence of ties is the outcome of negotiations and collective
decision-making, ERGMs are more appropriate, as they do not make assumptions such as those listed in
the following section. However, in the research context of this dissertation, pupils have agency to form,
maintain or dissolve ties to friends or invest resources into the formation and maintenance of ties to
advisors or free said resources through the dissolution of corresponding ties. Therefore, both approaches
are appropriate to investigate specific sets of attributes, and how they are considered when teenagers are
selecting friends or advisors, as shown in Figure 1.4.
Ultimately, in this dissertation, SAOMs were applied primarily because of their capacity to capture
mechanisms driving both behavior- and network structure changes simultaneously. Their multinomial
nature allows for each process to be estimated net of the other. As such, they are very suitable to
investigate all our research questions listed in Figures 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4.
1.2.1 Model assumptions
In the following paragraphs, we provide a comprehensive list of assumptions that need to be made when
applying SAOMs and discuss their plausibility considering our research questions.
• In each social system, changes in network structures and behaviors are the outcomes of a Markov
process, which means that the current state can determine future dynamics, as it contains infor-
mation from the entire history of events. Thus, for all actors at each moment, network structure-
and behavior changes depend on the current combination of network structures and behaviors.
This assumption is plausible if the combination of networks x(t), behavioral variables z(t) and at-
tributes v(t) can be regarded as a state which determines the corresponding endogenous dynamics in a
reasonable approximation. As a result, applications on volatile phenomena or brief events are excluded.
Thus, models based on the Markov assumption are not suitable if they are applied to investigate research
questions, such as dymanics in e-mail exchange or movie theatre attendance. In contrast, these models
are very qualified to investigate dynamics in social networks alongside lifestyle-related behaviors [Steglich
et al., 2010a], covering all research questions of this dissertation, as listed in Figures 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4.
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• The processes underlying each individual decision of every actor unfold in time steps of varying
length, which could be arbitrarily small. While the underlying time parameter t is assumed to be
continuous, the parameter estimation procedure assumes that network structures and behaviors
are observed as states at two or more discrete points in time.
[Holland and Leinhardt, 1977] already proposed this assumption as a basis for longitudinal network
modeling. According to this proposition, changes in network structures and behaviors are happening
at stochastically determined discrete moments and thus in continuous time. As such, the total change
between two sequential observations xt and xt+1 is regarded as the result of many unobserved steps
that occur between these observations. Thus, models based on this assumption are not appropriate
to investigate dynamics in affiliations between groups, for which unobserved creations and dissolutions
cannot be assumed at any given rate between observations. On the contrary, this assumption is plausible
to study the processes under investigation in this dissertation, as actors can be assumed to have full
capacity to change social network structures as well as lifestyle-related behaviors at any given rate.
Each step has two underlying processes. The first process determines the order, according to which
actors are allowed to make decisions.
• The probability λ for the selection of the focal actor i, to get the opportunity to make a change in his
or her network structure net or behavior beh is modeled through the rate function λ
net/beh
i (ρ, α, x,m) =∏
m λ
net/beh
im .
• At a given moment, when it is their turn to make a decision, actors are assumed to have agency
regarding their outgoing ties as well as their own behavior. They may either change a tie through the
initiation of a new relationship as well as the maintenance or dissolution of an existing relationship,
or change their behavior by going one unit up or down. Therefore, coordinations between changes
in the network structure and in the behavior are excluded.
• Conditional on the opportunity to make the respective decisions, changes in network structures
and behaviors are modeled as distinct processes and are therefore governed by a priori unrelated
parameters.
By default, the rate function λ
net/beh
im = ρ
net/beh
m depends on the period m, in which case actors are
selected at random at each period. While this is a reasonable approximation for the order according to
which changes happen, social systems maybe composed of actors with different characteristics. Thus,
denoting the estimation parameter by λh, the selection can also be made with probabilities depending
on actor’s attributes v such as inertia, yielding λ
net/beh
im = exp(
∑
h αhvhi) or network positions x ap-
proximating intra- vs. extraversion, yielding λ
net/beh
im = exp(
∑
h αh(
∑
j xij)). Although the possibility
to coordinate between changes in the network structures and behaviors is primarily excluded, in combi-
nation with the continuous time assumption, actors could coordinate decisions if the order according to
which they have to wait for their turn is not determined by chance, but depends on their characteristics.
The second process determines the way actors evaluate all potential changes in their behavior and
network space.
• The functions, which assign utility outcomes for specific changes in an actor’s network structure
eneti (x) =
∑
k β
net
k s
net
ik (x) or behavior e
beh
i (x, z) =
∑
k β
beh
k s
beh
ik (x, z), are referred to as objective
functions. Actors evaluate utility outcomes of their objective functions for each behavior- or net-
work state that results from every possible change in their behaviors or network structures. Thus
actors are assumed to have access to the corresponding information.
• Actors sharing the same social context are governed by a common objective function.
In social contexts, which are limited to single school classes, there is no need to relax the assumption
of complete information, as pupils have access to all necessary information through the communication
with- or observation of peers in their school classes. In larger social contexts, this assumption can be
relaxed by creating groups of social systems with similar properties (e.g. social groups similar in size
or maturity, social groups with a common supervisor or affiliated with the same institution). If the
dynamics are assumed to differ across the respective groups, it is necessary to impose corresponding
restrictions on the common objective function.
• Objective functions are specified to include parameters according to specific dynamics that are
assumed to take place in the behavior- sbehik (x, z) and network space s
net
ik (x).
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In their objective functions, actors consider how each change in their behavior or network structure
would affect their utility. Parameters that are specified in the objective function are referred to as effects.
They attach relative importance to each dynamic that is assumed to happen and thus determine actors’
decisions. Section 3 of the Appendix provides descriptions for all effects that are used to specify models
in this dissertation. The interpretation of effects is similar to parameters from a multinomial logistic
regression.
• For the specification of objective functions, it is assumed that terminating a tie is the exact opposite
of creating one, and that increasing the behavioral level by one unit generates as much utility as is
lost when decreasing the behavioral level by one unit.
This assumption is not an accurate reflection of the reality in most social systems, including organiza-
tional foci such as school classes. For example, the increase in utility for a pupil, who creates a new tie to
a specific peer, might not be as substantial as the decrease in utility if the same pupil were to terminate
an existing tie to the corresponding peer. This can be modeled by two complementary components of
the objective function. The creation function takes the value of eneti (x) = 0 for the dissolution of ties or
ebehi (x, z) = 0 for decreases in the behavior. The endowment function takes the value of e
net
i (x) = 0 for
the creation of ties or ebehi (x, z) = 0 for increases in the behavior.
Considering all of these assumptions, as well as the numerous possibilities to relax these assump-
tions through model specification, SAOMs are uniquely qualified to investigate our research questions in
Figures 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4.
1.2.2 Model estimation
Having specified SAOMs based on theoretical considerations, results are estimated according to the
meta-analytical method proposed by [Snijders and Baerveldt, 2003, Ripley et al., 2011]. Following an
unconventional Method of Moments, the parameter values and standard errors for all effects in the chosen
model specification are estimated separately for each school class.
[Bowman and Shenton, 1985] provide a review of the Method of Moments. Given the data Y and the
parameter vector θ, the Method of Moments estimator is the parameter vector θˆ for which the expected
and observed values of u(Y) are the same, as imposed by the moment equation Eθˆ(u(Y )) = u(Y ). θ
and u(Y) are usually vectors with the same dimension, whereby the solutions are locally- and often
also globally unique. Using the delta method [Lehmann, 1999] and the implicit function theorem under
regularity conditions, it can be proven that if θˆ is a consistent solution to the moment equation, the
asymptotic covariance matrix of the moment estimator is covθˆ ≈
( δEθu(Y )
δθ
)−1
covθ
(( δEθu(Y )
δθ
)T )−1
. Its
components - the covariance matrix covθ as well as the partial derivatives matrix
( δEθu(Y )
δθ
)−1
- are
estimated using Monte Carlo methods. Parameter estimates θˆ are obtained as the solution to the
moment equation and standard errors σθˆ are extracted as the square roots of the diagonal elements in
this asymptotic covariance matrix.
Model specification is crucial. Not only does it affect a model’s computation time, but the efficiency
of the Method of Moments estimator also depends on the statistics that were specified in the model’s
utility function. But how are the models validated once parameters θˆ with the corresponding standard
errors σθˆ have been separately estimated for all effects in the chosen model for each school class?
1.2.3 Model validation
In order to validate the estimated models, separate goodness of fit tests are performed for each school
class. For each effect, θˆ and σθˆ are tested using Fisher’s combined probability tests. Goodness of fit tests
are performed according to the following procedure:
• Data are simulated based on auxiliary statistics such as in- or outdegree distributions, behavior
distributions, as well as distributions based on geodesic distance, dyadic- or triadic census.
• Statistics of the simulated data are tested against the corresponding statistics of the observed data
using Fisher’s combined probability tests.
Fisher’s combined tests are investigating if the null Hypothesis: θ = 0 can be rejected in at least
one school class [Mercken et al., 2010]. In two sided tests, the alternative Hypothesis is θ 6= 0, while in
Fisher’s left- and right sided tests, alternative Hypotheses are θ < 0 and θ > 0 respectively.
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Chapter 2
Values in Adolescent Friendship
Networks
Abstract
Values - the motivational goals that define what is important to us - are guiding our decisions and behav-
iors everyday. Their importance is established in a long line of research investigating their universality
across countries and their evolution over time. Existing research produced a multitude of frameworks
linking values to sociologically relevant dimensions. So far, these mechanisms were considered to happen
within each person independently. But life is social, and adolescence is a special stage in people’s lives,
as they are exploring various paths in an effort to build their self identity and find out who they are.
Embedded in various social systems, adolescents turn to their affiliated peers for emotional support,
for social validation, or to seek advice. Thus, they are constantly subject to interpersonal influence.
In this article, we introduce a framework focused on the emergence and evolution of value priorities in
the context of network dynamics. Drawing on stochastic actor-oriented network models, we analyze 73
friendship networks of adolescents. We find that a.) adolescents in pursuit of growth related values
are more satisfied with their lives, b.) gender homophily is more salient for friendship creation, whereas
satisfaction- and value homophily are more relevant for friendship maintenance, and c.) while some value
priorities are subsumed in gender stereotypes, others show increasing or diminishing marginal utilities
on similarity in same-sex friendships. The implications of our framework are discussed.
Keywords: Value homophily, value adaption, life satisfaction, stochastic actor-oriented network
models, adolescent networks
Publication note: A version of this article has been accepted for publication in Network Science.
Co-authors of this article are Alexander Ehlert, Jan Cieciuch, Eldad Davidov, Heiko Rauhut, Claudio
Juan Tessone and Rene Algesheimer.
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2.1 Introduction
What is the motivation behind our behavior and the decisions we make everyday? What can explain
the choices we made in the past and what determines the paths we choose for our future? Essentially,
values - or the motivational goals that define what is important to us, embody the potential to answering
all of these questions. Values are guiding us along all the stages of our lives [Schwartz, 1992]. Similar
to the way we learn our native language, to a large extent our values are formed through learning and
observing what is important to our parents. Throughout the early stages of our lives, we set and adjust
priorities in our value structure until they are part of our self identity, just like the unique ways we
use to express ourselves in our native language. Similar to the misconceptions or misunderstandings
we might have with people speaking different languages, our co-existance with people holding different
values can incite disagreements or even conflicts. Every society on the planet is fostering specific sets of
value priorities through the different ways, how behaviors or decisions of their members are sanctioned
[Schwartz, 1999]. Thus, values are like a common language, through which we are bound to each other
in our societies. Irrespective of whether people migrate in pursuit of better opportunities or whether
they seek refuge in other countries, they all carry their own value priorities with them. Conflicts are
emerging if there are substantial gaps in how immigrants and residents are prioritizing different values
such as family constellations, hierarchies, traditions, conformity, freedom of speech, gender equality,
social justice or the protection of the natural environment. So far, research on values investigated a
variety of mechanisms linking values to sociologically relevant dimensions, all of which assume these
processes to take place within people, who are independent of each other.
But life is social. People are embedded in various social systems at each stage of their lives [McPher-
son et al., 2001a]. While people cannot choose their family context, they can select their preferred
education or workplaces they can identify with. Furthermore, people can join different communities, or
choose political parties representing their opinions and attitudes. Thus, people are constantly exposed to
interpersonal influence. Within each sphere, people can form networks, access knowledge to understand
specific aspects of their reality and obtain feedback to validate their beliefs, preferences, attitudes, inten-
tions or behaviors [Festinger, 1954]. Surprisingly, values have not yet been investigated in the context of
social systems. Of particular interest is their formation during adolescence, as teenagers are exploring
various paths in an effort to build their self identity. Thus, the goal of our paper is to provide insights
on how values are co-evolving with network structures in adolescent social systems.
[Schwartz, 1992] introduced values as principles guiding people’s beliefs, preferences and intentions
and found that alongside decisions and behaviors [Bardi and Schwartz, 2003, Skimina et al., 2018], they
can also affect life satisfaction [Bilsky and Schwartz, 1994]. Thus, it is highly relevant to understand
how values emerge, how their multi-dimensional structure evolves, how their development is affected by
specific attributes and how their evolution can impact life satisfaction.
According to [Aral et al., 2009], people are making decisions in social systems, where different types
of homophily might be present. [Lazarsfeld et al., 1954] introduced the concept of homophily as people’s
tendency to affiliate with similar peers. [McPherson et al., 2001a] identified many salient dimensions on
which homophily can occur, including not only race and ethnicity [Marsden, 1987, Shrum et al., 1988],
gender [Marsden, 1987], and age [Fischer, 1982, Feld, 1982, Marsden, 1987], but also religion [Verbrugge,
1977], education [Marsden, 1987], occupation [Kalmijn, 1995], behaviors [Steglich et al., 2010b, Knecht
et al., 2010, Ellwardt et al., 2012, Haye et al., 2013, Solish et al., 2010, Friemel, 2012] and values [Kandel,
1978, Lazarsfeld et al., 1954, Newcomb, 1961]. However, it is highly relevant to understand value adaption
and value homophily as dynamic processes. First, as a result of their dynamic and endogenous nature,
value homophily might be latent or hidden insofar as teenagers adjust values according to how they
are emphasized by their peers [Aral et al., 2009]. Second, the presence of homophily can be observed
both in the creation of new affiliations to similar peers and the dissolution of existing affiliations to
dissimilar peers [Hallinan and Williams, 1989]. Third, not only are values inherently multi-dimensional
by themselves, the impact of adolescents’ similarity in values on their selection of affiliations might not
be independent in the multi-dimensional space of attributes [Block and Grund, 2014].
Thus, in the current study we will investigate a.) how the change in value priorities is reflected in
life satisfaction, b.) how adolescents change their value priorities, c.) how processes such as gender
homophily or homophily based on life satisfaction and values are different for the creation of new affil-
iations compared to the maintenance of existing affiliations, and d.) whether homophilous tendencies
based on gender and similarities in life satisfaction or values are independent or interact with each other.
We will begin with our theoretical framework and Hypotheses, followed by a description of our data and
variables in the model. Next we will present the results, and finalize with concluding remarks.
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2.2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
Teenagers can come into contact with peers in a wide variety of contexts. Thus, they are consantly
exposed to information about how their peers behave, how they solve problems and how they are affil-
iated in these contexts. In each of these spheres, teenagers might display homophilous preferences and
susceptibility to interpersonal influence to various extents. Among all the different types of relationships,
the concept of friendship attracts the highest degree of attention in both theoretical- as well as empirical
research [Fischer, 1982]. Although the term ”friendship” has been used in a largely unsystematic way,
friendship quality can generally be defined as the amount of time people voluntarily spend with each
other [Bukowski et al., 1994]. This feature makes friendship relations particularly relevant for this study,
as they are contexts, in which adolescents are most likely to talk about their value priorities or observe
behavioral expressions of each other’s values.
2.2.1 Dynamics in friendship networks
In which contexts are teenagers forming friendships? [Feld, 1981] introduces the concept of organiza-
tional foci, which are contexts, in which people draw- and evaluate information in order to validate
cognitions and form relationships with their peers. Such foci are essentially pools of peers, with whom
people can create and maintain friendships. They are defined as social, psychological, legal, or physical
entities around which joint activities are organized. Through their impact on social interaction patterns,
structural properties such as the size of such organizational foci can affect specific features of the social
networks that evolve within these contexts [Hallinan, 1979].
Why does friendship emerge between acquaintances, and why does a teenager reach out to another
as a friend? Social comparison theory [Festinger, 1954] suggests that people have an inherent need to
validate their cognitions. Realizing that their own lifetime experiences do not yield sufficient insights,
teenagers need to reach out to their peers and spend more time with them in order to obtain more
comprehensive information.
Additionally, [Wright, 1984] suggests that friendships are rewarding on multiple dimensions and pro-
vides a taxonomy based on their self referent implications. First, friends are encouraging and helping to
maintain an impression of one’s competence. Second, friends behave in ways that facilitate the expres-
sion of one’s self-concept and the recognition of important and highly valued features. Third, friends
are stimulating and fostering an expansion or elaboration of one’s knowledge and perspectives. Fourth,
friends are expressing a personalized interest and concern through their helpfulness and cooperation in
meeting one’s goals and are thus enacting behaviors that are instrumental to achieve such goals. But the
most important self referent implication - and a necessary condition for friendships to evolve - is that
friends do not behave in ways that would threaten the integrity of one’s self-concept. Thus, friends do
not betray trust, cause embarrassment, or draw attention to points of weakness and self doubt [Kelvin,
1977].
How are friendships distinguished from other types of relationships? Are teenagers reciprocating
friendship nominations of their peers? Are they trying to induce balance and encourage their friends
to meet and spend more time together? People generally expect positive affective relationships such as
friendships to be mutual, balanced in terms of social capital [Coleman and Cross, 2000] and emotionally
supportive, even when such reciprocity does not exist [Krackhardt and Kilduff, 1999, Vaquera and
Kao, 2008, Freeman, 1992]. [Festinger and Hutte, 1954] argue that people who perceive friendships as
unbalanced, are experiencing feelings of uncertainty or instability.
Are teenagers more popular as friends if many other peers already nominated them as friends?
Preferential attachment [Baraba´si and Albert, 1999] is consistently found as a significant property in
many types of networks. Although teenagers could become less popular in evolving networks, if they
have a limited capacity to receive links, or if they incur costs when receiving links [Amaral et al., 2000],
we expect adolescents with a larger pool of existing friendships to be more popular.
2.2.2 Emergence and evolution of values
In a review on value theories and value research, [Rohan, 2000] identified considerable inconsistency in
how values are defined. Theorists define values as motivational guides [Lewin et al., 1951], conceptions
[Kluckhohn et al., 1951], properties of entities [Heider, 1958], and beliefs about the desirability or prefer-
ability of modes of conduct and states of existence [Morris, 1956, Feather, 1996, Rokeach, 1973]. There
is general agreement that value systems contain a finite number of universally relevant value types, on
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which people place relative importance, and that value systems need to have an underlying structure
based on the motivational goals embodied by each value type.
The theory of basic human values defines values as trans-situational goals, which vary in importance,
and serve as guiding principles for groups or in a single person’s life [Schwartz, 1992]. The term ”value
structure” is used with reference to the classification of values according to the congruence or conflicts
experienced when contemporaneously enacting those values, while the term ”value priorities” describes
the relative importance placed on different values. Their framework - as shown in Figure 2.1 - assumes
that value systems can be structured by two motivational dimensions, which are cast in terms of conflicts,
and fundamental human problems that need to be solved. The first dimension, labeled as ”openness to
change - conservation”, highlights the conflict between the motivation to ”follow one’s own intellectual
and emotional interests in unpredictable and uncertain directions” and the motivation to ”preserve the
status quo and the certainty it provides in relationships with close others, institutions, and traditions”
(p. 43). The second dimension, labeled as ”self-enhancement - self-transcendence”, relates to the conflict
between people’s motivation to ”enhance their own personal interests, (even at the expense of others)”
and their motivation to ”transcend selfish concerns and promote the welfare of others, close and distant,
and of nature” (p.44). While the pursuit of values on opposite sides of these dimensions creates conflict,
higher order values adjacent to each other can be negotiated and enacted simultaneously.
People have a capacity for meta-cognition, which means that teenagers are not only capable of
talking about their value priorities but also that they are able to use value language to make arguments
supporting their decisions or behaviors [Rohan, 2000, Schwartz, 1996]. Therefore, this study uses the
framework of higher order values from the theory of basic human values.
Whereas prior research agrees that people’s own value systems and their perceptions of others’ value
systems are intrapsychic cognitive structures, there is no consensus about how to understand perceptions
of groups’ value systems. Norms are beliefs about what the groups’ value priorities should be. But are
they perceived as the average of all group members’ personal value priorities, those of the majority,
those of friends, or those of group leaders or other significant members? This study follows a long line
of research investigating friendship selection and social influence [Steglich et al., 2010b, Knecht et al.,
2010, Ellwardt et al., 2012, Haye et al., 2013, Solish et al., 2010, Friemel, 2012, Ehlert et al., 2018].
In the following paragraphs, we take a more detailed look at each of the individual higher order values
”self transcendence”, ”openness”, ”self enhancement”, as well as ”conservation” and then derive our
Hypotheses.
Figure 2.1: The motivational circle according to the theory of basic human values [Schwartz et al., 2012]
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Self-transcendence
What is self-transcendence? This higher order value entails the importance of benevolence- and uni-
versalism values. The concern for the prosperity of groups composed of close alters is referred to as
benevolence. It entails the need for positive social interactions [Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987, Kluckhohn,
1951] and affiliations [Korman, 1974, Maslow, 1959]. It emphasizes the preservation and enhancement
of true friendship, mature love and prosperity for people with whom personal interactions are frequent.
Individuals, who value benevolence are striving to be helpful, loyal, forgiving, honest, and responsible
friends. Benevolence might be triggered if people realize that the welfare within their social systems
increases through their prosociality. Individuals who value universalism are driven by the motivational
goals of understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for na-
ture [Maslow, 1959]. In contrast to benevolence values, the needs underlying universalism values become
apparent when individuals come into contact with people outside their social group. Exposures such as
these might trigger the realization that broad-mindedness, accepting different cultures, aiming for social
justice and equality may help to avoid conflicts. Universalism needs might also be revealed if individuals
become aware of the scarcity of natural resources and thus realize that unity with nature and protecting
the natural environment will help to sustain the resources on which life depends.
Openness to change
This higher order value is composed of self-direction and stimulation values. Individuals who value
self-direction are driven by the intrinsic motivation as described in the theory of self efficacy [Bandura,
1977, Deci and Ryan, 1975, White, 1959] such as creativity, curiosity, or discovering things on their
own. Furthermore, they require autonomy and independence in interpersonal relationships [Kluckhohn,
1951, Kohn and Schooler, 1983, Morris, 1956], such as the freedom to choose their own goals, or to make
up their mind independently. Those who value stimulation seek variety in order to maintain an optimal
level of activation [Berlyne, 1960, Houston and Mednick, 1963, Maddi, 1961, Farley, 1986], and search
for excitement, novelty, and challenge in life [Deci and Ryan, 1975].
Self-enhancement
What is self-enhancement? This higher order value entails the importance of achievement and power
values. On the one hand, individuals who value ambition or personal success want to demonstrate com-
petence according to social- and cultural standards of excellence in order to obtain resources for survival
and social approval [Maslow, 1959, Rokeach, 1973, Scott and Scott, 1965]. On the other hand, [Mc-
Clelland et al., 1953] defines the motivation for achievement as the goal to meet internal standards of
excellence [Deci and Ryan, 1975]. Thus, individuals who value power are driven by the need to attain so-
cial status [Durkheim, 1964, Parsons, 1991], prestige, and control or dominance over people and resources
[Korman, 1974, Schutz, 1958, Allport, 1961, Gordon, 1960]. Therefore, they strive for authority, wealth,
social power, social recognition, or the preservation of their public image. The commonality between
power values and achievement values lies in the emphasis social esteem. Whereas achievement values
highlight the demonstration of competence in social interactions, power values focus on the attainment
or preservation of a dominant position within the social system.
Conservation
This higher order value entails the importance of the security, conformity and tradition values. Individu-
als, who value security require safety, harmony, and stability on the society-, dyadic- and individual level
[Kluckhohn, 1951, Maslow, 1959]. Security values can serve individual- or collective interests, and thus
require a sense of belonging, stability for a group of alters with whom one identifies, emphasis on social
order, reciprocation of favors, family security, or national security. In order to facilitate smooth everyday
interactions, individuals who value conformity are restraining socially disruptive actions, inclinations or
impulses, which might upset or harm others or violate social norms [Freud, 1933, Kohn and Schooler,
1983, Parsons, 1991]. As a result, such individuals want to honor parents and elders and place great
emphasis on being obedient, self-disciplined, and polite. Finally, around the world, individuals in groups
value symbols and practices as part of traditions and customs that represent their shared experience
in the past as well as the fate they share in the future [Sumner, 1906]. Such practices can be religious
rites, beliefs, and norms of behavior [Radcliffe-Brown, 1952] symbolizing a group’s solidarity, expressing
its unique positioning, and presumably providing a guarantee for its survival [Durkheim, 1964, Parsons,
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1991]. Individuals, who value tradition emphasize acceptance of-, or respect and commitment for customs
and ideas imposed by their culture or religion, such as humility, devotion, moderation, or acceptance of
their place and role in life.
2.2.3 Evolution of values and their reflection in life satisfaction
Life satisfaction is defined as the degree to which one judges the quality of one’s life favorably [Veenhoven
and Ehrhardt, 1995]. People can make this judgement in the cognitive context of their own experiences
or through social comparison [Festinger, 1954, Diener et al., 1985, Sagiv and Schwartz, 2000].
According to [Bilsky and Schwartz, 1994], people who attribute greater importance to value types
representing growth needs - in particular universalism, benevolence, self direction and stimulation - are
likely to have attained their goals. However, becoming aware of the inability to realize their goals, people
are likely to attribute greater importance to achievement and power, or switch on a defense mechanism,
which promotes the pursuit of conformity, security or tradition. If we assume that positive well-being is
a consequence of goal realization, the association between value priorities and life satisfaction is expected
to be positive for growth related values and negative for deficiency related values. Having measured life
satisfaction as a state at the end of the process for value change, we can assume the above direction of
causality. This classification of higher order values is in line with [Deci and Ryan, 1975]. They assume that
the sense of well-being experienced by people, who prioritize intrinsic goals, as in self transcendence or
openness values, is more positive compared to people in pursuit of extrinsic goals, as in self enhancement
and conservation values.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Thus, teenagers increasing their priority given to growth related values are more
satisfied with their lives compared to teenagers in pursuit of deficiency related values.
When adolescents consider changing their value priorities in the future, the most convenient way for
them to find support for their decision would be to ignore their social environment and just evaluate
their own current value priorities. If this imformation is considered exclusively, teenagers are primarily
driven by the utility they expect to receive from shifting priorities in specific ways. Adolescents can
estimate how much time they spend in pursuit of specific values and assess if it is worthwhile to increase
the corresponding priorities. However, especially in light of the trade-offs that need to be made at the
expense of other values, we make the following Hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2a (H2a). We expect that teenagers, who currently show higher emphasis on any given
higher order value, are more likely to decrease the corresponding emphasis, instead of further increasing
it or holding on to the way they currently prioritize those higher order values.
Social validation [Festinger, 1954] provides teenagers with the necessary information to make informed
decisions regarding the complex trade-offs associated with changes in their value structure. Thus, they
might want to know the social meaning of their value priorities.
In a first scenario, teenagers are primarily subject to the exposure of observed value expressive
behaviors or attributes of their current friends. However, they will only use this information, if they feel
confident that their friends’ attributes or behaviors are expressions of their true values and that they
can approximate the extent to which they emphasize these. In this scenario, we assume that adolescents
want to decide for themselves, whether and how far to shift their priorities. However, in their quest to
find their ideal value structure, they are assumed to build- and update gender stereotypes, which include
specific value structures for male and female friends. Thus, we expect teenagers to adapt their value
priorities according to their currently perceived gender stereotypes depending on whether their friends
are predominantly male of female.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b). We expect that teenagers adapt their value priorities according to how values
are prioritized in the predominant gender stereotype among their friends.
In a second scenario, value priorities are mainly communicated rather than expressed through other
means. However, for adolescents to use this information, they have to rely on their friends to reveal their
true value priorities. In this scenario, we assume teenagers to fully subcontract the decisions on how to
adapt their value priorities to the judgement of their friends. We expect that teenagers believe in the
wisdom of crowds phenomenon, assuming that the average extent to which their friends emphasize values
is very close to their ideal, even if their separate value expressions are remarkably far from it [Lorenz
et al., 2011].
Hypothesis 2c (H2c). Thus, we expect that teenagers shift their priorities towards the average expres-
sion of their friends value priorities.
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2.2.4 Homophily on the stages of friendship network evolution
In the previous section, we stated our expectations on how adolescents’ priorities evolve and how these
changes affect their life satisfaction. We now shift our focus towards understanding how much considera-
tion is given to value priorities in the multi-dimensional space of attributes, which could potentially affect
teenagers’ friendship selection. First, adolescents can choose the attributes they consider in friendship
selection. In our framework, we distinguish between manifest traits such as gender as well as latent traits
such as life satisfaction or value priorities. Second, adolescents can choose whether they consider favor-
able expressions of their own- or their peers’ traits as inclusion- or exclusion criteria to select friends or
whether they prefer their friends to be similar on such traits. We assume they have a general preference
for their attributes to be similar to those of their friends. Third, homophily is not only the result of
a tendency to form friendships with similar peers, but also the consequence of a tendency to dissolve
friendships with dissimilar peers.
At an early stage, where teenagers know nothing about their peers, we assume that gender - as
a readily observable and permanent part of teenagers’ self identity - is highly relevant for friendship
formation [Eder and Hallinan, 1978].
However, at a later stage, adolescents gradually learn more about what is important to their friends,
as they spend more time with them. Therefore, although similarity in values among peers generally seems
to be a powerful explanation for homophily [Kandel, 1978, Lazarsfeld et al., 1954, Newcomb, 1961], it
might be more salient for the maintenance of existing friendships. Spending more time with friends
also creates more opportunities for teenagers to observe and interpret signs indicating how satisfied they
are with their lives. In the first section, we hypothesize that changes in value priorities are associated
with life satisfaction. First, adolescents might prefer the simplicity in interpreting expressions of the
life satisfaction observed with their friends, compared to deriving value priorities from such expressions.
Second, adolescents might even consider indicators for the life satisfaction of their friends as signals
for their value priorities. Therefore, we propose the following Hypothesis for the respective impact of
similarity on visible and invisible traits on the different stages of the friendship network evolution.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). While similarity on manifest traits is more important for teenagers to create new
friendships to peers they haven’t spent much time with, similarity on latent traits is more relevant for
those friendships to persist.
2.2.5 Interactions between different forms of homophily
The more time adolescents spend with each other in friendships, the more likely they are to realize that
they can use more than one dimension to assess how similar they are compared to their friends. In the
previous section, we hypothesize that gender is an attribute teenagers care more about during friendship
initiation. However, we assume that gender homophily is still present during the stage of friendship
maintenance, when the value priorities of their friends are revealed. [Block and Grund, 2014] provide
arguments for the interaction of homophily on several attributes.
Under the assumption that adolescents’ choices to select friends depend on the utilities they expect
to gain from the corresponding ties, it is reasonable to assume that being similar on multiple dimensions
is more rewarding than being similar on just one dimension. This line of thought would predict a
positive interaction between value- and gender homophily. Conversely, a long line of research suggests
that friendships, which constitute bridges between fragmented social subsystems, are beneficial because
they provide access to different thoughts, ideas, and knowledge [Granovetter, 1977]. Thus, in contexts
incentivizing knowledge exchange, adolescents might derive more utility from friendship ties to dissimilar
peers, which would suggest that gender homophily negatively interacts with value homophily. However,
[Block and Grund, 2014] argue that if attributes are primarily generating opportunities to meet peers,
additional similarity on such attributes may not have any marginal impact on the likelihood for ties to
emerge. This would imply that some attributes are vastly superior in their salience, such that similarity
on other dimensions don’t seem to matter.
The impact of similarity on value priorities might not interact with gender homophily, if adolescents
assume the corresponding priorities to be correlated with gender. [Schwartz and Rubel, 2005] investigate
gender differences in value priorities. Although they hypothesize that both men and women similarly
experience the conflicts and compatibilities in values, they assume gender differences for value priorities.
Males are socialized to prioritize self enhancement values more strongly than females because they
are given opportunities to gain and exercise power or to compete for personal success more frequently
and are sanctioned more positively when they do so. Women are socialized to prioritize openness values
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less strongly than men because women’s roles are often more protected than men’s [Eagly and Crowley,
1986]. Females are given fewer opportunities to take risks and are subject to more severe social sanctions
if they get into trouble when doing so. Another distinctive criterium is agency, as females are supposedly
socialized less strongly to strive for autonomy and are more likely to face negative sanctions when
expressing self-direction of thought and action [Lykes, 1985].
Previous literature on self transcendence values does not find any gender-based differences for the
universalism dimension, but females are assumed to be socialized more strongly to pursue benevolence
values as many societies believe that females are sanctioned more positively to attend to the needs of
others [Cieciuch et al., 2013, Markus and Oyserman, 1989]. Endorsing conformity to justify submissive
behavior is assumed to be more self-congruent and adaptive for females as they are more likely to face
negative sanctions when they act forcefully or assertively. While previous research on conservation values
does not assume gender-related differences for the security dimension, females are often socialized more
strongly to guard extisting traditions and institutions [Feltey and Poloma, 1991].
Significant gender differences in values would indicate that they are submerged in teenagers’ perceived
gender stereotypes. This would imply that similarity on value priorities does not matter, since it is
assumed for same sex peers. However, we expect teenagers to derive more benefits from same sex
friendships if they also have similar value priorities, because they have more common ground, on which
they can build and maintain their relationship.
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Thus, we expect that homophily based on latent traits in the form of value priorities
is strengthened by homophily based on manifest demographic traits such as gender.
2.3 Data and method
Our study is designed as a longitudinal three-wave panel. Starting in October 2015 until December 2016,
we commissioned three waves of surveys with pupils from both Switzerland and Poland, who entered
compulsory- or voluntary secondary education on the 7th and 9th grades respectively. Thus, for all
pupils participating in the study, the observation period starts at a point, where they are reassembled
in new classes and assigned new teachers, such that overall, they are equally exposed to a new pool of
peers, whom they did not know before.
2.3.1 Sites and samples
Schools can be considered to provide ideal environments to study the evolution of- and interdependencies
between the processes this study sets out to investigate for many reasons. First, while the main function
of schools is to provide an environment for children and adolescents to acquire cognitive and social skills,
schools are also arenas for pupils to observe traits and behaviors of peers and thus validate their own.
As a consequence, these processes display considerable dynamics. Second, while hierarchically nested
class structures still dominate in primary education, pupils are no longer nested in single classes in
secondary education, but to some extent can self-select into performance classes for specific subjects. Such
an environment can foster collaboration and knowledge exchange. Third, while schools are embedded
in the regulatory environment of the government, pupils in the environment of schools are protected
from various external contexts, which could potentially co-determine their decision-making. Following
exemplary studies from previous research [Mercken et al., 2010, Steglich et al., 2010b, Knecht et al.,
2010, Solish et al., 2010, Ellwardt et al., 2012, Friemel, 2012, Haye et al., 2013], we conclude that this
environment can be seen as an ideal context for our study.
2.3.2 Design
The waves in our longitudinal design are representing the number of times pupils were interviewed. The
dynamics of the processes under consideration of this study are expected to be highest at the beginning
of the group formation process [Friemel, 2012]. Thus, the timing, when surveys were administered to
pupils is designed with proportionally increasing time windows between waves of data collection. The
longitudinal design is intended to limit the exposure of respondents to surveys, while making sure that all
dynamics in the processes under consideration are captured. Subjects in our compulsory and voluntary
secondary school cohorts entered at the age of 12 or 13 and left at the age of 15 or 16. The sample sizes
and compositions are summarized in Table 2.1.
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2.3.3 Procedures
All procedures contributing to this work are in compliance with the ethical standards of the relevant
national and institutional committees. The surveys commissioned in the various school classes were
supervised by trained students. At each wave in each cohort, data was collected during a full school
hour of 45 minutes. In order to eliminate method bias, data was collected using the same method across
all waves for each pupil. Respondents surveyed in Switzerland were provided with questionnaires in
paper and pencil form, while surveys commissioned in Poland were administered online. Pupils and their
parents were informed about the design and purpose of the study several weeks before data collection
started. Due to different regulations concerning data protection, we used different approaches to obtain
parental consent for the participation of Swiss- and Polish pupils in our study. All parents in Switzerland
were provided with an opt-out possibility. Out of all 1’193 pupils in the Swiss sample, none of the parents
made use of that possibility. In contrast, parents in Poland were specifically asked to opt-in. From a
total of 2’743 pupils sampled in Poland, approximately 67% of the corresponding parents provided their
consent.
Table 2.1: Panel size in Switzerland and Poland
Country Wave Panel Analysis
sites classes participants sites classes participants
Switzerland
1 8 55 1183 7 44 890
2 8 55 1193 7 44 890
3 7 44 890 7 44 890
Poland
1 31 105 2733 6 29 670
2 29 105 2743 6 29 670
3 29 105 2700 6 29 670
In order to make the school classes in both countries comparable in terms of participation rates, we
excluded 86 secondary school classes, where absences in any given wave exceeded 50%, due to the opt-in
procedure. The result of this process can be seen in Table 2.1. The sample we used for our analyses
includes 73 secondary school classes from Switzerland and Poland.
2.3.4 Measures
To investigate the emergence and development of adolescents’ value priorities within friendship network
structures of school classes, as well as the consequences of this co-evolution in terms of life satisfaction,
this study uses the following measures.
Values
Our study uses two versions of the Portrait Value Questionnaire [Schwartz et al., 2012] to collect data
on respondents’ values. These versions only differ in the number of items contained therein. The
common set of items used in both versions includes 13 items asking respondents to compare themselves
to people described in short statements and to evaluate how similar they are to these people on a six-
point scale ranging from ”not similar at all” to ”very similar” [Beierlein et al., 2014]. The Portrait Value
Questionnaires used for the Swiss and Polish panels are listed in Section 2 of the Appendix.
Friendship
Data on networks were collected with a roster design. All names of the pupils in each class were displayed
on a list, including those who did not participate in the survey or those absent from the class at the
dates scheduled for the waves.
Pupils were asked ”How strong is your friendship with your classmates?” They responded on a six
point scale ranging from ”no friendship at all” to ”very close”. In line with the friendship quality
scale [Bukowski et al., 1994], pupils were consistently given instructions to determine the strength of
friendship by the proportion of leisure or recreation time they voluntarily spent together. The weighted
friendship scale we used in our study is shown in Section 2 of the Appendix. However, the methodology
we applied in our analyses is restricted to binary data. All possible thresholds for dichotomization
were tested. Thresholds above and below the cut-off level five on the six point scale are creating very
sparse or dense networks respectively, which result in little network dynamics. Therefore, the weighted
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friendship networks were dichotomized at the cut-off level five. Consequently, pupils’ decisions do not
only cover situations, where friendships are created from non-existing relationships, but also situations,
where casual relationships are upgraded to friendships. Similarly, pupils’ decisions are not restricted to
situations, where existing friendships are dissolved completely, but also include situations, where existing
friendships are downgraded to casual relationships.
Life Satisfaction
This study is based on the five dimensional satisfaction with life scale [Diener et al., 1985] with a focus on
general perceived life satisfaction. Therefore, we use the following single item to measure life satisfaction:
”All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life these days”. Pupils were given consistent
instructions to determine their satisfaction by considering all possible spheres of their lives. The scale
on general perceived life satisfaction is shown in Section 2 of the Appendix.
2.3.5 Analytical approach
In order to investigate the dynamic processes of value change in the context of friendship networks,
we draw on stochastic actor-oriented network models (SAOMs). They were introduced by [Snijders,
2001, Snijders et al., 2010] and implemented in RSiena by [Ripley et al., 2011]. Changes in attributes
and network ties between panel waves are at the core of these models. On the one hand, attributes
of actors can change in time. Such changes can either be the outcome of actors’ characteristics (e.g.,
attributes change because of attributes the actors currently possess) or of their peers’ characteristics (e.g.,
attributes change because of attributes that actors’ friends possess). On the other hand, relationships
between actors can emerge or disappear in time. Such changes in the network structure can be the
outcome of an actor’s structural position within the network, (e.g., forming ties to people because they
are friends of friends), an actor’s characteristics (e.g., attractiveness of actors because of attributes
they possess), or characteristics shared by actors (e.g., attractiveness of actors because of similarity in
attributes). SAOMs have been used in a wide variety of contexts to study network dynamics and behavior
change [Van de Bunt et al., 2005, Van Duijn et al., 2003, Schaefer et al., 2011] or the co-evolution of
networks and actor behavior [Checkley and Steglich, 2007, Burk et al., 2007, Pearson et al., 2006, Steglich
et al., 2010b, Lewis et al., 2012].
Estimation procedure
Modeling the change of attributes and network structure, SAOMs are applied to longitudinal attributes
as well as complete, directed and longitudinal networks. Although these types of data are measured at
discrete waves, SAOMs assume a continuing underlying process with attribute- or network tie changes
occurring sequentially. Actors can make decisions regarding their attributes (e.g., increasing- or decreas-
ing their value priorities, as well as keeping their current state) or their network structure (e.g., creating
or dissolving network ties, as well as keeping their current state). The term used for each individual
decision an actor makes is a mini-step. A mini-step is modeled by two underlying processes.
In the first process, the actor who is allowed to make a decision, is selected through a rate function.
Using a period-wise constant rate function, we assume no difference in the rate of change between actors.
In the second process, the selected actors evaluate all potential changes in their attributes and personal
networks. Assuming specific dynamics to happen, an objective function including the corresponding
parameters is specified, and actors consider how each change in their attributes or network structure
would affect their utility regarding these parameters. For factors that are combined in the objective
function and thus determine actors’ decisions, SAOMs use the term ’effects’. Homophily is an example
for such effects. If the parameter for homophily is positive, actors are more likely to create or maintain
ties to other actors, who are similar to themselves. Thus, actors compare the outcome of the objective
function for each attribute- or network state that results from every possible change in attributes or
network structure. At the conclusion of each mini-step, the attribute- or network states, which are most
likely to be chosen by actors are those with the highest values in the objective function. In a series
of mini-steps connecting empirical observations, parameters that attach relative importance to different
effects are estimated. The interpretation of effects is similar to parameters from a multinomial logistic
regression, where θ is the log odds ratio, as they co-determine the relative likelihood of a mini-step to
be realized. For a non-technical introduction to the method, including different methods of parameter
estimation, we refer to [Snijders, 2001, Steglich et al., 2006, Snijders et al., 2010].
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We decided to use SAOMs for their capability to capture the mechanisms that drive attribute- and
network change simultaneously. First, the dynamics of attributes and networks are conditioned on the
first observation. Therefore, no assumptions regarding the respective states of equilibrium have to be
made. Second, the multinomial nature of the models allows for each process to be estimated net of the
other.
Model specification
The structural effects we include in our analyses have been selected on the basis of theoretical consid-
erations based on past experience with these models, and based on results from previous studies using
this method with similar data [Steglich et al., 2010b]. Outdegree determines the average degree, and can
be compared to an intercept in regression analyses. Reciprocity sneti (x) =
∑
j xijxji is the tendency of
actors to reciprocate ties to each other. Transitivity or geometrically weighted edgewise shared partners
sneti (x) =
∑n
j=1 xije
α
{
1− (1− e−α)
∑n
h=1 xihxhi
}
models the tendency of actors to be linked to friends of
friends. Indegree popularity sneti (x) =
∑
j xij
∑
h xhj controls for dispersion in indegrees and investigates
if somebody who already has a lot of incoming ties is more popular as a target for further friendship
nominations. Linear shape svali (z) = zi controls for the general tendency to change one’s value priorities.
The first focus of this article is on value change. In all analyses reported in Tables 2.2 to 2.5, models
in the columns denoted as ”value susceptibility” include the average similarity effect, which measures
the tendency to adapt one’s value priorities in order to become more similar to one’s friends. Instead of
the average similarity effect, models in columns denoted as ”value resistance” include the quadratic shape
effect, which measures the tendency to change one’s value priorities depending on one’s current emphasis
on specific values. Additional models further include effects from sex and the average alter sex effect,
or effects from satisfaction and the average alter satisfaction effect. The former effects estimate gender
differences in value change and the tendency to change one’s value priorities depending on whether friends
are primarily male or female. The latter effects estimate how value change is reflected in life satisfaction
and how value change depends on the average life satisfaction of one’s friends.
Moreover, the change in priorities on a specific value dimension might be a function of the change
in one’s own priorities- or the priorities of one’s friends on other value dimensions. Therefore, we
additionally report results of models investigating the interdependencies in the co-evolution of all higher
order values. While the models reported in ”value susceptibility” columns include effects from other
higher order values, those reported in ”value resistance” columns additionally show effects for average
higher order values of alters. The former effects estimate the tendency to change one’s priorities on a
specific higher order value based on one’s current priorities on other values. The latter estimates this
change based on the average priorities given to other values by one’s peers. Results are listed in Tables
6.14 to 6.17 of the Appendix.
The second focus of this article is on value homophily, as measured by dyadic effects indicating the
similarity between actors. Such effects capture the tendency for friendship to form between actors who
are similar on certain attributes. In all analyses, we include ego-, alter-, and dyadic effects for value
priorities, which refer to the tendency to send or receive friendship ties based on such priorities, or
to the preference for having friendships with peers, who are similarly prioritizing values. Additional
models further include an effect for having the same sex, as well as ego-, alter-, and dyadic effects for life
satisfaction. The statistic for the former effect is equal to one, if sender and recipient of the tie are of the
same gender and zero otherwise. We excluded ego- and alter-effects for gender from the analyses. First,
we did not find any theoretical support for their inclusion in literature. Second, their exclusion could
be empirically justified in our data. The latter effects refer to the tendency to send or receive friendship
ties based on life satisfaction, or to the preference for having friendships with peers, who are similarly
satisfied with life.
Furthermore, we report results on interactions between the homophily effects in the analyses. The
statistics for both interaction effects are calculated as the product of the respective statistics for value
similairty effects with effects for same gender or satisfaction similarity. Thus, the relevant statistics for
the interaction effects are 0 if people are of different sex or at the opposite end of the life satisfaction
scale. In contrast, they take non-zero values if individuals are somewhat similar on life satisfaction or
have the same gender.
The objective function for decisions regarding network structures is given as eneti (x) =
∑
k γ
net
k s
net
ik (x).
It assumes that the utility actors can derive from creating a new tie is the same as the utility they expect
to lose if they were to dissolve that tie. However, the models in the third columns denoted as ”phase
transition” do not make this assumption. Instead, they divide the friendship network evolution process in
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two stages. At the first stage, actors only decide whether to create new friendships or not. At the second
stage, actors only decide whether to maintain existing friendships or dissolve such ties. Therefore, the
evaluation function of these models is replaced by gratification and endowment functions, as indicated
in the column labeled ”Function”. The gratification function is a modification of the objective function
giving zero weight to the dissolution of ties, while the endowment function assigns zero weight to the
creation of ties. These effects are revealing whether actors’ homophilous tendencies are more relevant
for friendship selection vs. ignorance, or for friendship maintenance vs. dissolution.
The objective function for decisions regarding changes in value priorities is given as evali (x) =∑M−1
m
∑n
i s
val
ik (x(tm+1) − x(tm)). It assumes that the utility actors expect to gain by increasing their
current priorities on any given value is exactly offset by the utility they would lose if they were to
lower their priorities on the corresponding value to the same extent. The models reported in the ”phase
transition” columns of Tables 6.14 to 6.17 of the Appendix use modified objective functions including
gratification and endowment effects from other values. The gratification function is a modification of the
corresponding objective function giving zero utility to a decrease of value priorities, while the endowment
function assigns zero utility to an increase in value priorities. These effects are estimating whether an
increase in priorities on a specific value depends on changes in priorities on other values more strongly
compared to a corresponding decrease.
Meta-analytical procedure
Our research design, where school classes are hierarchically nested in schools, calls for a two stage
procedure. In the first stage, we use an unconventional Method of Moments to estimate the model
parameters for each school class separately. Subsequently, goodness of fit tests are performed on the
results for each class. Goodness of fit tests are simulating data on auxiliary statistics. In order to compare
the data simulated using these auxiliary statistics with the observed data, they must be different from the
statistics used for parameter estimation. Complying with the standard for publications using SAOMs,
we require adequate fit on the auxiliary statistics of indegree- and higher order value distributions, which
was achieved for 50 out of 63 secondary school classes. In the second stage, the separately estimated
parameters for each class are aggregated according to the meta-analytical method proposed by [Snijders
and Baerveldt, 2003, Ripley et al., 2011]. In this meta-analysis, the mean and variance of the θ vector
- the true parameter values for all effects in the chosen model specification - are estimated across all
school classes in both countries. Results are reported in columns denoted accordingly, whereby the upper
value is the mean µθ and the lower value represents the standard error σθ. For any given effect, µθ is
interpreted as the log odds ratio. If µθ is estimated at 0.5, the odds ratio is e
µθ = 1.65, so the probability
for this effect to be present is 65% higher compared to the probability for this effect to be absent. Then,
the parameters µθ and σθ are tested using Fisher’s combined probability tests, investigating for each
effect, if the null Hypothesis: θ = 0 can be rejected in at least one school class [Mercken et al., 2010].
The tests are reported in each column denoted accordingly, whereby the upper values are results of two
sided tests with the alternative Hypotheses θ 6= 0 and the lower values are results of Fisher’s left- and
right sided tests with alternative Hypotheses θ < 0 and θ > 0 respectively.
2.4 Results
The following section is structured according to the higher order values. Results on a subset of effects
used for Hypothesis testing are reported in Tables 2.2 to 2.5. Results of the corresponding goodness of
fit tests are listed at the bottom of each table. All meta-analyses including the complete lists of effects
are shown in the corresponding Tables 6.2 to 6.21 of the Appendix, as indicated in the column denoted
as ”Appendix”.
2.4.1 Self-transcendence
The results provide support for Hypothesis 1, as actors with a higher life satisfaction appear to show
more emphasis on self transcendence values.
Hypothesis 2a is supported by our data. Actors currently showing very high or very low emphasis
on self transcendence are 25% (log odds ratio = -0.266, odds ratio = 0.766) more likely to adjust their
value priorities towards moderation, or to keep their current value priorities instead of diverging to
more extreme value priorities. The data provide partial support for Hypothesis 2b, as actors in a social
environment, which is dominated by female friends, are approximately 70% (log odds ratio = 0.526,
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Table 2.2: Self transcendence values (stv) and friendship networks
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
Hypotheses Effects Functions µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p Appendix
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
gender based selection:
H3 same gender endow 0.125
Table 6.6
0.127 [ 0.816 , 0.122 ]
H3 same gender create 0.685 ***
0.091 [ 1 , 0 ]
H4 same gender eval 0.391 *** 0.357 ***
0.055 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.067 [ 1 , 0 ]
H4 self-transcendence similarity eval 0.099 0.205
0.235 [ 0.949 , 0.638 ] 0.260 [ 0.933 , 0.438 ]
H4 I(gender*self-transcendence) eval 0.019 -0.113
0.320 [ 0.719 , 0.749 ] 0.350 [ 0.751 , 0.912 ]
satisfaction based selection:
H3 satisfaction similarity endow 0.147
Table 6.10
0.238 [ 0.742 , 0.264 ]
H3 satisfaction similarity create 0.334 †
0.205 [ 0.944 , 0.062 ]
H4 satisfaction similarity eval 0.307 *** 0.429 ***
0.089 [ 0.998 , 0.014 ] 0.113 [ 1 , 0.006 ]
H4 self-transcendence similarity eval 0.071 0.112
0.185 [ 0.895 , 0.664 ] 0.210 [ 0.926 , 0.436 ]
H4 I(satisfaction*self-transcendence) eval
0.557 0.665
0.770 [ 0.886 , 0.586 ] 0.883 [ 0.868 , 0.41 ]
value based selection:
self-transcendence alter endow -0.000
Table 6.2
0.074 [ 0.797 , 0.776 ]
self-transcendence ego endow 0.326
0.440 [ 0.416 , 0.102 ]
H3 self-transcendence similarity endow -0.064
0.460 [ 0.775 , 0.763 ]
self-transcendence alter create 0.018
0.070 [ 0.657 , 0.598 ]
self-transcendence ego create -0.380
0.458 [ 0.067 , 0.446 ]
H3 self-transcendence similarity create 0.125
0.427 [ 0.763 , 0.695 ]
self-transcendence alter eval -0.035 -0.020
0.028 [ 0.145 , 0.97 ] 0.035 [ 0.415 , 0.846 ]
self-transcendence ego eval -0.071 * -0.076 *
0.035 [ 0.001 , 0.886 ] 0.035 [ 0.043 , 0.973 ]
H3 self-transcendence similarity eval 0.184 0.113
0.151 [ 0.955 , 0.136 ] 0.174 [ 0.848 , 0.365 ]
self-transcendence change:
linear eval 0.242 *** 0.309 *** 0.279 ***
0.037 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.053 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.045 [ 1 , 0 ]
H2a quadratic eval -0.266 ***
0.045 [ 0 , 1 ]
H2c average similarity eval 2.482 *** 2.019 ***
0.401 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.431 [ 1 , 0 ]
effect from gender eval 0.302 *** 0.266 ***
Table 6.60.076 [ 1 , 0.002 ] 0.089 [ 1 , 0.026 ]
H2b average alter gender eval 0.526 ***
0.181 [ 1 , 0.022 ]
H1 effect from satisfaction eval 0.041 † 0.048 †
Table 6.100.025 [ 0.995 , 0.2 ] 0.027 [ 0.991 , 0.192 ]
H2b average alter satisfaction eval -0.091
0.137 [ 0.696 , 0.966 ]
goodness of fit: µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree) 0.319 *** 0.318 *** 0.338 ***
0.295 [ 58 / 46 ] 0.308 [ 55 / 39 ] 0.287 [ 46 / 36 ]
GOF (values) 0.554 *** 0.601 *** 0.556 ***
0.290 [ 58 / 55 ] 0.348 [ 55 / 50 ] 0.305 [ 46 / 43 ]
Fisher’s two-sided test: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
odds ratio = 1.692) more likely to increase their priorities on self transcendence, instead of decreasing
them or holding on to their current priorities. However, actors do not change their priorities on self
transcendence, if the majority of their friends are satisfied with their lives. The data fully supports
Hypothesis 2c, as actors are 11 times (log odds ratio = 2.482, odds ratio = 11.965) more likely to adapt
their value priorities towards the average of their friends, instead of diverging or keeping their priorities.
We could only find enough evidence in the data to partially support Hypothesis 3. While friendships
are more likely to be initiated if peers have the same gender, same-sex friendships are not more likely to
persist. However, neither does placing similar emphasis on benevolence and universalism make friendships
more likely to emerge, nor does it facilitate their persistence. Furthermore, in contradiction with our
expectations from Hypothesis 3, similarity on a latent trait such as life satisfaction is not as salient for
the maintenance of existing friendships as it is for the creation of new friendships.
Hypothesis 4 suggests that actors’ similarity in self transcendence values might increase their like-
lihood to form friendships with peers of the same gender. On average, actors only miss every third
opportunity to create friendships to same sex peers. Log odds ratios between 0.391 and 0.357 and odds
ratios between 1.478 and 1.529 indicate that creating ties to same-sex peers is 50% more likely than
creating ties to peers of the opposite sex or dissolving ties to same-sex peers. However, the results do not
confirm Hypothesis 4. Female actors show a higher emphasis on self transcendence values. Therefore,
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it appears that the emphasis actors place on these values is part of existing stereotypes assigned to the
genders. As a result, when actors are preselecting friends based on their gender, value priorities are
ignored, as girls are believed to be socialized into having higher priorities for self transcendence values
than boys.
Table 2.3: Openness values (opv) and friendship networks
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
Hypotheses Effects Functions µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p Appendix
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
gender based selection:
H3 same gender endow 0.305
Table 6.9
0.186 [ 0.81 , 0 ]
H3 same gender create 0.556 ***
0.146 [ 0.992 , 0 ]
H4 same gender eval 0.404 *** 0.460 ***
0.054 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.060 [ 1 , 0 ]
H4 openness similarity eval -0.110 -0.185
0.265 [ 0.85 , 0.807 ] 0.320 [ 0.72 , 0.882 ]
H4 I(sex*openness) eval 0.528 0.746 †
0.326 [ 0.951 , 0.349 ] 0.401 [ 0.972 , 0.16 ]
satisfaction based selection:
H3 satisfaction similarity endow 0.403
Table 6.13
0.349 [ 0.675 , 0.048 ]
H3 satisfaction similarity create 0.002
0.241 [ 0.5 , 0.408 ]
H4 satisfaction similarity eval 0.360 *** 0.301 *
0.104 [ 1 , 0.009 ] 0.144 [ 0.995 , 0.106 ]
H4 openness similarity eval 0.308 0.711 *
0.218 [ 0.992 , 0.205 ] 0.333 [ 0.998 , 0.2 ]
H4 I(satisfaction*openness) eval -0.486 -0.720
0.836 [ 0.588 , 0.853 ] 1.248 [ 0.456 , 0.793 ]
value based selection:
openness alter endow -0.049
Table 6.5
0.098 [ 0.505 , 0.946 ]
openness ego endow 0.565
0.621 [ 0.458 , 0.019 ]
H3 openness similarity endow 0.389
0.585 [ 0.966 , 0.523 ]
openness alter create 0.011
0.099 [ 0.799 , 0.694 ]
openness ego create -0.769
0.635 [ 0.005 , 0.614 ]
H3 openness similarity create 0.185
0.608 [ 0.738 , 0.673 ]
openness alter eval -0.078 * -0.069 †
0.035 [ 0.112 , 0.944 ] 0.041 [ 0.177 , 0.952 ]
openness ego eval -0.063 -0.036
0.041 [ 0.017 , 0.834 ] 0.048 [ 0.188 , 0.674 ]
H3 openness similarity eval 0.300 . 0.425 *
0.172 [ 0.992 , 0.133 ] 0.206 [ 0.995 , 0.074 ]
openness change:
linear eval 0.232 *** 0.285 *** 0.242 ***
0.038 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.050 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.051 [ 1 , 0 ]
H2a quadratic eval -0.273 ***
0.047 [ 0 , 1 ]
H2c average similarity eval 2.293 *** 2.126 ***
0.351 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.456 [ 1 , 0 ]
effect from gender eval 0.150 * 0.129
Table 6.90.074 [ 0.987 , 0.212 ] 0.099 [ 0.938 , 0.334 ]
H2b average alter gender eval 0.240
0.161 [ 0.967 , 0.194 ]
H1 effect from satisfaction eval 0.047 † 0.055
Table 6.13
0.027 [ 0.986 , 0.213 ] 0.037 [ 0.955 , 0.346 ]
H2b average alter satisfaction eval -0.021
0.131 [ 0.836 , 0.894 ]
goodness of fit: µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree) 0.333 *** 0.341 *** 0.337 ***
0.310 [ 57 / 44 ] 0.316 [ 47 / 36 ] 0.302 [ 40 / 30 ]
GOF (values) 0.673 *** 0.755 *** 0.676 ***0.269 [ 57 / 56 ] 0.278 [ 47 / 46 ] 0.267 [ 40 / 39 ]
Fisher’s two-sided test: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
2.4.2 Openness
The results provide sufficient evidence to confirm Hypothesis 1, as actors with a higher life satisfaction
appear to shift their emphasis on openness values upwards.
We found enough evidence in the data to support Hypothesis 2a for openness values. Actors currently
showing very high or very low priorities on openness are 24% (log odds ratio = -0.273, odds ratio = 0.761)
more likely to adjust their value priorities towards moderation or keeping their current status, instead
of diverging to more extreme value priorities. However, the data does not provide sufficient evidence to
support Hypothesis 2b. Actors neither increase their priorities on openness values, if most friends are
satisfied with life, nor if most of them are male or female. However, we find support for Hypothesis 2c, as
actors are 9 times (log odds ratio = 2.293, odds ratio = 9.904) more likely to adapt their value priorities
towards the average priorities of their friends, instead of diverging or keeping their priorities.
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The data provide enough evidence to partially support Hypothesis 3. Apparently, friendships are more
likely to be formed if peers have the same gender. However, at the stage, where existing friendships are
maintained, gender is bereft of all salience. If actors want to make their own decisions on the structure
of their ideal value system, a more pronounced tendency for homophily based on openness values is
revealed. Log odds ratios between 0.425 and 0.300 and odds ratios between 0.530 and 0.350 indicate
that friendships between actors, who are similar on openness values, are 53% more likely to emerge and
persist if they are resistant to the exposure of their friends’ expressions of value priorities. In contrast,
actors are only 35% more likely be friends with similar others if they are assumed to be susceptible to
the exposure of their friends’ expressions of value priorities. Value priorities are considered for friendship
selection, but actors do not distinguish between the stages of friendship initiation or friendship maturity,
but instead give value priorities the same consideration across both stages of friendship network evolution.
We could find enough evidence in our data to partially support Hypothesis 4 for openness values.
First, odds ratios reveal that actors are approximately 50% more likely to create friendships to same sex
peers than to let the opportunity pass. Second, although girls are more likely to shift their priorities on
openness values upwards than boys, actors do not subsume information regarding their peers’ openness
values in gender stereotypes. In line with our expectations, the results suggest that there are increasing
marginal returns to similarity on openness values in terms of the utility of a corresponding friendship.
Having preselected their friends based on gender, actors are more likely to sever ties to dissimilar friends
and maintain relationships with similar friends.
2.4.3 Self enhancement
The results provide no support for Hypothesis 1, as actors with a higher life satisfaction do not show
more emphasis on self enhancement values.
However, the data provide support for Hypothesis 2a on self enhancement values. Actors currently
showing very high or very low emphasis on openness are 16% more likely to adjust their value priorities
towards the center of the scale, instead of diverging to more extreme value priorities. The data also
yields enough evidence to partially support Hypothesis 2b. On the one hand, actors who live in a social
environment, which is dominated by male friends, are more likely to increase their emphasis on self
enhancement, compared to holding their current level or decreasing it. On the other hand, contrary to
our expectations, actors don’t seem to shift their priorities on self enhancement values, if the majority
of their friends are satisfied with their lives. Hypothesis 2c is confirmed as actors are 7 times more likely
to adapt their value priorities towards the average of their friends, instead of diverging or keeping their
priorities.
Furthermore, we could find enough evidence in our data to partially support Hypothesis 3. Appar-
ently, friendships are more likely to be formed if peers have the same gender. However, at the maturity
stage of friendship evolution, gender is less salient. While peers are 28% more likely to be friends if they
prioritize self enhancement to similar degrees, there is evidence suggesting that actors consider similar-
ity in their priorities on wealth, achievement and power only when distinguishing between friends with
whom they want to maintain friendships as opposed to dissolving their relationship. Having similar self
enhancement values is making existing friendships 141% more likely to be maintained.
The log odds ratio for gender homophily is estimated at 1.48, which indicates that actors are approxi-
mately 50% more likely to create friendships to same sex peers than to miss the opportunity. Interestingly,
although this tendency is more pronounced during the friendship initiation phase, the gender of peers is
also considered for decisions whether to maintain or dissolve existing friendships. However, the results
do not confirm Hypothesis 4 for self enhancement values. Thus, it appears that the emphasis actors
place on these values is part of the stereotypes assigned to the genders. Value expressions indicating
smilarity on self enhancement values are ignored, because boys are believed to be socialized into having
higher priorities on self enhancement values than girls.
2.4.4 Conservation
The results do not support Hypothesis 1. Actors with a higher life satisfaction do not place more
emphasis on conservation values.
Hypothesis 2a is confirmed, as actors currently showing very high or very low emphasis on conservation
are 12% more likely to adjust their value priorities towards the center of the scale or to keep their current
status, instead of diverging to more extreme value priorities. The data does not provide enough support
for Hypothesis 2b to be confirmed. First, actors do not adjust their value priorities if most of their
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Table 2.4: Self enhancement values (sev) and friendship networks
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
Hypotheses Effects Functions µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p Appendix
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
gender based selection:
H3 same gender endow 0.393 *
Table 6.8
0.166 [ 0.887 , 0 ]
H3 same gender create 0.458 ***
0.137 [ 0.986 , 0 ]
H4 same gender eval 0.373 *** 0.364 ***
0.056 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.058 [ 1 , 0 ]
H4 self-enhancement similarity eval 0.187 0.214
0.232 [ 0.967 , 0.349 ] 0.258 [ 0.991 , 0.331 ]
H4 I(gender*self-enhancement) eval -0.135 -0.148
0.305 [ 0.27 , 0.781 ] 0.336 [ 0.296 , 0.866 ]
satisfaction based selection:
H3 satisfaction similarity endow 0.220
Table 6.12
0.258 [ 0.78 , 0.08 ]
H3 satisfaction similarity create 0.070
0.200 [ 0.388 , 0.434 ]
H4 satisfaction similarity eval 0.204 *** 0.169 *
0.072 [ 0.997 , 0.022 ] 0.071 [ 0.985 , 0.05 ]
H4 self-enhancement similarity eval 0.337 * 0.220
0.162 [ 0.985 , 0.121 ] 0.167 [ 0.96 , 0.227 ]
H4 I(satisfaction*self-enhancement) eval
-0.337 0.031
0.655 [ 0.707 , 0.896 ] 0.678 [ 0.852 , 0.76 ]
value based selection:
self-enhancement alter endow -0.141 †
Table 6.4
0.073 [ 0.037 , 0.959 ]
self-enhancement ego endow -0.282
0.461 [ 0.012 , 0.088 ]
H3 self-enhancement similarity endow 0.883 †
0.501 [ 0.961 , 0.181 ]
self-enhancement alter create 0.007
0.055 [ 0.63 , 0.796 ]
self-enhancement ego create 0.402
0.452 [ 0.13 , 0.004 ]
H3 self-enhancement similarity create -0.133
0.475 [ 0.52 , 0.862 ]
self-enhancement alter eval -0.034 -0.048 †
0.022 [ 0.026 , 0.947 ] 0.027 [ 0.016 , 0.969 ]
self-enhancement ego eval 0.023 0.030
0.023 [ 0.541 , 0.041 ] 0.027 [ 0.753 , 0.036 ]
H3 self-enhancement similarity eval 0.243 . 0.202
0.133 [ 0.981 , 0.044 ] 0.156 [ 0.941 , 0.087 ]
self-enhancement change:
linear eval 0.072 * 0.105 *** 0.088 *
0.028 [ 1 , 0.005 ] 0.032 [ 1 , 0.001 ] 0.035 [ 0.999 , 0.006 ]
H2a quadratic eval -0.179 ***
0.022 [ 0 , 1 ]
H2c average similarity eval 1.912 *** 1.580 ***
0.291 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.348 [ 1 , 0 ]
effect from gender eval -0.126 * -0.122 †
Table 6.80.055 [ 0.04 , 1 ] 0.069 [ 0.039 , 0.996 ]
H2b average alter gender eval -0.301 **
0.111 [ 0.027 , 1 ]
H1 effect from satisfaction eval 0.003 -0.025
Table 6.120.016 [ 0.54 , 0.749 ] 0.020 [ 0.216 , 0.985 ]
H2b average alter satisfaction eval 0.057
0.069 [ 0.994 , 0.792 ]
goodness of fit: µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree) 0.328 *** 0.329 *** 0.294 ***
0.283 [ 63 / 50 ] 0.294 [ 60 / 44 ] 0.282 [ 46 / 34 ]
GOF (values) 0.670 *** 0.695 *** 0.681 ***
0.234 [ 63 / 63 ] 0.276 [ 60 / 60 ] 0.249 [ 46 / 46 ]
Fisher’s two-sided test: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
friends are male or female. Second, contrary to our expectations, actors’ decision to shift their priorities
on conservation values is independent of the degree to which the majority of their friends are satisfied with
their lives. Instead, the results confirm Hypothesis 2c, as actors are 12 times more likely to adapt their
value priorities towards the average of their friends, than diverging or keeping their current priorities.
Furthermore, the data provide enough evidence to fully support Hypothesis 3. Friendships are more
likely to be initiated if peers have the same gender. However, at the stage, where existing friendships
are maintained, the importance of gender diminishes. While peers are 32% more likely to be friends if
they prioritize conservation to similar degrees, there is evidence suggesting that actors consider similar-
ity in their priorities on conformity, security and tradition only when making decisions regarding the
maintenance or dissolution of relationships with friends. Existing friendships are 182% more likely to be
maintained, if actors have similar conservation values.
The estimation of the log odds ratio for gender homophily is 1.5, which indicates that actors are
approximately 50% more likely to create friendships to same sex peers than to miss an opportunity to do
so. According to our expectations, we found no evidence showing that male- and female actors are plac-
ing different weights on conservation values. However, in contrast to our expectations from Hypothesis
4, the results reveal that relationships between same sex friends are less likely to be maintained if they
are additionally emphasizing health, security, conformity and tradition to a similar extent. Therefore,
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Table 2.5: Conservation values (cov) and friendship networks
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
Hypotheses Effects Functions µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p Appendix
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
gender based selection:
H3 same gender endow 0.435 *
Table 6.7
0.179 [ 0.949 , 0 ]
H3 same gender create 0.487 ***
0.136 [ 0.991 , 0 ]
H4 same gender eval 0.345 *** 0.387 ***
0.044 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.062 [ 1 , 0 ]
H4 conservation similarity eval 0.490 0.448
0.316 [ 0.929 , 0.371 ] 0.353 [ 0.845 , 0.606 ]
H4 I(gender*conservation) eval -0.743 † -0.618
0.401 [ 0.177 , 0.948 ] 0.449 [ 0.383 , 0.866 ]
satisfaction based selection:
H3 satisfaction similarity endow 0.559 *
Table 6.11
0.247 [ 0.997 , 0.023 ]
H3 satisfaction similarity create -0.151
0.224 [ 0.299 , 0.726 ]
H4 satisfaction similarity eval 0.219 * 0.306 ***
0.086 [ 0.997 , 0.051 ] 0.098 [ 0.998 , 0.02 ]
H4 conservation similarity eval 0.022 -0.036
0.224 [ 0.852 , 0.705 ] 0.272 [ 0.737 , 0.733 ]
H4 I(satisfaction*conservation) eval
-0.195 -0.731
0.866 [ 0.761 , 0.633 ] 1.047 [ 0.489 , 0.871 ]
value based selection:
conservation alter endow -0.103
Table 6.3
0.073 [ 0.486 , 0.763 ]
conservation ego endow -0.178
0.495 [ 0.18 , 0.48 ]
H3 conservation similarity endow 1.037 †
0.609 [ 0.986 , 0.2 ]
conservation alter create 0.039
0.065 [ 0.547 , 0.833 ]
conservation ego create 0.372
0.449 [ 0.622 , 0.081 ]
H3 conservation similarity create -0.598
0.559 [ 0.385 , 0.937 ]
conservation alter eval -0.052 † -0.030
0.026 [ 0.036 , 0.986 ] 0.030 [ 0.179 , 0.903 ]
conservation ego eval 0.042 0.039
0.035 [ 0.644 , 0.011 ] 0.041 [ 0.62 , 0.029 ]
H3 conservation similarity eval 0.158 0.179
0.178 [ 0.845 , 0.468 ] 0.209 [ 0.819 , 0.423 ]
conservation change:
linear eval 0.133 *** 0.156 *** 0.111 ***
0.029 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.032 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.037 [ 1 , 0.014 ]
H2a quadratic eval -0.242 ***
0.024 [ 0 , 1 ]
H2c average similarity eval 2.946 *** 3.101 ***
0.312 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.408 [ 1 , 0 ]
effect from gender eval 0.084 0.119
Table 6.70.057 [ 0.917 , 0.18 ] 0.075 [ 0.978 , 0.148 ]
H2b average alter gender eval -0.024
0.107 [ 0.487 , 0.654 ]
H1 effect from satisfaction eval 0.009 0.026
Table 6.110.018 [ 0.84 , 0.403 ] 0.024 [ 0.901 , 0.327 ]
H2b average alter satisfaction eval -0.040
0.083 [ 0.779 , 0 ]
goodness of fit: µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree) 0.351 *** 0.342 *** 0.354 ***0.299 [ 57 / 44 ] 0.305 [ 54 / 41 ] 0.309 [ 40 / 29 ]
GOF (values) 0.653 *** 0.668 *** 0.642 ***
0.256 [ 57 / 56 ] 0.316 [ 54 / 52 ] 0.260 [ 40 / 40 ]
Fisher’s two-sided test: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
the results indicate diminishing marginal returns to similarity on conservation values. Having prese-
lected their friends based on gender, actors are more likely to sever ties to similar friends and maintain
relationships with dissimilar friends.
2.5 Discussion
Scholars agree that values not only have the potential to profoundly impact people’s choice of social
networks but also in particular the selection of affiliations with people inside the social networks of their
choice. They also agree that values not only guide people’s behavior directly, but also through norms if
aggregated in social networks. Scholars have produced a multitude of value frameworks to demonstrate
their cross-cultural universality and to create links to many sociologically relevant attributes. However,
values have not yet been investigated in the dymanic context of social networks. Our results provide
insights on how adolescents adapt value priorities and how value change is expressed in life satisfaction.
We show that some forms of homophily are more salient for friendship initiation, whereas other forms
become relevant for friendship maintenance. We also find evidence that priorities on some values are
subsumed in gender stereotypes, while similarity on others can either strengthen the tendency to maintain
ties to friends, who are similar on other attributes, or trigger the tendency to dissolve such ties.
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2.5.1 How do people adapt value priorities?
Values are multidimensional and context independent. Adolescents who want to form opinions indepen-
dently can show similar engagement for equal opportunities in their societies. Those who show concern
for the welfare of others in general can also strive for harmony in their own friendship circles. Em-
phasizing security or autonomy are not only congruent with the desire to attain power or social status,
adolescents are also likely to pursue those goals in many different contexts.
Finding a negative interaction between adolescents’ current emphasis on values and the way they
change their priorities, shows that their value dimensions are not independent. Teenagers currently
highly emphasizing one value dimension are aware that further increasing their priority could counteract
their desire to pursue values on other dimensions. Investigating the co-evolution of value dimensions,
shows that an increase in priorities on self transcendence values is associated with a decrease in priorities
on self enhancement values. This finding is in line with the theory of basic human values, which expects
conflicts between the goals underlying self transcendence and self enhancement. Similarly, the theory
expects congruence between the goals underlying self transcendence and openness, for which our findings
provide additional support. However, in contrast to the theory’s expectations, our findings suggest that
the goals underlying conservation values are independent.
[Bardi and Schwartz, 2003] argue that value systems are intrapsychic cognitive structures. Changes
in value priorities can occur regardless of whether teenagers are aware of them or not. However, ex-
pressing those values through behavior or communication might be driven by social norms. According to
our findings, teenagers are highly susceptible to interpersonal influence regarding their value priorities.
This implies that the social norms induced by adolescents’ friendship networks are not only affecting
the way they express their values publicly, but also have an impact on how they change their value
priorities privately. Finding similar susceptibility to interpersonal influence on all value dimensions gives
additional credence to the proposition that priorities on different values are not independent, but have
to be negotiated. This finding is also highly indicative for adolescents’ preference to rely on the wisdom
of crowds to find their ideal value structure. It seems teenagers are aware that if they adopt the value
priorities of their friends on one dimension, they can avoid conflicts by doing the same on other dimen-
sions, because their friends are subject to the same constraints imposed by the interdependence between
value dimensions.
Our findings also leave some room for the possibility that adolescents have a preference to find their
own ideal value structure according to the perceived gender stereotype dominating their friendship circles.
The supposed conflict with other findings regarding value change may be resolved by acknowledging the
profound tendency for gender homophily, which is apparent in the context of our study. If teenagers
self-select into a social enviornment, where most of their friends have the same gender, their conformity
to gender stereotypes may also be explained by their susceptibility to interpersonal influence.
2.5.2 What are the consequences of value change?
The chain of effects linking value change with life satisfaction has two paths, depending on teenagers’
current status of goal achievement. On the first path, adolescents have already achieved their goals.
Whereas goal achievement can trigger the pursuit of values representing growth needs, it is also reflected
in higher life satisfaction. On the second path, adolescents are struggling with goal achievement, which
can trigger the pursuit of values representing deficiency needs, and result in lower life satisfaction [Bilsky
and Schwartz, 1994]. Our findings lend support to the first path. Teenagers who increase their value
priorities on self transcendence and openness values are likely to be more satisfied with their lives. But
why couldn’t we find any support for value change along the second path? The framework of [Bilsky
and Schwartz, 1994] assumes a circular structure for higher order values as a result of the conflicts and
congruence in their underlying goals. If a change in priorities on conservation values was reinforced
by a change in self enhancement values or suppressed by a change in openness values, the pursuit of
values representing deficiency needs should result in lower life satisfaction. However, the absence of goal
congruence for values representing deficiency needs and the lack of goal conflicts between openness and
conservation values might explain our findings that the pursuit of values representing deficiency needs is
not reflected in lower life satisfaction.
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2.5.3 Which distinctive forms of homophily are present across the stages of
friendship network evolution?
At an early stage of the friendship network evolution, teenagers know little about their peers, so they
heavily rely on gender - and their associated stereotypes - to form new friendships [Eder and Hallinan,
1978]. The meta analysis comparing gender homophily across classes reveals that for the majority, this
tendency is more relevant for friendship initiation. The bars in the first panel of Figure 2.2 represent
the number of school classes, for which the θ parameter on the gender homophily effect is estimated
at a specific level, as indicated on the x-axis. Comparing the cumulative density of θ estimates in the
friendship creation with those in the friendship maintenance phase, suggests that overall, the probability
for friendships to emerge between same-sex peers is higher than the probability for such friendships to
persist.
Figure 2.2: Different forms of homophily across the stages of friendship network evolution
However, at a more mature stage, friendship relationships have already been formed. The more time
teenagers spend with their friends, the more likely they are to know whether their friends are satisfied with
their lives. We find that adolescents generally consider similarity to their peers’ life satisfaction. However,
the meta analysis estimating this tendency for all classes, suggests that satisfaction is significantly more
salient to decide whether to maintain or dissolve existing friendships. Bars in the second panel of
Figure 2.2 are counts of school classes, for which the estimate of the θ parameter for the life satisfaction
homophily effect falls on a specific level of the x-axis. The ratio of the cumulative density of θ estimates in
the initiation- compared to those in the maturity phase, imply that overall, the probability for friendships
to emerge between similarly satisfied peers is lower than the probability for such friendships to persist.
At this stage, adolescents are also likely to have learned, what is important to their friends. In line
with our expectations, the findings from meta-analyses across all classes imply that overall, homophily
on conservation and self enhancement is more salient for friendship maintenance. However, contrary to
our expectations, homophily on openness is similarly shown in either stage of the friendship network
evolution [Kandel, 1978, Lazarsfeld et al., 1954, Newcomb, 1961]. The school classes aggregated in the
bars of the third panel of Figure 2.2 are those, for which the estimates of the θ parameters for the
value homophily effects take on a specific level on the x-axis. Comparing the cumulative density of
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θ estimates in the initiation- compared to those in the maturity phase, reveals that in the aggregate,
the probability for friendships to persist among peers with similar values is higher than the probability
for such friendships to emerge. Surprisingly, there is considerable heterogeneity in the likelihood for
friendships to emerge or persist based on the similarity in value priorities of peers.
Based on the interdependencies in the structure of values, the development of priorities on openness
values is a reflection of the priority evolution regarding self transcendence values. Therefore, our find-
ings do not exclude the possibility that teenagers also consider homophily on self transcendence in the
evolution of friendship, because they believe these values to be reflected in openness values. As a result,
similarity in priorities on values representing growth needs is equally relevant for both initiation and
maintenance of friendships, while similarity in priorities on values representing deficiency needs are only
salient for friendship maintenance. Teenagers, who have not yet achieved their goals, seem to be reluc-
tant to spend cognitive resources on the evaluation of value similarity for friendship initiation. Instead,
they rely on gender stereotypes, because their cognitive resources are preoccupied to cope with their own
problems.
2.5.4 Does value homophily interact with other forms of homophily?
At the maturity stage of friendship network evolution, adolescents may realize that they have more in
common with some of their friends than with others. At this stage, teenagers are more likely to maintain
ties to friends who have similar priorities on openness values, given that they have been preselected
based on gender. However, this tendency is only shown if they primarily consider their own current
value priorities for value adaption, but also move closer to the perceived gender stereotype dominating
their friendship circles [Block and Grund, 2014]. As a result, the chance to remain friends is reinforced
by similarity on multiple dimensions. But why do adolescents need to dissolve ties to friends who
emphasize openness differently, if they have already adapted their priorities to the corresponding gender
stereotype? One possibility is that their friends do not express openness in ways that are consistent
with their perceived gender stereotype. As a consequence, they can derive additional utility by keeping
ties to friends with similar openness values. Furthermore, dissimilarity in value priorities is instrumental
in providing access to new ideas, knowledge or opportunities for validation. For teenagers in pursuit
of growth related values, the need for social validation is not immediate. Thus, having friends with
dissimilar value priorities does not provide superior utility for them.
Moreover, having preselected their friends based on gender, adolescents show an equally pronounced
likelihood to dissolve ties to friends, who place similar emphasis on conservation values. This tendency
is only revealed however, if they are not subject to the influence from the perceived gender stereotype
dominating their friendship circle, but instead exclusively consider their friends’ value priorities to adapt
their own. As a result, similarity on conservation values tempers the likelihood to remain friends in
connection with other dimensions [Block and Grund, 2014]. But why do adolescents move closer to
their friends’ value priorities, only to dissolve ties to friends that are too similar on conservation values?
Counter-intuitively, although friendship structures are neither complete nor stable, it seems that through
the dissolution of ties to similar others, the average- as well as the spread of their friends’ value priorities
are kept relatively stable. As a consequence, network dynamics appear to facilitate the maintenance of
a wide range of value priorities. Since dissimilarity in value priorities creates opportunities for social
validation, the corresponding friends are valuable benchmarks, if teenagers prioritize values representing
deficiency needs such as conservation.
Surprisingly, similarity on self transcendence- or self enhancement values does not make friendships
more or less likely to be maintained, given that they have been preselected based on their gender. Instead,
adolescents seem to rely on gender stereotypes regarding benevolence, universalism, achievement or power
values for friendship maintenance. In line with the framework in [Schwartz and Rubel, 2005], our findings
confirm that females are socialized more positively to pursue benevolence values, such as attending to
the needs of others [Cieciuch et al., 2013, Markus and Oyserman, 1989]. Our findings provide further
support for the framework in [Schwartz and Rubel, 2005], as societies seem to sanction females more
positively to endorse conformity as opposed to forceful or assertive action, for which males are facing less
severe consequences. Thus, value priorities on self transcendence or self enhancement are submerged in
adolescents’ perceived gender stereotypes, which implies that similarity does not matter, since teenagers
assume peers of the same gender to be similar regarding self transcendence or self enhancement.
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2.5.5 Are there differences across countries?
According to [Schwartz, 1999], values are the vocabulary of socially approved goals used to motivate
behavior, or to express and justify decisions. There are no differences in how teenagers adapt value
priorities across countries. Both Swiss and Polish pupils consider their own current value priorities and
similarly rely on the wisdom of crowds to find their ideal value structure. Gender differences are more
pronounced in Switzerland, which might be a reflection of a higher conformity to gender stereotypes.
Our findings suggest that there are different paths how teenagers in both countries find life satisfac-
tion. Swiss pupils are more satisfied if they increase their priority on openness values, while the path for
Polish pupils to reach this state is characterized by an increase in their priorities on self transcendence
values.
Across countries, some attributes are emphasized differently along the stages of friendship network
evolution. For Swiss pupils, the importance of gender homophily in friendship creation is shifted to
satisfaction- and value homophily for friendship maintenance. In contrast, the confidence of Polish pupils
to interpret signs indicating the life satisfaction of their peers is high enough to initiate friendships, even
if they have not spent much time with them. However, when reaching maturity, relationships between
friends of the same gender are more likely to persist.
According to our findings, there are distinctive ways how different types of homophily interact in the
multidimensional space of attributes across countries. Both Swiss- and Polish pupils appear to consider
self enhancement- and self transcendence values to be part of gender stereotypes. Consequently, being
similar on the corresponding value dimensions does not provide any marginal benefits on top of having
the same gender. Positive marginal returns on value similarity are realized by Swiss pupils, if they find
out that their friends’ priorities on openness values are similar to theirs. In contrast, Polish pupils seem
to experience negative marginal returns on similarity in conservation values.
2.6 Limitations
Although the data structure is hierarchically structured with classes nested in schools, this paper as-
sumes identical utility functions for all classes. However, classes might be heterogenous regarding the
composition of their utility functions, which could be captured by adding restrictions projecting unique
utility functions accounting for the hierarchical data structure.
For the sake of simplicity, we primarily investigate higher order values as orthogonal dimensions.
However, following our discussion, being exposed to behavioral expressions of specific values from peers
might not necessarily make people adjust their values on the same dimension. Instead, their reactions
might also be visible in value changes on other dimensions. Although we scratched the surface by
investigating the co-evolution of higher order values, further research is needed to understand the complex
interdependencies between value dimensions. For the sake of parsimony, indiviudal values are aggregated
to higher order values in this paper. However, the effects we identified for each higher order value might
be driven by subsets of specific values on the corresponding dimensions.
Furthermore, our meta-analysis investigating the tendency for value homophily indicated consider-
able heterogeneity across classes. Further research is needed to investigate the capacity of macro-level
properties in social systems to explain the heterogeneity in value homophily on the micro-level. Ran-
dom coefficient multi-level analyses would allow parameters to vary across classes, and thus capture
unobserved heterogeneity.
Finally, following our discussion on cultural differences, further research is needed to cross-validate
our findings in other countries. Insights from studies in other countries could provide substantial contri-
butions on the road to a more comprehensive picture by filling the gaps in the multi-dimensional value
space on the cultural level.
2.7 Conclusions
We conclude that future research should not only investigate the multidimensionality of higher order
values in more detail but also the change in individual values making up the higher order values. Further
research should also account for the hierarchical structure of classes embedded in schools, as well as
the heterogeneity in people’s tendencies for value change and homophily. Moreover, further research
is needed to investigate inhowfar the distinctive forms of value change and homophily are present in
different types of social systems such as networks of advice- or trust relationships.
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Chapter 3
Financial Decision-Making in
Adolescent Friendship Networks
Abstract
In many societies, adolescents are socialized to become consumers. Teenagers are a key market segment,
and firms devote considerable effort to tailor their marketing activities to this target audience. Thus,
the question is not if adolescents need to learn responsible management of their financial resources, but
whether they should be taught or socialized accordingly. The status attributed to parents in socialization
has been studied intensively in previous research. Surprisingly, the roles of socialization agents in the
school environment have received little attention. This article introduces a framework focused on the
evolution of financial decision making in the context of school classes. Drawing on stochastic actor-
oriented network models, 73 adolescent friendship networks are analyzed. First, our framework identifies
various motivational goals underlying practices of spending-, giving- or saving money. Second, our
findings provide evidence that social norms for spending and saving money are highly effective, while
norms regarding donations have no effect. Third, our findings suggest that self-control, cognitive abilities
and time preferences are contributing to the self efficacy for teenagers to divert money from spending to
savings and that failure to do so can increase their resilience for future trials. Implications for micro-level
behavior and macro-structural properties are discussed.
Keywords: Financial resource allocations, social norms, adolescent networks, stochastic actor-
oriented network models
Publication note: This article is a work in progress. A version of this article will be submitted to
the Journal of Marketing Research. Co-authors of this article are Alexander Ehlert, Jan Cieciuch, Eldad
Davidov, Heiko Rauhut, Claudio Juan Tessone and Rene Algesheimer.
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3.1 Introduction
Teaching children and adolescents responsible ways to manage financial resources is extremely important.
Having reached 159 billion USD in 2005, teenage markets are a key demographic in terms of both size
and spending volumes. In the United States alone, this segment comprises approximately 32 million
people [Breazeale and Lueg, 2011]. As firms are tailoring their marketing activities to teenage markets,
temptations for adolescents to spend their money are both continuous and ubiquitous. Among all
contributing domains, online shopping [Hill and Beatty, 2011] and -gaming [Gru¨sser et al., 2006] should
be highlighted, as they both harbour the potential for addictive consumption patters and are rapidly
growing phenomena among teenagers.
Buying commodities online is a mystifying experience. In virtual store windows, clothes appear to fit
perfectly and look amazing, especially with the right shoes to go with them. Having found the objects of
their desire, teenagers on a shopping spree are shown even more objects under ”You might also like this”
or ”Discover new fashion trends”. The experience is so bewildering that they don’t know whether the
objects have only been bookmarked, put in the shopping cart or whether they have just been bought.
Online shopping is highly addictive, and adolescents can be very creative, when they realize that their
accounts have been blocked [Youn, 2005].
Online gaming is another experience with an extremely large potential for addiction. Adolescents’
desire to outperform their competition in online games is consuming a significant proportion of their
recreation time. In extreme forms of addiction, it can drive teenagers to neglect sleep and even preoccupy
their attention at school. Moreover, in the virtual reality of online games, victory is not for free. For hard
currencies, adolescents can buy stronger weapons, new lives and a staggering amount of accessories for
their characters. The gaming industry is flooding markets with games. Using captive pricing strategies,
games can be downloaded for free, but instead, users are charged for extras. Loss of control over their
expenditures is a critical signal for addiction and not uncommon among teenagers, given that computer
gaming disorder is classified as a disease by the World Health Organization [Gru¨sser et al., 2006].
Consequently, the question is not if children need to be taught how to manage their financial resources
responsibly, but how they can effectively acquire the corresponding knowledge and skills. According to
[Kim and Chatterjee, 2013, Bucciol and Veronesi, 2014] and [Anderson and Nevitte, 2006], current
research is debating about whether children can effectively learn financial resource management through
the curriculum at school.
[Mandell and Klein, 2009, Hayhoe et al., 2000] find that through financial literacy education, adoles-
cents can acquire a satisfactory level of competence and efficacy for subsequent financial decision making
in adulthood. However, [Willis, 2008] argue that financial literacy education may also have detrimental
effects, such as instilling confidence in financial decision making without providing the necessary skills.
[Moschis, 1985, Olshavsky and Granbois, 1979] argue that depending on the type of communica-
tion, parents can exert a sustainable influence on adolescents’ priorities in financial decision making
throughout the socialization process. On the one hand, consensual families encourage their teenagers to
become self sufficient, look for jobs [Olshavsky and Granbois, 1979], and take an interest in new ideas on
budgeting without disturbing the family’s hierarchical harmony. Open communication, mutual respect
and interests are also encouraged in pluralistic families, who are discussing budgeting ideas without in-
sisting on obedience to authority [McLeod and O’Keefe, 1972]. On the other hand, protective families,
emphasizing social harmony and obedience, or laissez-faire families, who do not stress communication,
do not provide sufficient encouragement for children to learn responsible ways of managing financial re-
sources. Apart from its conditional effectiveness, the perspective of socializing responsible management
of financial resources has also received criticism through its potential to divert teenager’s attention from
curricular activities such as homework [Bucciol and Veronesi, 2014].
The perspective of selective attachment towards parents and peers in adolescence [Greenberg et al.,
1983] suggest that the relative influence adolescents are subject to from both parents and peers is situation
dependent. Parents are the consultants of choice for adolescents in important situations involving values
and future decision making [Musgrove, 1963, Smith, 1976, Won et al., 1969]. However, when they
perceive their parents to be indifferent or rejecting, adolescents are more likely to choose peers as their
reference group [Bowerman and Kinch, 1958, Iacovetta, 1975, Larson, 1972a, Larson, 1972b, Smith,
1976]. Surprisingly, existing literature is remarkably thin on the respective roles of socialization agents
in the school environment - such as teachers or peers.
We investigate the role of peers in pupils socialization of financial decision making. First, we study the
impact of values [Schwartz, 1992] as guiding principles, motivating specific changes in financial decision
making that lead to desirable outcomes. Second, we investigate the emergence and effectineness of
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corresponding norms [Cialdini and Trost, 1998] in the context of social networks. Third, we investigate
the impact of specific abilities on the self efficacy [Bandura, 1977] to realize corresponding changes in
financial resource allocations in this context. In so doing, we introduce the theory of basic human values
to the marketing discipline and interlink the corresponding motivational constructs with the theory of
self efficacy.
The paper is structured in the following way: We will begin with our theoretical framework and
hypotheses, followed by a description of our data and variables in the model. Next we will present the
results, and finalize with concluding remarks.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
When adolescents make decisions on whether and how much to change their financial decision making
practices, their own past experiences are not the only source of information. They are constantly exposed
to information about how peers behave in their social systems, how they solve problems and how they
are affiliated to each other.
Values
Social
network
structures
Abilities
Financial
decision-making
practices
H1: Adaption
through value-based
motivations
H2: Adaption
through social norms
H3: Self efficacy:
Vicarious accomplishments
H3: Self efficacy:
Own accomplishments
Efficacy Expectations
Outcome Expectations
Figure 1: Theoretical framework and hypotheses. Adapted from the theory of self efficacy Bandura (1977)
over long time intervals, teenagers are synthesizing information about situational
circumstances, in order to form expectations about specific practices and corresponding levels
of behavioral patterns that are necessary to produce desirable outcomes.
Outcome expectations are formed in two processes, the components of which are elaborated in
more detail in the following paragraphs, and illustrated in the upper panel of figure 1. First,
adolescents want to avoid dissonance, emerging through discrepancies between their behaviors
and self-concepts, but instead strive to maintain consistency or enhance themselves to
approach their ideal self-concepts (Sirgy, 1982). In their quest to find and validate their ideal
self-concepts, adolescents might identify peers with desirable lifestyles (Giddens, 1991) and
then determine behavioral changes in financial decision making practices that are necessary to
achieve such desirable states. Assuming that adolescents are facing budget constraints in
financial decision making, behaviroal changes such as these involve trading off consumption
(Solomon, 1983), donations (Sargeant, 1999) and saving (Olshavsky and Granbois, 1979)
against each other. Second, based on the need for affiliation, teenagers might yearn for social
rewards, which can be attained by adhering to norms and, in so doing avoid social sanctions
incurred for non-compliance (Algesheimer et al., 2005; Cialdini and Trost, 1998).
Figure 3.1: Theoretical framework and hypotheses. Adapted from the theory of self efficacy [Bandura,
1977]
Self efficacy theory [Farrell et al., 2016, Lim et al., 2014, Danes and Haberman, 2007, Bandura, 1977]
is the nexus of our theoretical framework. The theory proposes that teenagers’ decisions to change par-
ticular behavioral patterns depend on expectations regarding the corresponding effectiveness in realizing
desirable outcomes (outcome expectations), and expectations regarding the likelihood of successful real-
ization of the corresponding changes in behavioral patterns (efficacy expectations). Processing feedback
from sequences of eve ts over long time intervals, te nagers are synthesizing inform tion ut situa-
tional circumstances, in order to form expectations about specific practices and corresponding levels of
behavioral patterns that are necessary to produce de i ble outcomes.
Outcome expectations are formed in two processes, the components of which are elaborated in more
detail in the following paragraphs, a d illustrated in the upper panel of Figure 3.1. First, adolescents
want to avoid dissonance, emerging through discrepancies between their behaviors and self-concepts, but
i stead strive to maintain consistency or enh nce themselves to app oac their id al lf-concepts [Sirgy,
1982]. In their quest to find and validate their ideal self-concepts, adolescents might identify peers with
desi able lifestyles [Giddens, 1991] and then determine behavioral changes in financ al decision making
practices that are necessary to achieve such desirable states. Assuming that adolescents are facing budget
constraints in financial deci ion making, behaviroal changes such as these involve trading off consumption
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[Solomon, 1983], donations [Sargeant, 1999] and saving [Olshavsky and Granbois, 1979] against each
other. Second, based on the need for affiliation, teenagers might yearn for social rewards, which can
be attained by adhering to norms and, in so doing avoid social sanctions incurred for non-compliance
[Algesheimer et al., 2005, Cialdini and Trost, 1998].
3.2.1 Values and financial decision making practices
In their lifestyles, people integrate a distinct set of social practices, which span their daily lives into
a reasonably coherent unity. In structuration theory [Giddens, 1991], lifestyle is defined as a more or
less integrated set of practices, which an individual embraces, not only because such practices fulfill
utilitarian needs, but because they give material form to a narrative of the self concept. Practices are
routinized sets of mental activities and physical performances, enabled and limited through priorities
how given resources are used [Reckwitz, 2002]. We conceptualize financial decision making as priorities
how resources are to be used, and the corresponding practices as behaviors people can use to express
their self concept.
[Taylor, 1989] contends that people’s self concept is intrinsically connected to their values, as defined
by the way things have significance for them. In a review of value theories and value research, [Rohan,
2000] found that some theorists define values as motivational guides [Lewin et al., 1951], conceptions
[Kluckhohn, 1951], or properties of entities [Heider, 1958]. Other theorists define values as beliefs about
the desirability of modes of conduct and states of existence [Morris, 1956, Rokeach, 1973]. Prior value
research agrees that value systems need an underlying structure based on the motivational goals embodied
by each value type and that they contain a finite number of universally relevant values.
Therefore, our framework is based on the theory of basic human values, [Schwartz et al., 2012,
Schwartz, 1992, Cieciuch et al., 2016, Skimina et al., 2018]. The theory defines values as trans-situational
goals, to which people assign varying degrees of importance, and thus serve as guiding principles for
individuals and groups. In this framework, value systems are essentially structured according to three
main principles.
First, values are structured according to conflicts, resulting in two motivational dimensions, as il-
lustrated in the top panel of Figure 3.2. The conflict between the motivation to ”follow one’s own
intellectual and emotional interests in unpredictable and uncertain directions” and the motivation to
”preserve the status quo and the certainty it provides in relationships with close others, institutions, and
traditions” is highlighted by the first dimension labeled as ”openness to change - conservation” (p. 43).
The second dimension is labeled as ”self-enhancement - self-transcendence”, and relates to the conflict
between people’s motivation to ”enhance their own personal interests, even at the expense of others” and
their motivation to ”transcend selfish concerns and promote the welfare of others, close and distant, and
of nature” (p.44). If enacted simultaneously, values on opposite sides of these dimensions create conflict,
while the pursuit of values adjacent to each other can be negotiated.
Second, value attainment can serve specific interests, as illustrated on the intermediate layer. While
values on the right side of the motivational circle in Figure 3.2 predominantly regulate the expression of
personal interests, values on the left side mainly regulate the social expression towards others and their
interests [Schwartz et al., 2012].
Third, values can be structured according to their relations to anxiety, as shown on the peripheral
layer. While growth or self-expansive values on the top part of the motivational circle in Figure 3.2 express
anxiety-free motivations, self-protective values on the bottom part serve to cope with uncertainties in the
social and physical world [Schwartz et al., 2012]. In the following paragraphs, we provide more detailed
descriptions for each basic human value.
Self-transcendence
The group of values underlying self transcendence can be divided into ”benevolence” and ”universalism”
values. Driven by the need for positive social interactions [Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987, Kluckhohn, 1951]
and affiliation [Korman, 1974, Maslow, 1959], people emphasizing benevolence exhibit concern for the
prosperity of people in their immediate social environment. Thus, they emphasize the preservation and
maturation of true friendship, and pro-sociality towards people with whom personal interactions are
frequent. As a consequence, people who emphasize benevolence want to be helpful-, loyal-, forgiving-,
honest-, reliable and trustworthy friends. People in pursuit of universalism goals strive for understanding,
appreciation, tolerance for different groups and cultures. Their pro-sociality extends to include the welfare
of all people as well as the protection of nature [Maslow, 1959].
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Figure 2: The self concept Taylor (1989) as described by the motivational circle of values Schwartz et al. (2012)
and expressed through general- and specific practices of lifestyles Giddens (1991)
own personal interests, even at the expense of others" and their motivation to "transcend
selfish concerns and promote the welfare of others, close and distant, and of nature" (p.44). If
enacted simultaneously, values on opposite sides of these dimensions create conflict, while the
pursuit of values adjacent to each other can be negotiated.
Second, value attainment can serve specific interests, as illustrated on the intermediate layer.
While values on the right side of the motivational circle in figure 2 predominantly regulate the
expression of personal interests, values on the left side mainly regulate the social expression
towards others and their interests (Schwartz et al., 2012).
Third, values can be structured according to their relations to anxiety, as shown on the
peripheral layer. While growth or self-expansive values on the top part of the motivational
circle in figure 2 express anxiety-free motivations, self-protective values on the bottom part
serve to cope with uncertainties in the social and physical world (Schwartz et al., 2012). In the
following paragraphs, we provide more detailed descriptions for each basic human value.
Figure 3.2: The self concept [Taylor, 1989] as described by the motivational circle of values [Schwartz
et al., 2012] and expressed through general- and specific practices of lifestyles [Giddens, 1991]
Openness to change
The motivatio al goals underlying openness to c ange can be aggreg ted i two groups, specifically
”self-direction” and ”stimulation” values. Driven by the intrinsic motivation, as described in the theory
of self efficacy [Band ra, 1977, Deci and Ryan, 1975, Whit , 1959], people who emphasize self-direc ion
are creative or curious, and want to discover things on their own. Furthermore, autonomy in choosing
their own goals, as well as independence in int rp rs nal relationships [Kluckhohn, 1951, Kohn and
Schooler, 1983, Morris, 1956], are strong requirements for people in pursuit of self-direction. People who
emphasize stimulation want to maintain an optimal l vel of activa ion throug variety s eking [Berlyne,
1960, Houston and Mednick, 1963, Maddi, 1961, Farley, 1986]. Thus, they search for excitement, novelty,
and challenge in life [Deci and Ryan, 1975].
Self-enha cement
The group of values underlying self-enhancement are categorized into ”achievement” and ”power” values.
People emphasizing ambition or personal success want to demonstrate competence according to internal-
[Deci and Ryan, 1975, McClelland et al., 1953] or social- and cultural standards of excellence in order to
obtain resources for survival and social approval [Maslow, 1959, Rokeach, 1973, Scott and Scott, 1965].
The objective for individuals who emphasize power is to attain social status [Durkheim, 1964, Parsons,
1991], prestige, and control or dominance over people and resources [Korman, 1974, Schutz, 1958, All-
port, 1961, Gordon, 1960]. Thus, they emphasize authority, wealth, social power, social recognition, or
the preservation of their public image. The pursuit of social esteem is common for both power- and
achievement values. Whereas the demonstration of competence in social interactions is emphasized by
achievement values, power values focus on the attainment or preservation of a dominant position within
the social system.
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Conservation
The motivational goals underlying conservation can be categorized in three groups of values, specifically
”security”, ”conformity” and ”tradition” values. People who emphasize security, are pursuing safety, har-
mony, and stability on the individual-, the dyadic- as well as the society level, [Kluckhohn, 1951, Maslow,
1959]. Security values can serve collective interests, in which case people place great emphasis on social
order, the reciprocation of favors, and family- or national security. However, security values can also serve
individual interests, in which case people highly emphasize their sense of belonging. People who prioritize
conformity want to facilitate social interactions by restraining socially disruptive behavior, inclinations
or impulses, which might upset or harm others or violate social norms [Freud, 1933, Kohn and Schooler,
1983, Parsons, 1991]. Thus, they want to honor parents or elders and place great importance on being
obedient, self-disciplined, and polite. Finally, traditions and customs are represented by symbols, reli-
gious rites, beliefs, and norms of behavior [Sumner, 1906, Radcliffe-Brown, 1952]. Such norms symbolize
a group’s solidarity, express its unique positioning, and presumably guarantee its survival [Durkheim,
1964, Parsons, 1991]. Individuals, who prioritize tradition emphasize humility, devotion, moderation,
acceptance of their place and role in life, and show respect and commitment for customs imposed by
culture or religion.
3.2.2 Social network structures and financial decision making practices
Social networks are at the center of our framework in Figure 3.1. Their structure and dynamics are
determined by the underlying type of relationships. In this article, we focus on the dynamics in friendship
networks [Bukowski et al., 1994]. But what are the boundaries, which determine the scope up to which
adolescents evaluate information about how peers are affiliated with each other, how they behave and
how they solve problems? [Feld, 1981] introduced the concept of organizational foci, which are defined
as social, psychological, legal, or physical entities around which joint activities are organized (e.g., school
classes, workplaces, voluntary organizations, hangouts, families). Such foci represent pools of peers, with
whom adolescents are likely to form friendships.
Why are teenagers forming friendships with their peers in order to spend more time with them? Social
comparison theory [Festinger, 1954] proposes that people have an inherent need to validate cognitions and
behaviors. Thus, if teenagers cannot derive sufficient insights by considering their own financial decision
making experiences, they need to reach out to their peers. After initiating friendship relationships
with their peers, teenagers are spending more time with them and can thus obtain more comprehensive
information about their cognitions and behaviors. Apart from social validation, [Wright, 1984] proposes
that friendships encourage and facilitate the expression and recognition of highly valued attributes of
adolescents’ self-concept, that they stimulate and foster an expansion or elaboration of their knowledge
and perspectives, and that they provide security and emotional support [Smith and Rose, 2011].
Are teenagers reciprocating friendship nominations or encouraging their friends to meet and spend
more time together? [Krackhardt and Kilduff, 1999, Vaquera and Kao, 2008] and [Freeman, 1992] suggest
that people generally expect communal relationship types - such as friendships - to be mutually balanced
in terms of social capital [Coleman and Cross, 2000], irrespective of whether or not such reciprocity
exists. [Festinger and Hutte, 1954] argue that people experience feelings of uncertainty or instability,
if they perceive friendship relationships to be unbalanced. Thus, we expect that teenagers strive to
induce balance through the enactment and promotion of reciprocity. But how are such efforts to balance
friendship relationships reflected in the global friendship network structures? In spite of teenagers’
balancing efforts and their limited capacity and the costs associated with the creation and maintenance
of friendships [Amaral et al., 2000], we expect adolescents with a higher number of existing friendships
to be more popular, as preferential attachment [Baraba´si and Albert, 1999] is consistently found as a
significant property in many types of networks.
What is the link between social networks and financial decision making practices? If social practices
are shared among peers in social networks, they constitute social norms [Reckwitz, 2002, Cialdini and
Trost, 1998], which can be enforced or incentivized through adolescents’ need for affiliation [McAlister
and Pessemier, 1982, Algesheimer et al., 2005] or the threat of social exclusion [Mead et al., 2010].
3.2.3 Abilities and financial decision making practices
Forming expectations regarding desirable outcomes and evaluating which practices are necessary to
realize corresponding states is necessary for teenagers to change their behavioral patterns. However,
even if they believe that particular practices will produce desirable outcomes, teenagers will not adapt
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their behavioral patterns if they entertain serious doubts about whether they can enact the corresponding
changes [Xiao and O’Neill, 2016, Loke et al., 2015]. Efficacy expectations are formed in two processes,
as illustrated in the lower panel of Figure 3.1.
On the one hand, teenagers can use information from their own accomplishments to form efficacy
expectations. We assume that the successful enactment of practices, which are affected by financial
decision making priorities, depends on adolescents’ abilities. In particular, teenagers’ expectations con-
cerning their self efficacy might depend on their capacity for adaptation in the face of social pressures
(self-control) [Tangney et al., 2004], cognitive capacity (numeric- and linguistic proficiency, financial lit-
eracy), as well as their ability to delay immediate gratification (time preferences) [Lusardi et al., 2010].
Perceived self-efficacy does not only motivate adolescents to initiate changes in certain behavioral pat-
terns, but through the expectations about whether they will eventually succeed, it can affect how much
effort they will expend and how long they will persist in the face of obstacles and aversive experiences
(resilience) [Campbell-Sills and Stein, 2007].
On the other hand, teenagers might turn to their friends as sources for efficacy expectations. They
might draw courage to engage in trials to change behavioral patterns if they are verbally persuaded
by their friends. Alternatively, information from achievements vicariously experienced by their friends
might also strengthen efficacy expectations, that they can be successful themselves.
3.3 Dynamics in financial decision-making
In light of the fact that most teenagers have limited financial resources, we assume that shifting money
allocations in favor of a particular purpose must be compensated by decreases in financial resources previ-
ously devoted to other purposes. In the following paragraphs, we will outline the motivations underlying
financial decision making practices to the three generic purposes savings, spending and donations, as
illustrated in corresponding order on the three layers placed around the motivational goals [Schwartz
et al., 2012] at the center of Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: The motivational circle - Typology of financial decision making according to the theory of
basic human values [Schwartz et al., 2012]
3.3.1 Motivations for changes in savings
According to the interest regulation principle [Schwartz et al., 2012], values such as self-direction, stimu-
lation, power and achievement regulate the expression of personal interests, while values such as benev-
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olence, universalism, conformity, tradition or security serve to regulate social interests. In contrast to
teenagers, who emphasize values with a personal focus, we assume that adolescents in pursuit of values
with a social focus are more willing to compensate spending or donations through savings. According to
the anxiety relation principle [Schwartz et al., 2012], adolescents in pursuit of growth related values such
as universalism, benevolence, self direction and stimulation are likely to have reached their goals. In con-
trast, realizing that they will not be able to attain their goals, teenagers are likely to pursue achievement
and power, or trigger defense mechanisms promoting the pursuit of conformity, security or tradition.
We assume that adolescents in pursuit of growth related values are more willing to deplete savings for
spending or donations compared to teenagers emphasizing values related to self-protection. Both prin-
ciples are illustrated in Figure 2.1. With the exception of the conflict between risk preference vs. risk
aversion, both perspectives are predominantly consistent regarding their predictions on how allocations
of financial resources to savings are motivated by values. In adult populations, people concerned about
unpredictable shocks with the potential to cause financial distress are expected to put money aside in
order to guarantee financial security. However, in adolescents’ minds, this aspect is expected to play a
minor role.
Hypothesis 5a (H5a). Teenagers in pursuit of self transcendence, conservation and openness to change
are more likely to deplete savings compared to those emphasizing self enhancement.
3.3.2 Motivations for changes in spending
Adolescents increasing their financial resource allocations to spending, might be intrinsically motivated
to do so through their need for novelty, stimulation [McAlister and Pessemier, 1982, Venkatesan, 1973,
Holbrook and Hirschman, 1982], or acquisition of information [Hirschman, 1980]. Alternatively, intrinsic
motivations for teenagers to increase money allocations to spending might be triggered through their
desire to express individuality [Fromkin and Snyder, 1980], or to elevate their social status [O’cass and
McEwen, 2004, O’cass and Frost, 2002].
Some forms of consumption - particularly those driven by motivational goals underlying openness
to change and self enhancement - are in line with [Schwartz et al., 2012] suggesting that experiential-,
variety-seeking- and conspicuous consumption serve to express values with a personal focus. The person
spending financial resources in pursuit of these values is typically the same as the person consuming the
corresponding services or assuming possession of the corresponding goods.
However, other forms of consumption - especially if the corresponding goods or services are consumed
in public [Ratner and Kahn, 2002], or shared with others [Sherry Jr, 1983] - might also be explained
by conservation motivations, such as the need for affiliation [McAlister and Pessemier, 1982, Lee and
Shrum, 2012, Mead et al., 2010], or the intrinsic motivation to maintain harmony in social systems
[Sherry Jr, 1983]. If money is used to invite friends for social consumption, the benefactor spending
financial resources to express such values might not be the sole recipient, but can usually derive more
utility from the social consumption experience compared to the alternative of private consumption. If
money is used to buy gifts for spouses or friends, the benefactor is typically not the recipient, but can
nonetheless derive utility in the form of acquiring new friendships, and maintaining or enriching existing
friendships [Sherry Jr, 1983]. Thus, even though motives of benefactors are often prosocial, they can be
purely altruistic, which is accentuated if they choose to remain completely anonymous.
Whether benefactors are motivated to spend money based on conservation values or donate financial
resources motivated by self-transcendence values depends on recipients’ indigence. If recipients accepting
a gift or invitation are deriving benefits in the form of a symbolic meaning of the given object or gesture,
the corresponding expenditures are classified as social consumption. If recipients are in dire need of help,
the financial resources raised by the corresponding benefactor are classified as donations.
Hypothesis 5b (H5b). Teenagers emphasizing openness, self-enhancement or conservation values are
more likely to increase variety-seeking-, self-expressive-, and social consumption, compared to teenagers
prioritizing self transcendence values.
3.3.3 Motivations for changes in charitable donations
Depending on the underlying goals, the motivation for adolescents to entrust their money to charitable
organizations can range from altruistic to agonistic [Sherry Jr, 1983]. Realizing that friends are in dire
financial straits, benevolent teenagers might feel compelled to help them by allocating money to them.
Witnessing undue suffering, teenagers emphasizing universalism values are facing a threat to their belief
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in a just world and as a consequence, they may be motivated to restore their faith by increasing their
money allocations to charity donations [Miller, 1977]. While teenagers emphasizing self direction might
realize the potential of the act of giving to express their individuality, adolescents striving for power
and achievement might be motivated to increase donations to elevate their self esteem or status in a
social context [Sargeant, 1999, Haggberg, 1992, Sherry Jr, 1983, Schwartz, 1967]. Teenagers in pursuit
of conformity or tradition values may be motivated to increase their charitable donations depending on
the existence and effectiveness of corresponding social norms or traditions in their communities [Lee and
Shrum, 2012]. However, given that a considerable proportion of donors choose to remain anonymous,
we do not expect that charitable donations emerge as social normative behaviors. Furthermore, even if
charitable behaviors happen to emerge as norms or traditions in certain communities, we do not expect
them to be effective in motivating members to adjust their charitable behavior accordingly.
Hypothesis 5c (H5c). Teenagers in pursuit of self-transcendence, openness and self enhancement values
are more likely to increase altruistic-, instrumental and agonistic donations compared to those prioritizing
conservation values.
3.3.4 Social norms as motivations for changes in financial decision making
practices
Given their general lack of life experience, adolescents are often confronted with novel- or ambiguous
situations [McAlister and Pessemier, 1982]. Thus, they can derive considerable utility from knowing
what most other peers in their organizational foci are doing. If they are repeatedly triggered by specific
contextual cues, certain behaviors can become preferred responses in the corresponding situations and
are thus referred to as descriptive norms [Cialdini and Trost, 1998]. In light of the complex trade-offs
associated with changes in money allocation priorities, we expect that teenagers need to validate said
priorities in order to understand their social meaning [Festinger, 1954]. Thus, they are expected to
subcontract the quest to find their optimal money allocation priorities to the judgment of their friends
[Lorenz et al., 2011], particularly if they can assume that their friends are similar to themselves.
Social groups emerging from organizational foci can often utilize effective incentive mechansims such
as the need for affiliation [McAlister and Pessemier, 1982] or the threat of social exclusion [Mead et al.,
2010]. Particular behaviors, for which social groups emphasize general uniformity are referred to as
injunctive norms [Cialdini and Trost, 1998]. Triggered by corresponding situational cues, they can
prescribe or proscribe what most other group members approve or disapprove respectively. Their strength
depends on opportunities for communication or other means of norm transmission, as well as group
cohesion. For the most part, the mere presence of such norms is sufficient to enforce normative behavior
[Cialdini and Trost, 1998].
Successful norms are adaptive in promoting survival related behaviors [Schaller and Latane´, 1996,
Latane´, 1981, Latane´ et al., 1994], without unduely restricting the freedom or self-direction of group
members [Algesheimer et al., 2005, Levav and Zhu, 2009]. Similar to the way that maladaptive genes
will neither replicate nor be passed on, maladaptive social normative behaviors are unlikely to survive
in the presence of competing behaviors that are more useful - e.g. for group affiliation, self concept-
or group identity management. If accepted and internalized, injunctive or descriptive norms become
subjective. Thus, normative behavior is integrated into the self concept, and teenagers show conformity
even in the absence of other group members or effective incentive mechanisms.
Hypothesis 6 (H6). Teenagers shift their financial decision making priorities in order to move closer
to the average expression of how their friends allocate their financial resources.
3.3.5 Ability dependent trial accomplishments as motivations for changes in
financial decision making practices
In many cultures, people are already socialized in their adolescence, and learn that they can find their
desired place in society through their role as consumers [Moschis, 1985, Adler et al., 1977]. In their
function to sell products and services, organizations devote much effort to understanding and enhancing
the effectiveness of marketing activities, and thus tailor products or services, pricing, distribution chan-
nels and communication messages to the respective target audience. As a consequence, teenagers are
constantly facing temptations to spend their money. Therefore, we expect that it is not easy for them
to cut back on the consumption levels they require to fulfill utilitarian needs or to tell a coherent story
about themselves [Giddens, 1991].
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Teenagers can use their own trial accomplishments as sources to form efficacy expectations or use
vicarious trial accomplishments by observing their friends’ trials. In the following paragraphs, we list
our hypotheses regarding how teenagers’ expectations concerning the realization of particular financial
decision making practices are associated with a specific set of their own abilities or with the aggregated
level of these abilities among their friends.
On the one hand, we hypothesize that adolescents’ self efficacy [Bandura, 1977] or the confidence in
their ability to resist these temptations depends on their self control, which is defined as the capacity to
adapt the self to fit the social environment across a variety of domains [Tangney et al., 2004]. Teenagers
who lack self control might seriously doubt their ability to reallocate financial resources from consumption
to savings or forego consumption in favor of donations. On the other hand, [Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001]
and [Bucciol, 2012] argue that forward looking adolescents prefer to eliminate temptations by strategically
deliquefying money. In doing so, depending on their time preferences, teenagers can effectively tie their
hands through the limitation of preferred sets of spending alternatives by allocating more money from
consumption to donations or trading in consumption for the accrual of savings.
Hypothesis 7a (H7a). Teenagers’ self-control, and the aggregated average level of self-control among
their friends have a positive impact on allocations to savings and donations and a negative impact on
allocations to spending.
Hypothesis 7b (H7b). Teenagers’ forward looking time preferences, and the aggregated average level
of forward looking time preferences among their friends have a positive impact on allocations to savings
and donations and a negative impact on allocations to spending.
[Bandura, 1977] argues that besides variations on magnitude, self efficacy can also vary based on
generality and strength. In the face of disconfirming experiences, people with strong efficacy expectations
will persevere in their coping efforts, whereas people are easily discouraged if they have weak expectations
concerning their self efficacy. Resilience is defined as people’s capacity for positive adaptation in the face
of stress or obstacles [Campbell-Sills and Stein, 2007]. On the one hand, we expect resilience to increase
teenagers’ general confidence that they will eventually succeed, no matter what they set out to do. As
a consequence, through general self efficacy, teens might sustain their efforts to relinquish consumption
in order to put up savings or to reallocate financial resources from consumption to donations. On the
other hand, resilience might be a consequence of a long trial of disconfirming experiences in the pursuit
of a specific goal. As such, resilience is the ability to attribute failure to lack of effort or chance [Dweck,
1975, Langer, 1975]. As a result, the accrual of resilience through specific self efficacy is progressing with
every disconfirming experience, whereas every success in the pursuit of this specific goal can stop or even
reduce self efficacy, if chance provides a series of fortuitous circumstances for confirming experiences.
Hypothesis 7c (H7c). Teenagers’ resilience, and the aggregated average level of resilience among their
friends have a positive impact on allocations to savings and donations and a negative impact on allocations
to spending.
Investigating potential determinants of people’s financial literacy, [Lusardi et al., 2010] found that
acquiring cognitive abilities is similar to investing financial resources in assets with a delayed payoff.
Therefore, people with time preferences discounting the future more heavily, may be less willing to make
such investments. Furthermore, people’s opportunities to acquire cognitive abilities in their social systems
were additionally found to have significant explanatory power to predict variations in financial literacy
[Lusardi et al., 2010]. In adult populations, [Lusardi, 1999] found that people’s allocation of financial
resources to savings is positively affected by financial literacy, measured as a basic understanding of
financial numeracy and risk diversification. Therefore, we expect that successful reallocation of financial
resources from spending to donations or savings depends on financial literacy [Lusardi, 1999], time
preferences [Lusardi et al., 2010] and cognitive abilities such as numerical- or linguistic proficiency [Banks
et al., 2010].
Hypothesis 7d (H7d). Teenagers’ financial literacy, and the aggregated average level of financial literacy
among their friends have a positive impact on allocations to savings and donations and a negative impact
on allocations to spending.
Hypothesis 7e (H7e). Teenagers’ cognitive abilities, and the aggregated average level of cognitive abil-
ities among their friends have a positive impact on allocations to savings and donations and a negative
impact on allocations to spending.
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3.4 Data and method
The purpose underlying our selection of samples was to find two European countries with similar school
structures, comparable economies, but simultaneously representing societies with largely different values
or lifestyles. Figure 1 of the appendix displays the positions of 76 countries on seven different cultural
orientations. While Western European countries are culturally oriented towards intellectual autonomy
and egalitarianism, Eastern European cultures are oriented towards harmony. Figure 2 of the appendix
illustrates the average amount of money households in these cultural groups are spending on a variety of
purposes. We selected samples of schools in Switzerland and Poland as representatives for each cultural
group in Europe. Both economies are comparable in size, and although the respective households are
spending similar shares of their incomes on average, their consumption patterns and aggregate spending
volumes they allocate to a variety of consumption purposes are largely different. Despite having selected
multiple countries, our intention for the current article is not to compare dynamics in financial decision
making and their co-evolution with social network structures across countries.
Our study is designed as a longitudinal three-wave panel. We commissioned three surveys starting in
October 2015 until December 2016 in both Switzerland and Poland. Across three waves, we interviewed
pupils, who entered compulsory- or voluntary secondary education on the 7th and 9th grades respectively.
Thus, the observation period starts at a point, where all participants are assigned to new teachers and
reassembled in new classes, such that in the aggregate, they are exposed to a relatively new pool of peers,
whom they did not know before.
3.4.1 Samples
Schools are perfect examples for organizational foci [Feld, 1981] and provide ideal environments to study
the co-evolution of processes, which this article sets out to investigate for many reasons. First, the main
function of schools is to provide an environment for children and adolescents to acquire cognitive and
social skills. Second, schools are arenas, where pupils can observe traits and behaviors of their peers
and thus validate their own. As a consequence, these processes display considerable dynamics. Third,
although hierarchically nested class structures still dominate in primary education, pupils are no longer
nested in single classes during secondary education. To some extent, they can self-select into performance
classes for specific subjects. Such an environment can foster collaboration and knowledge exchange.
Third, while schools are embedded in the regulatory environment of the government, pupils in the
environment of schools are protected from various external contexts, which could potentially co-determine
their behavior. Following exemplary studies from previous research [Mercken et al., 2010, Steglich et al.,
2010b, Knecht et al., 2010, Solish et al., 2010, Ellwardt et al., 2012, Friemel, 2012, Haye et al., 2013], we
conclude that this environment can be seen as an ideal context for our study.
3.4.2 Design
The waves in our longitudinal design are representing the number of times pupils were interviewed.
[Friemel, 2012] argues that the dynamics of socialization processes - such as those under consideration of
this study - are expected to be highest at the beginning of the group formation process. Thus, we designed
the schedule, according to which surveys were administered to pupils with proportionally increasing time
windows between waves. The intention underlying such a longitudinal design is to make sure that
enough data are collected to be able to capture all dynamics in the processes under consideration,
and simultaneously limit the exposure of respondents to surveys. In both countries, subjects in the
compulsory and voluntary secondary school cohorts entered at the age of 12 or 13 and left at the age of
15 or 16. The sample size and composition is summarized in Table 3.1.
3.4.3 Procedures
All procedures contributing to this work are in compliance with the ethical standards of the relevant na-
tional and institutional committees. Every survey commissioned in specific school classes was supervised
by trained students. In every wave, data was collected during a full school hour of 45 minutes for each
cohort. Data was collected using the same method across every wave for each pupil to eliminate method
bias. While surveys commissioned in Poland were administered online, respondents surveyed in Switzer-
land were provided with questionnaires in paper and pencil form. Several weeks before data collection
started, pupils and parents were informed about the design and purpose of the study. We used different
approaches to obtain parental consent for the participation of Swiss- and Polish pupils in our study due
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to the unique regulations concerning data protection in each respective country. In Poland, parents were
specifically asked to opt-in. From a total of 2’743 pupils sampled in Poland, approximately 67% of the
corresponding parents provided their consent. In contrast, parents in Switzerland were provided with an
opt-out possibility. Out of all 1’193 pupils in the Swiss sample, none of the corresponding parents made
use of that possibility.
In order to make the school classes comparable in terms of participation rates across countries, 86
secondary school classes, where opt-out proportions exceeded 50% or opt-in ratios were falling below
50% in any given wave, were excluded from the analysis. Table 3.1 summarizes the result of this process.
The samples we used for our analyses include 73 secondary school classes from Switzerland and Poland.
Table 3.1: Panel size in Switzerland and Poland
Country Wave Panel Analysis
sites classes pupils sites classes pupils
Switzerland
1 8 55 1’183 7 44 890
2 8 55 1’193 7 44 890
3 7 44 890 7 44 890
Poland
1 31 105 2’733 6 29 670
2 29 105 2’743 6 29 670
3 29 105 2’700 6 29 670
3.4.4 Measures
For our investigation of the dynamics in financial decision making and its co-evolution with social network
structures, this study uses the following measures.
Values
Our study uses the Portrait Value Questionnaire [Schwartz et al., 2012] to collect data on basic human
values of respondents. The scale includes 13 items asking respondents to compare themselves to people
described in short statements. Respondents are asked to evaluate the similarity on a six-point scale
ranging from ”not similar at all” to ”very similar”.
Social network structures
The friendship network data was collected with a roster design, listing the names of all classmates,
including those, who did not participate in the survey or those, who were absent from their classes at
the dates scheduled for the waves. Pupils indicated the strength of their friendships on a six point scale
ranging from ”very close” to ”no friendship at all” as measured by the proportion of leisure or recreation
time they spent together voluntarily [Bukowski et al., 1994]. However, the methodology we applied in
our analyses is restricted to binary network data. Dichotomizing networks above or below the level of
five respectively creates very sparse or dense networks, yielding little network dynamics. Therefore, the
cut-off level creating the dichotomy of friendship vs. no friendship was set at the weight of five.
Financial decision making
To test our hypotheses it is important to frame financial endowments as disposable income. Therefore,
the position of the corresponding section in the questionnaire was chosen such that it could be incentivized
by a lottery. In the preceeding section, pupils were matched with anonymous peers from different classes
and instructed to divide a monetary endowment between themselves and the peer with whom they were
matched in simultaneous dictator games. In the lottery, one pupil was selected at random from each
class to win the amount of money they were assigned in the dictator game. Due to different regulations
concerning data protection and schools’ responsibilities concerning the guardianship for their pupils in
each respective country, we were exceptionally granted permission to use our incentive mechanism at
Swiss schools, whereas we did not obtain permission to do so at Polish schools. Therefore, the lottery
winnings, which were paid out in hard currency to the selected participants in Switzerland, were framed
as imaginary winnings in the corresponding waves of Polish questionnaires.
In the section on financial endowment allocations, pupils were then asked how they would allocate
their winnings, if they were to be randomly selected as beneficiaries of the lottery. In our questionnaire,
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the items for discretionary expenditures from [Crouch et al., 2007] were aggregated into generic categories.
Pupils were asked to indicate the proportion of their winnings they would allocate to ”consumption”,
”savings”, ”donations”, and ”other purposes”. If pupils indicated their willingness to donate winnings,
they were asked to select one out of four categories: ”nature protection”, ”animal protection”, ”diseases
and handicaps” or ”poverty and catastrophes” and then choose one out of three charitable organizations.
The proportions of the winnings allocated to ”donations” were then pooled and paid out to the charitable
organizations chosen by the pupils.
Time preferences
The proportions allocated to ”consumption” and ”other purposes” were paid in direct succession of the
survey, while the share of winnings allocated to ”savings” was paid out nine months later. To measure
time preferences and the ability to delay immediate gratification, pupils were asked how much of their
winnings they would sacrifice in order to receive the payment immediately as opposed to nine months
later.
Financial Literacy
To measure the financial literacy of pupils, this study uses the concept of interest compounding, which
pupils should have some understanding of, if they are to use these concepts to make financial decisions
[Lusardi et al., 2010]. Pupils were confronted with two contrasting scenarios. In the first scenario, pupils
were asked to imagine depositing 100 currency units in a savings account, which would yield 1% interest
per year. In the second scenario, pupils were instructed to imagine taking out a loan of 100 currency
units from a bank, which would run for the term of one year with 1% interest. In both scenarios, pupils
were asked whether the funds, which are due for repayment or available for withdrawal in one year
are more, less, or equal to the funds they deposited or received as a loan. In both scenarios, pupils
were additionally given the option to indicate whether they don’t know the correct solution or refuse to
answer.
Cognitive abilities
In both countries, pupils are given grades for a set of subjects, depending on their current level of
education. We were given access to performance evaluations on specific sets of subjects at the discretion
of each school participating in our study. Based on previous literature on financial resource management
[Lusardi et al., 2010], this study uses grades for school performance in mathematics as well as the native
languages in both countries. The most commonly used grading system in both countries ranges from 1
to 6, where 6 represents the highest- and 1 the lowest possible grade. The differences how predicates are
assigned to grades across countries, are shown in Table 6.1 of the Appendix.
Self-control
To measure the capacity to change and adapt oneself to the environment, this study uses a 10 point
scale for self control and -regulation, as developed by [Tangney et al., 2018]. Items to be evaluated are
including the ability to resist temptations, to break disadvantageous habits, to focus in the presence of
distractions, and to regulate impulses.
Resilience
To measure the capacity for positive adaptation in the face of stress or difficulty, this study uses a 10
point scale for resilience, as developed by [Campbell-Sills and Stein, 2007]. Pupils were asked to evaluate
items such as the ability to cope with stress or hardship, to recover from defeat, and to achieve goals in
the presence of handicaps.
3.4.5 Analytical approach
We are drawing on stochastic actor-oriented network models (SAOMs) [Snijders, 2001, Snijders et al.,
2010, Ripley et al., 2011] to investigate the dynamic processes of changes in financial decision making
within friendship networks. Changes in behavior and network ties between panel waves are at the
core of these models. On the one hand, behaviors of actors can change over time. Such changes can
either be the outcome of actors’ characteristics (e.g., actors change behaviors because of values they
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currently prioritize) or of their peers’ characteristics (e.g., actors change behaviors because of values
their friends prioritize). On the other hand, relationships between actors can emerge or disappear in
time. Such changes in the network structure can be the outcome of an actor’s structural position within
the network, (e.g., actors form ties to people because they are friends of friends), an actor’s characteristics
(e.g., actors are attractive because of values they prioritize), or characteristics shared by actors (e.g.,
actors are attractive because they have similar value priorities). In a wide variety of contexts, SAOMs
are used to study network dynamics and behavior change [Van de Bunt et al., 2005, Van Duijn et al.,
2003, Schaefer et al., 2011] or the co-evolution of networks and actor behavior [Checkley and Steglich,
2007, Burk et al., 2007, Pearson et al., 2006, Steglich et al., 2010b, Lewis et al., 2012].
Estimation procedure
Modeling the change of behavior and network ties, SAOMs are applied to longitudinal behavior as well
as complete, directed and longitudinal networks. Although these types of data are measured at discrete
waves, SAOMs assume a continuing underlying process with behavior- or network tie changes occurring
sequentially. Actors can make decisions regarding their behavior (e.g., increasing- or decreasing their
money allocation priorities, as well as keeping their current state) or their network structure (e.g., creating
or dissolving network ties, as well as keeping the current state). Each individual decision an actor makes
is called a mini-step. A mini-step is modeled by two underlying processes.
First, a rate function determines the order, according to which actors are allowed to make decisions.
Using a period-wise constant rate function, we do not assume any difference in the rate of change between
actors. Second, the chosen actors evaluate all potential changes in their behavior and network space.
Assuming specific dynamics to happen, an objective function including the corresponding parameters is
specified, and actors consider how each change in their behavior or network structure would affect their
utility regarding these parameters. For factors that are combined in the objective function and thus
determine actors’ decisions, SAOMs use the term ’effects’. ”Average similarity” is an example for such
effects. If the parameter for average similarity is positive, actors are more likely to adapt their behaviors
towards the average expressions of their friends compared to keeping their current state or diverging to
more extreme behavioral expressions. Thus, actors compare the outcome of the objective function for
each behavior- or network state that results from every possible change in behavior or network structure.
At the conclusion of each mini-step, the behavior- or network states, which are most likely to be chosen
by actors are those with the highest value in the objective function. In a series of mini-steps connecting
empirical observations, parameters that attach relative importance to different effects are estimated. The
interpretation of effects is similar to parameters from a multinomial logistic regression, where θ is the log
odds ratio, as they co-determine the relative likelihood of a mini-step to be realized. For a non-technical
introduction to the method, including different methods of parameter estimation, we refer to [Snijders,
2001, Steglich et al., 2006] and [Snijders et al., 2010].
The capacity to capture the mechanisms that drive behavior- and network change simultaneously
is the main reason why we decided to use SAOMs. First, the dynamics of behaviors and networks are
conditioned on the first observation. As a result, no assumptions regarding the respective states of
equilibrium have to be made. Second, the multinomial nature of the models allows for each process to
be estimated net of the other.
Model specification
Based on theoretical considerations from past experience with these models as well as results from pre-
vious studies using this method with similar data, we selected the following set of structural effects for
our analyses [Steglich et al., 2010b]. Outdegree measures the average number of outgoing links, and can
be compared to an intercept in regression analyses. Reciprocity sneti (x) =
∑
j xijxji is the tendency
of actors to reciprocate friendship nominations they received from alters. Transitivity or geometrically
weighted edgewise shared partners sneti (x) =
∑n
j=1 xije
α
{
1− (1− e−α)
∑n
h=1 xihxhi
}
captures the ten-
dency of actors to be linked to friends of friends. Indegree popularity sneti (x) =
∑
j xij
∑
h xhj controls
for the dispersion in indegrees and investigates if people who already have a lot of incoming ties are
more popular as a targets for further friendship nominations. Linear shape svali (z) = zi controls for the
general tendency to change one’s money allocation priorities. The inclusion of the quadratic shape effect,
which measures the tendency to change money allocation priorities depending on one’s current priority
on specific allocations, could not be empirically justified in our data. As a consequence, we excluded this
effect from our analyses.
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First, we specify the model with regard to changes in allocations of financial resources. For all
analyses reported in tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5, models are specified to include average similarity effects,
as well as effects from values and abilities. The former effects capture the tendency to adapt one’s money
allocation priorities in order to become more similar to one’s friends. The latter estimate the dynamic
effects of values and abilities on money allocation priorities. Additional models further include effects for
values and abilities of the average alter. These effects estimate differences in money allocation priorities
depending on the average expression of values and abilities among friends.
Second, in all analyses, we control for ego-, alter-, and dyadic effects based on value priorities, which
refer to the tendency to send or receive friendship ties based on such priorities, or to the preference
for having friendship relationships with peers, who are prioritizing similar values. Additional models
further include an effect for having the same sex. The statistic for the gender effect is zero, if sender and
recipient of the tie have different genders, and one if they have the same gender. We excluded ego- and
alter-effects for gender as we did not find any theoretical support for their inclusion in literature. Ego-,
alter-, and dyadic effects for money allocation priorities are also included in additional models. These
effects refer to the tendency to send or receive friendship ties based on money allocation priorities, or to
the preference for having friendships with peers, who allocate their financial resources in similar ways.
Meta-analytical procedure
To aggregate our results in a meta-analysis, we use a two stage procedure. First, we apply an uncon-
ventional Method of Moments to estimate the model parameters and perform separate goodness of fit
tests for each school class. Goodness of fit tests are simulating data on auxiliary statistics, which are
compared to corresponding statistics of observed data. Complying with the standard for publications
using SAOMs, we require adequate fit on the auxiliary statistics of indegree- and money allocation dis-
tributions, which was achieved on average for 50 % of all secondary school classes. Second, parameter
estimations are aggregated for each class according to the meta-analytical method proposed by [Snijders
and Baerveldt, 2003, Ripley et al., 2011].
In this meta-analysis, the mean and variance of the θ vector - the true parameter values for all effects
in the chosen model specification - are estimated across all school classes. Results are reported in each
column denoted accordingly, whereby the upper value is the mean µθ and the lower value represents the
standard error σθ. For any given effect, µθ is interpreted as the log odds ratio. If µθ is estimated at 0.5,
the odds ratio is eµθ = 1.65, so the probability for this effect to be present is 65% higher compared to
the probability for this effect to be absent. For each effect, µθ and σθ are tested using Fisher’s combined
probability tests, investigating if the null Hypothesis: θ = 0 can be rejected in at least one school class
[Mercken et al., 2010]. The tests are reported in each column denoted accordingly, whereby the upper
values are results of two sided tests with the alternative Hypotheses θ 6= 0 and the lower values are
results of Fisher’s left- and right sided tests with alternative Hypotheses θ < 0 and θ > 0 respectively.
3.5 Results
The following section is structured according to our Hypotheses. Results on a subset of effects used for
Hypothesis testing are reported in tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5. Results of the corresponding goodness of
fit tests are listed at the bottom of each table. All meta-analyses including the complete lists of effects
are shown in the corresponding tables of the Appendix as indicated in the columns denoted ”Appendix”.
3.5.1 Values as motivations for financial decision making
The results provide full support for Hypothesis 5a. As shown in the section on savings in Table 3.2,
actors with higher priorities on values related to self protection, which are regulating personal interests
- such as self-enhancement - are less likely to engage in financial decision making practices to reallocate
money from savings to other purposes compared to actors in pursuit of conservation, openness to change
or self-transcendence values.
The section on spending in Table 3.2 refers to our findings on Hypothesis 5b, which is fully supported
by our data. Actors with higher priorities on openness to change-, self-enhancement- and conservation
values are more likely to engage in practices to reallocate money from other purposes to spending
compared to actors in pursuit of self-transcendence values.
Hypothesis 5c is partially supported by our data. The section on donations in Table 3.2 demonstrates
that actors are giving more money to charities, if they place higher priorities on growth related values -
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such as self transcendence and openness to change. However, we found no evidence that actors in pursuit
of self-enhancement values are more likely to give money to charity.
Table 3.2: Values and financial decision making practices
Savings Self-transcendence Self-enhancement Conservation Openness to change
µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s pHypothesis Effect
σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p
Appendix
selection effects: Table 6.28
savings change
-0.073 *** -0.075 *** -0.083 *** -0.067 ***
Table 6.28
0.023 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.020 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.022 [ 0 , 0.999 ]
effects from:
H5a
self transcendence
-0.051 †
Table 6.28
0.028 [ 0.031 , 0.989 ]
self enhancement
-0.018
Table 6.28
0.022 [ 0.069 , 0.832 ]
conservation
-0.041 †
Table 6.28
0.022 [ 0.025 , 0.969 ]
openness
-0.030
Table 6.34
0.028 [ 0.154 , 0.935 ]
Spending Conservation Openness to change Self-enhancement Self-transcendence
µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s pHypothesis Effect
σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p
Appendix
selection effects: Table 6.29
spending change
-0.050 ** -0.064 *** -0.047 * -0.056 ***
Table 6.29
0.019 [ 0.007 , 0.982 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 0.998 ] 0.020 [ 0.013 , 0.967 ] 0.017 [ 0.001 , 1 ]
effects from:
H5b
conservation
0.041 †
Table 6.29
0.025 [ 0.984 , 0.015 ]
openness
0.058
Table 6.35
0.043 [ 0.72 , 0.004 ]
self enhancement
0.039 †
Table 6.29
0.022 [ 0.95 , 0.064 ]
self transcendence
0.032
Table 6.29
0.029 [ 0.725 , 0.061 ]
Donations Openness to change Conservation Self-transcendence Self-enhancement
µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s pHypothesis Effect
σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p
Appendix
selection effects: Table 6.30
donations change
-0.405 *** -0.444 *** -0.408 *** -0.380 ***
Table 6.30
0.054 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.066 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.053 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.052 [ 0 , 1 ]
effects from:
H5c
openness
0.092 †
Table 6.30
0.053 [ 0.957 , 0.082 ]
conservation
0.014
Table 6.30
0.049 [ 0.887 , 0.304 ]
self transcendence
0.104 *
Table 6.30
0.050 [ 0.998 , 0.044 ]
self enhancement
0.004
Table 6.30
0.038 [ 0.907 , 0.576 ]
Goodness of fit Self-transcendence Self-enhancement Conservation Openness to change
statistics:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.291 *** 0.289 *** 0.290 *** 0.280 ***
0.304 [ 40 / 28 ] 0.300 [ 39 / 27 ] 0.298 [ 42 / 28 ] 0.312 [ 39 / 25 ]
GOF (savings)
0.264 *** 0.276 *** 0.280 *** 0.281 ***
0.250 [ 40 / 29 ] 0.276 [ 39 / 29 ] 0.263 [ 42 / 31 ] 0.271 [ 39 / 29 ]
GOF (spending)
0.323 *** 0.333 *** 0.321 *** 0.315 ***
0.311 [ 36 , 27 ] 0.306 [ 36 , 27 ] 0.305 [ 36 , 24 ] 0.300 [ 36 , 27 ]
GOF (donations)
0.345 *** 0.311 *** 0.305 *** 0.315 ***
0.279 [ 41 , 34 ] 0.265 [ 40 , 33 ] 0.248 [ 38 , 31 ] 0.246 [ 42 , 37 ]
GOF (overall)
[ 62 , 37 ] [ 61 , 36 ] [ 62 , 36 ] [ 60 , 36 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
3.5.2 Social norms as motivations for financial decision making
With regard to saving- and consumption specific financial decision making practices, our findings provide
full support for Hypothesis 6. The section on savings in Table 3.3 shows that actors are up to 6 times
(log odds ratio = 1.953, odds ratio = 7.049) more likely to adapt their priorities for practices allocating
money to savings towards the average expression of their friends’ priorities, as opposed to diverging or
keeping their current state of savings practices.
As shown in the section on spending in Table 3.3, actors are approximately 2.5 times (log odds
ratio = 1.218, odds ratio = 3.381) more likely to change their priorities for practices allocating money
to spending towards the average expression of their friends’ spending practices, instead of diverging to
more extreme spending practices or keeping their current state.
Hypothesis 6 is not supported by our data, as shown in the section on donations of Table 3.3.
Actors are as likely to adapt their priorities for practices of giving money to charity towards the average
expression of their friends’ priorities, as they are to keep their current state of donation practices or to
diverge from the average expression of their friends’ priorities.
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Table 3.3: Social norms and financial decision making practices
Savings Self-transcendence Self-enhancement Conservation Openness to change
µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s pHypothesis Effect
σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p
Appendix
selection effects: Table 6.28
savings change
-0.073 *** -0.075 *** -0.083 *** -0.067 ***
Table 6.28
0.023 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.020 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.022 [ 0 , 0.999 ]
H6 avg similarity
1.834 *** 1.953 *** 1.636 *** 1.572 ***
Table 6.28
0.476 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.591 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.500 [ 0.999 , 0 ] 0.480 [ 1 , 0 ]
Spending Conservation Openness to change Self-enhancement Self-transcendence
µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s pHypothesis Effect
σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p
Appendix
selection effects: Table 6.29
spending change
-0.050 ** -0.064 *** -0.047 * -0.056 ***
Table 6.29
0.019 [ 0.007 , 0.982 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 0.998 ] 0.020 [ 0.013 , 0.967 ] 0.017 [ 0.001 , 1 ]
H6 avg similarity
1.152 * 1.141 ** 1.218 * 0.978 *
Table 6.29
0.451 [ 0.89 , 0.024 ] 0.438 [ 0.926 , 0.02 ] 0.500 [ 0.848 , 0.024 ] 0.437 [ 0.882 , 0.025 ]
Donations Openness to change Conservation Self-transcendence Self-enhancement
µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s pHypothesis Effect
σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p
Appendix
selection effects: Table 6.30
donations change
-0.405 *** -0.444 *** -0.408 *** -0.380 ***
Table 6.30
0.054 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.066 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.053 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.052 [ 0 , 1 ]
H6 avg similarity
-0.521 -0.494 -0.021 -0.054
Table 6.30
0.788 [ 0.56 , 0.767 ] 0.914 [ 0.559 , 0.801 ] 0.765 [ 0.736 , 0.697 ] 0.769 [ 0.83 , 0.767 ]
Goodness of fit Self-transcendence Self-enhancement Conservation Openness to change
statistics:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.291 *** 0.289 *** 0.290 *** 0.280 ***
0.304 [ 40 / 28 ] 0.300 [ 39 / 27 ] 0.298 [ 42 / 28 ] 0.312 [ 39 / 25 ]
GOF (savings)
0.264 *** 0.276 *** 0.280 *** 0.281 ***
0.250 [ 40 / 29 ] 0.276 [ 39 / 29 ] 0.263 [ 42 / 31 ] 0.271 [ 39 / 29 ]
GOF (spending)
0.323 *** 0.333 *** 0.321 *** 0.315 ***
0.311 [ 36 , 27 ] 0.306 [ 36 , 27 ] 0.305 [ 36 , 24 ] 0.300 [ 36 , 27 ]
GOF (donations)
0.345 *** 0.311 *** 0.305 *** 0.315 ***
0.279 [ 41 , 34 ] 0.265 [ 40 , 33 ] 0.248 [ 38 , 31 ] 0.246 [ 42 , 37 ]
GOF (overall)
[ 62 , 37 ] [ 61 , 36 ] [ 62 , 36 ] [ 60 , 36 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
3.5.3 Ability dependent expectations on self efficacy for changes in financial
decision making
Our findings provide partial support for Hypothesis 7a, as shown in the sections on self-control in Table
3.4. On the one hand, actors with higher levels of self-control are more likely to accelerate their efforts
in trials to evade or withstand enticing consumption alternatives and increase the allocation of financial
resources to savings instead. On the other hand, actors with lower self-control are more likely to free
illiquid financial resources for the purpose of spending. However, we find no association between actors’
self-control and and the self efficacy to entrust financial resources - which were previously devoted to other
purposes - to charitable organizations. We also did not find any evidence in support of an association
between aggregated levels of friends’ self-control and actors’ self efficacy to change financial decision
making practices.
Hypothesis 7b is partially confirmed by our data. As demonstrated in the sections on time preferences
in Table 3.4, forward looking people seem more capable to reallocate money to savings, whereas present-
oriented people have a pronounced inclination to allocate money to spending. However, we find no
association between actors’ time preferences and the self efficacy for giving financial resources to charity,
which were previously devoted to other purposes. Moreover, we did not find any evidence in support of
an association between actors’ self efficacy to change financial decision making practices and aggregated
levels of their friends’ time preferences.
Our results provide sufficient evidence to partially support Hypothesis 7c, as shown in the sections
on resilience in Table 3.4. Instead of contributing to the self efficacy for increasing financial resource
allocations to savings through the limitation of allocations to spending, resilience seems to be a reflection
of the corresponding self efficacy. We find no association between resilience and the self efficacy for
liquefying financial resources - which are tied in the form of savings - and thus freeing said resources for
the purpose of spending or donations. It appears that both actors’ own resilience as well as the aggregate
level of resilience accumulated by their friends are negatively and exclusively associated with savings.
As shown in the sections on cognitive abilities (mathematics and linguistics) in Table 3.5, we find
sufficient evidence to partially support Hypothesis 7d. Actors with higher cognitive abilities are more
likely to increase their allocations to savings, whereas actors with lower cognitive abilities are more likely
to increase their allocations to spending. However, we don’t find any association between actors’ self effi-
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Table 3.4: Abilities and financial decision making practices
Savings Self-transcendence Self-enhancement Conservation Openness to change
µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s pHypothesis Effect
σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p
Appendix
selection effects: Table 6.28
savings change
-0.073 *** -0.075 *** -0.083 *** -0.067 ***
Table 6.28
0.023 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.020 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.022 [ 0 , 0.999 ]
self-control:
H7a
effect from own
0.057 † 0.084 * 0.069 * 0.052
Table 6.28
0.033 [ 0.951 , 0.057 ] 0.034 [ 0.997 , 0.02 ] 0.031 [ 0.989 , 0.011 ] 0.034 [ 0.88 , 0.073 ]
avg alter effect
0.050 0.085 0.076 0.151
Table 6.28
0.181 [ 767 , 0.723 ] 0.178 [ 0.733 , 0.855 ] 0.166 [ 0.792 , 0.727 ] 0.189 [ 0.521 , 0.956 ]
time preferences:
H7b
effect from own
-0.021 -0.025 † -0.028 * -0.035 *
Table 6.34
0.017 [ 0.957 , 0.305 ] 0.014 [ 0.983 , 0.533 ] 0.014 [ 0.973 , 0.012 ] 0.017 [ 0.974 , 0.033 ]
avg alter effect
0.055 0.077 0.136 0.126
Table 6.34
0.097 [ 0.311 , 0.816 ] 0.087 [ 0.219 , 0.966 ] 0.102 [ 0.190 , 0.951 ] 0.091 [ 0.224 , 0.880 ]
resilience:
H7c
effect from own
-0.047 -0.056 -0.047 -0.037
Table 6.28
0.031 [ 0.072 , 0.91 ] 0.037 [ 0.06 , 0.838 ] 0.029 [ 0.032 , 0.847 ] 0.034 [ 0.115 , 0.933 ]
avg alter effect
-0.146 -0.269 † -0.305 † -0.215
Table 6.28
0.172 [ 0.980 , 0.537 ] 0.162 [ 0.998 , 0.428 ] 0.169 [ 0.997 , 0.256 ] 0.184 [ 0.987 , 0.519 ]
Spending Conservation Openness to change Self-enhancement Self-transcendence
µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s pHypothesis Effect
σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p
Appendix
selection effects: Table 6.29
spending change
-0.050 ** -0.064 *** -0.047 * -0.056 ***
Table 6.29
0.019 [ 0.007 , 0.982 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 0.998 ] 0.020 [ 0.013 , 0.967 ] 0.017 [ 0.001 , 1 ]
self-control:
H7a
effect from own
-0.089 ** -0.078 * -0.082 * -0.085 ***
Table 6.29
0.033 [ 0.023 , 0.999 ] 0.034 [ 0.051 , 0.998 ] 0.035 [ 0.051 , 0.999 ] 0.030 [ 0.016 , 0.999 ]
avg alter effect
-0.092 -0.186 -0.124 -0.029
Table 6.29
0.262 [ 0.937 , 0.573 ] 0.232 [ 0.962 , 0.435 ] 0.232 [ 0.913 , 0.652 ] 0.236 [ 0.909 , 0.596 ]
time preferences:
H7b
effect from own
0.024 0.019 0.023 † 0.021
Table 6.35
0.020 [ 0.232 , 0.956 ] 0.020 [ 0.152 , 0.951 ] 0.016 [ 0.316 , 0.978 ] 0.021 [ 0.302 , 0.846 ]
avg alter effect
-0.064 -0.030 -0.044 -0.046
Table 6.35
0.092 [ 0.783 , 0.729 ] 0.091 [ 0.835 , 0.743 ] 0.081 [ 0.794 , 0.668 ] 0.093 [ 0.754 , 0.644 ]
resilience:
H7c
effect from own
0.017 0.010 0.000 0.046
Table 6.29
0.031 [ 0.89 , 0.19 ] 0.031 [ 0.807 , 0.242 ] 0.035 [ 0.681 , 0.35 ] 0.029 [ 0.991 , 0.065 ]
avg alter effect
0.108 0.295 0.151 0.237
Table 6.29
0.183 [ 0.589 , 0.944 ] 0.201 [ 0.333 , 0.992 ] 0.196 [ 0.485 , 0.975 ] 0.174 [ 0.302 , 0.987 ]
Donations Openness to change Conservation Self-transcendence Self-enhancement
µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s pHypothesis Effect
σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p
Appendix
selection effects: Table 6.30
donations change
-0.405 *** -0.444 *** -0.408 *** -0.380 ***
Table 6.30
0.054 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.066 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.053 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.052 [ 0 , 1 ]
self-control:
H7a
effect from own
0.044 -0.004 0.008 0.062
Table 6.30
0.065 [ 0.651 , 0.506 ] 0.080 [ 0.386 , 0.626 ] 0.063 [ 0.597 , 0.644 ] 0.053 [ 0.927 , 0.264 ]
avg alter effect
0.070 0.164 0.070 0.017
Table 6.30
0.371 [ 0.840 , 0.848 ] 0.345 [ 0.845 , 0.843 ] 0.634 [ 0.942 , 0.711 ] 0.547 [ 0.911 , 0.694 ]
time preferences:
H7b
effect from own
0.021 0.012 -0.002 -0.016
Table 6.36
0.044 [ 0.560 , 0.540 ] 0.029 [ 0.777 , 0.506 ] 0.047 [ 0.568 , 0.425 ] 0.049 [ 0.741 , 0.368 ]
avg alter effect
-0.086 -0.067 0.003 0.029
Table 6.36
0.146 [ 0.942 , 0.430 ] 0.126 [ 0.855 , 0.568 ] 0.128 [ 0.719 , 0.820 ] 0.202 [ 0.816 , 0.661 ]
resilience:
H7c
effect from own
-0.054 -0.030 -0.023 -0.027
Table 6.30
0.052 [ 0.181 , 0.979 ] 0.066 [ 0.243 , 0.924 ] 0.059 [ 0.273 , 0.878 ] 0.054 [ 0.367 , 0.875 ]
avg alter effect
0.008 0.193 0.421 0.268
Table 6.30
0.368 [ 0.722 , 0.872 ] 0.364 [ 0.583 , 0.942 ] 0.521 [ 0.677 , 0.935 ] 0.506 [ 0.692 , 0.900 ]
Goodness of fit Self-transcendence Self-enhancement Conservation Openness to change
statistics:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.291 *** 0.289 *** 0.290 *** 0.280 ***
0.304 [ 40 / 28 ] 0.300 [ 39 / 27 ] 0.298 [ 42 / 28 ] 0.312 [ 39 / 25 ]
GOF (savings)
0.264 *** 0.276 *** 0.280 *** 0.281 ***
0.250 [ 40 / 29 ] 0.276 [ 39 / 29 ] 0.263 [ 42 / 31 ] 0.271 [ 39 / 29 ]
GOF (spending)
0.323 *** 0.333 *** 0.321 *** 0.315 ***
0.311 [ 36 , 27 ] 0.306 [ 36 , 27 ] 0.305 [ 36 , 24 ] 0.300 [ 36 , 27 ]
GOF (donations)
0.345 *** 0.311 *** 0.305 *** 0.315 ***
0.279 [ 41 , 34 ] 0.265 [ 40 , 33 ] 0.248 [ 38 , 31 ] 0.246 [ 42 , 37 ]
GOF (overall)
[ 62 , 37 ] [ 61 , 36 ] [ 62 , 36 ] [ 60 , 36 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
cacy to entrust financial resources to charitable organizations and their cognitive abilities. Furthermore,
our findings do not provide support for an association between actors’ self efficacy to change financial
decision making practices and aggregated levels of their friends’ cognitive abilities.
Our data does not provide sufficient evidence to fully support Hypothesis 7e. The results in the
sections on financial literacy in Table 3.5 show that actors with a higher financial literacy are less likely
to allocate money to charitable organizations. However, actors do not change their charitable behavior
based on the aggregated average expressions of their friends’ financial literacy.
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Table 3.5: Literacy and financial decision making practices
Savings Self-transcendence Self-enhancement Conservation Openness to change
µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s pHypothesis Effect
σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p
Appendix
selection effects: Table 6.28
savings change
-0.073 *** -0.075 *** -0.083 *** -0.067 ***
Table 6.28
0.023 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.020 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.022 [ 0 , 0.999 ]
mathematics:
H7d
effect from own
0.046 0.029 0.021 0.037
Table 6.31
0.037 [ 0.969 , 0.327 ] 0.035 [ 0.827 , 0.391 ] 0.036 [ 0.802 , 0.521 ] 0.033 [ 0.944 , 0.35 ]
avg alter effect
0.066 0.125 0.023 -0.009
Table 6.31
0.208 [ 0.550 , 0.839 ] 0.239 [ 0.407 , 0.926 ] 0.200 [ 0.682 , 0.776 ] 0.257 [ 0.690 , 0.702 ]
linguistics:
effect from own
0.035 0.054 0.059 † 0.054
Table 6.31
0.038 [ 0.939 , 0.43 ] 0.034 [ 0.987 , 0.208 ] 0.031 [ 0.974 , 0.19 ] 0.034 [ 0.986 , 0.156 ]
avg alter effect
0.011 -0.117 0.121 -0.040
Table 6.31
0.242 [ 0.707 , 0.716 ] 0.318 [ 0.830 , 0.616 ] 0.272 [ 0.533 , 0.906 ] 0.320 [ 0.717 , 0.719 ]
financial literacy:
H7e
effect from own
-0.046 0.016 0.002 -0.014
Table 6.34
0.061 [ 0.606 , 0.116 ] 0.047 [ 0.222 , 0.723 ] 0.045 [ 0.483 , 0.536 ] 0.052 [ 0.315 , 0.393 ]
avg alter effect
-0.016 -0.086 -0.110 -0.014
Table 6.34
0.259 [ 0.656 , 0.429 ] 0.241 [ 0.714 , 0.431 ] 0.230 [ 0.763 , 0.328 ] 0.206 [ 0.677 , 0.454 ]
Spending Conservation Openness to change Self-enhancement Self-transcendence
µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s pHypothesis Effect
σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p
Appendix
selection effects: Table 6.29
spending change
-0.050 ** -0.064 *** -0.047 * -0.056 ***
Table 6.29
0.019 [ 0.007 , 0.982 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 0.998 ] 0.020 [ 0.013 , 0.967 ] 0.017 [ 0.001 , 1 ]
mathematics:
H7d
effect from own
-0.040 -0.050 -0.040 -0.031
Table 6.32
0.032 [ 0.276 , 0.941 ] 0.033 [ 0.241 , 0.943 ] 0.031 [ 0.296 , 0.856 ] 0.031 [ 0.264 , 0.835 ]
avg alter effect
-0.390 -0.417 -0.317 -0.092
Table 6.32
0.544 [ 0.893 , 0.450 ] 0.373 [ 0.967 , 0.313 ] 0.384 [ 0.838 , 0.566 ] 0.672 [ 0.604 , 0.779 ]
linguistics:
effect from own
-0.036 -0.059 † -0.029 -0.025
Table 6.32
0.032 [ 0.527 , 0.389 ] 0.032 [ 0.134 , 0.896 ] 0.030 [ 0.425 , 0.703 ] 0.031 [ 0.386 , 0.742 ]
avg alter effect
0.165 -0.094 0.260 0.065
Table 6.32
0.456 [ 0.596 , 0.791 ] 0.384 [ 0.771 , 0.657 ] 0.518 [ 0.567 , 0.841 ] 0.701 [ 0.594 , 0.778 ]
financial literacy:
H7e
effect from own
-0.037 0.006 -0.010 0.047
Table 6.35
0.051 [ 0.694 , 0.199 ] 0.058 [ 0.321 , 0.401 ] 0.046 [ 0.565 , 0.489 ] 0.067 [ 0.102 , 0.614 ]
avg alter effect
0.023 0.069 0.118 0.060
Table 6.35
0.251 [ 0.307 , 0.788 ] 0.252 [ 0.835 , 0.743 ] 0.220 [ 0.258 , 0.798 ] 0.243 [ 0.435 , 0.699 ]
Donations Openness to change Conservation Self-transcendence Self-enhancement
µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s pHypothesis Effect
σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p
Appendix
selection effects: Table 6.30
donations change
-0.405 *** -0.444 *** -0.408 *** -0.380 ***
Table 6.30
0.054 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.066 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.053 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.052 [ 0 , 1 ]
mathematics:
H7d
effect from own
0.030 0.115 0.014 0.071
Table 6.33
0.105 [ 0.731 , 0.656 ] 0.121 [ 0.876 , 0.424 ] 0.105 [ 0.699 , 0.587 ] 0.098 [ 0.766 , 0.548 ]
avg alter effect
0.267 0.214 -0.032 -0.019
Table 6.33
754 [ 0.353 , 0.858 ] 1.010 [ 0.433 , 0.688 ] 0.617 [ 0.638 , 0.377 ] 0.710 [ 0.577 , 0.795 ]
linguistics:
effect from own
0.079 0.071 0.094 -0.006
Table 6.33
0.100 [ 0.752 , 0.344 ] 0.117 [ 0.63 , 0.624 ] 0.102 [ 0.777 , 0.422 ] 0.099 [ 0.48 , 0.613 ]
avg alter effect
-0.304 -0.028 -0.369 -0.148
Table 6.33
0.418 [ 0.949 , 0.319 ] 0.365 [ 0.797 , 0.432 ] 0.400 [ 0.982 , 0.266 ] 0.333 [ 0.916 , 0.423 ]
financial literacy:
H7e
effect from own
-0.170 † -0.202 † -0.109 -0.081
Table 6.36
0.126 [ 0.901 , 0.224 ] 0.115 [ 0.948 , 0.149 ] 0.127 [ 0.796 , 0.373 ] 0.159 [ 0.758 , 0.408 ]
avg alter effect
-0.317 -0.222 -0.139 -0.719
Table 6.36
0.540 [ 0.922 , 0.362 ] 0.587 [ 0.884 , 0.422 ] 0.486 [ 0.877 , 0.492 ] 0.694 [ 0.962 , 0.263 ]
Goodness of fit Self-transcendence Self-enhancement Conservation Openness to change
statistics:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.291 *** 0.289 *** 0.290 *** 0.280 ***
0.304 [ 40 / 28 ] 0.300 [ 39 / 27 ] 0.298 [ 42 / 28 ] 0.312 [ 39 / 25 ]
GOF (savings)
0.264 *** 0.276 *** 0.280 *** 0.281 ***
0.250 [ 40 / 29 ] 0.276 [ 39 / 29 ] 0.263 [ 42 / 31 ] 0.271 [ 39 / 29 ]
GOF (spending)
0.323 *** 0.333 *** 0.321 *** 0.315 ***
0.311 [ 36 , 27 ] 0.306 [ 36 , 27 ] 0.305 [ 36 , 24 ] 0.300 [ 36 , 27 ]
GOF (donations)
0.345 *** 0.311 *** 0.305 *** 0.315 ***
0.279 [ 41 , 34 ] 0.265 [ 40 , 33 ] 0.248 [ 38 , 31 ] 0.246 [ 42 , 37 ]
GOF (overall)
[ 62 , 37 ] [ 61 , 36 ] [ 62 , 36 ] [ 60 , 36 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
3.6 Discussion
From adolescence to adulthood, most people need to constrain their expenditures according to a limited
budget. Therefore, teenagers need to learn how to manage- and allocate their finacial resources effec-
tively. Applying a wide range of strategies, parents have a considerable and sustainable influence on the
financial decision making of their teenagers. However, their influence in shaping the school environment
of their children is very limited. While they can choose their community of residence and have full dis-
cretion in selecting the schools their children will attend, they have very few possibilities to co-determine
the compositions of classes. Surprisingly, teenagers’ decisions on financial resource allocations have not
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yet been investigated in the dynamic context of social networks in the school environment. Our findings
confirm that adolescents’ money allocation priorities are subject to change, insofar as those are instru-
mental in achieving desirable outcomes. We propose a framework, describing how behavioral changes in
the generic money allocations of spending, saving and giving are linked to unique sets of motivational
goals, such as the expression of desirable lifestyles, the maintenance or enhancement of their self-concept,
or the realization of social rewards for compliance with norms. Our findings further confirm that changes
in money allocation priorities are not implemented if adolescents are lacking the confidence in their abil-
ities to enact behavioral changes that are necessary to achieve desired outcomes. We propose another
framework describing how a specific set of abilities contributes to adolescents’ self efficacy for the accrual
of savings via constraints in their spending allocations.
3.6.1 Which are the motivational goals underlying financial decision-making
practices?
According to our findings, the motivations for adolescents to deplete savings or charity allocations to
facilitate shifts in consumption patters are threefold.
First, our findings suggest that teenagers are intrinsically motivated to increase their money alloca-
tions to spending through their need for novelty, stimulation [McAlister and Pessemier, 1982, Venkatesan,
1973], as well as their emphasis on acquiring information [Hirschman, 1980]. On the one hand, conforming
consumption patterns including familiar brands may not stimulate sufficient levels of arousal, in which
case teenagers switch to spending patterns reflecting non-conforming lifestyles. On the other hand, ado-
lescents may want to switch brands to determine the true value of brands not recently purchased. We
use the term variety-seeking consumption for shifts in spending patters of this nature. Second, we also
find evidence that increases in money allocations to spending are triggered through teenagers’ desire to
express individuality - a proclivitiy, for which we use the term self expressive consumption. According
to [Fromkin and Snyder, 1980], social pressure for conformity creates the need to express uniqueness,
e.g. through possession of commodities that are scarce or unavailable to others. Third, we find that
teenagers’ decisions to increase money allocations to spending are also motivated through their need for
affiliation [McAlister and Pessemier, 1982] and harmony [Sherry Jr, 1983] in social systems. On the one
hand, their need for affiliation may lead teenagers to imitate changes in spending patterns of their peers.
On the other hand, their consumption patterns might be a reflection of their desire to maintain harmony
in social groups. Both are tendencies, for which we use the term social consumption.
Similar to the motivations for adolescents to alleviate spending allocations, we hypothesized that the
motivations for them to increase the financial resources entrusted to charitable organizations [Sargeant,
1999] are threefold. In the following paragraphs, we discuss each of the three motivations - altruistic,
instrumental and agonistic - in turn [Sherry Jr, 1983].
First, we find evidence on altruistic motivations for teenagers’ allocation of financial resources to help
friends in need. On the one hand, benevolence values might trigger feelings of cognitive dissonance in
teenagers with abundant lifestyles if they compare themselves with friends in financial distress. On the
other hand, universalism values and the belief in a just world might be threatened if adolescents witness
serious hardship, and thus trigger their motivation to increase money allocations to charity donations
[Miller, 1977]. Second, we find evidence on instrumental motivations for teenagers to reallocate financial
resources to donations. For adolescents with the desire to express their individuality, allocating money
to charitable organizations might be instrumental to communicate non-conforming lifestyles. However,
our findings do not provide evidence on agonistic motivations for teenagers to allocate money to charity.
It appears that teenagers do not see charity donations as valid instruments for them to elevate their
social status [Haggberg, 1992, Sherry Jr, 1983, Schwartz, 1967].
Most teenagers live in a reality where financial resources are limited, and increases in money allo-
cations to spending or donations must be compensated by decreases in money allocations devoted to
savings or other purposes. Our findings are an accurate reflection of both hypothesized motivational
frameworks [Schwartz et al., 2012, Bilsky and Schwartz, 1994]. We observe that teenagers prioritizing
self-transcendence values - such as universalism and benevolence - are likely to deplete financial resources
devoted to savings in order to give money to charitable organizations. Likewise, adolescents emphasizing
conservation values - such as tradition, conformity and security - are likely to fund their social con-
sumption lifestyles with money from savings. Lifestyles of teenagers in pursuit of openness values - such
as self-direction and stimulation - are characterized by variety seeking consumption and instrumental
charity donations, for which they are also likely to deplete savings. However, adolescents emphasizing
self-enhancement values are not likely to use savings to fund their conspicious consumption lifestyles.
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3.6.2 How are teenagers reacting to social norms regarding financial decision-
making practices?
Previous literature on social normative behavior assumes that social norms are situation dependent
and thus may be triggered by contextual cues. Additional assumptions propose that all members of a
particular social system are equally subject to the social norms, which have evolved therein, and that
these social systems do not change over time [Cialdini and Trost, 1998]. However, social norms do not
necessarily spread across an entire organizational focus, but instead, their diffusion might be limited
by the boundaries of communities [Algesheimer et al., 2005]. Thus, adolescents can not only choose
the social environment, in which they feel most comfortable, but their chosen commmunities are also
constantly evolving. [Kindschi et al., 2019b] found that among other determinants, teenagers’ values
have a strong impact on people’s friendship selection. In this article, we assume that teenagers can not
only choose acceptable norms by selecting their friendship network structure based on their values, but
also shape the social norms in their chosen friendship circles.
We have strong reason to assume that norms prescribing money allocations to charitable organiza-
tions are forming in friendship circles. The results consistently show that similarities on value dimensions,
which are shown to be conflicting - particularly on self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement values [Kind-
schi et al., 2019b] - are considered for friendship selection. Thus, the communities formed in friendship
networks are likely to prioritize self-transcendence or self-enhancement to similar degrees. Since behav-
ioral expressions of self-transcendence values are exclusively focused on money allocations to charitable
organizations, equivalent norms are most likely to emerge in communities prioritizing self-transcendence
over self-enhancement. However, it seems that the corresponding contextual cues do not trigger them.
Conversely, social norms prescribing specific allocations of financial resources to spending or savings are
more likely to emerge in communities prioritizing self-enhancement over self-transcendence. Our find-
ings indicate that the corresponding norms are triggered in friendship networks. On their journey to
find- and validate their optimal money allocation priorities, or to understand the corresponding social
meaning [Festinger, 1954] teenagers appear to fully rely on the judgement of their friends [Lorenz et al.,
2011]. The implication is that once social norms on whether to prioritize spending or savings are formed
in friendship networks, teenagers are likely to comply, and might eventually even internalize the corre-
sponding norms. Parents should be encouraged to embrace their roles as socialization agents and put in
more effort, given that teenagers seem to select friends with similar money allocation priorities.
3.6.3 Are teenagers’ expectations regarding the self-efficacy of financial de-
cision making affected by their abilities?
Figure 3.4 summarizes our findings in a framework based on goal directed action [Bagozzi and Dholakia,
1999, Bagozzi, 2007] and self efficacy theory [Bandura, 1977]. Our results confirm the expectation that
adolescents find it difficult to cut back on a given consumption level, as stimulated by their lifestyles
[Giddens, 1991]. Adolescents in possession of certain abilities are more capable to shift financial resources
to savings, while teenagers lacking these abilities are likely to allocate money to spending. These abilities
include teenagers’ self-control, their cognitive performance as well as their time preferences, as measured
by their ability to delay gratification. In line with the arguments in [Bucciol, 2012], forward looking
teenagers strategically set money aside to eliminate temptations irrespective of their level of self control.
This implies that being intrinsically motivated is not a sufficient condition for teenagers to shift their
financial decision making priorities in favor of savings. Teenagers have to understand the importance of
acquiring self-control, cognitive abilities, and skills that are necessary to avoid- or resist temptations.
But what about the well established positive impact of financial literacy on savings allocations?
[Lusardi et al., 2010] found that cognitive abilities and time preferences can be used to predict financial
literacy. Both factors increase teenagers’ confidence in their capacity to eliminate or resist temptations
to spend their financial resources and accumulate money in savings accounts instead. However, in com-
bination with these abilities, financial literacy does not impact the confidence of teenagers to accumulate
savings through the limitation of consumption, but rather counteracts their tendency to entrust money
to charitable organizations. Thus, teenagers do not need to be literate or possess abilities increasing their
confidence to be able to give money to charity, as long as they are motivated to do so. Moreover, efforts
to introduce financial literacy in the curriculum at schools have no impact on teenagers’ self efficacy to
manage their financial resources responsibly. Instead, it appears that the tools and methods used to
educate financial literacy are more effective in facilitating individualistic practices of financial decision
making.
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Figure 4: Framework of goal directed action (Bagozzi and Dholakia, 1999; Bagozzi, 2007) adapted to self ef-
ficacy theory (Bandura, 1977) summarizing results from tables 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22 and 22 of the appendix
Arrows: Dashed type 99K arrows represent core processes based on goal directed action; Regular type →
arrows indicate positive impacts of abilities on self efficacy in trials to allocate money to donations, savings or
spending; Dotted type .....> arrows indicate negative impacts; Color indicates whether self efficacy is affected via
one’s own trial accomplishments or vicarious trial accomplishments
Boxes: In the process of forming outcome expectations, intentions for priority changes in financial deci-
sion making are formed. Social norms (Cialdini and Trost, 1998), emphasis on consonance between financial
decision making and values (Schwartz et al., 2012), or desirable lifestyles Giddens (1991) are driving forces
underlying the formation of outcome expectations. Colors indicate motivations to shift money from consumption
to savings or donations, as outcome expectations are formed under the restriction that financial resources are
limited. Abilities represent time preferences, self regulation- and cognitive abilities. Colors indicate the degree to
which these abilities are affecting efficacy expectations in general or in specific trials to shift financial resources
from consumption to savings or donations. Efficacy expectations emerge from a process, which evaluates
the expected outcome of performing concrete actions with given means for enactment. Trials represent specific
actions, which are performed to shift money from consumption to savings or donations, as indicated by colors.
In the process of outcome attributions, realized outcomes - such as having successfully resisted or eliminated
temptations of consumption, having accumulated savings, having entrusted financial resources to charitable
donations - or failures in corresponding trials are not attributed to one’s own abilities, but rather to a lack of effort
or to chance (Dweck, 1975; Langer, 1975)
According to our findings, teenagers’ resilience - as reflected in their willingness to put more
effort in future trials - is not alleviated through success, as they don’t seem to care about why
they were successful. On the contrary, our findings imply that failure is an excellent teacher,
motivating teenagers to draw on their experience to accumulate information about all possible
Figure 3.4: Framework of goal directed action [Bagozzi and Dholakia, 1999, Bagozzi, 2007] adapted to
the theory of self efficacy [Bandura, 1977] summarizing results from Tables 6.22, 6.23, 6.24, 6.28, 6.29,
6.30, 6.31, 6.32, 6.33, 6.34, 6.35 and 6.36 of the Appendix
Arrows: Dashed type 99K arrows represent core processes based on goal directed action; Regular
type → arrows indicate positive impacts of abilities on self efficacy in trials to allocate money to
donations, savings or spending; Dotted type .....> arrows indicate negative impacts; Color indicates
whether self efficacy is affected via one’s own trial accomplishments or vicarious trial accom-
plishments
Boxes: In the process of forming outcome expectations, intentions for priority changes in fi-
nancial decision making are formed. Social norms [Cialdini and Trost, 1998], emphasis on consonance
between financial decision making and values [Schwartz et al., 2012], or desirable lifestyles [Giddens,
1991] are driving forces underlying the formation of outcome expectations. Colors indicate motivations
to shift money from consumption to savings or donations, as outcome expectations are formed
under the restriction that financial resources are limited. Abilities represent time preferences, self
regulation- and cognitive abilities. Colors indicate the degree to which these abilities are affecting
efficacy expectations in general or in specific trials to shift financial resources from consumption to
savings or donations. Efficacy expectations emerge from a process, which evaluates the expected
outcome of performing concrete actions with given means for enactment. Trials represent specific
actions, which are performed to shift money from consumption to savings or donations, as indicated
by colors. In the process of outcome attributions, realized outcomes - such as having successfully
resisted or eliminated temptations of consumption, having accumulated savings, having entrusted
financial resources to charitable donations - or failures in corresponding trials are not attributed to
one’s own abilities, but rather to a lack of effort or to chance [Dweck, 1975, Langer, 1975]
Self efficacy theory [Bandura, 1977] suggests that changes in financial decision making are based
on teenager’s expectations that the corresponding decisions can be successfully enacted. In their trials
to enact the decision to save money, adolescents can attribute the success in resisting temptations or
eliminating enticing consumption alternatives to fortuitous circumstances, to the effort they put in the
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trial, or to their abilities. According to our findings, resilience can be seen as the ability to attribute
the surrender to temptations, or the failure to eliminate them to a lack of effort or to chance [Dweck,
1975, Langer, 1975]. As a consequence, the accrual of resilience happens in consequtive feedback loops,
specifically through the self efficacy depending on the outcome of trials to allocate money to savings.
According to our findings, teenagers’ resilience - as reflected in their willingness to put more effort
in future trials - is not alleviated through success, as they don’t seem to care about why they were
successful. On the contrary, our findings imply that failure is an excellent teacher, motivating teenagers
to draw on their experience to accumulate information about all possible circumstances leading to failure
and put in more effort in future trials.
Surprisingly, compared to experiencing outcomes of their own trials to put money aside, the effects are
even more pronounced, if trial accomplishments are experienced vicariously. On this path, the accrual
of resilience also happens in consequtive feedback loops, depending on the outcomes of friends’ trials
to shift financial resources to savings. Teenagers’ relationships to their friends are very strong, as they
seem to experience their friends’ successes and failures as their own [Smith and Rose, 2011]. Celebrating
their friends successes without asking why, teenagers’ willingness to amplify their efforts to accumulate
savings is not increased by witnessing their friends successfully resisting or evading temptations. Instead,
teenagers seem to be particularly motivated to use the collective experiences- and all insights that can
be derived from their friends’ failures to put in more effort in their own future trials.
3.7 Limitations
As pupils are nested in school classes representing unique organizational foci, which are themselves nested
in distinct contexts of specific schools, the structure of the data we collected from the participants in our
study is inherently hierarchical. Therefore, teenagers’ utility functions may have unique compositions.
Consequently, the sets of attributes adolescents consider to select friends or to adjust their behaviors
should be subject to class-specific restrictions according to how specific attributes are emphasized or
promoted in the corresponding organizational foci. For the sake of simplicity, we assume identical
compositions of utility functions for pupils across classes. However, one might capture the heterogeneity
in the composition of effects that contribute to teenagers’ utility functions through the application of
restrictions that prescribe distinct utility functions according to the specific groups in the hierarchical
data structure.
Furthermore, an illustration of our findings across school classes in Figure ?? of the Appendix identifies
considerable heterogeneity regarding the tendency for adolescents in different school classes to comply
with social norms regarding financial decision making. Thus, we call on further research to investigate
how the heterogeneity in teenagers’ susceptibility to social norms on the micro-level can be explained by
properties emerging on the macro-level of organizational foci. Random coefficient multi-level analyses
could be used to capture such heterogeneity in adolescents’ compliance with social norms regarding
money allocation priorities on the individual level.
Finally, the composition of adolescents’ utility functions for the selection of friends as well as the
adaption of their behaviors might not only depend on the unique contexts of organizational foci, but
also on the cultural context. Even though a comparison across countries is not the primary objective of
this study, correspondingly differentiated results are available on request. Insights from further research,
cross-validating our findings in different countries would provide substantial contributions to a more
comprehensive understanding of a culture’s impact on the composition of teenager’s utility functions.
3.8 Conclusions
We conclude that future research should not only investigate the heterogeneity in utility functions -
prescribing distinct sets of attributes for teenagers to evaluate changes in their network structures and
behaviors across classes - but also the unobserved heterogeneity across individuals. Further research
cross-validating our findings in other countries would also make substantial contributions on the road
to a more comprehensive picture about the socialization of adolescents’ financial decision making across
countries with different cultural orientations. Moreover, further research is needed to investigate how
norms regarding the allocation of financial resources emerge and evolve in different types of social systems
such as networks of advice- or trust relationships.
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Chapter 4
Finding Social Support in
Adolescent Friendship- and Advice
Networks
Abstract
Having access to social support that is tailored to their specific needs is vital for adolescents in the
process of their transition into adulthood. Existing literature provides considerable evidence for an
independent and significant impact of social support on life satisfaction. While teenagers are building
their self identity, they are encouraged to explore different paths in love, work and worldviews. To
avoid social exclusion, teenagers may be forced to comply with various norms dictating appropriate
behaviors. Thus, finding social support that is tailored to their specific needs is crucial for teenagers.
The nature and effectiveness of social support from friends and advisors has been studied intensively in
previous research. Surprisingly, the dynamics in corresponding networks as potential sources for social
support have received little attention. In this article, we introduce a framework focused on the dynamics
and nature of friendship- and advice networks, in which unique forms of social support can be found.
Drawing on stochastic actor-oriented network models, we analyze 73 friendship- and advice networks of
adolescents. Our findings provide insights how teenagers can elevate their life satisfaction through the
selection of friends and advisors with a good match in attributes, which are salient for the respective
relationship types. Implications for structural properties of friendship and advice networks are discussed.
Keywords: Dynamic social network analysis, friendship, advice, homophily, social norms, financial
decision making, values, self monitoring, adolescents, school classes
Publication note: This article is a work in progress. A version of this article is ready for submission
to Network Science. Co-authors of this article are Alexander Ehlert, Jan Cieciuch, Eldad Davidov, Heiko
Rauhut, Claudio Juan Tessone and Rene Algesheimer.
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4.1 Introduction
Adolescents need to understand the importance of building friendship- and advice networks, as the
unique forms of social support each network provides may be tailored to the specific needs emerging
in their situations. Teenagers in a majority of cultures in industrialized countries are socialized to
delay traditional markers for their transition into adulthood such as leaving school or completing higher
education, becoming self-sufficient by starting a full-time job [Jensen, 2004], leaving the home of their
origin, getting married, and becoming parents [Shanahan, 2000, Arnett, 2000].
Teenagers experience a period with frequent changes in every aspect of their lives, as various paths
in love [Feiring, 1999, Collins, 2003], work [Moschis and Churchill Jr, 1978, Olshavsky and Granbois,
1979], and worldviews [Schwartz et al., 2012] are explored. Meanwhile, they are heavily preoccupied with
finding out who they are, as they are building their self-identity [Turner, 1982, Turner, 1985] through the
formation of friendships [Wright, 1984, Clark, 1981, Clark and Mills, 1979] as well as the social validation
of worldviews and values [Schwartz et al., 2012].
Thus, having access to social support from peers is essential for teenagers to cope with the changes
they experience during this time. Friends with a strong match in their self-identity are likely to face
similar obstacles or crossroads and can thus provide better social support compared to friends, who are
entirely different. Likewise, exchanging knowledge or advice and collaboration in teams are forms of
social support, which are more valuable if collaborators have similar preferences regarding teamwork.
Adolescents’ need for social support [Halbesleben, 2006, Ray and Miller, 1994] and affiliation [McAlis-
ter and Pessemier, 1982] determines the degree to which they fear social exclusion [Mead et al., 2010, Ju-
vonen and Graham, 2014, Boivin et al., 1995, Stormshak et al., 1999, Wright et al., 1986], which is
a form of bullying that is not uncommon in school classes [Juvonen and Graham, 2014, Boivin et al.,
1995, Stormshak et al., 1999, Wright et al., 1986].
Most forms of bullying are categorized as direct or indirect [Lagerspetz et al., 1988]. Direct forms
involve physical aggression or threats of intimidating, humiliating, or belittling someone in social settings.
Indirect forms include spreading of rumors and network structure manipulations such as social exclusion
[Crick and Grotpeter, 1995], which is designed to damage or deflate the targets’ social reputation.
Indirect forms are concealing the identity of the source [Bjo¨rkqvist et al., 1992] such that the bully is
able to use the social network as an instrument or vessel [Xie et al., 2002]. Bullying is rarely targeted
randomly. The most common targets are teenagers, who are socially isolated, have special conditions,
physical characteristics, or display nonnormative patterns of behavior, which set them apart from their
peers in social networks [Wright et al., 1986].
Teenagers deviating from norms of social consumption might be regarded as selfish and thus excluded
from the group. If they are not stimulated by variety seeking and refuse to spend money on new fashion
trends or products with new features, adolescents cannot participate in discussions or social activities
centered around such objects. In social groups, where membership can be expressed through specific
products or brands, teenagers who do not feel the need to express themselves through consumption and
refuse to spend money on such items might be excluded.
In situations such as these, teenagers are less vulnerable and thus less attractive as targets of bullies,
if they remain socially connected. Moreover, if they are nevertheless selected as targets, functional
strategies such as maintaining access to social support [Halbesleben, 2006, Ray and Miller, 1994] are
vital for teenagers to cope with problems such as these, while dysfunctional strategies such as denial
or repression could entail fatalistic attitudes that lead to withdrawal [Frydenberg and Lewis, 2000] and
ultimately result in burnout [Maslach, 2017].
Existing literature is particularly rich on the respective effectiveness of social support, which is pro-
vided by various sources. Spouses, friends, or family members can offer emotional support, trigger
memories of personal accomplishment, and thus lower the likelihood of withdrawal. Conversely, cowork-
ers and supervisors can offer instrumental support such as advice on how to reduce demands at work, or
sharing responsibility for tasks and thus lower the likelihood of exhaustion [Halbesleben, 2006, Ray and
Miller, 1994]. Surprisingly, research on the dynamics in different types of social networks, their unique
nature, as well as the corresponding potential to provide social support is remarkably thin.
Thus, in the current study we will investigate the emergence and evolution of different social network
types, as well as their distinct nature based on various selection criteria, which are salient for the
corrsponding type of social networks. The paper is structured in the following way: We will begin with
our theoretical framework and hypotheses, followed by a description of our data and variables in the
model. Next we will present the results, and finalize with concluding remarks.
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4.2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
People’s characteristics and behaviors are often attributed to some essential aspect of their personality
or self identity. Driven by the motivation to enhance their self-concept, to reduce uncertainty or vali-
date their subjective beliefs, values or behavior, self-categorization theory [Turner, 1982, Turner, 1985]
suggests that people socially categorize themselves and others into ingroup and outgroups. People cogni-
tively represent the defining and stereotypical attributes of groups in the form of prototypes. Having been
constructed and committed to memory, prototypes are modified depending on features of the immediate
and salient social interactive context [Hogg and Terry, 2000, Fiske and Taylor, 1991].
Thus, through prototypes that are shared by people in the same groups, social categorization deter-
mines both normative behavior and the dynamics in social network structures. On the one hand, in the
process of choosing their affiliations, people are attracted to peers that are similar to these prototypes.
[McPherson et al., 2001a] define the principle of homophily as the tendency for relationships to emerge
and persist between people that are alike. On the other hand, in the process of validating their cog-
nitions and behaviors, people embedded in the same groups are exposed to similar social information.
Thus, homophily is an important key to the operation of social systems. There is voluminous empirical
evidence for the pattern of homophily [McPherson et al., 2001a]. Depending on the context in which it
occurs, it can take various forms, and depend on many attributes.
alike. As a result, people embedded in the same groups are ex-
posed to similar social information. Thus, homophily is an im-
portant key to the operation of social systems. There is volumi-
nous empirical evidence for the pattern of homophily McPher-
son et al. (2001a). Depending on the context in which it oc-
curs, it can take various forms, and depend on a multitude of
attributes.
Our framework is built on the taxonomy of salient dimen-
sions of homophily McPherson et al. (2001a), as shown in Fig-
ure 1, which classifies attributes according to their endogeneity.
On the one hand, we are using the term "choice homophily" to
describe the tendency to affiliate with people that are similar
on ascribed attributes such as demographics Marsden (1987);
Shrum et al. (1988); Fischer (1982); Feld (1982) and inherent
personality traits such as self-monitoring (Snyder and Copeland,
1989; Kilduff and Day, 1994; Mehra et al., 2001). On the other
hand, we are using the term "latent homophily" for the tendency
to affiliate with people that are similar on behaviors Steglich
et al. (2010); Knecht et al. (2010); Ellwardt et al. (2012); Haye
et al. (2013); Solish et al. (2010); Friemel (2012), whereby the
corresponding similarity may also be the result of interpersonal
influence.
As illustrated in the framework, the categories introduced
in the previous paragraph are overlapping, and thus create an
area for traits of people’s personality, which can be seen as hav-
ing both an invariant and endogeneous nature. While the for-
mer perspective would support the classification of homophily
based on people’s values as "choice homophily" Verbrugge (1977);
Kalmijn (1995), the latter would classify the corresponding pro-
clivity as "latent homophily", insofar as they are adjusted ac-
cording to how they are pronounced among their peers Kindschi
et al. (2019b). Cognitive dissonance theory Festinger (1962)
argues that for people experiencing a state of disharmony be-
tween their values and associated behaviors, a feeling of cog-
nitive dissonance is triggered, which urges them to create har-
mony and consistency. In their pursuit to achieve consonance,
they can change their behaviors to make them consistent with
their values or adapt their values to create harmony with re-
spect to their behaviors. The more values become part of peo-
ple’s self-identity, the stronger people will prefer the former ap-
proach compared to the latter.
The distinction between specific types of social networks is
one of the primary objectives of our theoretical framework, as
illustrated in Figure 1. The type of relationship can determine
the structure and corresponding dynamics in social networks.
But what are the boundaries of social systems? What is
the relevant context from which adolescents draw- and evaluate
information about how their peers are affiliated and how they
behave? Feld (1981) introduced the concept of organizational
foci, which are defined as social, psychological, legal, or phys-
ical entities around which joint activities are organized (e.g.,
school classes, workplaces, voluntary organizations, hangouts,
families).
Such foci represent pools of peers, with whom people can
form different types of relationships. On the one hand, affilia-
tions are intrinsic, if they become part of people’s self-concept
themselves, and thus create a self sufficient, communal relation-
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Figure 1: Theoretical framework and hypotheses in the dynamic context of
social networks:
Colors of arrows indicate the type of relationships in social networks:
Advice Networks and Friendship Networks
Regular unidirectional arrows indicate different forms of choice homophily in
–> friendship networks and –> advice networks
Regular bidirectional arrows indicate different forms of latent homophily in
co-evolutions between behavioral patterns and <–> friendship networks or
<–> advice networks and <–> between friendship- and advice networks
Dashed unidirectional arrows indicate effects from evolving behavioral
patterns on life satisfaction
Dotted arrows indicate interactions between different forms of homophily and
life satisfaction in .... > friendship networks and .... > advice networks
ship, in which people are directly concerned with the well-being
of the partner. On the other hand, affiliations are extrinsic, if
the relationship is instrumental in facilitating the achievement
of desirable goals or the enactment of corresponding behaviors
that are necessary to achieve such goals Wright (1984); Clark
(1981); Clark and Mills (1979). In this article, we focus on the
dynamics in both types of social networks, as represented by
friendship- (Bukowski et al., 1994) and advice networks Ag-
neessens and Wittek (2011).
2.1. Network selection dynamics in friendship networks
Why are teenagers forming friendships with their peers in
order to spend more time with them? Social comparison theory
Festinger (1954) proposes that people have an inherent need to
validate cognitions and behaviors. If they cannot derive suffi-
cient insights by considering their own past experiences, they
need to reach out to their peers in order to obtain more compre-
hensive information.
Apart from social validation, Wright (1984) suggests that
rewards of friendships are perceived in terms of their self refer-
ent implications. Friends have ego support value, if they are
encouraging and help to maintain an impression of people’s
competence. Friends with self affirmation value are regarded
3
Figure 4.1: Theoretical framework and hypotheses in the dynamic cont xt of social networks:
Colors of arrows indicate the type of relationships in Advice Networks and Friendship Networks
Regular unidirectional arrows indicate different forms of choice homophily in − > friendship networks
and − > advice networks
Regular bidirectional arrows indicate different forms of latent homophily in co-evolutions between
behavioral patterns and < − > friendship networks or < − > advice networks and between friendship-
and advice networks < − >
Dashed unidirectional arrows indicate effects from evolving behavioral patterns on life satisfaction
Dotted unidirectional arrows indicate interactions between different forms of homophily and life
satisfaction in .... > friendship networks and .... > advice networks
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As shown in Figure 4.1, our framework is built on the distinction between different types of re-
lationships. The environments from which adolescents draw- and evaluate information to form such
relationships are referred to as organizational foci [Feld, 1981]. They are defined as social, psycholog-
ical, legal, or physical entities around which joint activities are organized. Such foci represent pools
of peers, with whom teenagers can initiate and maintain different types of relationships. On the one
hand, relationships are intrinsic, if they become part of people’s self-concept themselves, and thus create
a self sufficient, communal relationship, in which people are directly concerned with the well-being of
the partner. On the other hand, relationships are extrinsic, if they are instrumental in facilitating the
achievement of desirable goals or the enactment of corresponding behaviors that are necessary to achieve
such goals [Wright, 1984, Clark, 1981, Clark and Mills, 1979].
According to our framework, teenagers form ties to peers based on attributes they possess. The
taxonomy of salient dimensions of homophily [McPherson et al., 2001a], classifies attributes according to
their endogeneity. On the one hand, we are using the term ”choice homophily” to describe the tendency to
affiliate with people that are similar on ascribed attributes such as demographics [Marsden, 1987, Shrum
et al., 1988, Fischer, 1982, Feld, 1982] and inherent personality traits such as self-monitoring [Snyder and
Copeland, 1989, Kilduff and Day, 1994, Mehra et al., 2001]. On the other hand, we are using the term
”latent homophily” for the tendency to affiliate with people that are similar on behaviors [Steglich et al.,
2010b, Knecht et al., 2010, Ellwardt et al., 2012, Haye et al., 2013, Solish et al., 2010, Friemel, 2012],
whereby the corresponding similarity may also be the result of interpersonal influence. The overlap
between these categories creates an area for attributes such as values, which can be seen as having both
an invariant [Verbrugge, 1977, Kalmijn, 1995] and endogeneous nature [Kindschi et al., 2019b].
In the following sections, we introduce friendship- [Bukowski et al., 1994] and advice networks [Ag-
neessens and Wittek, 2011] as representatives for each type of social networks and state our expectations
on a.) the salience of these attributes for teenagers’ selection of friends and advisors and b.) how friends
and advisors selected based on similarity on these attributes affect teenagers’ life satisfaction.
4.2.1 Network selection dynamics in friendship networks
Why are teenagers forming friendships with their peers in order to spend more time with them? Social
comparison theory [Festinger, 1954] proposes that people have an inherent need to validate cognitions
and behaviors. Teenagers need to reach out to their peers to obtain more comprehensive information for
validation, as they cannot derive sufficient insights by considering their own past experiences.
Apart from social validation, [Wright, 1984] suggests that rewards of friendships are perceived in
terms of their self referent implications. Friends have ego support value, if they are encouraging and
help to maintain an impression of one’s competence. Friends with self affirmation value are regarded
as behaving in characteristic ways that facilitate the expression and recognition of more important and
highly valued attributes of one’s self-concept. If they have stimulation value, friends are interesting,
stimulating and fostering an expansion or elaboration of one’s knowledge and perspectives. Friends with
security value are disinclined to behave in ways that would betray trust, cause embarrassment, draw
attention to points of weakness and self doubt, or otherwise threaten the integrity of one’s self-concept
- a quality, which is necessary for friendships to evolve [Kelvin, 1977]. Friends with utility value are
expressing a personalized interest and concern through their helpfulness and cooperation in meeting
one’s goals and enacting behaviors that are instrumental to achieve such goals.
Structural properties of friendship networks
Are teenagers reciprocating friendship nominations or encouraging their friends to meet and spend more
time together? [Krackhardt and Kilduff, 1999, Vaquera and Kao, 2008, Freeman, 1992] argues that
people generally expect positive affective relationships such as friendships to be mutually balanced in
terms of social capital [Coleman and Cross, 2000], irrespective of whether or not such reciprocity exists.
[Festinger and Hutte, 1954] argue that people experience feelings of uncertainty or instability, if they
perceive friendship relationships to be unbalanced. Thus, adolescents are motivated to induce balance
into their immediate friendship network structures. Although [Clark and Mills, 1979] propose that in
communal relationships such as friendships, balance is not required, they concur that the reciprocity in
giving a reward in response to a need for the reward is appropriate.
Although teenagers in friendship networks could become less popular, if their capacity to receive links
is limited, or if they incur costs when receiving links [Amaral et al., 2000], we expect adolescents with
a higher number of existing friendships to be more popular, as preferential attachment [Baraba´si and
Albert, 1999] is consistently found as a significant property in corresponding types of networks.
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Gender- and age homophily
Previous literature yields many salient dimensions on which different types of homophily can orrur.
Friendships have been shown to be more likely when people are similar in demographic attributes such as
race and ethnicity [Marsden, 1987, Shrum et al., 1988], gender [Marsden, 1987], age [Fischer, 1982, Feld,
1982, Marsden, 1987], as well as religion [Verbrugge, 1977], education [Marsden, 1987], and occupation
[Kalmijn, 1995]. Most of these attributes are ascribed, as adolescents do not have the agency or flexibility
to choose or adapt them. Furthermore, similar to the way friendship relationships can become part of
teenagers’ self-concept [Wright, 1984, Clark, 1981, Clark and Mills, 1979], all of these attributes are
central in the definition of teenagers’ self identity.
The fact that children are organized into school classes with peers of similar age levels induces strong
homophily, although this tendency was found to be less pronounced in adolescent friendship networks
[Shrum et al., 1988]. While [Eder and Hallinan, 1978] observed that children have a pronounced tendency
for gender homophily in their friendship networks, as soon as they realize that gender is a permanent
part of their personality, [Marsden, 1987] found that people’s friendship networks become more mixed
with both gender groups, when they reach adulthood. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis
for the impact of demographics on friendship selection.
Hypothesis 8a (H8a). Friendship relationships are more likely to occur if actors have the same gender
and similar age levels in contrast to advice relationships, where gender and age is not relevant.
Latent homophily based on norms of financial decision making
Given that adolescents have comparatively little life experience, they are often confronted with novel-
or ambiguous situations [McAlister and Pessemier, 1982]. Understanding the social meaning of their
behaviors [Festinger, 1954] is something teenagers can derive considerable utility from. If certain behav-
iors are adjusted to the way most other peers are behaving [Lorenz et al., 2011] in specific situations, as
they are repeatedly triggered by corresponding contextual cues, they are referred to as descriptive norms
[Cialdini and Trost, 1998].
Behaviors, for which general uniformity is emphasized in social groups, are referred to as injunctive
norms [Cialdini and Trost, 1998]. They can prescribe or proscribe what most other group members
approve or disapprove respectively, if they are triggered by corresponding situational cues. The strength
of such norms depends on the degree to which teenagers’ desire group affiliation [McAlister and Pessemier,
1982], the degree to which they fear social exclusion [Mead et al., 2010], as well as the cohesion within
their social groups. Often, the mere presence of such norms is sufficient to enforce normative behavior
[Cialdini and Trost, 1998].
Social norms are successful, if they are adaptive in promoting survival related behaviors [Schaller and
Latane´, 1996, Latane´, 1981, Latane´ et al., 1994], without unduely restricting the freedom or self-direction
of group members [Algesheimer et al., 2005, Levav and Zhu, 2009]. Maladaptive social normative behav-
iors are unlikely to survive in the presence of competing behaviors, which are useful for groups to manage
their identities, or for their members to maintain or enhance their self concept. If they are accepted and
internalized, injunctive or descriptive norms become subjective. As a result, the corresponding norma-
tive behaviors are integrated into the self concept, and teenagers show conformity even in the absence of
other group members or effective incentive mechanisms.
Practices of financial decision making are part of teenagers’ daily lives. Thus, they are likely to be
integrated in lifestyles, which teenagers use to express their self identity [Giddens, 1991]. Moreover,
practices of financial decision making are also likely to be part of prototypes, which teenagers use for
self categorization into in- and outgroups [Turner, 1982, Turner, 1985]. Thus, specific situations might
trigger social normative behaviors that capture particular practices of financial decison making [Hogg
and Terry, 2000, Fiske and Taylor, 1991]. If accepted and internalized, corresponding financial decision
making practices may become part of adolescents’ self concept. [Kindschi et al., 2019a] found that social
norms regarding practices to allocate financial resources to spending or savings are highly effective in
adolescent friendship networks. Assuming that adolescents intend for communal friendship relationships
to become aspects of their self identity, we hypothesize that teenagers want to select their friends on
the basis of financial decision making practices. In contrast, assuming that teenagers do not aim for
instrumental relationships to be part of their self identity, we hypothesize that social normative behaviors
are not used as criteria for the selection of advisors.
Hypothesis 8b (H8b). In contrast to advice relationships, friendship ties are more likely to emerge and
persist if teenagers are similar on social norms regarding financial decision making.
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4.2.2 Network selection dynamics in advice networks
Organizational foci are equally driven by instrumental goals such as members’ motivation of getting
ahead or performing their function as well as social goals such as being liked or being looked up to.
Motivations such as these can have important implications for the exchange of advice. There are two
major perspectives, which are capable to explain the evolution of advice exchange networks [Agneessens
and Wittek, 2011].
Structural properties of advice networks
The social capital perspective [Adler and Kwon, 2002] builds on the assumption that ties to other people
can provide access to valuable resources and other services. Therefore, people are likely to ”invest” in
social relations by creating and maintaining ties to resourceful peers [Sparrowe et al., 2001]. According
to this perspective, people are driven by reciprocity and equity norms prescribing that they are not
supposed to benefit from their peers’ benevolence without providing an appropriate compensation in
return. Such reciprocity can take different forms. First, repayment can be effectuated immediately
or delayed. Second, direct reciprocity refers to scenarios where resources or services are repaid to the
original benefactor. Repayment to any another member of the social system is referred to as generalized
reciprocity. Third, the form of repayment can be the same or different compared to the resource or
service received.
The social status perspective assumes people’s concern for social status - defined as being respected
and admired by others [Krackhardt, 1990] - is strongly motivating people’s behaviors and decisions.
According to this perspective, people do not only care about their relative position in social systems
[Huberman et al., 2004], but are striving for social status [Loch et al., 2001] as a means to improve
their relative position. People can improve their relative social status by giving advice, as well as by
refraining from seeking advice. The social status perspective further assumes that advice obtained from
people with a higher social status is considered more valuable than advice obtained from people with
lower social status.
Homophily in advice networks
[Labun et al., 2016] find an abundance of evidence on the respective impact of individual differences
in personality on the attainment of power and status [Judge et al., 1999], the emergence of leadership
[Judge et al., 2002], and the performance of employees [Mehra et al., 2001]. A construct with a well
documented validity to measure individual personality differences in situations such as these is the degree
of people’s self-monitoring capacities [Snyder and Copeland, 1989, Kilduff and Day, 1994, Mehra et al.,
2001]. This capacity affects how people perceive and shape their social environments, and the ways they
express themselves in social contexts [Gangestad and Snyder, 2000].
On the one hand, people with pronounced self-monitoring capacities exhibit distinct levels of self-
regulation. With superior understanding of situational appropriateness and elevated skills for social
interaction, they are acting on available cues in their social environment, and thus actively construct,
cultivate and maintain favorable public images [Gangestad and Snyder, 2000]. Having a pronounced
capacity for self-monitoring, people constantly try to impress others, as they are motivated to win their
approval and respect or to enhance their status in organizational foci [Gangestad and Snyder, 2000].
In social situations, people with pronounced self-monitoring capabilities are asking themselves: ”Who
does this situation want me to be and how can I be that person?”. On the other hand, people with
limited capacities for self-monitoring are asking this question: ”Who am I - and how can I be me - in
this situation?” [Snyder and Copeland, 1989], as they are guided from within by their affective states
and attitudes. [Snyder, 1987] found that people with high self-monitoring abilities are more successful
in acquiring social status [Flynn et al., 2006, Kilduff and Krackhardt, 1994] and more likely to emerge
as group leaders [Zaccaro et al., 1991]. Thus, we expect this capacity to be more important for the
emergence and maintenance of extrinsic social ties, reflecting social hierarchy and competition as advice
relationships do.
Hypothesis 8c (H8c). In contrast to friendship, where self monitoring is not relevant for selection,
advice relationships are more likely to emerge if actors have similar levels of self control-, resilience and
social desirability awareness.
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4.2.3 Values and network selection dynamics of friendship and advice net-
works
On the one hand, values can be a basis for the self selection into organizational foci [Feld, 1982] and
thus indirectly limit the pool of peers adolescents have the opportunity to get in contact with. On the
other hand, attributes such as values might determine the network position, which teenagers feel most
confortable with. Adolescents emphasizing power and social status might feel comfortable in central
network positions, while teenagers emphasizing compliance or conformity might be happy in peripheral
network positions. In adolescence, values are evolving - as teenagers were found to adjust their values
according to how they are pronounced with their peers [Kindschi et al., 2019b] - but also representing
attributes, which are salient for the selection of social network affiliations.
Values are defined as motivational guides [Lewin et al., 1951], conceptions [Kluckhohn, 1951], proper-
ties of entities [Heider, 1958] or beliefs about the desirability of modes of conduct and states of existence
[Morris, 1956, Rokeach, 1973]. [Rohan, 2000] find that value systems need to contain a finite number
of universally relevant value types, on which people place relative importance, which are structured
according to the motivational goals embodied by each value.
Figure 4.2: The selection of friends and advisors according to the similarity in motivational goals based
on the theory of basic human values [Schwartz et al., 2012]
Therefore, our framework uses the theory of basic human values, [Schwartz, 1992]. The theory
structures value systems in two motivational dimensions, according to conflicts and fundamental human
problems. If enacted simultaneously, values on opposite sides of these dimensions create conflict, while
the pursuit of higher order values adjacent to each other can be negotiated. In the following paragraphs,
we describe each dimension of basic human values ”self-transcendence” vs. ”self-enhancement” and
”conservation” vs. ”openness to change”, and make propositions about the respective salience for the
selection of friends or advisors.
Openness
Values on this dimension are distinguished depending on the importance assigned to ”self-direction” and
”stimulation”. Driven by the intrinsic motivation, as described in the theory of self efficacy [Bandura,
1977, Deci and Ryan, 1975, White, 1959], people who emphasize self-direction are creative or curious,
and want to discover things on their own. Furthermore, autonomy in choosing their own goals, as well as
independence in interpersonal relationships [Kluckhohn, 1951, Kohn and Schooler, 1983, Morris, 1956],
are strong requirements for people in pursuit of self-direction. People who emphasize stimulation want
to maintain an optimal level of activation through variety seeking [Berlyne, 1960, Houston and Mednick,
1963, Maddi, 1961, Farley, 1986]. Thus, they search for excitement, novelty, and challenge in life [Deci
and Ryan, 1975].
58
Conservation
Values on this dimension are categorized depending on the degree to which people place importance on
”security”, ”conformity” and ”tradition”. People who emphasize security, are pursuing safety, harmony,
and stability on the individual-, the dyadic- as well as the society level, [Kluckhohn, 1951, Maslow, 1959].
Security values can serve collective interests, in which case people place great emphasis on social order,
the reciprocation of favors, and family- or national security. However, security values can also serve in-
dividual interests, in which case people highly emphasize their sense of belonging. People who prioritize
conformity want to facilitate social interactions by restraining socially disruptive behavior, inclinations
or impulses, which might upset or harm those alters or violate social norms [Freud, 1933, Kohn and
Schooler, 1983, Parsons, 1991]. Thus, they want to honor parents or elders and place great importance
on being obedient, self-disciplined, and polite. Finally, traditions and customs are represented by sym-
bols, religious rites, beliefs, and norms of behavior [Sumner, 1906, Radcliffe-Brown, 1952]. Such norms
symbolize a group’s solidarity, express its unique positioning, and presumably guarantee its survival
[Durkheim, 1964, Parsons, 1991]. Individuals, who prioritize tradition emphasize humility, devotion,
moderation, and the acceptance of one’s place and role in life, and show respect and commitment for
customs imposed by their culture or religion.
Self-transcendence
The values underlying this dimension can be grouped into two distinct sets of values labeled as ”benev-
olence” and ”universalism”. Driven by the need for positive social interactions [Schwartz and Bilsky,
1987, Kluckhohn, 1951] and affiliation [Korman, 1974, Maslow, 1959], people emphasizing benevolence
exhibit concern for the prosperity of people in their immediate social environment. Thus, they emphasize
the preservation and maturation of true friendship, and pro-sociality towards people with whom per-
sonal interactions are frequent. As a consequence, people who emphasize benevolence want to be helpful-,
loyal-, forgiving-, honest-, reliable and trustworthy friends. People in pursuit of universalism goals strive
for understanding, appreciation, tolerance for different groups and cultures. Their pro-sociality extends
to include the welfare of all people as well as the protection of nature [Maslow, 1959].
Self Enhancement
This dimension introduces the distinction between achievement and power values. People emphasizing
ambition or personal success want to demonstrate competence according to internal- [Deci and Ryan,
1975, McClelland et al., 1953] or social- and cultural standards of excellence in order to obtain resources
for survival and social approval [Maslow, 1959, Rokeach, 1973, Scott and Scott, 1965]. The objective for
individuals who emphasize power is to attain social status [Durkheim, 1964, Parsons, 1991], prestige, and
control or dominance over people and resources [Korman, 1974, Schutz, 1958, Allport, 1961, Gordon,
1960]. Thus, they emphasize authority, wealth, social power, social recognition, or the preservation of
their public image. The pursuit of social esteem is common for both power- and achievement values.
Whereas the demonstration of competence in social interactions is emphasized by achievement values,
power values focus on the attainment or preservation of a dominant position within the social system.
We expect that the conflict between self-direction (openness), vs. harmony and conformity (conserva-
tion) [Schwartz, 1992] is very important for teamwork and the exchange of advice. Group decisions need
compromise and harmony. Therefore, collaboration in teams, where all members place equally strong
emphasis on harmony is superior to teamwork in groups, where all members want to make their own deci-
sions and don’t care about harmony or conformity. Despite its importance for the collaboration in teams,
we expect that the conflict between, leadership (self-enhancement) and pro sociality (self-transcendence)
values is not likely to be considered for the selection of advisors. If it was considered, the odds are that
groups could end up being unbalanced with a majority of leaders or followers.
Furthermore, we expect that in communal relationships such as friendships, the conflict between
leadership (self-enhancement) and pro sociality (self-transcendence) takes precedence. Even though
sharing values such as stimulation (openness) and tradition (conservation) can be a good basis for
friendships, there is no match compared to the self referent implications, which benevolence, pro sociality
or the concern for the welfare of others (self-transcendence) have for friendships [Wright, 1984].
Hypothesis 8d (H8d). Friendship is more likely to exist if teenagers are similar on self transcendence-,
and self-enhancement values, whereas advice relationships are more likely to exist if teenagers are similar
on openness to change- and conservation values.
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4.2.4 Homophilous tendencies in the selection of friends and advisors and
their reflection in life satisfaction
[Veenhoven and Ehrhardt, 1995] define life satisfaction as the degree to which one judges the quality of
one’s life favorably. Adolescents can either make this judgement based on the foundation of their own
experiences or through social comparison [Festinger, 1954, Diener et al., 1985, Sagiv and Schwartz, 2000].
On the one hand, supporting previous research on friendship relationships in the work environment
[Ibarra, 1993], [Markiewicz et al., 2000] and [Avery et al., 2007] found that same sex ties are more
engaged, and thus more satisfactory than opposite sex ties. Therefore, we expect that teenagers with
a more pronounced tendency for gender homphily to be more satisfied than teenagers that don’t show
any preferences for same sex friendships. On the other hand, investigating friendship relationships in the
work environment, [Avery et al., 2007] found that levels of engagement - and correspondingly levels of
satisfaction - are higher among coworkers with similar age levels compared to coworkers with different
age levels. Therefore, we expect teenagers with marked levels of homophilous tendencies concerning the
age levels of their peers to be more satisfied than teenagers that don’t show any preferences for similarity
concerning their friends’ age levels.
Hypothesis 9a (H9a). Life satisfaction is positively associated with the tendency to select same sex
friends and friends that have similar age levels.
We hypothesized that teenagers are more likely to use financial decision making practices to select
their friends [Kindschi et al., 2019a] rather than their advisors [Wright, 1984, Clark, 1981, Clark and Mills,
1979]. On the one hand, motivations to perform financial decision making practices can be extrinsic,
in which case they constitute social norms. As a result, adolescents are performing these practices
based on their need for social harmony and -affiliation [McAlister and Pessemier, 1982] or based on
their fear of social exclusion [Mead et al., 2010]. However, teenagers will only use normative financial
decision making practices to select their friends, if each of the following conditions is met. First, social
normative behaviors are readily observable, and thus allow teenagers to distinguish between in- and
outgroups [Turner, 1982, Turner, 1985]. Second, the majority of ingroup members possess highly valued
attributes, which teenagers cannot readily observe, but which they expect to be strongly associated with
the social normative behaviors they observe. Third, teenagers are triggered to attribute the performance
of normative financial decision making practices, and prefer to do so internally [Cooper and Fazio, 1984].
As a consequence, performing extrinsically motivated financial decision making practices might trigger
cognitive dissonance [Festinger, 1962] - a state, which we expect to be comparable to a mood, and thus
negatively affecting teenagers’ life satisfaction [Schwarz and Clore, 1983].
On the other hand, motivations to perform financial decision making practices can also be intrinsic.
Being internalized in teenagers’ self identities, compliance with social norms such as these is not likely
to trigger cognitive dissonance - and thus affect life satisfaction.
[Kindschi et al., 2019a] found that social norms regarding practices of spending and saving money -
to which adolescents are subject in friendship networks - are highly effective. However, we do not expect
that teenagers are using financial decision making practices to select their friends, if these practices have
not been internalized in their self identities.
Hypothesis 9b (H9b). Therefore we expect that similarity in social normative behavior is not affecting
teenagers’ life satisfaction in friendship networks.
According to [Kilduff and Day, 1994], high self-monitors are characterized as pragmatic and utilitar-
ian, whereas low self-monitors are described as committed and principled in their respective approaches
to relationships. People scoring high on their capacity for self-monitoring refrain from making emotional
investments in relationships and strive to maintain flexibility. In contrast, people with lower capacities
for self-monitoring are willing to make emotional investments in relationships so that they can be true to
themselves. Thus, we expect that advice relationship partners with similar willingness to make emotional
investments are more highly satisfied with their lives, whereas the level of life satisfaction is lower among
advice relationship partners, whose willingness to make emotional investments is different.
Hypothesis 9c (H9c). Life satisfaction is positively associated with the tendency to select advisors
showing similar levels of self-monitoring.
We hypothesized that the respective salience of value priorities for friendship- and advice network se-
lection is determined by the principle, which structures values in two dimensions according to fundamental
human conflicts [Schwartz et al., 2012]. The hypothesis stating that similarity on the self-transcendence
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vs. self-enhancement dimension is fostering friendship, while similarity on the conservation vs. openness
to change dimension is facilitating advice relationships, assumes that respective similarity on either value
dimension is somehow rewarding in corresponding networks. While friends and family can offer emotional
support and trigger memories of personal accomplishment, coworkers and supervisors can offer shared
responsibility for tasks as well as suggestions about how to reduce workload [Halbesleben, 2006, Ray
and Miller, 1994]. We expect that the respective social support provided by friends and advisors is more
rewarding if they are similar on the corresponding value dimensions.
Hypothesis 9d (H9d). Similarity in self-enhancement and self-transcendence values has a positive effect
on life satisfaction in friendship networks, while similarity in conservation and openness to change values
has a positive effect on life satisfaction in advice networks.
4.3 Data and method
Our selection of samples is a result of the goal to find two European countries, which have similar
school structures, but represent two societies with largely different values or lifestyles. Figure 1 of
the Appendix shows the positions of 76 countries on seven different dimensions of cultural orientations.
While Eastern European countries are culturally oriented towards harmony, Western European countries
are oriented towards intellectual autonomy and egalitarianism. We selected Switzerland and Poland as
representatives for each of the primary cultural groups in Europe. Despite having selected multiple
countries, our intention for the current article is not to compare the nature and dynamics in social
network structures and their co-evolution with financial decision making norms across countries.
Our study is designed as a longitudinal three-wave panel with three cohorts. In both Switzerland and
Poland, we commissioned three surveys starting in October 2015 until December 2016. In three waves,
we interviewed pupils, who entered the first- and second cycles of primary education on the 1st and 4th
grades as well as pupils, who entered compulsory- or voluntary secondary education on the 7th and 9th
grades respectively. Thus, for all pupils participating in the study, the observation period starts at a
point, where they are reassembled in new classes and are assigned new teachers, such that overall, they
are exposed to a relatively new pool of peers, whom they did not know before.
4.3.1 Samples
In order to study the evolution of social network structures and financial decision making norms, schools
can be considered to provide ideal environments for three reasons. First, these processes display consid-
erable dynamics in school classes. The main function of schools is to provide an environment for children
and adolescents, facilitating the acquisition of cognitive and social skills, However, schools are also arenas
for pupils to observe traits and behaviors of peers and thus validate their own. Second, in the school
environment, pupils are encouraged to collaborate and exchange knowledge. Although primary educa-
tion is still dominated by hierarchically nested class structures, pupils in secondary education are no
longer nested in single classes, but are given the option to self-select into performance classes for specific
subjects - and are thus to some extent provided with a mirror for workplace environments. Third, being
embedded in the regulatory environment of the government, the school environment protects pupils from
various external forces, which could potentially co-determine their decisions and behaviors. Following
exemplary studies from previous research [Mercken et al., 2010, Steglich et al., 2010b, Knecht et al.,
2010, Solish et al., 2010, Ellwardt et al., 2012, Friemel, 2012, Haye et al., 2013], we conclude that this
environment can be seen as an ideal context for our study.
4.3.2 Design
The waves in our longitudinal design are representing the number of times pupils were interviewed. The
dynamics of the processes under consideration of this study are expected to be highest at the beginning
of the group formation process [Friemel, 2012]. Thus, the timing, when surveys were administered to
pupils is designed with proportionally increasing time windows between waves of data collection. The
longitudinal design is intended to limit the exposure of respondents to surveys, while making sure that
all dynamics in the processes under consideration are captured. In both countries, subjects entered our
compulsory and voluntary secondary school cohorts at the age of 12 or 13 and left those cohorts at the
age of 15 or 16. The sample size and composition is summarized in Table 4.1.
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4.3.3 Procedures
All procedures contributing to this work are in compliance with the ethical standards of the relevant
national and institutional committees. The surveys commissioned in the various school classes were
supervised by trained students. At each wave in each cohort, data was collected during a full school
hour of 45 minutes. In order to eliminate method bias, data was collected using the same method across
all waves for each pupil. Respondents surveyed in Switzerland were provided with questionnaires in
paper and pencil form, while surveys commissioned in Poland were administered online. Pupils and their
parents were informed about the design and purpose of the study several weeks before data collection
started. Due to different regulations concerning data protection, we used different approaches to obtain
parental consent for the participation of Swiss- and Polish pupils in our study. All parents in Switzerland
were provided with an opt-out possibility. Out of all 1’193 pupils in the Swiss sample, none of the parents
made use of that possibility. In contrast, parents in Poland were specifically asked to opt-in. From a
total of 2’743 pupils sampled in Poland, approximately 67% of the corresponding parents provided their
consent.
In order to make the school classes in both countries comparable in terms of participation rates, we
excluded 86 secondary school classes, where absences in any given wave exceeded 50%, due to the opt-in
procedure. The result of this process can be seen in Table 4.1. The sample we used for our analyses
includes 73 secondary school classes from Switzerland and Poland.
Table 4.1: Panel size in Switzerland and Poland
Country Wave Panel Analysis
sites classes pupils sites classes pupils
Switzerland
1 8 55 1’183 7 44 890
2 8 55 1’193 7 44 890
3 7 44 890 7 44 890
Poland
1 31 105 2’733 6 29 670
2 29 105 2’743 6 29 670
3 29 105 2’700 6 29 670
4.3.4 Measures
The aim of this study is to investigate a.) the dynamics and the unique nature of teenagers’ friendship-
and advice networks, b.) the formation and effectiveness of social normative financial decision making
practices in the social context of these networks, and c.) the impact of homophily in the selection of
friends and advisors on life satisfaction. In order to investigate these aspects, this study uses the following
measures.
Values
Our study uses two versions of the Portrait Value Questionnaire [Schwartz et al., 2012] to collect data on
respondents values. These versions only differ in the number of items contained therein. The set of items
used in both versions includes 13 items asking respondents to compare themselves to peers described in
short statements and to evaluate how similar they are to these peers on a six-point scale ranging from
”not similar at all” to ”very similar”.
Social networks
The friendship network data was collected with a roster design. All names of the pupils in each class
were displayed on a list, including those who did not participate in the survey or those absent from the
class at the dates scheduled for the waves. Pupils were asked ”How strong is your friendship with your
classmates?” They responded on a six point scale ranging from ”very close” to ”no friendship at all”. In
line with the friendship quality scale [Bukowski et al., 1994], pupils were consistently given instructions
to determine the strength of friendship by the proportion of leisure or recreation time they voluntarily
spent together, as shown in Section 2 of the Appendix.
For the collection of advice network data, questionnaires also included roster designs, displaying the
names of the pupils in each class on a list, including those who did not participate in the survey. Pupils
were asked about their conversation partners on school related topics and homework (without specifying
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specific subjects): ”In the past three months, how often did you contact your classmates to talk about
school topics or homework?” As shown in Section 2 of the Appendix, answer options included ”never”,
”rarely”, ”occasionally”, ”regularly”, ”often”, and ”constantly”.
Because the methodology we applied in our analyses is restricted to binary data, all possible thresh-
olds for dichotomization were tested. Cutting off the weighted friendship or advice networks above or
below the levels of five or four respectively creates very sparse or dense networks with insufficient net-
work dynamics. Therefore, friendship and advice networks were dichotomized at the cut-off weights of
five and four respectively. As a consequence, actors’ decisions additionally include situations, where
acquaintanceships or relationships based on occasional exchange of advice are upgraded to friendships or
relationships based on constant exchange of advice, and not only ties created from non-existing relation-
ships. Likewise, actors’ decisions not only include situations, where existing advice- or friendship ties
are dissolved completely, but also friendships that are downgraded to acquaintanceships or relationships,
where constant exchange of advice is downgraded to occasional exchange of advice.
Financial Endowment Allocations
To test our hypotheses it is important to frame financial endowments as disposable income. Therefore,
the scale was positioned in succession of a section on cooperative behavior, which was measured through
simultaneous dictator games and incentivized through a lottery. As a result, in the section on financial
endowment allocations, pupils were asked how they would allocate their winnings, if they were to be
randomly selected as beneficiaries in the lottery. Through the aggregation of items for discretionary
expenditures from [Crouch et al., 2007] into broader categories in our questionnaire, pupils were asked to
indicate the proportion of their winnings they would allocate to ”consumption”, ”savings”, ”donations”,
and ”other purposes”. The proportions allocated to ”consumption” and ”other purposes” were paid in
direct succession of the survey. The proportion allocated to ”savings” was paid out nine months later.
To measure time preferences and the ability to delay immediate gratification, pupils were asked how
much of their winnings they would sacrifice in order to receive the payment immediately as opposed to
nine months later. In scenarios, were pupils wanted to donate financial endowments, they were asked to
select one out of four categories: ”nature protection”, ”animal protection”, ”diseases and handicaps” or
”poverty and catastrophes” and then choose one out of three charitable organizations. The proportions
of the winnings allocated to ”donations” were then pooled and paid out to the charitable organizations
chosen by the pupils.
Life Satisfaction
This study is based on the five dimensional satisfaction with life scale [Diener et al., 1985] with a focus on
general perceived life satisfaction. Therefore, we use the following single item to measure life satisfaction:
”All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life these days”. Pupils were given consistent
instructions to determine their satisfaction by considering all possible spheres of their lives. The scale
on general perceived life satisfaction is shown in Section 2 of the Appendix.
Self monitoring
To measure the capacity to change and adapt the self as a reaction to situational cues of the social
environment, this study uses a 10 point scale for self control and self regulation, which was developed by
[Tangney et al., 2018]. Pupils were asked to evaluate items including the ability to resist temptations,
to break disadvantageous habits, to focus in the presence of distractions, and to regulate impulses. To
measure the capacity for positive adaptation in the face of stress or difficulty, this study uses a 10 point
scale for resilience, as developed by [Campbell-Sills and Stein, 2007]. Pupils were asked to evaluate items
such as the ability to cope with stress or difficulty, to recover from defeat, and to achieve goals in the
presence of handicaps. For the measurement of the capacity to detect cues signalling the situational
appropriateness of practices in any given social environment, this study uses 16 items comprising the
social- and ethical risk dimensions of the domain specific risk taking scale [Weber et al., 2002]. Pupils
were asked to evaluate the likelihood according to which they would carry out activities associated with
social- and ethical risks. Within the social risk domain, items included the chance that they would stand
up for non-conforming tastes, express provocative views, as well as argue and persevere in defending
unpopular views. Within the ethical risk domain, items included the likelihood according to which
they would steal items from shops, submit someone else’s work as their own, forge signatures, withhold
information to be revealed or reveal information to be kept secret.
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4.3.5 Analytical approach
We are drawing on stochastic actor-oriented network models (SAOMs) to investigate the dynamic pro-
cesses of network selection and adaption to social normative behaviors within friendship and advice
networks. These models were introduced by [Snijders, 2001, Snijders et al., 2010] and implemented in
RSiena by [Ripley et al., 2011]. At the core of these models are changes in behavior and network ties
between panel waves. On the one hand, behaviors of actors can change over time. Such changes can
either be the outcome of actors’ characteristics (e.g., actors change behaviors because of attributes they
currently possess) or of their peers’ characteristics (e.g., actors change behaviors because of attributes
their friends or advisors possess). On the other hand, relationships between actors can emerge or disap-
pear in time. Such changes in the network structure can be the outcome of an actor’s structural position
within the network, (e.g., actors form ties to others because they are friends of friends or give advice
to advisors), an actor’s characteristics (e.g., actors are attractive because of attributes they possess), or
characteristics shared by actors (e.g., actors are attractive because they are similar on specific attributes).
In a wide variety of contexts, SAOMs are used to study network dynamics and behavior change [Van de
Bunt et al., 2005, Van Duijn et al., 2003, Schaefer et al., 2011] or the co-evolution of networks and actor
behavior [Checkley and Steglich, 2007, Burk et al., 2007, Pearson et al., 2006, Steglich et al., 2010b, Lewis
et al., 2012].
Estimation procedure
SAOMs are applied to longitudinal behavior as well as complete, directed and longitudinal networks to
model changes in behavior and network ties. Although these types of data are measured at discrete
waves, SAOMs assume a continuing underlying process with behavior- or network tie changes occurring
sequentially. Actors can make decisions regarding their behavior (e.g., increases- or decreases, as well
as keeping their current state) or their network ties (e.g., creation or dissolution, as well as keeping the
current state). Each individual decision an actor makes is represented by a so-called mini-step, which is
modeled by two underlying processes.
First, a rate function determines the order, according to which actors are allowed to make decisions.
Using a period-wise constant rate function, we do not assume any difference in the rate of change between
actors. Second, the chosen actors evaluate all potential changes in their behavior and network space.
Assuming specific dynamics to happen, an objective function including the corresponding parameters is
specified, and actors consider how each change in their behavior or network structure would affect their
utility regarding these parameters. For factors that are combined in the objective function and thus
determine actors’ decisions, SAOMs use the term ’effects’. ”Homophily” and ”Average Similarity” are
examples for such effects. If the parameter for average similarity is positive, actors are more likely to adapt
their behaviors towards the average expressions of their friends or advisors than to keep their current
state or diverge to more extreme behavioral expressions. If the parameter for homophily is positive,
actors are more likely to select friends or advisors that are similar on specific attributes or dissolve ties
to dissimilar friends or advisors. Thus, actors compare the outcome of the objective function for each
behavior- or network state that results from every possible change in behavior or network structure. At
the conclusion of each mini-step, the behavior- or network states, which are most likely to be chosen by
actors are those with the highest values in the objective functions. In a series of mini-steps connecting
empirical observations, the parameters that attach relative importance to the corresponding effects are
estimated. The interpretation of parameters estimated in SAOMs is similar to parameters that are
estimated in a multinomial logistic regression, where θ is the log odds ratio, as they co-determine the
relative likelihood of a mini-step to be realized. For a non-technical introduction to the method, we refer
to [Snijders, 2001, Steglich et al., 2006, Snijders et al., 2010].
The capacity to capture the mechanisms that drive behavior- and network change simultaneously
is the main reason why we decided to use SAOMs. First, the dynamics of behaviors and networks are
conditioned on the first observation. As a result, no assumptions regarding the respective states of
equilibrium have to be made. Second, given the multinomial nature of these models, each process can
be estimated net of the other.
Model specification
The structural effects we include in our analyses have been selected on the basis of theoretical consider-
ations based on past experience with these models, and based on results from previous studies using this
method with similar data [Steglich et al., 2010b]. Outdegree determines the average degree, and can be
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compared to an intercept in regression analyses. Reciprocity sneti (x) =
∑
j xijxji is the tendency of ac-
tors to reciprocate ties to each other. The variations of geometrically weighted edgewise shared partners
sneti (x) =
∑n
j=1 xije
α
{
1− (1− e−α)
∑n
h=1 xihxhj
}
and sneti (x) =
∑n
j=1 xije
α
{
1− (1− e−α)
∑n
h=1 xjhxhi
}
model situations in which a friend of a friend (an advisor of an advisor) nominates the focal actor as a
friend (asks the focal actor for advice) cyclicality, as opposed to situations, where a friend of a friend
(an advisor of an advisor) is nominated by the focal actor as friend (is asked for advice by the focal
actor) transitivity. Indegree popularity sneti (x) =
∑
j xij
∑
h xhj controls for dispersion in indegrees and
investigates if somebody who already has a lot of incoming ties is more popular as a target of further
nominations for friendship- or advice exchange relationships. Linear shape svali (z) = zi controls for the
general tendency to change one’s financial decision-making priorities. The inclusion of the quadratic
shape effect, which measures the tendency to change financial decision-making priorities depending on
one’s current priority for specific allocations of financial resources, could not be empirically justified in
our data. As a consequence, we excluded this effect from our analyses.
First, we specify the model with regard to changes in allocations of financial resources. In all analyses
that are reported in Table 4.2, models include the average similarity effect, as well as effects from
satisfaction. The former effect measures the tendency to adapt one’s priorities concerning the allocation
of financial resources in order to become more similar to one’s friends or advisors. The latter estimates
the effects of life satisfaction on changes in the way specific purposes are prioritized in financial decision-
making.
Second, we specify value homophily, as measured by dyadic effects indicating the similarity between
actors. These effects capture the tendency for friendship or advice relationships to form between actors
who are similar on certain attributes. In all analyses, we include ego-, alter-, and dyadic effects for value-
and financial decision-making priorities as well as self-monitoring capacities, which refer to the tendency
to send or receive friendship- or advice ties based on such priorities or capacities, or to the preference
for having friendship- or advice relationships with peers, who are similar on such capacities or priorities.
Additional models further include an effect for having the same age and gender, The statistics for age
and gender effects are zero, if sender and recipient of a given tie have different age levels or genders, and
one if they have the same age or gender. We excluded ego- and alter-effects for age and gender as we
did not find any theoretical support for their inclusion in literature.
Third, we report results on interactions of effects on satisfaction with average similarity effects as
well as interactions between ego satisfaction and dyadic effects of homophily based on values, social mon-
itoring capacities, financial decision making practices, and demographic characteristics. The statistics
for interaction effects are calculated as the product of the respective statistics.
Meta-analytical procedure
We follow a two stage procedure to aggregate our results in a meta-analysis. In the first stage, we use an
unconventional Method of Moments to estimate the model parameters and perform goodness of fit tests
for each school class separately. Goodness of fit tests are simulating data on auxiliary statistics, which are
compared to the corresponding statistics of observed data. Complying with the standard for publications
using SAOMs, we require adequate fit on the auxiliary statistics of indegree- behavior distributions, which
was achieved on average for 50 % of all secondary school classes. In the second stage, the separately
estimated parameters for each class are aggregated according to the meta-analytical method proposed
by [Snijders and Baerveldt, 2003, Ripley et al., 2011].
In this meta-analysis, the mean and variance of the θ vector are estimated across all school classes.
Results are reported in each column denoted accordingly, whereby the upper value is the mean µθ and
the lower value represents the standard error σθ. For any given effect, µθ is interpreted as the log odds
ratio. If µθ is estimated at 0.5, the odds ratio is e
µθ = 1.65, so the probability for this effect to be
present is 65% higher compared to the probability for this effect to be absent. For each effect, µθ and
σθ are tested using Fisher’s combined probability tests, investigating if the null Hypothesis: θ = 0 can
be rejected in at least one school class [Mercken et al., 2010]. The results reported in each column are
both tested against θ 6= 0 (two sided tests) as well as θ < 0 and θ > 0 (one sided tests).
4.4 Results
The following section is structured according to the unique types of social networks. Results on a subset
of effects used for Hypothesis testing are reported in Table 4.2. The first column denoted as ”Hypothesis”
indicates for each hypothesis, which rows of Table 4.2 are used to test it. Results of the corresponding
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goodness of fit tests are listed at the bottom Table 4.2. All meta-analyses including the complete lists of
effects are shown in the corresponding Tables of the Appendix, as indicated in the last column denoted
as ”Model”.
4.4.1 Dynamics in friendship networks
The results provide sufficient evidence to support Hypotheses 8a and 9a in friendship networks. Gender
and age levels are very salient attributes for friendship networks to emerge and persist. Depending on
the specific value priorities, which co-determine friendship selection along with the gender attribute,
same sex friendships are between 37% (openness to change) and 47% (conservation) more likely to exist
compared to friendships among peers with different genders. In particular, given that friendship selection
is co-determined by gender and similarities on conservation values, the odds for gender homophily to
result in higher life satisfaction are 7% higher than the odds for life satisfaction to be decreased- or
to remain unaffected by this tendency. Contrary to our expectations, gender homophily is even more
pronounced in advice networks, as shown in additional analyses in Tables 6.46, 6.47 and 6.48 of the
Appendix exploring the salience of attributes for the selection of both friends and advisors.
Furthermore, teenagers are not attracted to peers with similar age levels, but rather tend to befriend
those with different age levels, as indicated by the results in Table 4.2 and confirmed by additional
analyses in Tables 6.37, 6.38 and 6.39 of the Appendix controlling for the motivational goals underlying
teenagers’ behavioral changes. Surprisingly, the odds for such heterophily based on the level of maturity
to have a positive impact on life satisfaction are 6% higher than the odds in favor of the complementary
event.
The additional analyses investigating the salience of attributes for the selection of both friends and
advisors also confirm Hypothesis 8b suggesting that unlike advice networks, friendship networks are
formed and maintained on the basis of social normative behaviors such as financial decision making
practices. As shown in Tables 6.40, 6.41 and 6.42 of the Appendix, social norms regarding charity
donations appear to be ineffective, as actors do not appear to adjust their corresponding priorities to
the average level of charity donations among their friends. However, social norms regarding saving-
and spending practices appear to be highly effective, as teenagers are up to 123% and 216% more
likely to adapt their respective spending- and saving practices to the average expression among their
friends compared to keeping their current behavioral patterns or diverging further away from the average
expression of their friends’ financial decision making practices.
These findings on changes in behavioral patterns in friendship networks are compatible with the
results on friendship selection shown in Table 4.2. Through the similarity in practices for the allocation
of financial resources to savings or spending, friendships are 63% and 52% more likely to exist respectively,
compared to friendships among peers with dissimilar levels on financial decision making practices. In
contrast, similarity in practices for shifting money to charitable organizations does not make friendships
more likely to emerge or persist. Our findings additionally confirm Hypothesis 9b, as life satisfaction
appears to be unaffected by latent homophily based on financial decision making practices.
Hypothesis 8d is partially supported by our data. On the one hand, our expectations concerning
the homophily based on self-enhancement values in friendship networks are confirmed. The odds for
teenagers that are similar on self-enhancement values to be friends are higher than the odds for them to
ignore each other in friendship considerations. First, in co-evolution with changes in practices to shift
money to charitable organization, adolescents that are similar on self-enhancement are equally likely
select each other as friends (26% more likely, log odds ratio = 0.230) and advisors (26% more likely,
log odds ratio = 0.231). Second, in co-evolution with spending practices, the odds for teenagers to
be friends if they are similar on self-transcendence values are no different than the odds for them to
ignore each other in friendship selection. Third, in co-evolution with saving practices, our expectations
are confirmed, as this proclivity can be observed for the selection of both friends (45% more likely, log
odds ratio = 0.370) and advisors (57% more likely, log odds ratio = 0.452). On the other hand, our
findings do not provide support for Hypothesis 8d concerning the homophily based on self-transcendence
values in friendship networks. Furthermore, in contrast to our expectations from Hypothesis 9d, neither
homophily based on self-enhancement values nor corresponding tendencies based on self-transcendence
values have an impact on life satisfaction.
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Table 4.2: Social normative behaviors in friendship and advice networks
friendship networks advice networks
Self-transcendence Self-enhancement Conservation Openness to change Self-transcendence Self-enhancement Conservation Openness to change
Hypothesis Effects
µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p µθ Fisher’s p Model
σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p σθ Fisher’s [l,r] p
network transformation to
0.135 0.188 0.173 0.286 0.773 *** 0.845 *** 0.805 *** 0.857 ***
Table 6.42
0.209 [ 0.943 , 0.164 ] 0.205 [ 0.938 , 0.129 ] 0.226 [ 0.853 , 0.17 ] 0.252 [ 0.939 , 0.043 ] 0.153 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.121 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.128 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.148 [ 1 , 0 ]
satisfaction based selection effects:
-0.027 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 0.050 * 0.051 *** 0.025 0.045 *
satisfaction alter
0.020 [ 0.037 , 0.278 ] 0.024 [ 0.081 , 0.236 ] 0.019 [ 0.125 , 0.354 ] 0.023 [ 0.101 , 0.294 ] 0.021 [ 0.815 , 0.009 ] 0.016 [ 0.934 , 0.003 ] 0.023 [ 0.566 , 0.063 ] 0.018 [ 0.831 , 0.003 ]
Table 6.40
satisfaction ego
0.000 -0.015 -0.020 0.014 -0.001 -0.020 -0.034 0.000
Table 6.40
0.040 [ 0.28 , 0.486 ] 0.047 [ 0.132 , 0.578 ] 0.041 [ 0.179 , 0.692 ] 0.040 [ 0.573 , 0.418 ] 0.037 [ 0.151 , 0.152 ] 0.029 [ 0.04 , 0.289 ] 0.029 [ 0.045 , 0.797 ] 0.025 [ 0.138 , 0.498 ]
0.229 0.290 * 0.256 † 0.198 0.043 -0.048 0.164 -0.049
satisfaction similarity
0.154 [ 0.842 , 0.026 ] 0.146 [ 0.919 , 0.037 ] 0.140 [ 0.898 , 0.044 ] 0.145 [ 0.893 , 0.093 ] 0.169 [ 0.466 , 0.158 ] 0.121 [ 0.483 , 0.279 ] 0.157 [ 0.851 , 0.05 ] 0.126 [ 0.569 , 0.203 ]
Table 6.40
demography based selection effects:
0.009 0.033 -0.015 0.020
8a same age
0.054 [ 0.133 , 0.328 ] 0.074 [ 0.186 , 0.125 ] 0.054 [ 0.107 , 0.504 ] 0.065 [ 0.178 , 0.17 ]
Table 6.41
same age 0.044 0.064 0.061 † 0.082 †
9a
*ego satisfaction 0.036 [ 0.768 , 0.071 ] 0.046 [ 0.807 , 0.04 ] 0.036 [ 0.859 , 0.074 ] 0.043 [ 0.929 , 0.007 ]
Table 6.41
0.350 *** 0.355 *** 0.382 *** 0.312 ***
8a same sex
0.066 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.064 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.068 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.054 [ 1 , 0 ]
Table 6.40
same sex 0.049 0.073 0.071 † 0.041
9a
*ego satisfaction 0.044 [ 0.631 , 0.023 ] 0.047 [ 0.741 , 0.007 ] 0.043 [ 0.805 , 0.01 ] 0.045 [ 0.587 , 0.074 ]
Table 6.40
behavior based selection effects:
0.016 0.013 0.016 0.024 †
savings alter
0.019 [ 0.804 , 0.101 ] 0.018 [ 0.708 , 0.202 ] 0.018 [ 0.778 , 0.139 ] 0.014 [ 0.964 , 0.119 ]
Table 6.43
savings ego
-0.011 -0.020 -0.016 -0.012
Table 6.43
0.014 [ 0.209 , 0.822 ] 0.015 [ 0.081 , 0.953 ] 0.015 [ 0.089 , 0.915 ] 0.014 [ 0.088 , 0.94 ]
0.490 † 0.429 0.570 † 0.617 *
8b savings similarity
0.292 [ 0.863 , 0.017 ] 0.270 [ 0.968 , 0.059 ] 0.297 [ 0.971 , 0.021 ] 0.250 [ 0.995 , 0.011 ]
Table 6.43
9b
savings similarity -0.107 -0.018 -0.096 -0.082
Table 6.43
*ego satisfaction 0.157 [ 0.306 , 0.688 ] 0.146 [ 0.517 , 0.549 ] 0.158 [ 0.261 , 0.753 ] 0.150 [ 0.309 , 0.694 ]
spending alter
0.004 0.006 0.010 -0.005
Table 6.44
0.021 [ 0.574 , 0.213 ] 0.022 [ 0.434 , 0.231 ] 0.023 [ 0.547 , 0.237 ] 0.018 [ 0.531 , 0.417 ]
spending ego
-0.005 -0.010 0.009 0.005
Table 6.44
0.015 [ 0.696 , 0.594 ] 0.015 [ 0.726 , 0.475 ] 0.019 [ 0.85 , 0.254 ] 0.016 [ 0.921 , 0.31 ]
0.419 † 0.200 0.414 0.244
8b spending similarity
0.256 [ 0.975 , 0.068 ] 0.270 [ 0.896 , 0.206 ] 0.287 [ 0.925 , 0.058 ] 0.275 [ 0.969 , 0.082 ]
Table 6.44
9b
spending similarity -0.066 -0.065 -0.072 0.037
Table 6.44
*ego satisfaction 0.175 [ 0.42 , 0.902 ] 0.179 [ 0.46 , 0.935 ] 0.175 [ 0.447 , 0.946 ] 0.165 [ 0.551 , 0.659 ]
donations alter
0.003 0.012 0.001 0.009
Table 6.45
0.032 [ 0.588 , 0.617 ] 0.032 [ 0.633 , 0.55 ] 0.030 [ 0.601 , 0.684 ] 0.032 [ 0.639 , 0.486 ]
donations ego
0.012 0.002 -0.003 0.010
Table 6.45
0.032 [ 0.801 , 0.223 ] 0.031 [ 0.635 , 0.32 ] 0.030 [ 0.62 , 0.4 ] 0.031 [ 0.702 , 0.243 ]
0.341 0.382 0.247 0.360
8b donations similarity
0.302 [ 0.816 , 0.245 ] 0.313 [ 0.874 , 0.214 ] 0.296 [ 0.831 , 0.348 ] 0.308 [ 0.748 , 0.19 ]
Table 6.45
9b
donations similarity -0.218 -0.142 -0.230 -0.246
Table 6.45
*ego satisfaction 0.159 [ 0.13 , 0.905 ] 0.150 [ 0.251 , 0.911 ] 0.183 [ 0.129 , 0.971 ] 0.185 [ 0.126 , 0.905 ]
ability based selection effects:
self control alter
0.039 0.040 0.021 0.043
Table 6.42
0.055 [ 0.487 , 0.052 ] 0.052 [ 0.365 , 0.045 ] 0.051 [ 0.309 , 0.072 ] 0.043 [ 0.452 , 0.12 ]
-0.150 *** -0.097 † -0.094 * -0.107 **
self control ego
0.045 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.050 [ 0 , 0.976 ] 0.047 [ 0.003 , 0.988 ] 0.041 [ 0.001 , 0.999 ]
Table 6.42
8c self control similarity
-0.076 0.015 -0.045 -0.104
Table 6.42
0.131 [ 0.37 , 0.406 ] 0.120 [ 0.676 , 0.235 ] 0.125 [ 0.608 , 0.577 ] 0.122 [ 0.255 , 0.766 ]
self control similarity 0.164 † 0.119 † 0.157 * 0.137 †
9c
*ego satisfaction 0.085 [ 0.948 , 0.018 ] 0.069 [ 0.931 , 0.05 ] 0.066 [ 0.961 , 0.024 ] 0.073 [ 0.95 , 0.061 ]
Table 6.42
resilience alter
0.031 0.033 0.027 0.034
Table 6.42
0.055 [ 0.281 , 0.023 ] 0.055 [ 0.117 , 0.016 ] 0.045 [ 0.486 , 0.024 ] 0.047 [ 0.402 , 0.034 ]
resilience ego
0.017 0.066 0.028 0.037
Table 6.42
0.056 [ 0.568 , 0.098 ] 0.048 [ 0.755 , 0.008 ] 0.051 [ 0.635 , 0.169 ] 0.046 [ 0.688 , 0.085 ]
0.253 0.224 0.309 * 0.271 †
8c resilience similarity
0.159 [ 0.884 , 0.02 ] 0.167 [ 0.785 , 0.011 ] 0.135 [ 0.898 , 0.005 ] 0.149 [ 0.906 , 0.009 ]
Table 6.42
resilience similarity 0.065 0.046 0.071 0.118 †
9c
*ego satisfaction 0.068 [ 0.79 , 0.225 ] 0.071 [ 0.612 , 0.268 ] 0.066 [ 0.819 , 0.249 ] 0.063 [ 0.946 , 0.146 ]
Table 6.42
social risk alter
0.002 0.033 0.010 0.041
Table 6.42
0.058 [ 0.072 , 0.069 ] 0.052 [ 0.387 , 0.027 ] 0.062 [ 0.056 , 0.057 ] 0.055 [ 0.335 , 0.018 ]
social risk ego
-0.008 0.002 -0.040 0.016
Table 6.42
0.042 [ 0.189 , 0.322 ] 0.047 [ 0.663 , 0.267 ] 0.043 [ 0.719 , 0.434 ] 0.041 [ 0.731 , 0.479 ]
0.191 0.323 * 0.173 0.167
8c social risk similarity
0.129 [ 0.968 , 0.021 ] 0.129 [ 0.998 , 0.01 ] 0.123 [ 0.985 , 0.049 ] 0.119 [ 0.985 , 0.094 ]
Table 6.42
9c
social risk similarity 0.001 0.031 0.005 0.026
Table 6.42
*ego satisfaction 0.072 [ 0.538 , 0.776 ] 0.075 [ 0.629 , 0.639 ] 0.070 [ 0.658 , 0.661 ] 0.070 [ 0.573 , 0.625 ]
-0.059 -0.117 *** -0.064 † -0.081 *
ethical risk alter
0.040 [ 0.026 , 0.883 ] 0.037 [ 0.001 , 0.99 ] 0.036 [ 0.026 , 0.968 ] 0.037 [ 0.008 , 0.98 ]
Table 6.42
0.120 * 0.159 * 0.179 *** 0.146 *
ethical risk ego
0.058 [ 0.848 , 0 ] 0.070 [ 0.861 , 0 ] 0.061 [ 0.977 , 0 ] 0.057 [ 0.967 , 0 ]
Table 6.42
0.271 † 0.235 † 0.323 * 0.185
8c ethical risk similarity
0.148 [ 0.949 , 0.005 ] 0.129 [ 0.941 , 0.019 ] 0.130 [ 0.974 , 0.004 ] 0.135 [ 0.843 , 0.038 ]
Table 6.42
9c
ethical risk similarity 0.051 0.063 0.083 0.070
Table 6.42
*ego satisfaction 0.078 [ 0.651 , 0.152 ] 0.072 [ 0.788 , 0.212 ] 0.063 [ 0.913 , 0.192 ] 0.072 [ 0.818 , 0.149 ]
value based selection effects:
self-transcendence alter
0.014 0.059
Table 6.41
0.046 [ 0.487 , 0.289 ] 0.039 [ 0.923 , 0.042 ]
-0.102 * -0.022
self-transcendence ego
0.045 [ 0.001 , 0.991 ] 0.041 [ 0.093 , 0.507 ]
Table 6.41
0.102 0.413 ***
8d self-transcendence similarity
0.132 [ 0.826 , 0.114 ] 0.131 [ 0.999 , 0 ]
Table 6.41
self-transcendence similarity 0.004 -0.095 †
9d
*ego satisfaction 0.075 [ 0.679 , 0.532 ] 0.058 [ 0.063 , 0.9 ]
Table 6.41
-0.040 -0.049 .
self-enhancement alter
0.031 [ 0.023 , 0.82 ] 0.029 [ 0.005 , 0.807 ]
Table 6.42
self-enhancement ego
0.030 -0.026
Table 6.42
0.030 [ 0.743 , 0.122 ] 0.027 [ 0.024 , 0.559 ]
0.230 † 0.231 *
8d self-enhancement similarity
0.137 [ 0.872 , 0.031 ] 0.114 [ 0.938 , 0.019 ]
Table 6.42
9d
self-enhancement similarity 0.043 0.033
Table 6.42
*ego satisfaction 0.071 [ 0.599 , 0.329 ] 0.057 [ 0.612 , 0.311 ]
conservation alter
-0.030 0.009
Table 6.40
0.035 [ 0.038 , 0.749 ] 0.028 [ 0.473 , 0.421 ]
-0.045 -0.095 ***
conservation ego
0.050 [ 0.005 , 0.311 ] 0.032 [ 0.001 , 0.992 ]
Table 6.40
0.055 0.206 †
8d conservation similarity
0.162 [ 0.319 , 0.135 ] 0.122 [ 0.986 , 0.022 ]
Table 6.40
conservation similarity) -0.068 0.195 *
9d
*ego satisfaction 0.085 [ 0.087 , 0.508 ] 0.078 [ 0.882 , 0.005 ]
Table 6.40
openness alter
0.039 -0.034
Table 6.42
0.033 [ 0.868 , 0.185 ] 0.046 [ 0.004 , 0.266 ]
openness ego
-0.005 -0.012
Table 6.42
0.068 [ 0.056 , 0.053 ] 0.040 [ 0.015 , 0.467 ]
0.082 0.277 *
8d openness similarity
0.117 [ 0.604 , 0.428 ] 0.109 [ 0.976 , 0.002 ]
Table 6.42
9d
openness similarity -0.020 0.003
Table 6.42
*ego satisfaction 0.082 [ 0.468 , 0.416 ] 0.058 [ 0.618 , 0.724 ]
behavior change effects:
saving on satisfaction
-0.016 . -0.018 . -0.018 . -0.018 . -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.006
Table 6.40
0.010 [ 0.062 , 0.927 ] 0.009 [ 0.048 , 0.973 ] 0.010 [ 0.035 , 0.945 ] 0.010 [ 0.028 , 0.919 ] 0.009 [ 0.212 , 0.905 ] 0.010 [ 0.368 , 0.923 ] 0.010 [ 0.219 , 0.844 ] 0.010 [ 0.359 , 0.76 ]
spending on satisfaction
0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.005 -0.010 -0.011 -0.008 -0.014 .
Table 6.41
0.010 [ 0.407 , 0.529 ] 0.010 [ 0.337 , 0.723 ] 0.009 [ 0.477 , 0.54 ] 0.010 [ 0.476 , 0.464 ] 0.008 [ 0.196 , 0.965 ] 0.008 [ 0.128 , 0.973 ] 0.008 [ 0.136 , 0.92 ] 0.008 [ 0.076 , 0.987 ]
giving on satisfaction
0.023 0.021 0.015 0.006 -0.001 0.011 0.000 0.004
Table 6.42
0.027 [ 0.745 , 0.127 ] 0.027 [ 0.753 , 0.139 ] 0.029 [ 0.641 , 0.196 ] 0.028 [ 0.52 , 0.265 ] 0.022 [ 0.908 , 0.565 ] 0.020 [ 0.913 , 0.267 ] 0.022 [ 0.829 , 0.416 ] 0.021 [ 0.813 , 0.483 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.331 *** 0.315 *** 0.321 *** 0.291 *** 0.336 *** 0.328 *** 0.313 *** 0.291 ***
0.290 [ 36 , 28 ] 0.290 [ 39 , 29 ] 0.285 [ 37 , 27 ] 0.297 [ 38 , 27 ] 0.268 [ 38 , 33 ] 0.280 [ 38 , 32 ] 0.268 [ 40 , 33 ] 0.224 [ 39 , 34 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.311 *** 0.281 *** 0.286 *** 0.294 *** 0.266 *** 0.280 *** 0.278 *** 0.265 ***
0.301 [ 36 , 25 ] 0.284 [ 39 , 27 ] 0.284 [ 37 , 26 ] 0.297 [ 38 , 25 ] 0.278 [ 38 , 26 ] 0.288 [ 38 , 26 ] 0.269 [ 40 , 29 ] 0.267 [ 39 , 27 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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4.4.2 Dynamics in advice networks
As shown in Tables 6.43, 6.44, 6.45 of the Appendix, and summarized in Table 4.2, our findings provide
full support for Hypothesis 8c in advice networks. Self-monitoring attributes are very salient for actors,
when choosing their advisors.
First, advice relationships are equally fostered through the similarity regarding the capacity to adapt
themselves under social pressure (34% more likely, log odds ratio = 0.288), stress or difficulty (31%
more likely, log odds ratio = 0.271) as well as the similarity regarding the awareness of social norms
(38% more likely, log odds ratios = 0.323) and ethical constraints (26% more likely, log odds ratios =
0.235). Second, elevated levels of teenagers’ capacity to adapt their self to social pressure generally make
them more popular as advisors (14% more likely, log odds ratio = 0.134), but less inclined to approach
their peers for advice (10% less likely, log odds ratio = -0.107). Similarly, while teenagers with higher
capacities to adapt their self to stressful or difficult situations are more popular as advisors (9% more
likely, log odds ratio = 0.085), their willingness to ask peers for advice is not lower compared to teenagers
with lower levels on the corresponding adaptive capacity. Third, teenagers trying to avoid ethical risks
are generally less popular as advisors (11% less likely, log odds ratio = -0.117) but more willing to ask
peers for advice (17% more likely, log odds ratio = 0.159). Conversely, while teenagers with higher levels
of aversion towards social risks are less inclined to approach their peers for advice (6% less likely, log
odds ratio = -0.067), they are not more popular as advisors compared to teenagers with lower levels of
awareness concerning social desirability.
Moreover, our findings provide partial support for Hypothesis 9c. The odds for life satisfaction to
increase through the selection of advisors with similar capacities to adapt their self to social pressure
(15% more likely, log odds ratio = 0.137), stress or difficulty (13% more likely, log odds ratio = 0.118) are
higher than the odds in favor of the opposite. However, homophilous proclivities regarding the awareness
of social norms and ethical constraints have no impact on life satisfaction.
Hypothesis 8d suggests that actors similar in conservation and openness to change are more likely to
select each other as advisors, while actors similar in self-transcendence and self-enhancement are more
likely to select each other as friends. In the following paragraphs, we describe how far our expectations
concerning these homophilous tendencies are confirmed by our results, as summarized in Table 4.2.
First, our findings do not appear to provide any support for Hypothesis 8d concerning the homophily
based on self-transcendence values. In co-evolution with spending practices, advice exchange is more
likely among teenagers with similar self-transcendence values (51% more likely, log odds ratio = 0.413),
which is a tendency that Hypothesis 8d expects for friendship selection. However, our findings show
that in advice networks, the odds for homophilous tendencies regarding self-transcendence values to
increase teenagers’ satisfaction with their lives, are lower than the odds that teenagers’ life satisfaction
is decreased or remains unaffected (9% less likely, log odds ratio = -0.095). While these findings do not
provide any support for Hypothesis 9d, they are providing indirect support for Hypothesis 8dsuggesting
that advisors should not be selected based on self-transcendence values, as this tendency has a negative
impact on teenagers life satisfaction. Second, in co-evolution with practices related to philantropy,
advice relationships are more likely among teenagers with similar emphasis on self-enhancement, which
is also a tendency that Hypothesis 8d expects for friendship selection. On the one hand, these findings
do not contradict our expectations from Hypothesis 8d, as teenagers with similar emphasis on self-
enhancement values are as likely to select each other as advisors (26% more likely, log odds ratio =
0.231), as they are to be friends (26% more likely, log odds ratio = 0.230). On the other hand, our
findings concerning Hypothesis 9d suggest that this tendency is not associated with higher levels of
life satisfaction in either type of social networks. Third, in co-evolution with philantropic practices,
advice relationships are more likely among teenagers placing similar priorities on openness to change
(32% more likely, log odds ratio = 0.277), and thus confirming our expectations from Hypothesis 8d.
However, the data do not provide sufficient evidence to support our expectations stated in Hypothesis 9d
suggesting that homophily based on openness to change values is not associated with higher levels of life
satisfaction. Fourth, in co-evolution with practices allocating financial resources to savings, teenagers
have a preference to select advisors that are similar on conservation values. The data provides sufficient
evidence to confirm Hypothesis 8d, as the odds for advice exchange relationships to emerge between
teenagers with similar emphasis on conservation values are higher than the odds in favor of the opposite
(23% more likely, log odds ratio = 0.206). Additionally, our findings also provide support for Hypothesis
9d, suggesting that teenagers’ life satisfaction is increased through homophilous tendencies regarding
conservation values (22% more likely, log odds ratio = 0.195) compared to the opposite event, suggesting
that teenagers’ life satisfaction is decreased or remains unaffected by the corresponding tendency.
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4.5 Discussion
Scholars agree that teenagers are exposed to a variety of unfamiliar, conflicting and ambivalent situations,
as they are encouraged to explore many alternative paths in love, work and worldviews shaping their
self-identity and avoid social exclusion through compliance with social norms prescribing appropriate
behaviors in social interactions. Scholars also agree that adolescents are better able to cope if they can
rely on the social support from friendship circles or advice communities. However, the dynamics in
different types of social networks and their potential as sources for social support have received little
attention in existing literature. Our findings provide insights on how teenagers can elevate their life
satisfaction through the selection of friends and advisors with a good match in attributes, which are
salient for the respective relationship types.
4.5.1 How are norms transmitted through friendship- and advice relation-
ships affecting life satisfaction?
[Cialdini and Trost, 1998] argue that behavioral patterns can become social norms, if they are triggered
by contextual cues in novel- or ambiguous situations, or if they are incentivized and thus performed
repeatedly.
We have strong reason to assume that social norms regarding financial decision making not only exist
for all behavioral expressions in friendship networks [Kindschi et al., 2019a], but also in advice networks.
Similar to the social norms in friendship networks, social normative behaviors regarding allocations
of financial resources to spending and saving are also highly effective in advice networks, while norms
regarding charitable donations appear to have no effect. Both the effectiveness of norms and the cohesion
within the social environment can determine the weight of expectations urging teenagers to behave
appropriately. If teenagers feel cognitive dissonance [Festinger, 1962, Hochschild, 1979] - generated by
inconsistencies between norms and values [Schwartz, 1990] - but are coerced into conformity through
their need for social affiliation [McAlister and Pessemier, 1982] or their fear of social exclusion [Mead
et al., 2010], the weight of the corresponding burden becomes heavier. The extent to which they can cope
with such expectations can co-determine the way teenagers evaluate the quality of their lives [Festinger,
1954, Diener et al., 1985, Veenhoven and Ehrhardt, 1995, Sagiv and Schwartz, 2000] or the stress they
feel as a result [Michie, 2002, Maslach, 2017].
According to [Cialdini and Trost, 1998], the effectiveness of social norms varies according to the
cohesion in friendship networks, and the corresponding rate at which teenagers are given opportunities for
communication. But are social norms also more or less effective, depending on whether their transmission
occurs in friendship circles or in advice exchange communities?
Both tendencies are compared across all school classes in a meta-analysis. The y-axes in the panels
of Figure 4.3 represent the log odds ratios, according to which pupils in school classes adapt to social
norms regarding financial decision making practices in their friendship- and advice networks. The x-axes
indicate the log odds ratios, according to which densities of friendship- or advice network structures in
school classes change over time. Colors indicate the degree to which pupils in school classes are satisfied
with their lives on average. The meta-analysis reveals considerable variation in these tendencies across
school classes, as teenagers’ reactions range from reactance [Algesheimer et al., 2005, Levav and Zhu,
2009, Latane´ et al., 1994] to susceptibility [Cialdini and Trost, 1998].
In friendship networks, social norms regarding allocations of financial resources are slightly more
effective in networks with lower densities, while in advice networks, social norms are more effective in
networks with higher densities. We are assuming that teenagers like to internalize communal relationships
such as friendships into their self-concept [Smith and Rose, 2011]. This implies that the failure to maintain
their self concept through the process of losing friends is compensated by the immediacy and attribution
of persuasive power to remaining friends [Latane´ et al., 1994]. In contrast, the loss of advisors does not
appear to lead to substantial gaps in adolescents’ self concept, and thus, they don’t feel the need to
compensate such losses by attributing more persuasive power to the remaining advisors.
Figure 4.3 does not reveal specific patterns, how adolescents’ tendencies to converge to - or diverge
from the average expression of their friends’ behavioral patterns - are related to the average degree to
which they are satisfied with their lives. Apparently, compliance with social norms regarding financial
decison making practices is not associated with life satisfaction, which implies that the corresponding
social normative practices are likely to be internalized in teenagers’ self identities.
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Figure 4.3: Susceptibility to general normative behavior vs. density in social networks:
Based on results of meta analyses Tables 6.37, 6.38 and 6.39 of the Appendix with significance
levels exceeding 0.1 in Fisher’s two sided probability tests
y-Axis: Estimations for average similarity effects on the class level, interpretation of positive effects as
susceptibility or convergence towards social norms and negative effects as reactance or divergence from
social norms concerning allocations of financial resources to spending, savings or donations.
x-Axis: Estimations for the change in density on the class level.
Color: Based on the 12-point satisfaction with life scale [Diener et al., 1985, Veenhoven and Ehrhardt,
1995, Sagiv and Schwartz, 2000]. Aggregation on the class level yields averages with a range between 5.5
and 9.5. Averages lower than 7 − > ”low satisfaction”, averages between 7 and 8 − > ”intermediate
satisfaction”, and averages higher than 8 − > ”high satisfaction”
4.5.2 What are the differences in the nature of friendship compared to advice
relationships?
Social support from friendship- and advice networks does not only have the potential to elevate teenagers’
well-being, but also provide access to social resources which are helpful in buffering adversive conse-
quences [Cohen and Wills, 1985] such as burnout. On the one hand, by triggering memories of personal
accomplishments, friends are providing emotional encouragement, and thus lower the likelihood of de-
personalization and withdrawal. On the other hand, advisors are better able to give tangible assistance
by offering to share responsibility for tasks [Ray and Miller, 1994] or help by making suggestions about
how to reduce demands, and thus mitigate the extent of exhaustion [Halbesleben, 2006]. Our framework,
as shown in Figure 4.1, provides evidence regarding the unique nature of affiliations in friendship- and
advice networks.
Our findings support the perspective that friendship relationships are intrinsic or communal. As they
are created and maintained on the basis of demographics or social normative behaviors, which are inte-
grated in teenagers’ self-identities, they are likely to become part of their self-identity themselves. Thus,
they represent self sufficient and communal relationships, in which adolescents are directly concerned
with the well-being of their relationship partners.
Our findings also provide support for the perspective that advice relationships are extrinsic or instru-
mental, as they are formed and maintained primarily on the basis of attributes such as self-monitoring
traits, which are instrumental in facilitating the achievement of desirable goals, or the enactment of
behaviors that are necessary to achieve such goals [Wright, 1984, Clark, 1981, Clark and Mills, 1979].
But why are teenagers considering their peers’ gender to select both their friends and advisors?
Complementary analyses exploring the co-evolution of friendship- and advice network structures reveal
that teenagers are more likely start asking their friends for advice than to initiate friendship relationships
with their advisors. Given the fact that substantial extents of gender homophily can be observed in
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friendship networks, teenagers are spending considerably more time with peers of the same gender.
Therefore, the fact that gender homophily occurs in advice networks is not a reflection of adolescents’
preferences, but rather an artefact created by the convenience associated with approaching friends as
easily accessible sources for instrumental support.
Figure 4.4: Interaction of homophily on values with social and personal focus:
Based on aggregated results of meta analyses in Tables 6.37, 6.38 and 6.39 of the Appendix. Up-
per right hand- and lower left hand panels are empty as significance levels did not exceed 0.1 in Fisher’s
two sided probability tests
y-Axis: Class level estimations for homophily effects based on similarity in Conservation (social focus
for advice panel) or Self-transcendence (social focus for friendship panel).
x-Axis: Class level estimations for homophily effects based on similarity in Openness to change (personal
focus for advice panel) or Self-enhancement (personal focus for friendship panel).
Color: Based on the 12-point satisfaction with life scale [Diener et al., 1985, Veenhoven and Ehrhardt,
1995, Sagiv and Schwartz, 2000]. Aggregation on the class level yields averages with a range between 5.5
and 9.5. Averages lower than 7 − > ”low satisfaction”, averages between 7 and 8 − > ”intermediate
satisfaction”, and averages higher than 8 − > ”high satisfaction”
4.5.3 Do friends or advisors provide better social support if they are similar
on traits reflecting the nature of the corresponding relationship?
Our findings suggest that teenagers are more likely to consider values on the self-transcendence vs. self
enhancement dimension as part of their self-identities, and thus more salient for friendship selection.
Even though similarity with respect to values on this dimension is also considered for the selection of
advisors, pupils who display this tendency are generally less satisfied with their lives, suggesting that
they would be better off not considering these values for the selection of their advisors. Our results
further suggest that values on the openness to change vs. conservation value dimension are more likely
to be considered instrumental, and thus more salient for the selection of advisors.
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Tendencies for homophily on both value dimensions are compared across all school classes in a meta-
analysis. The y-axes in the panels of Figure 4.4 represent the log odds ratios, according to which pupils
in school classes select advisors that are similar on conservation values and friends that are similar on
self-transcendence values. The x-axes indicate the log odds ratios, indicating the likelihood to which
pupils select advisors with similar openness values and friends with similar self-enhancement values. The
meta-analysis indicates considerable variation in these tendencies across school classes, ranging from
homophily to heterophily [McPherson et al., 2001b]. The colors of nodes in Figure 4.4 represent three
levels, on which pupils in the corresponding school classes evaluate the quality of their lives on average.
The criteria, according to which pupils select friends are shown in the lower right hand panel of Figure
4.4. On the one hand, if pupils with intermediate or higher levels of life satisfaction do not consider self-
transcendence values to select friends, they also disregard self-enhancement values. However, if they do
consider self-transcendence values as important attributes, pupils on intermediate levels of life satisfaction
are striving for homophily on both higher order values, while highly satisfied pupils prefer friends that are
similar on self-transcendence- but different on self enhancement values. On the other hand, if pupils on
lower levels of life satisfaction do not give any consideration to self-transcendence values to select friends,
they either strive for homophily or show heterophily regarding self-enhancement values. However, if they
do not consider self-enhancement values, pupils on lower levels of life satisfaction strive for homophily
regarding self-transcendence.
Adolescents are facing conflicts in the simultaneous pursuit of self-transcendence and self-enhancement
values [Schwartz et al., 2012, Kindschi et al., 2019b], which implies that friends that are selected based
on similarity on self-transcendence values are likely to be similar on self-enhancement as well. But why
is multidimensional value homophily [Block and Grund, 2014] not associated with the highest levels of
life satisfaction? It appears that groups composed entirely of followers - who are motivated to help each
other - are facing similar limitations in reaching higher levels of life satisfaction as groups full of leaders -
who are motivated to dominate each other. This implies that groups require balance in the distribution
of power among their members in order to reach higher levels of life satisfaction.
A mirror image is shown in the upper left hand panel of Figure 4.4, illustrating criteria for pupils
select advisors. On the one hand, if pupils with higher levels of life satisfaction show homophily on
conservation values, they also show preferences for having advisors that are similar on openness to change
values. However, if they look for advisors, who are different on conservation values, they either strive for
homophily or heterophily on openness to change values. On the other hand, if pupils with intermediate
or lower levels of life satisfaction show heterophilous tendencies regarding conservation values, they do
not consider openness to change values to be salient attributes for the selection of advisors. However,
if they look for advisors, who are similar on conservation values, they either strive for homophily or
heterophily on openness to change values.
Teenagers in simultaneous pursuit of conservation- and openness to change values are also likely
to experience conflict [Schwartz et al., 2012]. This implies that advisors, who are selected based on
similarity on conservation values are likely to be similar on openness to change as well. The meta
analysis - comparing our findings across all school classes - illustrates that for the selection of advisors,
moderate tendencies for homophily on multiple dimensions [Block and Grund, 2014] are associated with
the highest levels of life satisfaction. However, groups can also reach the highest levels of life satisfaction
on average, if they are composed of members, which are different on conservation values or entirely
different on both values. This implies that in order to reach higher levels of life satisfaction, groups
prefer uniformity in the way that their members emphasize openness to change- and conservation values.
However, if they do not unanimously agree on the importance of self direction and stimulation, advice
relationships can still be satisfying if members are different in their prioritization of tradition, conformity
or security as well.
4.6 Limitations
Our data is structured hierarchically, whereby school classes are nested in schools. Being organized in
school classes representing unique orgnaizational foci, teenagers’ utility functions should be assumed
to have unique compositions. Similar to the way this article identifies unique sets of attributes, which
teenagers consider to select friends and advisors, the respective sets should be subject to class-specific
restrictions according to how specific attributes are emphasized or promoted in the corresponding orga-
nizational foci. For the sake of simplicity, we assume identical compositions of utility functions for pupils
across different classes. However, we identified considerable heterogeneity in how adolescents’ tendency
to comply with social norms varies across classes. Setting restrictions, which prescribe unique utility
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functions for school classes according to groups imposed by the hierarchical data structure might capture
heterogeneity in the composition of effects contributing to teenagers’ utility functions, and thus bring
this article closer to reality. Moreover, random coefficient multi-level analyses could be used to capture
heterogeneity in adolescents’ reactions to social norms on the individual level. Thus, we call on further
research to investigate how the heterogeneity in teenagers’ reactions to social norms on the micro-level
can be explained by properties emerging on the macro-level of organizational foci.
Furthermore, our analyses are restricted to social contexts of friendship- and advice networks within
school classes. Although many activities are organized within these organizational foci, teenagers also
participate in social activities that transcend these boundaries through their pursuit of hobbies. Thus,
studying the selection of friends and advisors across school classes is essential to understand the impact
of organizational foci on the dynamics in different types of social networks.
Finally, the composition of adolescents’ utility functions for the selection of peers they want to be
affiliated with, might not only depend on the type of affiliation - resulting in a unique nature of friendship-
and advice relationships - but also on the cultural context. Differentiated results on the country level are
available on request. However, insights from further research, cross-validating our findings in different
countries would provide substantial contributions to a more comprehensive understanding of a culture’s
impact on the determinants and consequences of social norms, as well as the composition of teenagers’
utility functions for the selection of friends and advisors.
4.7 Conclusions
To conclude, we emphasize that future research should not only investigate the heterogeneity in the
composition of utility functions adolescents use to select friends and advisors across classes and the cor-
responding impact of cultures, but also the unobserved heterogeneity across individuals. Further research
is also needed to find out whether the heterogeneity in key network selection effects can be explained
by macro-level properties of organizational foci or by micro-level characteristics or personality traits of
individuals. Furthermore, validations of our findings in other countries would also make substantial con-
tributions to a more comprehensive understanding regarding the evolution of social norms in different
types of social networks, as well as the salience of specific attributes for adolescents to select friends and
advisors across countries with different cultural orientations.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Dynamics in social networks and financial decision making
The combined findings from all studies in this dissertation support the view that adolescents are socialized
to become consumers. In line with the theory of structuration [Giddens, 1984], teenagers were found
to draw on their social network structures for decisions regarding whether- and how much to change
financial decision-making practices as well as to use practices such as these to build and shape their
social network structures accordingly.
5.1.1 The nature of friendship and advice networks
In line with previous literature, our findings suggest that both friendship and advice networks have a
unique nature, as the respective ties can provide better social support if they are selected based on
features reflecting the nature of the corresponding relationship. In addition, our findings suggest strong
interdependence in the formation and evolution of friendship alongside advice networks. Specifically,
teenagers are using their friendship network structures as a pool for the formation of advice network
structures. This implies that the effort teenagers put in the formation and maintenance of friendship
relationships can be viewed as investments yielding both emotional- as well as instrumental social support.
Moreover, our findings provide support for the view that societies have unique stereotypes, which
assume that value priorities are different for boys compared to girls. While boys are socialized to pursue
self-enhancement values, girls are encouraged to emphasize openness to change, conservation and self
transcendence values. In adolescence, these stereotypes are more salient during the friendship initiation
stage, when teenagers don’t know anything about their peers except for highly visible attributes such
as gender. However, in the maintenance stage of friendship network evolution, teenagers gradually learn
more about their friends’ true intrinsic motivations, as they spend more time with them. Realizing that
the vast heterogeneity in value systems among their friends cannot be captured by the gender stereotypes
they were taught in their societies, teenagers are gradually shifting the salience of attributes that are
considered for the maintenance of their friendships from gender to value priorities. The implication
is that through the instillation of children with expectations that they should pursue gender specific
goals, societies also have an impact on the formation of social networks. When teenagers consider peers
for friendship selection, they don’t have much information about their agendas. Thus, it is convenient
for teenagers to use society-inherited gender stereotypes to select their friends and later adjust these
stereotypes as well as their social network structures according to their own experiences.
5.1.2 Motivations for financial decision-making practices
In pursuit of building their self-identity, teenagers are drawing on their social network structures to form
values along with the underlying intrinsic motivations. All of these motivations are features with the
potential to define their roles as consumers. Complementary products such as virtual reality games,
allowing users to build characters expressing their ideal selves and to compete with other users, are
attractive for teenagers adopting values associated with the motivation to express or enhance their self-
concept. New products that don’t have any brand recognition, consumer electronics or other durables
related to hobbies are attractive for teenagers seeking variety or to understand different aspects of their
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reality. Any product or service that can be socially consumed in groups or bestowed to friends is attrac-
tive for teenagers seeking to maintain harmony in their social networks. In addition to the values, which
are intrinsically motivating teenagers to spend their financial resources, we can also identify intrinsic mo-
tivations for adolescents to donate money to charitable organizations. In particular, our findings suggest
that adolescents in pursuit of growth related values including benevolence, universalism, stimulation and
self-direction are more motivated to donate financial resources compared to teenagers emphasizing power,
achievement, security, tradition or conformity. Considering that most adolescents have restricted access
to financial resources, using money for spending or donations usually means foregoing opportunities to
accumulate savings. According to our findings, adolescents in pursuit of values with a social focus are
intrinsically motivated to fund their spending or donation lifestyles through their savings.
As group identities are formed and negotiated, products with established brand identities that provide
a good match with the corresponding group identities can be used as instruments for teenagers to
express their group membership. Through normative consumption patterns such as these, adolescents
are also extrinsically motivated to use their financial resources for purposes that are prescribed by their
social networks. Our findings confirm that social norms regarding charity donations are ineffective.
As teenagers’ decisions to donate money are not driven by motivations to express or enhance their
self concept, they don’t need the corresponding charitable organizations to know who they are and
thus appear to prefer anonymous donations, which makes it practically impossible for corresponding
normative behaviors to form. In contrast, our findings confirm that social norms for spending and saving
money are highly effective. As a consequence, teenagers are at risk of being socially excluded, if their
consumption- or saving patterns deviate from the corresponding group norms. Thus, remaining socially
connected with friends and advisors who can provide emotional- and instrumental support is essential for
teenagers. The disadvantage of losing social support has particularly heavy implications for teenagers
in their roles as consumers. They are better able to cope with the vast variety of products, services
and brands if they can outsource the search for information as well as the evaluation of corresponding
product- or service attributes to narrow down their selection to their friends or advisors, or subcontract
their entire purchase decision to them.
5.1.3 Need for effective financial resource management
In recent years, as the teenage market has been growing in significance, firms have started to design
campaigns with marketing activities that are specifically customized to preoccupy teenagers’ attention.
Our findings provide evidence that it is difficult for teenagers to scale down on their accustomed con-
sumption patterns, particularly given the ubiquity and continuity of temptations and opportunities to
spend financial resources, as well as the presence of intrinsic- or extrinsic motivations do so. According
to our findings, teenagers showing higher levels of adaptive- and cognitive abilities, as well as forward
looking time orientations are better able to evade or resist temptations to spend their financial resources,
and stock up their savings accounts instead. Moreover, teenagers appear to have a more pronounced
inclination to attribute success or failure to fortuitous or adverse circumstances as well as the effort they
put in trials. According to our findings, failures in trials to accumulate savings are increasing teenagers’
resilience, and thus provide more motivation to put in extra efforts in future trials compared to suc-
cessfull trials. Surprisingly, these effects are even more pronounced if teenagers observe the outcomes of
trials to accumulate savings among their friends, as opposed to experiencing the corresponding outcomes
themselves. Thus, societies need to understand the importance of providing environments for adolescents
to acquire capacities and skills that are necessary to manage their financial resources effectively.
5.2 Limitations
Pupils are organized in school classes, which represent unique organizational foci. Considering hierarchi-
cal structures, where pupils are nested in school classes and schools, teenagers utility functions should be
assumed to have unique compositions across schools or even across school classes. Our findings indicate
considerable heterogeneity in adolescents’ tendency to select similar friends or advisors, as well as the
susceptibility and compliance with social norms across classes. Therefore, the set of effects contributing
to teenagers’ utility functions should be class-specific depending on how specific attributes or behaviors
are emphasized or promoted in the corresponding organizational foci. For the sake of simplicity, the
articles contained in this dissertation assume identical compositions of utility functions for all pupils
across school classes. However, the heterogeneity in the composition of effects contributing to teenagers’
utility functions could be better captured by setting restrictions, which prescribe a unique set of effects
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for each school class, and thus improve external validity. Random coefficient multi-level analyses could be
used to capture the heterogeneity in adolescents’ homophilous tendencies in their friendship- and advice
networks, as well as their reactions to social norms on the individual level. However, future research is
needed to investigate how the heterogeneity in teenagers’ tendency to select similar friends or advisors,
as well as the susceptibility and compliance with social norms on the micro-level can be explained by
properties emerging on the macro-level of school classes or schools.
Furthermore, the composition of adolescents’ utility functions might not only be class specific, but
also depend on the level of maturity as well as the cultural context. First, the samples of all papers in this
dissertation are restricted to school classes from Poland and Switzerland. Differentiated meta-analyses
comparing our findings across these two countries are listed in Tables 6.18, 6.19, 6.20 and 6.21 of the Ap-
pendix for values in friendship networks as well as Tables 6.25, 6.26 and 6.27 of the Appendix for financial
decision making in friendship and advice networks. However, cross-validating our findings in different
countries would substantially contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of a culture’s impact
on the selection of friends and advisors, changes in financial decision making practices, as well as the
composition of the corresponding utility functions. While our findings are providing valuable insights on
the interdependencies between financial decision making practices and the selection of friends or advisors
in countries representing the cultural orientations of harmony, egalitarianism and intellectual autonomy,
these interdependencies could be entirely different in countries representing the cultural orientations of
mastery, hierarchy or embeddedness, as suggested in Figure 6.1. Second, the analyses are restricted to a
panel of adolescent school classes in each paper of this dissertation. Although behavioral- and structural
dynamics in social networks of adolescents are expected to be highest, investigating how children or adults
are selecting friends or advisors and adapt financial decision making practices compared to adolescents,
as well as the effects making up their respective utility functions would make another substantial contri-
bution. Meta-analyses comparing our findings across panels of children and adolescents are available on
request. Financial decision-making practices are restricted to the generic practices of spending, saving
and donating financial resources in the papers of this dissertation. Further research investigating adult
panels in social contexts of organizations could provide more detailed insights regarding more specific
financial decision making practices, such as those listed in Figure 6.2.
Moreover, the intrinsic motivations driving the dynamics in financial decision making are aggregated
to higher order values in every paper of this dissertation. Although these constructs of higher order
values have been validated extensively, studying the impacts of- and relations between individual goals
underlying these value systems would provide a more detailed understanding of the motivational drivers
of specific financial decision making practices. Saving or investing in conservative financial solutions
such as treasury bonds or mutual funds might be preferred if people are motivated by security values,
while stocks, options or forward contracts might be the preferred financial solutions for people who
emphasize stimulation or self-direction. In purchase decisions for discretionary spending categories,
people prioritizing power or achievement values might be drawn by the challenge of competing in virtual
reality games or purchase equipment to pursue sports activities. While people who emphasize hedonsism
might be drawn to spend financial resources at the theater and immerse themselves in adventurous or
inspiring cinematic experiences, other people might be drawn to the stimulation of seeing new places and
different cultures by travelling abroad. In purchase decisions for non-discretionary spending categories,
fair-trade or sustainability labels on nutrition- or clothing items might attract the attention of people
emphasizing universalism values, while quality and luxury labels might be features, based on which people
prioritizing power and achievement values make their purchase decisions. In general purchase decisions,
new brands trying to build awareness and recognition in the multi-dimensional landscape of brands
and their associations within consumers’ minds might be attractive for people emphasizing stimulation
values, as they are perfect means to satisfy variety seeking motivations, or the need to understand different
aspects of their reality. Products with established brand identities might be favored by people prioritizing
tradition-, conformity or security values. Existing brand reputations are not only perfect means to provide
consumers with the security they need, established brand images also make the corresponding products
ideal means for consumers to tell stories about themselves, or symbols for benefactors to communicate
the meaning of their relationships to beneficiaries who receive the corresponding products as gifts.
Finally, the analyses in every paper of this dissertation are restricted to social contexts of friendship-
and advice networks within school classes. While a majority of joint activities are organized within
these organizational foci, adolescents who are engaged in hobbies usually participate in social activities
that transcend these boundaries. Studying the formation and maintenance of relationships across school
classes would provide valuable insights on the impact of organizational foci on the dynamics in different
types of social networks.
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5.3 Conclusions
In conclusion, future research is not only needed to investigate unobserved heterogeneity in the dynamics
of financial decision making and social network structures across individuals, but also the heterogeneity
in the composition of adolescents’ utility functions across classes as well as the corresponding impact
of cultures and levels of maturity. Additionally, we call on future research to differentiate between
more specific practices of spending, saving and donating financial resources, and thus investigate the
motivational drivers of financial decision making in more detail. Finally, we would like to emphasize that
future research should not only study the dynamics in different types of social networks, but also the
dynamics in social networks that are transcending the boundaries of organizational foci.
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Chapter 6
Appendix
6.1 Samples
Figure 6.1: Co-Plot Map of Nations on Cultural Orientations - Source: [Schwartz, 2006]
Figure 6.2: Average consumption per household in European countries (data sources: [Bundesamt fu¨r
Statistik, 2019], [European Statistics, 2019])
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6.2 Measures
6.2.1 Values
Swiss Version: Here we briefly describe different people. Please read each description and think about
how much that person is or is not like you. Please put an X in the box to the right that shows how much
the person described is like you.
It’s important for him/her...
001. ...to care for nature not like me at all 2—2—2—2—2—2 very much like me
002. ...to show that his/her performance
is better than the performance of others 2—2—2—2—2—2
003. ...to maintain traditional values
and ways of thinking 2—2—2—2—2—2
004. ......to figure things out
himself/herself 2—2—2—2—2—2
005. ...be tolerant towards all kinds of
people and groups 2—2—2—2—2—2
006. ...to be wealthy 2—2—2—2—2—2
007. ...to live in a strong state that
can defend ist citizens 2—2—2—2—2—2
008. ...to make all kinds of new experiences 2—2—2—2—2—2
009. ...to be able to tell others what to do 2—2—2—2—2—2
010. ...to obey all the laws 2—2—2—2—2—2
011. ...to take care of every need of
his/her close ones 2—2—2—2—2—2
012. ...to have the freedom to choose
what to do 2—2—2—2—2—2
013. ...that everyone be treated justly 2—2—2—2—2—2
Polish Version: Here we briefly describe different people. Please read each description and think
about how much that person is or is not like you. Please put an X in the box to the right that shows
how much the person described is like you.
It’s important for him/her...
001. ...to care for nature not like me at all 2—2—2—2—2—2 very much like me
002. ...to show that his/her performance
is better than the performance of others 2—2—2—2—2—2
003. ...to maintain traditional values
and ways of thinking 2—2—2—2—2—2
004. ......to figure things out
himself/herself 2—2—2—2—2—2
005. ...be tolerant towards all kinds of
people and groups 2—2—2—2—2—2
006. ...to live in a strong state that
can defend ist citizens 2—2—2—2—2—2
007. ...to make all kinds of new experiences 2—2—2—2—2—2
008. ...to be able to tell others what to do 2—2—2—2—2—2
009. ...to obey all the laws 2—2—2—2—2—2
010. ...to take care of every need of
his/her close ones 2—2—2—2—2—2
011. ...to have the freedom to choose
what to do 2—2—2—2—2—2
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012. ...that everyone be treated justly 2—2—2—2—2—2
013. ...to be independent in shaping your views 2—2—2—2—2—2
014. ...that their country is stable and secure 2—2—2—2—2—2
015. ...to spend time for yourself 2—2—2—2—2—2
016. ...to avoid annoying others 2—2—2—2—2—2
017. ...that the weak and vulnerable in
society are protected 2—2—2—2—2—2
018. ...that people do whatever you tell them 2—2—2—2—2—2
019. ...never to think that you deserve
more than others 2—2—2—2—2—2
020. ...that no one ever be humbled 2—2—2—2—2—2
021. ...to always have something different to do 2—2—2—2—2—2
022. ...to take care of the people
close to you 2—2—2—2—2—2
023. ...to have the power that money can buy 2—2—2—2—2—2
024. ...to avoid diseases and protect
your health 2—2—2—2—2—2
025. ...never to violate rules or regulations 2—2—2—2—2—2
026. ...to make your own decisions
about life 2—2—2—2—2—2
027. ...to be wealthy 2—2—2—2—2—2
028. ...that the people you know have
full confidence in you 2—2—2—2—2—2
029. ...to take part in activities to
protect nature 2—2—2—2—2—2
030. ...never to annoy nor irritate anyone 2—2—2—2—2—2
031. ...to protect your public image 2—2—2—2—2—2
032. ...to help people dear to you 2—2—2—2—2—2
033. ...to feel save and secure 2—2—2—2—2—2
034. ...to be a reliable and trustworthy friend 2—2—2—2—2—2
035. ...to take risks that make life
more exciting 2—2—2—2—2—2
036. ...to have the power to make people
do what you want 2—2—2—2—2—2
037. ...to be independent in planning
your activities 2—2—2—2—2—2
038. ...to follow the rules even if
no one watches 2—2—2—2—2—2
039. ...to be successful 2—2—2—2—2—2
040. ...to respect the customs of your
family and your religion 2—2—2—2—2—2
041. ...to listen to and understand
people that are different from you 2—2—2—2—2—2
042. ...to enjoy the pleasures of life 2—2—2—2—2—2
043. ...that everyone in the world have
equal opportunities in life 2—2—2—2—2—2
044. ...to be modest 2—2—2—2—2—2
045. ...to figure things our yourself 2—2—2—2—2—2
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046. ...to understand the traditional
customs of your culture 2—2—2—2—2—2
047. ...to own expensive things that
show your wealth 2—2—2—2—2—2
048. ...to protect the environment from
destruction or pollution / contanmination 2—2—2—2—2—2
049. ...to have fun in any situation 2—2—2—2—2—2
050. ...that people appreciate your achievements 2—2—2—2—2—2
051. ...never to be humiliated 2—2—2—2—2—2
052. ...that your country can defend
itself against all threats 2—2—2—2—2—2
053. ...never to annoy or anger anyone 2—2—2—2—2—2
054. ...to avoid anything that is dangerous 2—2—2—2—2—2
055. ...to be satisfied with what you
have and not ask for more 2—2—2—2—2—2
056. ...that all his friends and family
can rely on you completely 2—2—2—2—2—2
057. ...to accept people even if you
disagree with them 2—2—2—2—2—2
6.2.2 Friendship Quality
How strong is your friendship with your classmates?
Please answer the question on the following scale.
1. I don’t spend any of my spare time with him/her.
2. I hardly spend any of my spare time with him/her.
3. Occasionally, I spend some of my spare time with him/her.
4. I regularly spend some of my spare time with him/her.
5. I spend a lot of my spare time with him/her.
6. I practically spend every minute of my spare time with him/her.
001. classmate 1 no friendship at all 2—2—2—2—2—2 very close friendship
002. classmate 2 2—2—2—2—2—2
003. classmate 3 2—2—2—2—2—2
6.2.3 Advice Seeking Frequency
How many times have you approached your classmates to talk about school subjects or to ask for advice
during the past three months?
Please answer the question on the following scale.
1. I have never approached him/her.
2. I approached him/her only once.
3. I approached him/her occasionally.
4. I approached him/her regularly.
5. I approached him/her on countless occasions.
6. I approached him/her everytime I needed advice.
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001. classmate 1 never 2—2—2—2—2—2 constantly
002. classmate 2 2—2—2—2—2—2
003. classmate 3 2—2—2—2—2—2
6.2.4 Self-Control
Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements.
001. I have a hard time
changing bad habits. don’t agree at all 2—2—2—2—2—2 totally agree
002. I get easily distracted. 2—2—2—2—2—2
003. Sometimes I am saying inappropriate things. 2—2—2—2—2—2
004. I reject things that are bad for me,
even if they are fun. 2—2—2—2—2—2
005. I can easily resist temptations. 2—2—2—2—2—2
006. People would say that I have a
distinctive self discipline. 2—2—2—2—2—2
007. Fun and enjoyment are sometimes
keeping me from finishing my work. 2—2—2—2—2—2
008. I do things, which feel good at the
moment, but which I regret later. 2—2—2—2—2—2
009. Sometimes, I cannot keep myself from
doing something, even when I know
that it is wrong. 2—2—2—2—2—2
010. I often act without thinking
through all alternatives. 2—2—2—2—2—2
6.2.5 Resilience
Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements.
001. I can easily adjust to changes. don’t agree at all 2—2—2—2—2—2 totally agree
002. I can deal with any situation
that comes my way. 2—2—2—2—2—2
003. I try to see the humorous side
in every problem. 2—2—2—2—2—2
004. Coping with stress makes me stronger. 2—2—2—2—2—2
005. I tend to bounce back rapidly
after sickness or difficult situations. 2—2—2—2—2—2
006. I can reach goals irrespective
of handicaps. 2—2—2—2—2—2
007. I can stay focused under pressure. 2—2—2—2—2—2
008. Defeat cannot bring me down. 2—2—2—2—2—2
009. I think of myself as a strong person. 2—2—2—2—2—2
010. I can deal with uncomfortable feelings. 2—2—2—2—2—2
6.2.6 Social and Ethical Risks
For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood of engaging in the corresponding
activities.
001. Admitting that your tastes are
different from those of your friends. don’t agree at all 2—2—2—2—2—2 totally agree
002. To cheat at an exam. 2—2—2—2—2—2
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003. To argue with your friends about an
issue, on which they have a
very different opinion. 2—2—2—2—2—2
004. To submit someone else’s work
as your own. 2—2—2—2—2—2
005. To wear provocative clothing on occasion. 2—2—2—2—2—2
006. To forge somebody’s signature. 2—2—2—2—2—2
007. To communicate a different opinion
on an important topic your parents. 2—2—2—2—2—2
008. Not returning a wallet you found
that contains 100 currency units. 2—2—2—2—2—2
009. To ask your parents for a higher
allowance (adolescent version).
To ask your boss for a raise (adult version). 2—2—2—2—2—2
010. Not telling your parents that you
won in a lottery (adolescent version).
Hiding money on your tax declaration
(adult version). 2—2—2—2—2—2
011. Telling your friend that his/her
significant other has made a pass at you. 2—2—2—2—2—2
012. Illegally copying a piece of software. 2—2—2—2—2—2
013. Prefer doing a task that you like
over a more prestigious but
less convenient task. 2—2—2—2—2—2
014. To steal an item from a shop. 2—2—2—2—2—2
015. To defend an unpopular position in
which you believe at a social occasion. 2—2—2—2—2—2
016. To reveal a friend’s secret to
someone else. 2—2—2—2—2—2
6.2.7 Cooperation Decision Making
In the following tasks, you can actually win money. For each task, one pupil from your class is randomly
chosen to receive money. In the first task you will be randomly assigned to someone else from another
class. This person will remain unknown to you. You will also remain unknown to the other person. Your
information will be used with complete confidentiality.
We ask you to make six decisions to allocate money between you and someone else. The points
positioned above indicate what you keep to yourself and the points positioned below indicate what what
you give to the other person. Please indicate for each question, which allocation you would prefer. For
each question, you can only choose one allocation. There are no right or wrong answers, we are only
interested in your personal preferences. In each class, one pair of matched pupils will be randomly
chosen, and one of them will receive a payment according to the allocation decision of the peer assigned
to them. If you are randomly chosen from your class, you will either be paid your chosen allocation or
the allocation of your assigned person in another class determines your payment. Each point represents
one Swiss Franc.
Please choose one financial resource allocation in each of the following scenarios.
001. Scenario 1 2—2—2—2—2—2—2—2—2
002. Scenario 2 2—2—2—2—2—2—2—2—2
003. Scenario 3 2—2—2—2—2—2—2—2—2
004. Scenario 4 2—2—2—2—2—2—2—2—2
005. Scenario 5 2—2—2—2—2—2—2—2—2
006. Scenario 6 2—2—2—2—2—2—2—2—2
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Figure 6.3: Social value orientation slider measure, source: [Murphy and Ackermann, 2014]
In the second task, you will be randomly assigned to two other pupils from different other classes. You
will either be the ”Sender” or the ”Receiver”. If you are randomly chosen as a Sender, you are endowed
with 100 points, from which you can give any given amount to an unknown person from another class.
We will call this person ”Receiver B”. If you are randomly chosen as a Receiver, you will receive an
amount from another unknown person from a different class. We will call this person ”SenderA”. The
following picture illustrates these possibilities. In the first section, you are asked which allocation you
would find just, if you receive it from someone else or if you give it to someone else. Then you are asked
how you would allocate the 100 points between you and someone else. In the last section, you are asked,
what you expect to receive from another person and what you believe others will expect to receive from
you. Each point represents half of one Swiss Franc.
Please indicate your chosen financial resource allocation in each of the following scenarios.
001. Scenario 1: What do you believe, a Sender should give?
I find it just to give the following amount
from 100 points to Receiver B 2
002. Scenario 2: Please put yourself in the shoes of a Receiver. What percentage would
you find just, if you receive it from the Sender?
I find it just to receive the following amount
from 100 points from Sender A 2
003. Scenario 3: Now please put yourself in the shoes of the other Receiver. Which
allocation do you believe, the Receiver expects from you?
If you estimate the answer of Receiver B in scenario 2 correctly within +/- 3 Points,
you receive an additional 20 points.
I believe, Receiver B finds it just to receive the
following amount of 100 points from me. 2
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004. Scenario 4: What is your decision as a Sender?
I give the following amount of 100 points
to Receiver B 2
005. Scenario 5: Please imagine you are chosen as a Receiver. What would you expect
that the Sender actually gives?
If you estimate the answer of Sender A in scenario 4 correctly within +/- 3 Points,
you receive an additional 20 points.
I believe, Sender A will give me the following amount
of 100 points. 2
006. Scenario 6: Now please put yourself in the shoes of the other Receiver. Which
allocation do you believe, the Receiver expects to actually receive from you?
I believe, Receiver B expects to receive the
following amount of 100 points from me. 2
6.2.8 Time Preferences
Imagine you are one of the selected winners in the lottery of the previous money allocation task and
win the amount of money, which was assigned to you. We will visit your school in a few weeks to
communicate the winners of the lottery, which are randomly selected from your class. There are two
options, specifying the dates at which the payout transaction will be executed.
1. In the normal transaction option, the winnings will be paid out nine months after the communica-
tion of the lottery results.
2. In the fast transaction option, the winnings will be paid out immediately following the communi-
cation of the lottery results.
001. Please indicate the proportion of
your winnings you would be willing to sacrifice
in order to receive your payout immediately under
the conditions of the fast transaction option. 2
6.2.9 Financial Decision Making
Imagine you are one of the selected winners in the lottery of the previous money allocation task and win
the amount of money, which was assigned to you. Please indicate the proportion of your winnings you
would allocate to the following purposes.
1. Consumption: We will visit your school in a few weeks to communicate the winners of the lottery,
which are randomly selected from your class. If you choose to allocate your winnings to spending,
the corresponding amount will be paid out to you immediately at our next visit to your school.
2. Savings: If you choose to save your winnings, the amount will be pooled with all the amounts
allocated to savings by randomly selected winners from other classes, and put in a savings account.
Your deposited winnings are earning 1% interest and will be paid out to you in one year.
3. Donations: If you choose to donate your winnings, the amount will be pooled with all the amounts
allocated to the same charitable organization by all randomly selected winners from other classes
and paid our to the corresponding institution.
4. Other purposes: If you choose to allocate your winnings to other purposes, the corresponding
amount will be paid out to you immediately at our next visit to your school.
001. Please indicate the percentage of
your winnings you would allocate to the
following categories. category 1 2—2—2—2 category 4
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6.2.10 Financial Literacy
Please read through the following scenarios:
Scenario 1: Imagine that you are depositing 100 units in national currency into a savings account. The
interest rate is 1%.
Scenario 2: Imagine that you are borrowing 100 units in national currency from a financial institution.
The loan carries an interest rate of 1% and runs for one year.
Please choose one of the following options.
1. More
2. Less
3. Same amount
4. Don’t know
001. How much money will you be able to
withdraw in one year? option 1 2—2—2—2 option 4
002. How much money will you need to
pay back in one year? option 1 2—2—2—2 option 4
6.2.11 Cognitive Capacities
Table 6.1: Grading Systems in Switzerland and Poland.
Subject School performance Switzerland Poland
grade points % grade points %
Mathematics
excellent 6 98-100 6 98-100
very good 5.5 91-97 5 91-97
good 5 81-90 4 75-90
satisfactory 4.5 71-80
sufficient 4 61-70 3 51-74
borderline 3.5 51-60
insufficient 3 41-50 2 35-50
poor 2.5 31-40
very poor 2 21-30
none 1.5 11.20
absence 1 0-10 1 0-34
Linguistics
excellent 6 98-100 6 98-100
very good 5.5 91-97 5 91-97
good 5 81-90 4 75-90
satisfactory 4.5 71-80
sufficient 4 61-70 3 51-74
borderline 3.5 51-60
insufficient 3 41-50 2 35-50
poor 2.5 31-40
very poor 2 21-30
none 1.5 11.20
absence 1 0-10 1 0-34
6.2.12 Life Satisfaction
Please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: All things considered,
how satisfied are you with your life?
001. not satisfied at all 2—2—2—2—2—2—2—2—2—2—2—2 completely satisfied
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6.3 Methodology
The following selection effects are used:
• Outdegree measures the average number of outgoing links, and can be compared to an intercept in
regression analyses.
• Reciprocity sneti (x) =
∑
j xijxji is the tendency of actors to reciprocate ties to each other.
• cyclicality sneti (x) =
∑n
j=1 xije
α
{
1− (1− e−α)
∑n
h=1 xjhxhi
}
in its variation of geometrically weighted
edgewise shared partners models situations in which a friend of a friend (an advisor of an advisor)
nominates the focal actor as a friend (asks the focal actor for advice).
• transitivity sneti (x) =
∑n
j=1 xije
α
{
1− (1− e−α)
∑n
h=1 xihxhj
}
in its variation of geometrically weighted
edgewise shared partners models situations, where a friend of a friend (an advisor of an advisor) is
nominated by the focal actor as friend (is asked for advice by the focal actor).
• Indegree popularity sneti (x) =
∑
j xij
∑
h xhj controls for dispersion in indegrees and investigates if
somebody who already has a lot of incoming ties is more popular as a target for further friendship
nominations.
• ego effects sneti (x) = vixi+ measure the tendency to initiate friendship- or advice relationship based
on one’s value priorities, life satisfaction, money allocation priorities, self-control, resilience, social
risks, ethical risks.
• alter effects sneti (x) =
∑n
j=1 xijvj measure the tendency for peers to be popular as friends or
advisors based on their value priorities, life satisfaction, money allocation priorities, self-control,
resilience, social risks, ethical risks.
• dyadic effects sneti (x) =
∑n
j=1 xij
{
simij − sim
}
if xi+ > 0 or 0 if xi+ = 0, measure the ten-
dency for peers to initiate friendship- or advice relationships with each other based on their simi-
larity on gender, age, value priorities, life satisfaction, money allocation priorities, self-control,
resilience, social risks, ethical risks, whereby simij = (1 − (vi − vj)) ∗ (vmax − vmin)−1 and
sim = n−1
∑ni
i=1
∑n
j=ni+1
(1− (vi − vj)) ∗ (vmax − vmin)−1
• transformation to advice sneti (x,w) =
∑n
j=1 xijwij measures the tendency to start asking one’s
friends for advice.
• transformation to friendship sneti (w, x) =
∑n
j=1 xijwij measures the tendency to initiate friendships
with one’s advisors.
The following behavior effects are used:
• Linear shape svali (z) = zi or sbehi (z) = zi effects control for the general tendency to change one’s
value- or money allocation priorities.
• quadratic shape svali (z) = z2i or sbehi (z) = z2i effects measure the tendency to change value- or money
allocation priorities depending on one’s current priority on specific values or money allocations.
• average similarity svali (x, z) = x−1i+
∑n
j=1 xij
{
simij − sim
}
or sbehi (x, z) = x
−1
i+
∑n
j=1 xij
{
simij − sim
}
if xi+ > 0 or 0 if xi+ = 0, measures the tendency to adapt one’s value- or money allocation
priorities to one’s friends or advisors, whereby simij = (1 − (vi − vj)) ∗ (vmax − vmin)−1 and
sim = n−1
∑ni
i=1
∑n
j=ni+1
(1− (vi − vj)) ∗ (vmax − vmin)−1
• covariate effects svali (x, z) = zivi or sbehi (x, z) = zivi measure the main effects from one’s gender,
life satisfaction, self-contol, resilience, financial literacy, mathematical ability, linguistic ability,
and time preferences on one’s value- or money allocation priorities.
• average alter covariate effects svali (x, z) = zi
∑n
h=1 xjhvh or s
beh
i (x, z) = zi
∑n
h=1 xjhvh if xj+ > 0
or 0 if xj+ = 0 measure the effects of the average expression of gender, life satisfaction, self-contol,
resilience, financial literacy, mathematical ability, linguistic ability, and time preferences among
one’s friends or advisors on one’s value- or money allocation priorities.
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6.4 Results
6.4.1 Values in Friendship Networks
Table 6.2: Self-transcendence values (stv)
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
1st period rate
8.072 *** 7.560 *** 7.795 ***
0.583 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.632 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.658 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.250 *** 6.632 *** 7.539 ***
0.425 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.437 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.679 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.961 *** -1.979 *** -1.916 ***
0.084 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.110 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.111 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.092 *** 1.172 *** 1.157 ***
0.080 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.102 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.093 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.369 *** 1.337 *** 1.330 ***
0.049 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.054 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.056 [ 1 , 0 ]
indegree popularity eval
-0.111 *** -0.117 *** -0.121 ***
0.014 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 1 ]
gender based selection:
same gender eval
0.386 *** 0.412 *** 0.383 ***
0.048 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.059 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.046 [ 1 , 0 ]
value based selection:
stv alter eval
-0.035 -0.020
0.028 [ 0.145 , 0.97 ] 0.035 [ 0.415 , 0.846 ]
stv ego eval
-0.071 * -0.076 *
0.035 [ 0.001 , 0.886 ] 0.035 [ 0.043 , 0.973 ]
stv similarity eval
0.184 0.113
0.151 [ 0.955 , 0.136 ] 0.174 [ 0.848 , 0.365 ]
stv alter endow
-0.000
0.074 [ 0.797 , 0.776 ]
stv ego endow
0.326
0.440 [ 0.416 , 0.102 ]
stv similarity endow
-0.064
0.460 [ 0.775 , 0.763 ]
stv alter create
0.018
0.070 [ 0.657 , 0.598 ]
stv ego create
-0.380
0.458 [ 0.067 , 0.446 ]
stv similarity create
0.125
0.427 [ 0.763 , 0.695 ]
self-transcendence change:
1st period rate
1.401 *** 4.666 † 1.380 ***
0.142 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.461 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.159 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
1.138 *** 1.119 *** 1.150 ***
0.117 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.136 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.134 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
0.242 *** 0.309 *** 0.279 ***
0.037 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.053 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.045 [ 1 , 0 ]
quadratic eval
-0.266 ***
0.045 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
2.482 *** 2.019 ***
0.401 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.431 [ 1 , 0 ]
effect from gender eval
0.302 *** 0.266 ***
0.076 [ 1 , 0.002 ] 0.089 [ 1 , 0.026 ]
average alter gender eval
0.526 ***
0.181 [ 1 , 0.022 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.319 *** 0.318 *** 0.338 ***
0.295 [ 58 / 46 ] 0.308 [ 55 / 39 ] 0.287 [ 46 / 36 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.554 *** 0.601 *** 0.556 ***
0.290 [ 58 / 55 ] 0.348 [ 55 / 50 ] 0.305 [ 46 / 43 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.3: Conservation values (cov)
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
1st period rate
7.501 *** 6.915 *** 7.232 ***
0.537 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.507 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.650 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.340 *** 6.923 *** 8.274 ***
0.369 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.355 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.666 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.975 *** -1.990 *** -2.096 ***
0.082 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.092 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.121 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.152 *** 1.226 *** 1.261 ***
0.077 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.080 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.086 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.303 *** 1.332 *** 1.369 ***
0.045 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.045 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.055 [ 1 , 0 ]
indegree popularity eval
-0.096 *** -0.108 *** -0.116 ***
0.014 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.015 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ]
gender based selection:
same gender eval
0.390 *** 0.395 *** 0.434 ***
0.049 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.049 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.062 [ 1 , 0 ]
value based selection:
cov alter eval
-0.052 † -0.030
0.026 [ 0.036 , 0.986 ] 0.030 [ 0.179 , 0.903 ]
cov ego eval
0.042 0.039
0.035 [ 0.644 , 0.011 ] 0.041 [ 0.62 , 0.029 ]
cov similarity eval
0.158 0.179
0.178 [ 0.845 , 0.468 ] 0.209 [ 0.819 , 0.423 ]
cov alter endow
-0.103
0.073 [ 0.486 , 0.763 ]
cov ego endow
-0.178
0.495 [ 0.18 , 0.48 ]
cov similarity endow
1.037 †
0.609 [ 0.986 , 0.2 ]
cov alter create
0.039
0.065 [ 0.547 , 0.833 ]
cov ego create
0.372
0.449 [ 0.622 , 0.081 ]
cov similarity create
-0.598
0.559 [ 0.385 , 0.937 ]
conservation change:
1st period rate
1.707 *** 1.741 *** 1.673 ***
0.142 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.153 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.162 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
1.381 *** 1.268 *** 1.277 ***
0.163 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.166 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.177 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
0.133 *** 0.156 *** 0.111 ***
0.029 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.032 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.037 [ 1 , 0.014 ]
quadratic eval
-0.242 ***
0.024 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
2.946 *** 3.101 ***
0.312 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.408 [ 1 , 0 ]
effect from gender eval
0.084 0.119
0.057 [ 0.917 , 0.18 ] 0.075 [ 0.978 , 0.148 ]
average alter gender eval
-0.024
0.107 [ 0.487 , 0.654 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.351 *** 0.342 *** 0.354 ***
0.299 [ 57 / 44 ] 0.305 [ 54 / 41 ] 0.309 [ 40 / 29 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.653 *** 0.668 *** 0.642 ***
0.256 [ 57 / 56 ] 0.316 [ 54 / 52 ] 0.260 [ 40 / 40 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.4: Self-enhancement values (sev)
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
1st period rate
7.549 *** 6.986 *** 6.987 ***
0.494 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.458 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.565 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.270 *** 6.967 *** 7.381 ***
0.411 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.417 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.564 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.967 *** -1.944 *** -1.979 ***
0.074 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.082 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.106 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.120 *** 1.190 *** 1.207 ***
0.075 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.076 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.079 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.329 *** 1.345 *** 1.329 ***
0.043 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.046 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.057 [ 1 , 0 ]
indegree popularity eval
-0.099 *** -0.105 *** -0.101 ***
0.012 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.012 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.015 [ 0 , 1 ]
gender based selection:
same gender eval
0.398 *** 0.381 *** 0.394 ***
0.045 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.046 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.057 [ 1 , 0 ]
value based selection:
sev alter eval
-0.034 -0.048 †
0.022 [ 0.026 , 0.947 ] 0.027 [ 0.016 , 0.969 ]
sev ego eval
0.023 0.030
0.023 [ 0.541 , 0.041 ] 0.027 [ 0.753 , 0.036 ]
sev similarity eval
0.243 † 0.202
0.133 [ 0.981 , 0.044 ] 0.156 [ 0.941 , 0.087 ]
sev alter endow
-0.141 †
0.073 [ 0.037 , 0.959 ]
sev ego endow
-0.282
0.461 [ 0.012 , 0.088 ]
sev similarity endow
0.883 †
0.501 [ 0.961 , 0.181 ]
sev alter create
0.007
0.055 [ 0.63 , 0.796 ]
sev ego create
0.402
0.452 [ 0.13 , 0.004 ]
sev similarity create
-0.133
0.475 [ 0.52 , 0.862 ]
self-enhancement change:
1st period rate
1.473 *** 1.413 *** 1.431 ***
0.110 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.117 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.125 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
1.448 *** 1.428 *** 1.383 ***
0.116 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.126 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.130 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
0.072 * 0.105 *** 0.088 *
0.028 [ 1 , 0.005 ] 0.032 [ 1 , 0.001 ] 0.035 [ 0.999 , 0.006 ]
quadratic eval
-0.179 ***
0.022 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
1.912 *** 1.580 ***
0.291 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.348 [ 1 , 0 ]
effect from gender eval
-0.126 * -0.122 †
0.055 [ 0.04 , 1 ] 0.069 [ 0.039 , 0.996 ]
average alter gender eval
-0.301 **
0.111 [ 0.027 , 1 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.328 *** 0.329 *** 0.294 ***
0.283 [ 63 / 50 ] 0.294 [ 60 / 44 ] 0.282 [ 46 / 34 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.670 *** 0.695 *** 0.681 ***
0.234 [ 63 / 63 ] 0.276 [ 60 / 60 ] 0.249 [ 46 / 46 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.5: Openness to change values (opv)
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
1st period rate
7.148 *** 6.575 *** 6.879 ***
0.513 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.512 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.583 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
6.787 *** 6.610 *** 7.397 ***
0.417 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.445 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.876 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.880 *** -1.907 *** -1.878 ***
0.081 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.092 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.103 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.152 *** 1.193 *** 1.223 ***
0.084 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.101 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.105 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.330 *** 1.355 *** 1.337 ***
0.046 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.048 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.054 [ 1 , 0 ]
indegree popularity eval
-0.121 *** -0.130 *** -0.127 ***
0.015 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 1 ]
gender based selection:
same gender eval
0.403 *** 0.428 *** 0.412 ***
0.046 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.045 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.046 [ 1 , 0 ]
value based selection:
opv alter eval
-0.078 * -0.069 †
0.035 [ 0.112 , 0.944 ] 0.041 [ 0.177 , 0.952 ]
opv ego eval
-0.063 -0.036
0.041 [ 0.017 , 0.834 ] 0.048 [ 0.188 , 0.674 ]
opv similarity eval
0.300 . 0.425 *
0.172 [ 0.992 , 0.133 ] 0.206 [ 0.995 , 0.074 ]
opv alter endow
-0.049
0.098 [ 0.505 , 0.946 ]
opv ego endow
0.565
0.621 [ 0.458 , 0.019 ]
opv similarity endow
0.389
0.585 [ 0.966 , 0.523 ]
opv alter create
0.011
0.099 [ 0.799 , 0.694 ]
opv ego create
-0.769
0.635 [ 0.005 , 0.614 ]
opv similarity create
0.185
0.608 [ 0.738 , 0.673 ]
openness change:
1st period rate
1.481 *** 1.468 *** 1.394 ***
0.128 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.141 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.143 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
0.864 *** 0.943 *** 0.826 ***
0.103 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.121 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.114 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
0.232 *** 0.285 *** 0.242 ***
0.038 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.050 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.051 [ 1 , 0 ]
quadratic eval
-0.273 ***
0.047 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
2.293 *** 2.126 ***
0.351 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.456 [ 1 , 0 ]
effect from gender eval
0.150 * 0.129
0.074 [ 0.987 , 0.212 ] 0.099 [ 0.938 , 0.334 ]
average alter gender eval
0.240
0.161 [ 0.967 , 0.194 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.333 *** 0.341 *** 0.337 ***
0.310 [ 57 / 44 ] 0.316 [ 47 / 36 ] 0.302 [ 40 / 30 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.673 *** 0.755 *** 0.676 ***
0.269 [ 57 / 56 ] 0.278 [ 47 / 46 ] 0.267 [ 40 / 39 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.6: Self-transcendence values (stv) and gender
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
1st period rate
7.771 *** 7.649 *** 7.673 ***
0.572 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.661 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.680 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.015 *** 6.648 *** 7.432 ***
0.430 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.432 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.660 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.956 *** -1.909 *** -1.916 ***
0.096 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.116 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.120 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.116 *** 1.159 *** 1.172 ***
0.086 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.097 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.098 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.348 *** 1.342 *** 1.345 ***
0.050 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.056 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.057 [ 1 , 0 ]
indegree popularity eval
-0.107 *** -0.119 *** -0.125 ***
0.015 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ]
gender based selection:
same gender eval
0.391 *** 0.357 ***
0.055 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.067 [ 1 , 0 ]
same gender endow
0.125
0.127 [ 0.816 , 0.122 ]
same gender create
0.685 ***
0.091 [ 1 , 0 ]
gender value interaction:
I(gender*stv similarity) eval
0.019 -0.113
0.320 [ 0.719 , 0.749 ] 0.350 [ 0.751 , 0.912 ]
value based selection:
stv alter eval
-0.024 -0.030
0.030 [ 0.303 , 0.923 ] 0.033 [ 0.444 , 0.898 ]
stv ego eval
-0.063 * -0.080 *
0.029 [ 0.011 , 0.959 ] 0.040 [ 0.01 , 0.933 ]
stv similarity eval
0.099 0.205
0.235 [ 0.949 , 0.638 ] 0.260 [ 0.933 , 0.438 ]
stv alter endow
0.003
0.078 [ 0.867 , 0.777 ]
stv ego endow
-0.125
0.497 [ 0.088 , 0.393 ]
stv similarity endow
0.005
0.454 [ 0.768 , 0.677 ]
stv alter create
-0.000
0.073 [ 0.712 , 0.727 ]
stv ego create
0.036
0.503 [ 0.267 , 0.153 ]
stv similarity create
0.169
0.444 [ 0.819 , 0.691 ]
self-transcendence change:
1st period rate
1.381 *** 1.347 *** 1.341 ***
0.137 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.152 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.155 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
1.189 *** 0.990 *** 1.174 ***
0.123 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.114 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.139 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
0.262 *** 0.333 *** 0.276 ***
0.038 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.055 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.047 [ 1 , 0 ]
quadratic eval
-0.253 ***
0.045 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
2.320 *** 2.195 ***
0.403 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.449 [ 1 , 0 ]
effect from gender eval
0.341 *** 0.291 ***
0.079 [ 1 , 0.001 ] 0.088 [ 1 , 0.011 ]
average alter gender eval
0.581 ***
0.195 [ 1 , 0.032 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.317 *** 0.328 *** 0.313 ***
0.290 [ 56 / 42 ] 0.307 [ 53 / 40 ] 0.282 [ 43 / 33 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.547 *** 0.585 *** 0.568 ***
0.291 [ 56 / 54 ] 0.349 [ 53 / 48 ] 0.281 [ 43 / 42 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
103
Table 6.7: Conservation values (cov) and gender
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
1st period rate
7.245 *** 6.740 *** 8.328 ***
0.539 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.539 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.799 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.411 *** 6.855 *** 8.757 ***
0.379 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.385 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.740 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.919 *** -2.005 *** -2.098 ***
0.093 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.119 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.106 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.179 *** 1.220 *** 1.163 ***
0.077 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.090 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.072 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.368 *** 1.361 *** 1.359 ***
0.049 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.052 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.057 [ 1 , 0 ]
indegree popularity eval
-0.107 *** -0.106 *** -0.110 ***
0.014 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.016 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 1 ]
gender based selection:
same gender eval
0.345 *** 0.387 ***
0.044 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.062 [ 1 , 0 ]
same gender endow
0.435 *
0.179 [ 0.949 , 0 ]
same gender create
0.487 ***
0.136 [ 0.991 , 0 ]
gender value interaction:
I(gender*cov similarity) eval
-0.743 † -0.618
0.401 [ 0.177 , 0.948 ] 0.449 [ 0.383 , 0.866 ]
value based selection:
cov alter eval
-0.074 * -0.025
0.033 [ 0.008 , 0.992 ] 0.033 [ 0.252 , 0.882 ]
cov ego eval
0.019 0.020
0.032 [ 0.597 , 0.117 ] 0.042 [ 0.641 , 0.138 ]
cov similarity eval
0.490 0.448
0.316 [ 0.929 , 0.371 ] 0.353 [ 0.845 , 0.606 ]
cov alter endow
-0.123 †
0.072 [ 0.361 , 0.818 ]
cov ego endow
-0.376
0.476 [ 0.006 , 0.321 ]
cov similarity endow
0.388
0.559 [ 0.858 , 0.697 ]
cov alter create
0.021
0.063 [ 0.646 , 0.889 ]
cov ego create
0.520
0.416 [ 0.626 , 0.005 ]
cov similarity create
-0.082
0.541 [ 0.661 , 0.772 ]
conservation change:
1st period rate
1.649 *** 1.700 *** 1.607 ***
0.130 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.153 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.154 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
1.344 *** 3.980 *** 1.247 ***
0.157 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.402 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.161 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
0.130 *** 0.143 *** 0.120 ***
0.030 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.035 [ 1 , 0.001 ] 0.036 [ 1 , 0.004 ]
quadratic eval
-0.260 ***
0.026 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
3.083 *** 2.912 ***
0.320 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.386 [ 1 , 0 ]
effect from gender eval
0.092 0.036
0.058 [ 0.952 , 0.146 ] 0.072 [ 0.697 , 0.489 ]
average alter gender eval
-0.021
0.113 [ 0.549 , 0.63 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.349 *** 0.353 *** 0.364 ***
0.308 [ 56 / 45 ] 0.320 [ 53 / 40 ] 0.319 [ 39 / 31 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.654 *** 0.671 *** 0.654 ***
0.257 [ 56 / 56 ] 0.320 [ 53 / 51 ] 0.278 [ 39 / 38 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.8: Self-enhancement values (sev) and gender
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
1st period rate
7.319 *** 7.143 *** 7.764 ***
0.492 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.506 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.716 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
6.779 *** 6.481 *** 7.673 ***
0.402 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.357 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.613 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.961 *** -1.949 *** -2.040 ***
0.090 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.102 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.097 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.115 *** 1.143 *** 1.212 ***
0.084 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.089 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.085 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.358 *** 1.369 *** 1.387 ***
0.049 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.052 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.057 [ 1 , 0 ]
indegree popularity eval
-0.100 *** -0.104 *** -0.111 ***
0.013 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.014 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.015 [ 0 , 1 ]
gender based selection:
same gender eval
0.373 *** 0.364 ***
0.056 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.058 [ 1 , 0 ]
same gender endow
0.393 *
0.166 [ 0.887 , 0 ]
same gender create
0.458 ***
0.137 [ 0.986 , 0 ]
gender value interaction:
I(gender*sev similarity) eval
-0.135 -0.148
0.305 [ 0.27 , 0.781 ] 0.336 [ 0.296 , 0.866 ]
value based selection:
sev alter eval
-0.028 -0.030
0.024 [ 0.093 , 0.881 ] 0.028 [ 0.084 , 0.858 ]
sev ego eval
0.016 0.017
0.025 [ 0.48 , 0.133 ] 0.028 [ 0.552 , 0.1 ]
sev similarity eval
0.187 0.214
0.232 [ 0.967 , 0.349 ] 0.258 [ 0.991 , 0.331 ]
sev alter endow
-0.099
0.075 [ 0.118 , 0.852 ]
sev ego endow
0.039
0.466 [ 0.08 , 0.02 ]
sev similarity endow
0.618
0.513 [ 0.93 , 0.284 ]
sev alter create
-0.004
0.056 [ 0.478 , 0.827 ]
sev ego create
0.106
0.439 [ 0.035 , 0.031 ]
sev similarity create
0.028
0.458 [ 0.733 , 0.779 ]
self-enhancement change:
1st period rate
1.422 *** 1.431 *** 1.389 ***
0.111 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.121 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.122 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
1.427 *** 1.427 *** 1.439 ***
0.119 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.130 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.139 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
0.080 ** 0.109 *** 0.074 *
0.029 [ 1 , 0.005 ] 0.034 [ 1 , 0.003 ] 0.035 [ 0.998 , 0.012 ]
quadratic eval
-0.168 ***
0.022 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
1.666 *** 1.643 ***
0.311 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.353 [ 1 , 0 ]
effect from gender eval
-0.129 * -0.116 †
0.058 [ 0.04 , 0.999 ] 0.068 [ 0.059 , 0.996 ]
avg alter gender eval
-0.324 **
0.119 [ 0.033 , 1 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.303 *** 0.300 *** 0.305 ***
0.273 [ 60 / 46 ] 0.280 [ 57 / 43 ] 0.284 [ 47 / 35 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.646 *** 0.668 *** 0.676 ***
0.240 [ 60 / 60 ] 0.284 [ 57 / 57 ] 0.246 [ 47 / 47 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.9: Openness to change values (opv) and gender
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
1st period rate
7.214 *** 6.585 *** 6.927 ***
0.541 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.542 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.618 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
6.778 *** 6.651 *** 7.739 ***
0.426 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.469 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.868 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.925 *** -1.991 *** -1.845 ***
0.095 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.098 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.098 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.127 *** 1.171 *** 1.228 ***
0.088 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.104 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.105 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.328 *** 1.374 *** 1.390 ***
0.052 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.054 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.064 [ 1 , 0 ]
indegree popularity eval
-0.118 *** -0.124 *** -0.139 ***
0.014 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.020 [ 0 , 1 ]
gender based selection:
same gender eval
0.404 *** 0.460 ***
0.054 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.060 [ 1 , 0 ]
same gender endow
0.305
0.186 [ 0.81 , 0 ]
same gender create
0.556 ***
0.146 [ 0.992 , 0 ]
gender value interaction:
I(gender*opv similarity) eval
0.528 0.746 †
0.326 [ 0.951 , 0.349 ] 0.401 [ 0.972 , 0.16 ]
value based selection:
opv alter eval
-0.086 * -0.075 †
0.035 [ 0.077 , 0.97 ] 0.042 [ 0.148 , 0.96 ]
opv ego eval
-0.053 -0.037
0.040 [ 0.057 , 0.86 ] 0.049 [ 0.267 , 0.694 ]
opv similarity eval
-0.110 -0.185
0.265 [ 0.85 , 0.807 ] 0.320 [ 0.72 , 0.882 ]
opv alter endow
-0.099
0.100 [ 0.307 , 0.965 ]
opv ego endow
0.420
0.605 [ 0.493 , 0.036 ]
opv similarity endow
0.069
0.572 [ 0.913 , 0.69 ]
opv alter create
-0.027
0.095 [ 0.67 , 0.679 ]
opv ego create
-0.526
0.610 [ 0.018 , 0.567 ]
opv similarity create
0.566
0.571 [ 0.916 , 0.459 ]
openness change:
1st period rate
1.469 *** 1.471 *** 1.333 ***
0.125 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.147 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.137 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
0.846 *** 0.941 *** 0.854 ***
0.101 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.125 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.117 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
0.237 *** 0.301 *** 0.256 ***
0.040 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.050 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.051 [ 1 , 0 ]
quadratic eval
-0.231 ***
0.043 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
2.310 *** 2.010 ***
0.362 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.452 [ 1 , 0 ]
effect from gender eval
0.143 † 0.146
0.076 [ 0.977 , 0.217 ] 0.098 [ 0.97 , 0.266 ]
avg alter gender eval
0.176
0.170 [ 0.905 , 0.248 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.318 *** 0.308 *** 0.338 ***
0.290 [ 54 / 42 ] 0.298 [ 46 / 34 ] 0.304 [ 38 / 29 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.676 *** 0.739 *** 0.669 ***
0.271 [ 54 / 53 ] 0.305 [ 46 / 44 ] 0.273 [ 38 / 37 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.10: Self-transcendence values (stv) and life satisfaction
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
1st period rate
7.017 *** 6.842 *** 7.804 ***
0.583 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.683 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.679 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.017 *** 6.321 *** 7.130 ***
0.410 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.389 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.689 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.742 *** -1.661 *** -1.720 ***
0.092 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.108 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.108 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.336 *** 1.415 *** 1.353 ***
0.085 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.097 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.085 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.438 *** 1.412 *** 1.466 ***
0.053 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.057 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.057 [ 1 , 0 ]
indegree popularity eval
-0.157 *** -0.174 *** -0.162 ***
0.021 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.026 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.020 [ 0 , 1 ]
satisfaction based selection:
satisfaction similarity eval
0.307 *** 0.429 ***
0.089 [ 0.998 , 0.014 ] 0.113 [ 1 , 0.006 ]
satisfaction similarity endow
0.147
0.238 [ 0.742 , 0.264 ]
satisfaction similarity create
0.334 †
0.205 [ 0.944 , 0.062 ]
satisfaction value interaction:
I(satisfaction*stv similarity) eval
0.557 0.665
0.770 [ 0.886 , 0.586 ] 0.883 [ 0.868 , 0.41 ]
value based selection:
stv alter eval
-0.017 -0.018
0.038 [ 0.459 , 0.911 ] 0.045 [ 0.362 , 0.8 ]
stv ego eval
-0.052 -0.038
0.042 [ 0.02 , 0.882 ] 0.043 [ 0.114 , 0.84 ]
stv similarity eval
0.071 0.112
0.185 [ 0.895 , 0.664 ] 0.210 [ 0.926 , 0.436 ]
stv alter endow
-0.036
0.095 [ 0.639 , 0.886 ]
stv ego endow
0.233
0.506 [ 0.36 , 0.186 ]
stv similarity endow
-0.201
0.517 [ 0.653 , 0.708 ]
stv alter create
0.044
0.089 [ 0.809 , 0.552 ]
stv ego create
-0.252
0.503 [ 0.137 , 0.46 ]
stv similarity create
0.218
0.475 [ 0.833 , 0.629 ]
self-transcendence change:
1st period rate
1.375 *** 1.383 *** 1.300 ***
0.165 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.194 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.166 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
1.168 *** 1.064 *** 1.117 ***
0.140 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.146 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.142 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
0.289 *** 0.294 *** 0.277 ***
0.046 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.063 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.050 [ 1 , 0 ]
quadratic eval
-0.220 ***
0.053 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
2.643 *** 2.371 ***
0.494 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.507 [ 1 , 0 ]
effect from satisfaction eval
0.041 † 0.048 †
0.025 [ 0.995 , 0.2 ] 0.027 [ 0.991 , 0.192 ]
average alter satisfaction eval
-0.091
0.137 [ 0.696 , 0.966 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.286 *** 0.304 *** 0.295 ***
0.298 [ 54 / 36 ] 0.311 [ 43 / 30 ] 0.300 [ 44 / 32 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.542 *** 0.597 *** 0.621 ***
0.308 [ 54 / 50 ] 0.346 [ 43 / 38 ] 0.289 [ 44 / 42 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.11: Conservation values (cov) and life satisfaction
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
1st period rate
6.869 *** 6.568 *** 7.603 ***
0.521 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.542 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.718 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.007 *** 6.606 *** 8.387 ***
0.377 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.370 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.726 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.730 *** -1.786 *** -1.833 ***
0.074 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.083 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.095 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.319 *** 1.405 *** 1.409 ***
0.082 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.091 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.075 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.420 *** 1.480 *** 1.467 ***
0.053 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.055 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.061 [ 1 , 0 ]
indegree popularity eval
-0.134 *** -0.144 *** -0.156 ***
0.016 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ]
satisfaction based selection:
satisfaction similarity eval
0.219 * 0.306 ***
0.086 [ 0.997 , 0.051 ] 0.098 [ 0.998 , 0.02 ]
satisfaction similarity endow
0.559 *
0.247 [ 0.997 , 0.023 ]
satisfaction similarity create
-0.151
0.224 [ 0.299 , 0.726 ]
satisfaction value interaction:
I(satisfaction*cov similarity) eval
-0.195 -0.731
0.866 [ 0.761 , 0.633 ] 1.047 [ 0.489 , 0.871 ]
value based selection:
cov alter eval
-0.074 * -0.065
0.037 [ 0.018 , 0.994 ] 0.047 [ 0.066 , 0.932 ]
cov ego eval
-0.018 0.004
0.033 [ 0.385 , 0.449 ] 0.041 [ 0.644 , 0.335 ]
cov similarity eval
0.022 -0.036
0.224 [ 0.852 , 0.705 ] 0.272 [ 0.737 , 0.733 ]
cov alter endow
-0.162 †
0.091 [ 0.347 , 0.886 ]
cov ego endow
-0.936 *
0.470 [ 0.036 , 0.925 ]
cov similarity endow
0.726
0.682 [ 0.922 , 0.386 ]
cov alter create
-0.017
0.074 [ 0.573 , 0.911 ]
cov ego create
0.938 *
0.419 [ 0.962 , 0.023 ]
cov similarity create
-0.533
0.609 [ 0.383 , 0.925 ]
conservation change:
1st period rate
1.583 *** 1.707 *** 1.628 ***
0.142 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.171 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.174 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
1.528 *** 1.164 *** 1.313 ***
0.200 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.180 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.204 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
0.126 *** 0.141 *** 0.104 ***
0.030 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.037 [ 1 , 0.002 ] 0.037 [ 1 , 0.021 ]
quadratic eval
-0.250 ***
0.028 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
3.086 *** 3.047 ***
0.360 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.436 [ 1 , 0 ]
effect from satisfaction eval
0.009 0.026
0.018 [ 0.84 , 0.403 ] 0.024 [ 0.901 , 0.327 ]
average alter satisfaction eval
-0.040
0.083 [ 0.779 , 0 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.283 *** 0.289 *** 0.275 ***
0.290 [ 58 / 40 ] 0.287 [ 53 / 36 ] 0.281 [ 40 / 26 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.652 *** 0.648 *** 0.676 ***
0.261 [ 58 / 58 ] 0.307 [ 53 / 51 ] 0.261 [ 40 / 40 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.12: Self-enhancement values (sev) and life satisfaction
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
1st period rate
7.325 *** 6.932 *** 7.406 ***
0.524 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.455 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.643 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.023 *** 7.081 *** 7.164 ***
0.441 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.444 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.512 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.733 *** -1.793 *** -1.770 ***
0.060 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.064 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.079 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.255 *** 1.333 *** 1.386 ***
0.083 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.081 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.087 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.410 *** 1.461 *** 1.477 ***
0.048 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.046 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.052 [ 1 , 0 ]
indegree popularity eval
-0.127 *** -0.139 *** -0.142 ***
0.014 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.015 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.015 [ 0 , 1 ]
satisfaction based selection:
satisfaction similarity eval
0.204 *** 0.169 *
0.072 [ 0.997 , 0.022 ] 0.071 [ 0.985 , 0.05 ]
satisfaction similarity endow
0.220
0.258 [ 0.78 , 0.08 ]
satisfaction similarity create
0.070
0.200 [ 0.388 , 0.434 ]
satisfaction value interaction:
I(satisfaction*sev similarity) eval
-0.337 0.031
0.655 [ 0.707 , 0.896 ] 0.678 [ 0.852 , 0.76 ]
value based selection:
sev alter eval
-0.039 † -0.051 †
0.023 [ 0.021 , 0.958 ] 0.029 [ 0.017 , 0.968 ]
sev ego eval
0.020 0.038
0.026 [ 0.474 , 0.127 ] 0.026 [ 0.636 , 0.051 ]
sev similarity eval
0.337 * 0.220
0.162 [ 0.985 , 0.121 ] 0.167 [ 0.96 , 0.227 ]
sev alter endow
-0.139 †
0.081 [ 0.084 , 0.826 ]
sev ego endow
-0.609
0.444 [ 0 , 0.165 ]
sev similarity endow
0.797
0.532 [ 0.969 , 0.252 ]
sev alter create
-0.022
0.060 [ 0.506 , 0.891 ]
sev ego create
0.657
0.433 [ 0.274 , 0 ]
sev similarity create
-0.006
0.470 [ 0.702 , 0.789 ]
self-enhancement change:
1st period rate
1.477 *** 1.399 *** 1.330 ***
0.118 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.119 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.124 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
1.461 *** 1.456 *** 1.349 ***
0.122 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.128 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.145 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
0.073 * 0.103 *** 0.089 *
0.030 [ 1 , 0.004 ] 0.036 [ 1 , 0.005 ] 0.037 [ 0.999 , 0.009 ]
quadratic eval
-0.156 ***
0.022 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
1.982 *** 1.684 ***
0.319 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.367 [ 1 , 0 ]
effect from satisfaction eval
0.003 -0.025
0.016 [ 0.54 , 0.749 ] 0.020 [ 0.216 , 0.985 ]
average alter satisfaction eval
0.057
0.069 [ 0.994 , 0.792 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.275 *** 0.283 *** 0.243 ***
0.269 [ 64 / 46 ] 0.269 [ 59 / 44 ] 0.271 [ 54 / 35 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.678 *** 0.698 *** 0.679 ***
0.246 [ 64 / 64 ] 0.278 [ 59 / 59 ] 0.255 [ 54 / 54 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.13: Openness to change values (opv) and life satisfaction
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
1st period rate
6.010 *** 5.715 *** 6.472 ***
0.451 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.526 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.555 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
6.120 *** 5.743 *** 6.644 ***
0.428 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.518 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.848 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.615 *** -1.658 *** -1.633 ***
0.102 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.119 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.103 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.355 *** 1.248 *** 1.401 ***
0.105 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.136 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.113 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.465 *** 1.368 *** 1.444 ***
0.060 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.071 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.062 [ 1 , 0 ]
indegree popularity eval
-0.165 *** -0.134 *** -0.165 ***
0.020 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.024 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.021 [ 0 , 1 ]
satisfaction based selection:
satisfaction similarity eval
0.360 *** 0.301 *
0.104 [ 1 , 0.009 ] 0.144 [ 0.995 , 0.106 ]
satisfaction similarity endow
0.403
0.349 [ 0.675 , 0.048 ]
satisfaction similarity create
0.002
0.241 [ 0.5 , 0.408 ]
satisfaction value interaction:
I(satisfaction*opv similarity) eval
-0.486 -0.720
0.836 [ 0.588 , 0.853 ] 1.248 [ 0.456 , 0.793 ]
value based selection:
opv alter eval
-0.104 * -0.079
0.051 [ 0.131 , 0.926 ] 0.059 [ 0.508 , 0.874 ]
opv ego eval
-0.067 -0.076
0.053 [ 0.132 , 0.925 ] 0.057 [ 0.284 , 0.841 ]
opv similarity eval
0.308 0.711 *
0.218 [ 0.992 , 0.205 ] 0.333 [ 0.998 , 0.2 ]
opv alter endow
-0.122
0.121 [ 0.395 , 0.964 ]
opv ego endow
0.393
0.638 [ 0.59 , 0.059 ]
opv similarity endow
0.056
0.634 [ 0.9 , 0.746 ]
opv alter create
-0.050
0.105 [ 0.649 , 0.814 ]
opv ego create
-0.652
0.641 [ 0.028 , 0.785 ]
opv similarity create
0.733
0.591 [ 0.955 , 0.352 ]
openness change:
1st period rate
1.455 *** 1.649 *** 1.374 ***
0.142 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.221 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.150 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
0.877 *** 1.029 *** 0.818 ***
0.116 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.164 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.119 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
0.248 *** 0.274 *** 0.267 ***
0.048 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.067 [ 1 , 0.001 ] 0.064 [ 1 , 0 ]
quadratic eval
-0.270 ***
0.063 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
2.335 *** 2.049 ***
0.422 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.540 [ 1 , 0 ]
effect from satisfaction eval
0.047 † 0.055
0.027 [ 0.986 , 0.213 ] 0.037 [ 0.955 , 0.346 ]
avg alter satisfaction eval
-0.021
0.131 [ 0.836 , 0.894 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.282 *** 0.270 *** 0.281 ***
0.307 [ 56 / 36 ] 0.302 [ 40 / 25 ] 0.304 [ 41 / 26 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.693 *** 0.757 *** 0.678 ***
0.272 [ 56 / 55 ] 0.294 [ 40 / 38 ] 0.290 [ 41 / 40 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.14: Interdependence with self-transcendence values (stv)
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
1st period rate
7.301 *** 6.942 *** 7.433 ***
0.580 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.720 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.765 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
6.887 *** 6.818 *** 7.097 ***
0.470 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.500 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.579 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.591 *** -1.601 *** -1.563 ***
0.069 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.115 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.103 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.253 *** 1.229 *** 1.315 ***
0.080 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.110 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.087 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.368 *** 1.352 *** 1.415 ***
0.043 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.056 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.064 [ 1 , 0 ]
indegree popularity eval
-0.143 *** -0.139 *** -0.159 ***
0.015 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.021 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.022 [ 0 , 1 ]
self-transcendence change:
1st period rate
4.597 * 1.437 *** 1.574 ***
2.237 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.198 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.246 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
1.108 *** 1.167 *** 1.265 ***
0.134 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.157 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.228 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
0.261 *** 0.260 *** 0.342 ***
0.045 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.079 [ 1 , 0.008 ] 0.070 [ 1 , 0 ]
quadratic eval
-0.217 ***
0.068 [ 0.014 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
2.835 *** 2.714 ***
0.507 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.717 [ 1 , 0.001 ]
value interdependencies:
effect from cov eval
0.012
0.060 [ 0.665 , 0.745 ]
effect from cov endow
0.304
0.398 [ 0.886 , 0.678 ]
effect from cov create
-0.442
0.414 [ 0.661 , 0.965 ]
average alter cov eval
0.304
0.324 [ 0.939 , 0.558 ]
effect from sev eval
-0.048
0.049 [ 0.177 , 0.988 ]
effect from sev endow
0.061
0.353 [ 0.839 , 0.873 ]
effect from sev create
-0.246
0.360 [ 0.632 , 0.943 ]
average alter sev eval
-0.347
0.278 [ 0.506 , 0.967 ]
effect from opv eval
0.056
0.068 [ 0.974 , 0.352 ]
effect from opv endow
-0.248
0.547 [ 0.658 , 0.94 ]
effect from opv create
0.545
0.524 [ 0.951 , 0.412 ]
average alter opv eval
-0.040
0.419 [ 0.866 , 0.807 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.268 *** 0.256 *** 0.219 ***
0.286 [ 64 , 42 ] 0.296 [ 40 , 26 ] 0.257 [ 44 , 28 ]
GOF (values)
0.581 *** 0.600 *** 0.592 ***
0.301 [ 64 , 59 ] 0.339 [ 40 , 38 ] 0.279 [ 44 , 42 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.15: Interdependence with conservation values (cov)
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
1st period rate
7.495 *** 7.381 *** 7.399 ***
0.565 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.744 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.595 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.430 *** 7.155 *** 7.410 ***
0.474 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.571 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.413 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.633 *** -1.677 *** -1.640 ***
0.069 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.078 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.073 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.249 *** 1.345 *** 1.334 ***
0.076 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.102 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.062 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.358 *** 1.392 *** 1.362 ***
0.045 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.056 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.046 [ 1 , 0 ]
indegree popularity eval
-0.135 *** -0.147 *** -0.141 ***
0.014 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.015 [ 0 , 1 ]
conservation change:
1st period rate
1.505 *** 1.536 *** 1.677 ***
0.128 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.191 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.195 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
3.607 *** 1.530 *** 1.145 ***
1.175 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.280 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.191 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
0.134 *** 0.156 ** 0.113 **
0.033 [ 1 , 0.001 ] 0.058 [ 1 , 0.047 ] 0.042 [ 1 , 0.027 ]
quadratic eval
-0.261 ***
0.046 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
3.057 *** 3.206 ***
0.404 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.448 [ 1 , 0 ]
value interdependencies:
effect from stv eval
-0.020
0.050 [ 0.68 , 0.862 ]
effect from stv endow
-0.296
0.369 [ 0.666 , 0.872 ]
effect from stv create
0.297
0.330 [ 0.881 , 0.701 ]
average alter stv eval
-0.123
0.294 [ 0.831 , 0.847 ]
effect from sev eval
0.025
0.036 [ 0.653 , 0.711 ]
effect from sev endow
-0.040
0.241 [ 0.671 , 0.899 ]
effect from sev create
-0.095
0.225 [ 0.778 , 0.888 ]
average alter sev eval
-0.038
0.223 [ 0.746 , 0.873 ]
effect from opv eval
-0.004
0.054 [ 0.833 , 0.482 ]
effect from opv endow
0.269
0.363 [ 0.805 , 0.462 ]
effect from opv create
-0.073
0.343 [ 0.608 , 0.762 ]
average alter opv eval
-0.031
0.357 [ 0.765 , 0.883 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.273 *** 0.266 *** 0.267 ***
0.281 [ 63 , 42 ] 0.289 [ 39 , 26 ] 0.289 [ 50 , 39 ]
GOF (values)
0.667 *** 0.673 *** 0.665 ***
0.257 [ 63 , 63 ] 0.288 [ 39 , 38 ] 0.275 [ 50 , 50 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.16: Interdependence with self-enhancement values (sev)
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
1st period rate
7.940 *** 6.924 *** 7.773 ***
0.574 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.552 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.703 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.340 *** 6.883 *** 7.227 ***
0.442 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.564 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.508 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.629 *** -1.630 *** -1.647 ***
0.061 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.076 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.068 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.215 *** 1.274 *** 1.225 ***
0.074 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.093 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.088 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.325 *** 1.403 *** 1.346 ***
0.043 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.047 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.047 [ 1 , 0 ]
indegree popularity eval
-0.126 *** -0.142 *** -0.128 ***
0.013 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.017 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.015 [ 0 , 1 ]
self-enhancement change:
1st period rate
1.319 *** 1.089 *** 1.458 ***
0.110 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.128 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.179 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
1.304 *** 1.353 *** 1.415 ***
0.112 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.167 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.190 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
0.072 * 0.088 0.101 *
0.034 [ 1 , 0.028 ] 0.059 [ 0.999 , 0.191 ] 0.048 [ 1 , 0.069 ]
quadratic eval
-0.160 ***
0.041 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
2.269 *** 2.279 ***
0.373 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.477 [ 1 , 0 ]
value interdependencies:
effect from stv eval
-0.118 *
0.054 [ 0.138 , 0.999 ]
effect from stv endow
-0.449
0.376 [ 0.473 , 0.97 ]
effect from stv create
0.116
0.323 [ 0.857 , 0.77 ]
average alter stv eval
0.167
0.337 [ 0.955 , 0.801 ]
effect from cov eval
0.045
0.046 [ 0.86 , 0.368 ]
effect from cov endow
-0.234
0.311 [ 0.625 , 0.877 ]
effect from cov create
0.138
0.269 [ 0.896 , 0.759 ]
average alter cov eval
0.224
0.254 [ 0.983 , 0.713 ]
effect from opv eval
-0.011
0.055 [ 0.712 , 0.81 ]
effect from opv endow
0.101
0.409 [ 0.74 , 0.626 ]
effect from opv create
-0.026
0.342 [ 0.717 , 0.779 ]
average alter opv eval
0.226
0.381 [ 0.955 , 0.775 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.260 *** 0.274 *** 0.265 ***
0.277 [ 65 , 44 ] 0.288 [ 44 , 32 ] 0.283 [ 51, 33 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.663 *** 0.689 *** 0.663 ***
0.240 [ 65 , 65 ] 0.308 [ 44 , 44 ] 0.283 [ 51 , 51 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.17: Interdependence with openness to change values (opv)
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
1st period rate
7.272 *** 5.675 *** 7.761 ***
0.587 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.474 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.805 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.291 *** 6.449 *** 6.954 ***
0.529 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.533 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.440 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.606 *** -1.529 *** -1.661 ***
0.073 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.075 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.073 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.244 *** 1.386 *** 1.272 ***
0.087 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.068 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.123 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.390 *** 1.449 *** 1.381 ***
0.049 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.052 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.049 [ 1 , 0 ]
indegree popularity eval
-0.144 *** -0.175 *** -0.133 ***
0.015 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ]
openness change:
1st period rate
1.453 *** 1.427 *** 7.913
0.149 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.180 [ 1 , 0 ] 5.163 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
0.830 *** 0.937 *** 0.851 ***
0.096 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.165 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.189 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
0.260 *** 0.304 *** 0.254 **
0.049 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.106 [ 1 , 0.02 ] 0.091 [ 1 , 0.007 ]
quadratic eval
-0.325 ***
0.107 [ 0.007 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
2.326 *** 2.871 ***
0.447 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.788 [ 1 , 0.006 ]
value interdependencies:
effect from stv eval
0.190 **
0.074 [ 1 , 0.056 ]
effect from stv endow
0.035
0.604 [ 0.816 , 0.565 ]
effect from stv create
0.657
0.559 [ 0.97 , 0.339 ]
average alter stv eval
0.118
0.475 [ 0.903 , 0.733 ]
effect from cov eval
0.024
0.063 [ 0.751 , 0.786 ]
effect from cov endow
-0.058
0.589 [ 0.771 , 0.732 ]
effect from cov create
-0.065
0.498 [ 0.647 , 0.769 ]
average alter cov eval
-0.258
0.533 [ 0.455 , 0.97 ]
effect from sev eval
-0.006
0.056 [ 0.861 , 0.751 ]
effect from sev endow
0.494
0.492 [ 0.953 , 0.388 ]
effect from sev create
-0.299
0.475 [ 0.395 , 0.9 ]
average alter sev eval
0.160
0.394 [ 0.91 , 0.695 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.255 *** 0.287 *** 0.295 ***
0.278 [ 57 , 37 ] 0.309 [ 36 , 25 ] 0.317 [ 39 , 25 ]
GOF (values)
0.668 *** 0.766 *** 0.730 ***
0.287 [ 57 , 56 ] 0.265 [ 36 , 35 ] 0.225 [ 39 , 39 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
114
Table 6.18: Self-transcendence values (stv) across countries
Switzerland Poland
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
same gender eval
0.402 *** 0.446 *** 0.345 *** 0.359 *** 0.336 *** 0.415 ***
0.061 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.064 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.053 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.075 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.111 [ 0.998 , 0 ] 0.078 [ 1 , 0 ]
same gender endow
0.013 0.222
0.187 [ 0.602 , 0.465 ] 0.173 [ 0.896 , 0.029 ]
same gender create
0.655 *** 0.708 ***
0.122 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.145 [ 1 , 0 ]
int(gender*stv) eval
-0.169 -0.281 0.221 0.083
0.445 [ 0.641 , 0.85 ] 0.478 [ 0.642 , 0.938 ] 0.459 [ 0.654 , 0.386 ] 0.515 [ 0.721 , 0.535 ]
satisfaction similarity eval
0.288 ** 0.392 *** 0.348 * 0.549 *
0.108 [ 0.974 , 0.056 ] 0.129 [ 0.998 , 0.03 ] 0.157 [ 0.995 , 0.044 ] 0.233 [ 0.989 , 0.03 ]
satisfaction similarity endow
0.496 † -0.549
0.285 [ 0.915 , 0.119 ] 0.402 [ 0.189 , 0.797 ]
satisfaction similarity create
0.129 0.899 *
0.239 [ 0.743 , 0.427 ] 0.399 [ 0.985 , 0.009 ]
int(satisfaction*stv) eval
0.260 0.228 1.303 1.524
0.911 [ 0.691 , 0.646 ] 1.086 [ 0.641 , 0.667 ] 1.441 [ 0.934 , 0.384 ] 1.520 [ 0.964 , 0.124 ]
stv alter eval
-0.023 -0.012 -0.043 -0.025
0.047 [ 0.251 , 0.914 ] 0.055 [ 0.339 , 0.81 ] 0.036 [ 0.174 , 0.892 ] 0.045 [ 0.57 , 0.657 ]
stv ego eval
-0.051 -0.048 -0.089 . -0.102 *
0.048 [ 0.065 , 0.791 ] 0.052 [ 0.179 , 0.909 ] 0.053 [ 0.001 , 0.8 ] 0.048 [ 0.035 , 0.926 ]
stv similarity eval
0.070 0.115 0.401 0.111
0.207 [ 0.814 , 0.549 ] 0.228 [ 0.761 , 0.524 ] 0.265 [ 0.944 , 0.031 ] 0.269 [ 0.758 , 0.207 ]
stv alter endow
0.003 -0.003
0.117 [ 0.661 , 0.792 ] 0.096 [ 0.789 , 0.521 ]
stv ego endow
0.312 0.372
0.549 [ 0.564 , 0.27 ] 0.763 [ 0.25 , 0.081 ]
stv similarity endow
-0.185 0.040
0.676 [ 0.618 , 0.84 ] 0.627 [ 0.79 , 0.415 ]
stv alter create
0.024 0.012
0.101 [ 0.572 , 0.519 ] 0.098 [ 0.639 , 0.609 ]
stv ego create
-0.205 -0.630
0.566 [ 0.27 , 0.465 ] 0.796 [ 0.041 , 0.415 ]
stv similarity create
-0.053 0.350
0.570 [ 0.575 , 0.789 ] 0.643 [ 0.825 , 0.374 ]
self-transcendence change:
linear eval
0.321 *** 0.396 *** 0.360 *** 0.167 *** 0.095 0.159 *
0.053 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.062 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.058 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.052 [ 1 , 0.002 ] 0.091 [ 0.92 , 0.326 ] 0.070 [ 0.999 , 0.017 ]
quadratic eval
-0.315 *** -0.198 ***
0.060 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.070 [ 0.021 , 0.991 ]
average similarity eval
2.196 *** 2.031 *** 2.956 *** 1.964 *
0.462 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.502 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.806 [ 0.999 , 0 ] 0.922 [ 0.954 , 0.013 ]
effect from gender eval
0.257 * 0.239 * 0.365 *** 0.310 *
0.101 [ 1 , 0.039 ] 0.112 [ 0.998 , 0.1 ] 0.117 [ 1 , 0.008 ] 0.146 [ 0.994 , 0.048 ]
avg alter gender eval
0.530 ** 0.490
0.190 [ 0.999 , 0.019 ] 0.580 [ 0.849 , 0.342 ]
effect from satisfaction eval
0.041 0.028 0.042 0.080 †
0.031 [ 0.977 , 0.303 ] 0.034 [ 0.936 , 0.428 ] 0.045 [ 0.949 , 0.185 ] 0.043 [ 0.98 , 0.084 ]
average alter satisfaction eval
-0.090 -0.094
0.157 [ 0.636 , 0.951 ] 0.280 [ 0.626 , 0.73 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.435 *** 0.450 *** 0.453 *** 0.186 *** 0.160 *** 0.200 ***
0.287 [ 31 , 28 ] 0.306 [ 30 , 27 ] 0.266 [ 25 , 24 ] 0.247 [ 27 , 18 ] 0.228 [ 25 , 12 ] 0.252 [ 21 , 12 ]
GOF (values)
0.642 *** 0.722 *** 0.629 *** 0.453 *** 0.456 *** 0.470 ***
0.252 [ 31 , 30 ] 0.304 [ 30 , 28 ] 0.273 [ 25 , 24 ] 0.301 [ 27 , 25 ] 0.347 [ 25 , 22 ] 0.325 [ 21 , 19 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.19: Conservation values (cov) across countries
Switzerland Poland
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
same gender eval
0.419 *** 0.401 *** 0.431 *** 0.325 *** 0.373 *** 0.440 ***
0.055 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.054 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.072 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.094 [ 0.999 , 0 ] 0.102 [ 0.999 , 0 ] 0.130 [ 1 , 0 ]
same gender endow
0.327 0.561 *
0.255 [ 0.782 , 0.002 ] 0.238 [ 0.966 , 0 ]
same gender create
0.662 *** 0.227
0.170 [ 0.998 , 0 ] 0.223 [ 0.535 , 0 ]
int(gender*cov) eval
0.058 0.080 -2.118 *** -1.963 *
0.505 [ 0.858 , 0.637 ] 0.578 [ 0.91 , 0.52 ] 0.661 [ 0.005 , 0.996 ] 0.875 [ 0.012 , 0.998 ]
satisfaction similarity eval
0.201 * 0.274 * 0.266 0.477
0.101 [ 0.977 , 0.113 ] 0.108 [ 0.991 , 0.08 ] 0.163 [ 0.985 , 0.095 ] 0.295 [ 0.969 , 0.032 ]
satisfaction similarity endow
0.878 *** -0.265
0.299 [ 1 , 0.011 ] 0.561 [ 0.237 , 0.635 ]
satisfaction similarity create
-0.313 1.035
0.241 [ 0.168 , 0.97 ] 0.957 [ 0.86 , 0.026 ]
int(satisfaction*cov) eval
-0.160 -0.584 -0.310 -1.331
0.992 [ 0.686 , 0.638 ] 1.167 [ 0.545 , 0.843 ] 1.777 [ 0.701 , 0.45 ] 2.365 [ 0.307 , 0.629 ]
cov alter eval
-0.028 -0.013 -0.082 * -0.048
0.038 [ 0.161 , 0.885 ] 0.048 [ 0.238 , 0.786 ] 0.039 [ 0.031 , 0.993 ] 0.041 [ 0.237 , 0.888 ]
cov ego eval
0.041 0.024 0.006 0.006
0.036 [ 0.867 , 0.089 ] 0.040 [ 0.78 , 0.257 ] 0.086 [ 0.145 , 0.013 ] 0.122 [ 0.219 , 0.006 ]
cov similarity eval
0.240 0.276 0.066 0.056
0.249 [ 0.892 , 0.298 ] 0.302 [ 0.848 , 0.358 ] 0.256 [ 0.445 , 0.763 ] 0.300 [ 0.468 , 0.566 ]
cov alter endow
0.039 -0.219 *
0.108 [ 0.866 , 0.468 ] 0.098 [ 0.039 , 0.983 ]
cov ego endow
-0.420 0.476
0.532 [ 0.225 , 0.771 ] 1.181 [ 0.247 , 0.073 ]
cov similarity endow
0.936 1.117
0.918 [ 0.964 , 0.299 ] 0.815 [ 0.878 , 0.182 ]
cov alter create
-0.016 0.132
0.082 [ 0.411 , 0.903 ] 0.107 [ 0.762 , 0.306 ]
cov ego create
0.613 -0.394
0.459 [ 0.833 , 0.113 ] 1.214 [ 0.124 , 0.198 ]
cov similarity create
-0.280 -0.974
0.759 [ 0.587 , 0.898 ] 0.826 [ 0.133 , 0.769 ]
conservation change:
linear eval
0.130 *** 0.149 *** 0.103 * 0.141 * 0.195 * 0.148
0.033 [ 1 , 0.001 ] 0.035 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.041 [ 1 , 0.029 ] 0.059 [ 0.998 , 0.025 ] 0.081 [ 0.999 , 0.018 ] 0.091 [ 0.978 , 0.109 ]
quadratic eval
-0.254 *** -0.210 ***
0.027 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.050 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
2.830 *** 3.199 *** 3.331 *** 2.886 ***
0.357 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.471 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.648 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.921 [ 0.997 , 0.002 ]
effect from gender eval
0.102 0.167 * 0.021 -0.111
0.065 [ 0.933 , 0.103 ] 0.082 [ 0.996 , 0.063 ] 0.120 [ 0.551 , 0.635 ] 0.181 [ 0.329 , 0.799 ]
avg alter gender eval
-0.023 -0.036
0.113 [ 0.459 , 0.47 ] 0.348 [ 0.503 , 0.834 ]
effect from satisfaction eval
0.014 0.029 -0.006 -0.003
0.020 [ 0.895 , 0.322 ] 0.026 [ 0.928 , 0.307 ] 0.035 [ 0.371 , 0.616 ] 0.082 [ 0.411 , 0.452 ]
average alter satisfaction eval
-0.059 16.530
0.084 [ 0.595 , 0.984 ] 15.713 [ 0.942 , 0 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.461 *** 0.449 *** 0.463 *** 0.163 *** 0.160 ** 0.153 *
0.274 [ 36 , 33 ] 0.289 [ 34 , 32 ] 0.292 [ 26 , 23 ] 0.243 [ 21 , 11 ] 0.245 [ 20 , 9 ] 0.235 [ 14 , 6 ]
GOF (values)
0.684 *** 0.678 *** 0.636 *** 0.599 *** 0.652 *** 0.652 ***
0.216 [ 36 , 35 ] 0.301 [ 34 , 32 ] 0.228 [ 26 , 26 ] 0.311 [ 21 , 21 ] 0.347 [ 20 , 20 ] 0.320 [ 14 , 14 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.20: Self-enhancement values (sev) across countries
Switzerland Poland
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
same gender eval
0.416 *** 0.415 *** 0.401 *** 0.367 *** 0.299 *** 0.379 ***
0.056 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.058 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.069 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.078 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.070 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.112 [ 0.999 , 0 ]
same gender endow
0.191 0.723 ***
0.215 [ 0.48 , 0.032 ] 0.241 [ 1 , 0 ]
same gender create
0.567 *** 0.222
0.162 [ 0.997 , 0 ] 0.256 [ 0.46 , 0.002 ]
int(gender*sev) eval
0.051 0.144 -0.482 -0.762
0.375 [ 0.403 , 0.853 ] 0.411 [ 0.466 , 0.839 ] 0.596 [ 0.201 , 0.394 ] 0.631 [ 0.161 , 0.65 ]
satisfaction similarity eval
0.131 0.080 0.340 *** 0.382 ***
0.089 [ 0.941 , 0.141 ] 0.085 [ 0.831 , 0.294 ] 0.121 [ 0.997 , 0.021 ] 0.131 [ 0.998 , 0.016 ]
satisfaction similarity endow
0.202 0.273
0.311 [ 0.692 , 0.122 ] 0.472 [ 0.73 , 0.178 ]
satisfaction similarity create
-0.009 0.350
0.226 [ 0.236 , 0.686 ] 0.425 [ 0.793 , 0.108 ]
int(satisfaction*sev) eval
-0.297 0.117 -0.458 -0.285
0.755 [ 0.742 , 0.813 ] 0.779 [ 0.885 , 0.663 ] 1.315 [ 0.444 , 0.816 ] 1.437 [ 0.454 , 0.736 ]
sev alter eval
-0.030 -0.034 -0.040 -0.088 *
0.030 [ 0.073 , 0.804 ] 0.034 [ 0.062 , 0.837 ] 0.032 [ 0.083 , 0.949 ] 0.044 [ 0.042 , 0.989 ]
sev ego eval
0.015 0.011 0.039 0.084
0.026 [ 0.595 , 0.137 ] 0.029 [ 0.589 , 0.181 ] 0.046 [ 0.399 , 0.06 ] 0.067 [ 0.837 , 0.022 ]
sev similarity eval
0.225 0.237 0.280 0.090
0.171 [ 0.931 , 0.069 ] 0.185 [ 0.917 , 0.087 ] 0.224 [ 0.926 , 0.175 ] 0.323 [ 0.731 , 0.33 ]
sev alter endow
-0.146 † -0.147
0.084 [ 0.073 , 0.919 ] 0.153 [ 0.116 , 0.834 ]
sev ego endow
-0.349 -0.013
0.530 [ 0.018 , 0.117 ] 1.064 [ 0.175 , 0.218 ]
sev similarity endow
1.242 * -0.733
0.554 [ 0.987 , 0.115 ] 1.175 [ 0.346 , 0.63 ]
sev alter create
0.006 0.009
0.071 [ 0.577 , 0.754 ] 0.088 [ 0.591 , 0.637 ]
sev ego create
0.445 0.364
0.536 [ 0.12 , 0.011 ] 0.898 [ 0.386 , 0.08 ]
sev similarity create
-0.291 0.424
0.538 [ 0.361 , 0.875 ] 1.009 [ 0.776 , 0.52 ]
self-enhancement change:
linear eval
0.054 0.089 * 0.088 * 0.124 * 0.163 * 0.108
0.035 [ 0.98 , 0.023 ] 0.038 [ 1 , 0.004 ] 0.043 [ 0.989 , 0.01 ] 0.051 [ 1 , 0.04 ] 0.066 [ 0.999 , 0.05 ] 0.072 [ 0.985 , 0.135 ]
quadratic eval
-0.171 *** -0.212 ***
0.027 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.044 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
1.460 *** 1.290 *** 3.369 *** 2.786 ***
0.333 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.387 [ 0.999 , 0.003 ] 0.598 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.791 [ 1 , 0.001 ]
effect from gender eval
-0.156 * -0.185 * -0.040 0.110
0.064 [ 0.028 , 1 ] 0.078 [ 0.02 , 0.999 ] 0.109 [ 0.381 , 0.769 ] 0.148 [ 0.569 , 0.435 ]
avg alter gender eval
-0.333 *** 0.078
0.116 [ 0.012 , 1 ] 0.400 [ 0.56 , 0.829 ]
effect from satisfaction eval
0.006 -0.024 -0.003 -0.028
0.020 [ 0.688 , 0.6 ] 0.023 [ 0.311 , 0.957 ] 0.027 [ 0.274 , 0.779 ] 0.040 [ 0.193 , 0.905 ]
average alter satisfaction eval
0.060 0.031
0.073 [ 0.986 , 0.665 ] 0.200 [ 0.873 , 0.782 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.442 *** 0.445 *** 0.422 *** 0.164 *** 0.153 *** 0.074 ***
0.271 [ 37 , 35 ] 0.279 [ 36 , 34 ] 0.272 [ 29 , 27 ] 0.212 [ 26 , 15 ] 0.223 [ 24 , 10 ] 0.114 [ 17 , 7 ]
GOF (values)
0.695 *** 0.746 *** 0.692 *** 0.634 *** 0.617 *** 0.661 ***
0.218 [ 37 , 37 ] 0.261 [ 36 , 36 ] 0.233 [ 29 , 29 ] 0.254 [ 26 , 26 ] 0.284 [ 24 , 24 ] 0.279 [ 17 , 17 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.21: Openness to change values (opv) across countries
Switzerland Poland
value susceptibility value resistance phase transition value susceptibility value resistance phase transition
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
same gender eval
0.378 *** 0.356 *** 0.372 *** 0.403 *** 0.584 *** 0.475 ***
0.043 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.047 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.053 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.101 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.089 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.093 [ 0.998 , 0 ]
same gender endow
0.167 0.594 †
0.222 [ 0.499 , 0.041 ] 0.361 [ 0.968 , 0 ]
same gender create
0.606 *** 0.429
0.169 [ 0.997 , 0 ] 0.304 [ 0.611 , 0 ]
int(gender*opv) eval
0.541 0.790 † 0.508 0.671
0.416 [ 0.918 , 0.377 ] 0.533 [ 0.919 , 0.2 ] 0.527 [ 0.783 , 0.371 ] 0.636 [ 0.899 , 0.258 ]
satisfaction similarity eval
0.318 *** 0.216 0.693 * 0.822 *
0.111 [ 0.999 , 0.021 ] 0.155 [ 0.974 , 0.223 ] 0.310 [ 0.948 , 0.088 ] 0.384 [ 0.967 , 0.095 ]
satisfaction similarity endow
0.225 1.536
0.336 [ 0.523 , 0.299 ] 1.203 [ 0.805 , 0.009 ]
satisfaction similarity create
0.010 -0.125
0.251 [ 0.566 , 0.407 ] 0.918 [ 0.326 , 0.42 ]
int(satisfaction*opv) eval
-0.251 -0.450 -4.364 -3.371
0.861 [ 0.721 , 0.752 ] 1.310 [ 0.518 , 0.72 ] 3.498 [ 0.15 , 0.932 ] 4.107 [ 0.223 , 0.777 ]
opv alter eval
-0.087 † -0.100 † -0.052 -0.020
0.046 [ 0.116 , 0.949 ] 0.053 [ 0.153 , 0.971 ] 0.065 [ 0.322 , 0.612 ] 0.085 [ 0.449 , 0.46 ]
opv ego eval
-0.060 -0.071 -0.081 0.035
0.048 [ 0.071 , 0.814 ] 0.053 [ 0.13 , 0.867 ] 0.084 [ 0.04 , 0.618 ] 0.096 [ 0.59 , 0.14 ]
opv similarity eval
0.316 0.444 † 0.383 0.383
0.196 [ 0.987 , 0.214 ] 0.228 [ 0.996 , 0.103 ] 0.445 [ 0.805 , 0.177 ] 0.607 [ 0.686 , 0.205 ]
opv alter endow
-0.068 -0.040
0.124 [ 0.513 , 0.902 ] 0.178 [ 0.438 , 0.807 ]
opv ego endow
0.387 1.093
0.661 [ 0.581 , 0.105 ] 1.616 [ 0.253 , 0.023 ]
opv similarity endow
0.241 0.851
0.672 [ 0.896 , 0.656 ] 1.186 [ 0.916 , 0.263 ]
opv alter create
-0.075 0.160
0.124 [ 0.551 , 0.829 ] 0.163 [ 0.946 , 0.257 ]
opv ego create
-0.632 -1.114
0.670 [ 0.044 , 0.736 ] 1.658 [ 0.014 , 0.278 ]
opv similarity create
0.606 -1.616
0.676 [ 0.847 , 0.414 ] 1.399 [ 0.307 , 0.912 ]
openness change:
linear eval
0.298 *** 0.319 *** 0.305 *** 0.120 † 0.182 † 0.114
0.048 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.057 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.063 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.063 [ 0.986 , 0.056 ] 0.100 [ 0.997 , 0.091 ] 0.090 [ 0.972 , 0.15 ]
quadratic eval
-0.314 *** -0.180 **
0.057 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.069 [ 0.002 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
1.996 *** 1.747 *** 3.520 *** 3.827 ***
0.392 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.504 [ 1 , 0.003 ] 0.795 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.069 [ 1 , 0.001 ]
effect from gender eval
0.185 * 0.174 0.069 0.027
0.089 [ 0.98 , 0.156 ] 0.118 [ 0.931 , 0.23 ] 0.134 [ 0.789 , 0.518 ] 0.179 [ 0.655 , 0.643 ]
avg alter gender eval
0.265 0.055
0.169 [ 0.956 , 0.187 ] 0.584 [ 0.713 , 0.394 ]
effect from satisfaction eval
0.066 * 0.073 † -0.029 -0.017
0.030 [ 0.994 , 0.102 ] 0.041 [ 0.972 , 0.224 ] 0.060 [ 0.484 , 0.807 ] 0.082 [ 0.477 , 0.732 ]
average alter satisfaction eval
-0.028 0.044
0.138 [ 0.74 , 0.888 ] 0.440 [ 0.759 , 0.612 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.451 *** 0.442 *** 0.450 *** 0.170 *** 0.162 * 0.185 *
0.294 [ 0.008 , 0.975 ] 0.300 [ 0.016 , 0.965 ] 0.285 [ 0.045 , 0.957 ] 0.258 [ 0 , 0.92 ] 0.267 [ 0 , 0.953 ] 0.262 [ 0 , 0.752 ]
GOF (values)
0.725 *** 0.842 *** 0.707 *** 0.601 *** 0.601 *** 0.635 ***
0.226 [ 0.075 , 1 ] 0.173 [ 0.418 , 1 ] 0.223 [ 0.092 , 1 ] 0.309 [ 0.005 , 0.982 ] 0.358 [ 0.001 , 0.998 ] 0.320 [ 0.007 , 0.989 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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6.4.2 Financial Deicsion Making in Adolescent Friendship Networks
Table 6.22: Savings in friendship networks (interactions)
no interaction selecton interaction influence interaction
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
1st period rate
7.465 *** 7.763 *** 6.755 ***
0.702 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.837 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.654 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.241 *** 6.958 *** 7.664 ***
0.482 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.456 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.491 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-2.048 *** -1.991 *** -1.863 ***
0.107 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.135 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.142 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.069 *** 1.038 *** 1.217 ***
0.109 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.122 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.107 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.307 *** 1.279 *** 1.324 ***
0.059 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.070 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.082 [ 1 , 0 ]
indegree popularity eval
-0.083 *** -0.088 *** -0.137 ***
0.018 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.021 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.029 [ 0 , 1 ]
gender based selection:
same gender eval
0.353 *** 0.358 *** 0.399 ***
0.066 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.065 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.071 [ 1 , 0 ]
saving based selection:
savings alter eval
0.018 0.008 0.008
0.014 [ 0.822 , 0.105 ] 0.036 [ 0.74 , 0.515 ] 0.019 [ 0.654 , 0.376 ]
savings ego eval
-0.006 0.001 -0.015
0.012 [ 0.257 , 0.861 ] 0.015 [ 0.512 , 0.925 ] 0.015 [ 0.164 , 0.886 ]
savings similarity eval
0.455 † 0.419 0.409
0.238 [ 0.94 , 0.024 ] 0.276 [ 0.971 , 0.111 ] 0.289 [ 0.838 , 0.053 ]
savings I(ego*similarity) eval
0.021
0.167 [ 0.746 , 0.682 ]
savings change:
1st period rate
8.294 *** 8.957 *** 6.353 ***
0.887 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.014 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.854 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
10.261 *** 16.191 *** 12.407 ***
2.154 [ 1 , 0 ] 3.965 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.431 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.082 *** -0.073 *** -0.110 ***
0.018 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.025 [ 0 , 1 ]
quadratic eval
0.002
0.007 [ 0.47 , 0.901 ]
average similarity eval
0.894 * 0.922 * 0.015
0.356 [ 0.99 , 0.013 ] 0.407 [ 0.976 , 0.007 ] 0.030 [ 0.94 , 0.719 ]
I(quadratic*avg similarity) eval
0.067
0.048 [ 0.935 , 0.345 ]
covariate based change:
effect from gender eval
0.044 0.056 † 0.002
0.030 [ 0.945 , 0.306 ] 0.032 [ 0.975 , 0.13 ] 0.008 [ 0.806 , 0.856 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.318 *** 0.448 *** 0.303 ***
0.309 [ 37 , 28 ] 0.375 [ 17 , 12 ] 0.296 [ 35 , 24 ]
GOF (savings)
0.329 *** 0.493 *** 0.295 ***
0.278 [ 37 , 28 ] 0.331 [ 17 , 14 ] 0.285 [ 35 , 27 ]
GOF (financial decision making)
[ 61 , 35 ] [ 54 , 36 ] [ 57 , 32 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.23: Consumption in friendship networks (interactions)
no interaction selection interaction influence interaction
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
1st period rate
7.735 *** 7.801 *** 7.639 ***
0.864 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.872 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.984 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.277 *** 7.081 *** 6.505 ***
0.830 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.768 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.898 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.982 *** -2.043 *** -1.736 ***
0.116 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.128 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.159 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.203 *** 1.091 *** 1.279 ***
0.118 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.118 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.085 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.389 *** 1.327 *** 1.343 ***
0.066 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.074 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.083 [ 1 , 0 ]
indegree popularity eval
-0.129 *** -0.121 *** -0.160 ***
0.025 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.027 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.030 [ 0 , 1 ]
gender based selection:
same gender eval
0.359 *** 0.372 *** 0.272 ***
0.068 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.063 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.055 [ 1 , 0 ]
consumption based selection:
consumption alter eval
0.015 0.040 -0.001
0.018 [ 0.814 , 0.131 ] 0.040 [ 0.935 , 0.361 ] 0.025 [ 0.374 , 0.477 ]
consumption ego eval
0.007 0.016 -0.003
0.016 [ 0.842 , 0.263 ] 0.024 [ 0.877 , 0.493 ] 0.018 [ 0.764 , 0.462 ]
consumption similarity eval
0.468 † 0.088 0.104
0.260 [ 0.983 , 0.028 ] 0.354 [ 0.843 , 0.292 ] 0.290 [ 0.713 , 0.477 ]
consumption I(ego*similarity) eval
0.068
0.177 [ 0.782 , 0.704 ]
consumption change:
1st period rate
7.138 *** 8.254 *** 5.363 ***
1.089 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.330 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.205 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
16.876 *** 7.978 *** 8.296 ***
3.840 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.391 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.568 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.062 *** -0.066 *** -0.030
0.017 [ 0 , 0.983 ] 0.020 [ 0 , 0.989 ] 0.034 [ 0.271 , 0.757 ]
quadratic eval
-0.010
0.011 [ 0.257 , 0.746 ]
average similarity eval
0.918 * 1.040 * 0.028
0.372 [ 0.948 , 0.045 ] 0.418 [ 0.975 , 0.031 ] 0.050 [ 0.754 , 0.558 ]
I(quadratic*avg similarity) eval
0.042
0.059 [ 0.897 , 0.483 ]
covariate based change:
effect from gender eval
0.031 0.016 -0.002
0.032 [ 0.982 , 0.254 ] 0.035 [ 0.948 , 0.446 ] 0.016 [ 0.645 , 0.919 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.318 *** 0.448 *** 0.303 ***
0.309 [ 37 , 28 ] 0.375 [ 17 , 12 ] 0.296 [ 35 , 24 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.329 *** 0.493 *** 0.295 ***
0.278 [ 37 , 28 ] 0.331 [ 17 , 14 ] 0.285 [ 35 , 27 ]
GOF (financial decision making)
[ 61 , 35 ] [ 54 , 36 ] [ 57 , 32 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
120
Table 6.24: Donations in friendship networks (interactions)
no interaction selection interaction influence interaction
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship structure change:
1st period rate
6.977 *** 7.637 *** 5.930 ***
0.700 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.825 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.845 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.207 *** 6.655 *** 6.854 ***
0.475 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.467 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.547 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.899 *** -2.021 *** -1.927 ***
0.102 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.144 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.220 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.193 *** 1.070 *** 1.164 ***
0.070 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.103 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.096 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.236 *** 1.238 *** 1.301 ***
0.071 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.073 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.092 [ 1 , 0 ]
indegree popularity eval
-0.106 *** -0.084 *** -0.100 ***
0.016 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.023 [ 0 , 1 ]
gender based selection:
same gender eval
0.266 *** 0.353 *** 0.390 ***
0.052 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.066 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.084 [ 1 , 0 ]
donation based selection:
donation alter eval
-0.003 0.077 0.002
0.034 [ 0.416 , 0.81 ] 0.056 [ 0.919 , 0.37 ] 0.039 [ 0.471 , 0.72 ]
donation ego eval
0.021 0.026 0.072 †
0.034 [ 0.835 , 0.36 ] 0.040 [ 0.9 , 0.196 ] 0.037 [ 0.991 , 0.087 ]
donation similarity eval
0.502 0.893 † 0.601
0.353 [ 0.899 , 0.182 ] 0.458 [ 0.961 , 0.065 ] 0.453 [ 0.746 , 0.18 ]
donation I(ego*similarity) eval
-0.315 †
0.208 [ 0.439 , 0.806 ]
donation change:
1st period rate
2.115 *** 2.083 *** 1.682 ***
0.291 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.324 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.317 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
17.802 * 4.545 *** 3.681 ***
8.372 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.080 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.108 [ 1 , 0.003 ]
linear eval
-0.473 *** -0.349 *** -0.373 ***
0.059 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.043 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.066 [ 0 , 1 ]
quadratic eval
0.052 *
0.025 [ 0.897 , 0.244 ]
average similarity eval
-0.035 -0.560 0.105
0.735 [ 0.797 , 0.693 ] 0.630 [ 0.387 , 0.901 ] 0.107 [ 0.886 , 0.547 ]
I(quadratic*avg similarity) eval
0.119
0.118 [ 0.901 , 0.231 ]
covariate based change:
effect from gender eval
0.353 *** 0.144 † -0.013
0.104 [ 0.995 , 0 ] 0.075 [ 0.987 , 0.025 ] 0.027 [ 0.761 , 0.769 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.318 *** 0.448 *** 0.303 ***
0.309 [ 37 , 28 ] 0.375 [ 17 , 12 ] 0.296 [ 37 , 24 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.329 *** 0.493 *** 0.295 ***
0.278 [ 37 , 28 ] 0.331 [ 17 , 14 ] 0.285 [ 37 , 27 ]
GOF (financial decision making)
[ 61 , 35 ] [ 54 , 36 ] [ 57 , 32 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.25: Saving in friendship and advice networks across countries
Switzerland Poland
friendship advice friendship advice
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
network structure change:
1st period rate
5.748 *** 10.541 *** 5.071 *** 8.935 ***
0.499 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.644 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.522 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.055 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
6.443 *** 8.968 *** 5.035 *** 10.277 ***
0.483 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.175 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.680 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.677 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.886 *** -2.271 *** -1.873 *** -1.693 ***
0.130 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.150 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.127 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.108 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.237 *** 0.756 *** 0.696 *** 0.436 **
0.080 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.203 [ 0.998 , 0 ] 0.116 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.156 [ 0.997 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.352 *** 1.277 *** 1.441 *** 1.254 ***
0.090 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.096 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.136 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.108 [ 1 , 0 ]
popularity eval
-0.127 *** -0.031 . -0.117 *** -0.091 ***
0.021 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.016 [ 0.01 , 0.993 ] 0.033 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.025 [ 0 , 1 ]
same gender eval
0.372 *** 0.323 ** 0.545 *** 0.422 ***
0.075 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.116 [ 0.99 , 0 ] 0.094 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.077 [ 1 , 0 ]
sav alter eval
0.018 0.019 0.036 0.006
0.021 [ 0.739 , 0.232 ] 0.022 [ 0.715 , 0.111 ] 0.026 [ 0.977 , 0.097 ] 0.020 [ 0.521 , 0.326 ]
sav ego eval
-0.005 -0.007 0.002 0.001
0.017 [ 0.26 , 0.721 ] 0.016 [ 0.366 , 0.831 ] 0.030 [ 0.627 , 0.388 ] 0.025 [ 0.322 , 0.395 ]
sav similarity eval
0.744 * 0.129 0.743 -0.026
0.313 [ 0.987 , 0.029 ] 0.373 [ 0.414 , 0.198 ] 0.455 [ 0.986 , 0.163 ] 0.360 [ 0.583 , 0.664 ]
savings change:
1st period rate
8.007 *** 8.859 *** 8.490 *** 9.573 ***
1.089 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.527 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.221 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.613 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
13.043 *** 7.437 ** 29.443 *** 7.850 ***
2.611 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.882 [ 1 , 0 ] 10.185 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.262 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.053 *** -0.147 *** -0.057 *** -0.102 ***
0.018 [ 0.001 , 0.995 ] 0.030 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.017 [ 0.001 , 0.997 ] 0.026 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
0.793 † 1.220 † 1.039 † 1.848 *
0.407 [ 0.956 , 0.048 ] 0.732 [ 0.935 , 0.052 ] 0.583 [ 0.995 , 0.087 ] 0.766 [ 0.924 , 0.043 ]
effect from gender eval
0.043 0.047 -0.028 0.028
0.035 [ 0.919 , 0.289 ] 0.062 [ 0.748 , 0.416 ] 0.037 [ 0.435 , 0.768 ] 0.055 [ 0.763 , 0.323 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.419 *** 0.231 *** 0.150 ** 0.455 ***
0.000 [ 20 , 18 ] 0.005 [ 21 , 17 ] 0.000 [ 20 , 10 ] 0.030 [ 14 , 13 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.306 *** 0.218 *** 0.269 *** 0.356 **
0.002 [ 20 , 15 ] 0.000 [ 21 , 14 ] 0.000 [ 20 , 13 ] 0.001 [ 14 , 10 ]
GOF (allocations)
[ 62 , 37 ] [ 64 , 40 ] [ 63 , 38 ] [ 63 , 41 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.26: Consumption in friendship and advice networks across countries
Switzerland Poland
friendship advice friendship advice
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
network structure change:
1st period rate
5.963 *** 9.077 *** 6.036 *** 6.237 ***
0.737 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.413 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.044 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.691 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
6.633 *** 8.016 *** 4.943 *** 8.661 ***
0.627 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.598 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.607 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.463 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.661 *** -2.235 *** -1.760 *** -1.825 ***
0.157 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.135 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.170 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.177 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.492 *** 0.904 *** 0.881 *** 0.429 ***
0.110 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.138 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.147 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.106 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.438 *** 1.344 *** 1.498 *** 1.201 ***
0.098 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.093 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.141 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.094 [ 1 , 0 ]
popularity eval
-0.217 *** -0.062 *** -0.130 *** -0.068 *
0.031 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.020 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.043 [ 0.002 , 0.999 ] 0.027 [ 0 , 1 ]
same gender eval
0.355 *** 0.336 *** 0.482 *** 0.564 ***
0.078 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.115 [ 0.997 , 0 ] 0.143 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.069 [ 1 , 0 ]
con alter eval
0.037 0.011 0.006 0.006
0.045 [ 0.789 , 0.168 ] 0.021 [ 0.64 , 0.233 ] 0.067 [ 0.545 , 0.501 ] 0.024 [ 0.697 , 0.48 ]
con ego eval
0.046 -0.003 0.022 -0.008
0.035 [ 0.97 , 0.194 ] 0.018 [ 0.389 , 0.455 ] 0.077 [ 0.685 , 0.245 ] 0.039 [ 0.147 , 0.389 ]
con similarity eval
0.595 0.447 † 1.087 -0.133
0.724 [ 0.789 , 0.128 ] 0.283 [ 0.99 , 0.047 ] 0.931 [ 0.976 , 0.166 ] 0.430 [ 0.57 , 0.782 ]
consumption change:
1st period eval
5.899 *** 8.277 *** 5.330 *** 12.169 ***
1.131 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.879 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.142 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.373 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period eval
10.881 *** 20.787 *** 11.301 *** 7.441 ***
2.559 [ 1 , 0 ] 6.597 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.700 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.575 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.090 *** -0.023 -0.143 *** -0.005
0.022 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.030 [ 0.14 , 0.45 ] 0.033 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.023 [ 0.671 , 0.558 ]
average similarity eval
1.561 *** -0.050 1.099 2.253 *
0.480 [ 0.993 , 0.005 ] 0.589 [ 0.506 , 0.751 ] 0.987 [ 0.83 , 0.301 ] 1.119 [ 0.97 , 0.001 ]
effect from gender eval
0.057 0.017 0.061 -0.041
0.046 [ 0.977 , 0.29 ] 0.049 [ 0.817 , 0.312 ] 0.058 [ 0.959 , 0.339 ] 0.041 [ 0.316 , 0.855 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.374 ** 0.176 * 0.117 *** 0.489 ***
0.000 [ 13 , 10 ] 0.010 [ 11 , 7 ] 0.000 [ 23 , 11 ] 0.058 [ 12 , 12 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.471 *** 0.531 *** 0.234 *** 0.251 *
0.054 [ 13 , 13 ] 0.014 [ 11 , 10 ] 0.000 [ 23 , 16 ] 0.000 [ 12 , 10 ]
GOF (allocations)
[ 62 , 37 ] [ 64 , 40 ] [ 63 , 38 ] [ 63 , 41 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.27: Giving in friendship and advice networks across countries
Switzerland Poland
friendship advice friendship advice
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
network structure change:
1st period rate
6.342 *** 8.392 *** 5.788 *** 7.024 ***
0.805 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.071 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.605 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.474 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
6.655 *** 8.965 *** 5.092 *** 10.076 ***
0.488 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.968 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.691 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.248 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.846 *** -1.985 *** -1.571 *** -1.726 ***
0.129 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.217 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.142 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.157 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.273 *** 0.964 *** 0.663 *** 0.471 ***
0.077 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.195 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.124 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.146 [ 0.998 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.286 *** 1.120 *** 1.348 *** 1.301 ***
0.078 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.136 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.115 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.104 [ 1 , 0 ]
popularity eval
-0.126 *** -0.078 *** -0.130 *** -0.081 ***
0.020 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.024 [ 0.004 , 0.994 ] 0.038 [ 0 , 0.998 ] 0.029 [ 0 , 1 ]
same gender eval
0.304 *** 0.208 * 0.429 *** 0.496 ***
0.067 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.083 [ 0.929 , 0.017 ] 0.090 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.083 [ 1 , 0 ]
giv alter eval
0.018 -0.064 0.101 * 0.041
0.040 [ 0.475 , 0.728 ] 0.068 [ 0.319 , 0.709 ] 0.041 [ 0.886 , 0.106 ] 0.049 [ 0.782 , 0.6 ]
giv ego eval
0.043 -0.042 0.019 0.027
0.039 [ 0.869 , 0.298 ] 0.066 [ 0.451 , 0.533 ] 0.038 [ 0.739 , 0.495 ] 0.052 [ 0.393 , 0.525 ]
giv similarity eval
0.658 0.132 0.491 0.089
0.421 [ 0.859 , 0.177 ] 0.648 [ 0.695 , 0.351 ] 0.421 [ 0.791 , 0.268 ] 0.484 [ 0.676 , 0.51 ]
donation change:
1st period eval
1.999 *** 3.632 *** 1.618 *** 2.125 ***
0.302 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.095 [ 0.999 , 0.002 ] 0.268 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.502 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period eval
17.621 † 18.363 3.687 *** 1.744 ***
10.210 [ 1 , 0 ] 15.974 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.880 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.519 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.470 *** -0.488 *** -0.305 *** -0.214 ***
0.065 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.138 [ 0.001 , 1 ] 0.066 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.059 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
-0.065 0.321 -0.659 1.503
0.765 [ 0.724 , 0.697 ] 2.654 [ 0.678 , 0.481 ] 1.228 [ 0.479 , 0.839 ] 1.417 [ 0.766 , 0.489 ]
effect from gender eval
0.342 *** 0.433 0.163 0.234 **
0.117 [ 0.985 , 0 ] 0.271 [ 0.901 , 0.151 ] 0.122 [ 0.861 , 0.047 ] 0.087 [ 0.972 , 0.04 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.453 *** 0.337 *** 0.162 *** 0.423 ***
0.000 [ 17 , 16 ] 0.014 [ 15 , 14 ] 0.000 [ 18 , 8 ] 0.056 [ 13 , 13 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.309 *** 0.431 *** 0.283 ** 0.252 **
0.000 [ 17 , 13 ] 0.002 [ 15 , 13 ] 0.009 [ 18 , 14 ] 0.002 [ 13 , 12 ]
GOF (allocations)
[ 62 , 37 ] [ 64 , 40 ] [ 63 , 38 ] [ 63 , 41 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.28: Savings and (adaptive capacity) in friendship networks
self-transcendence self-enhancement conservation openness to change
(stv) (sev) (cov) (opv)
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship selection:
1st period rate
7.697 *** 7.720 *** 7.877 *** 7.362 ***
0.672 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.661 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.751 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.759 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
6.990 *** 7.416 *** 7.248 *** 6.988 ***
0.676 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.645 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.553 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.723 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.789 *** -1.746 *** -1.795 *** -1.765 ***
0.080 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.094 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.078 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.098 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.222 *** 1.247 *** 1.132 *** 1.156 ***
0.072 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.087 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.104 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.072 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.318 *** 1.356 *** 1.330 *** 1.328 ***
0.052 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.057 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.054 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.056 [ 1 , 0 ]
popularity eval
-0.098 *** -0.111 *** -0.089 *** -0.096 ***
0.016 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.016 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.016 [ 0 , 1 ]
stv alter eval
0.046
0.043 [ 0.702 , 0.044 ]
stv ego eval
-0.031
0.042 [ 0.017 , 0.514 ]
stv similarity eval
0.300 **
0.108 [ 0.994 , 0.01 ]
sev alter eval
-0.044
0.039 [ 0.002 , 0.607 ]
sev ego eval
-0.011
0.040 [ 0.02 , 0.079 ]
sev similarity eval
0.215
0.133 [ 0.875 , 0.012 ]
cov alter eval
-0.033
0.030 [ 0.044 , 0.841 ]
cov ego eval
-0.048
0.035 [ 0.002 , 0.593 ]
cov similarity eval
-0.007
0.124 [ 0.234 , 0.349 ]
opv alter eval
-0.000
0.046 [ 0.168 , 0.205 ]
opv ego eval
-0.050
0.055 [ 0.004 , 0.328 ]
opv similarity eval
0.022
0.099 [ 0.531 , 0.446 ]
savings change:
1st period rate
7.311 *** 12.134 *** 6.958 *** 12.575 ***
0.846 [ 1 , 0 ] 3.864 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.747 [ 1 , 0 ] 3.463 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
8.192 *** 8.036 *** 7.480 *** 19.262 *
1.696 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.709 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.456 [ 1 , 0 ] 7.823 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.073 *** -0.075 *** -0.083 *** -0.067 ***
0.023 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.020 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.022 [ 0 , 0.999 ]
avg similarity eval
1.834 *** 1.953 *** 1.636 *** 1.572 ***
0.476 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.591 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.500 [ 0.999 , 0 ] 0.480 [ 1 , 0 ]
effects from:
self-control eval
0.057 † 0.084 * 0.069 * 0.052
0.033 [ 0.951 , 0.057 ] 0.034 [ 0.997 , 0.02 ] 0.031 [ 0.989 , 0.011 ] 0.034 [ 0.88 , 0.073 ]
resilience eval
-0.047 -0.056 -0.047 -0.037
0.031 [ 0.072 , 0.91 ] 0.037 [ 0.06 , 0.838 ] 0.029 [ 0.032 , 0.847 ] 0.034 [ 0.115 , 0.933 ]
self-transcendence eval
-0.051 †
0.028 [ 0.031 , 0.989 ]
self-enhancement eval
-0.018
0.022 [ 0.069 , 0.832 ]
conservation eval
-0.041 †
0.022 [ 0.025 , 0.969 ]
openness to change eval
-0.030
0.028 [ 0.154 , 0.935 ]
average alter effects:
social control eval
0.050 0.085 0.076 0.151
0.181 [ 767 , 0.723 ] 0.178 [ 0.733 , 0.855 ] 0.166 [ 0.792 , 0.727 ] 0.189 [ 0.521 , 0.956 ]
resilience eval
-0.146 -0.269 † -0.305 † -0.215
0.172 [ 0.980 , 0.537 ] 0.162 [ 0.998 , 0.428 ] 0.169 [ 0.997 , 0.256 ] 0.184 [ 0.987 , 0.519 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.291 *** 0.289 *** 0.290 *** 0.280 ***
0.304 [ 40 , 28 ] 0.300 [ 39 , 27 ] 0.298 [ 42 , 28 ] 0.312 [ 39 , 25 ]
GOF (savings)
0.264 *** 0.276 *** 0.280 *** 0.281 ***
0.250 [ 40 , 29 ] 0.276 [ 39 , 29 ] 0.263 [ 42 , 31 ] 0.271 [ 39 , 29 ]
GOF (allocations)
[ 62 , 37 ] [ 61 , 36 ] [ 62 , 36 ] [ 60 , 36 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.29: Consumption and (adaptive capacity) in friendship networks
conservation openness to change self-enhancement self-transcendence
(cov) (opv) (sev) (stv)
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship selection:
1st period rate
8.287 *** 8.011 *** 8.826 *** 8.466 ***
0.941 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.797 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.992 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.938 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.566 *** 7.235 *** 7.644 *** 8.075 ***
0.844 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.741 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.975 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.741 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.625 *** -1.616 *** -1.639 *** -1.663 ***
0.088 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.082 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.107 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.089 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.354 *** 1.336 *** 1.316 *** 1.331 ***
0.122 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.096 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.120 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.112 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.339 *** 1.324 *** 1.340 *** 1.363 ***
0.054 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.051 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.057 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.062 [ 1 , 0 ]
popularity eval
-0.143 *** -0.136 *** -0.143 *** -0.147 ***
0.024 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.030 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.024 [ 0 , 1 ]
cov alter eval
-0.020
0.034 [ 0.076 , 0.679 ]
cov ego eval
0.010
0.026 [ 0.754 , 0.135 ]
cov similarity eval
0.141
0.113 [ 0.945 , 0.066 ]
opv alter eval
-0.007
0.036 [ 0.285 , 0.593 ]
opv ego eval
-0.065
0.050 [ 0.001 , 0.609 ]
opv similarity eval
-0.012
0.093 [ 0.565 , 0.701 ]
sev alter eval
-0.073 *
0.034 [ 0.001 , 0.977 ]
sev ego eval
0.029
0.025 [ 0.86 , 0.144 ]
sev similarity eval
0.224
0.157 [ 0.827 , 0.011 ]
stv alter eval
-0.011
0.045 [ 0.134 , 0.233 ]
stv ego eval
-0.095 *
0.044 [ 0 , 0.953 ]
stv similarity eval
0.286 *
0.119 [ 0.991 , 0.002 ]
consumption change:
1st period rate
7.055 *** 6.041 *** 6.695 *** 7.517 ***
1.235 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.944 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.349 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.293 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
19.014 *** 19.074 ** 8.212 *** 15.719 ***
6.511 [ 1 , 0 ] 7.044 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.373 [ 1 , 0 ] 3.952 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.050 ** -0.064 *** -0.047 * -0.056 ***
0.019 [ 0.007 , 0.982 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 0.998 ] 0.020 [ 0.013 , 0.967 ] 0.017 [ 0.001 , 1 ]
avg similarity eval
1.152 * 1.141 ** 1.218 * 0.978 *
0.451 [ 0.89 , 0.024 ] 0.438 [ 0.926 , 0.02 ] 0.500 [ 0.848 , 0.024 ] 0.437 [ 0.882 , 0.025 ]
effects from:
self-control eval
-0.089 ** -0.078 * -0.082 * -0.085 ***
0.033 [ 0.023 , 0.999 ] 0.034 [ 0.051 , 0.998 ] 0.035 [ 0.051 , 0.999 ] 0.030 [ 0.016 , 0.999 ]
resilience eval
0.017 0.010 0.000 0.046
0.031 [ 0.89 , 0.19 ] 0.031 [ 0.807 , 0.242 ] 0.035 [ 0.681 , 0.35 ] 0.029 [ 0.991 , 0.065 ]
conservation eval
0.040
0.025 [ 0.984 , 0.015 ]
openness to change eval
0.058
0.043 [ 0.72 , 0.004 ]
self-enhancement eval
0.039 †
0.022 [ 0.95 , 0.064 ]
self-transcendence eval
0.032
0.029 [ 0.725 , 0.061 ]
average alter effects:
self-control eval
-0.092 -0.186 -0.124 -0.029
0.262 [ 0.937 , 0.573 ] 0.232 [ 0.962 , 0.435 ] 0.232 [ 0.913 , 0.652 ] 0.236 [ 0.909 , 0.596 ]
resilience eval
0.108 0.295 0.151 0.237
0.183 [ 0.589 , 0.944 ] 0.201 [ 0.333 , 0.992 ] 0.196 [ 0.485 , 0.975 ] 0.174 [ 0.302 , 0.987 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.264 *** 0.254 *** 0.249 *** 0.217 ***
0.302 [ 36 , 23 ] 0.314 [ 36 , 22 ] 0.300 [ 36 , 22 ] 0.283 [ 36 , 21 ]
GOF (spending)
0.323 *** 0.333 *** 0.321 *** 0.315 ***
0.311 [ 36 , 27 ] 0.306 [ 36 , 27 ] 0.305 [ 36 , 24 ] 0.300 [ 36 , 27 ]
GOF (allocations)
[ 62 , 37 ] [ 61 , 36 ] [ 62 , 36 ] [ 60 , 36 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.30: Donations and (adaptive capacity) in friendship networks
openness to change conservation self-transcendence self-enhancement
(opv) (cov) (stv) (sev)
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship selection:
1st period rate
7.875 *** 7.980 *** 8.132 *** 8.011 ***
0.821 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.924 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.960 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.753 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
6.999 *** 6.863 *** 6.732 *** 7.081 ***
0.536 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.579 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.574 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.551 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.684 *** -1.712 *** -1.693 *** -1.658 ***
0.082 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.087 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.077 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.089 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.166 *** 1.132 *** 1.202 *** 1.153 ***
0.102 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.114 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.126 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.102 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.321 *** 1.290 *** 1.321 *** 1.284 ***
0.052 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.055 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.054 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.050 [ 1 , 0 ]
popularity eval
-0.115 *** -0.098 *** -0.113 *** -0.099 ***
0.018 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 1 ]
opv alter eval
0.001
0.033 [ 0.392 , 0.316 ]
opv ego eval
-0.060
0.039 [ 0.002 , 0.642 ]
opv similarity eval
0.002
0.099 [ 0.299 , 0.346 ]
cov alter eval
-0.055 †
0.031 [ 0.012 , 0.938 ]
cov ego eval
-0.034
0.037 [ 0.016 , 0.516 ]
cov similarity eval
-0.005
0.119 [ 0.346 , 0.375 ]
stv alter eval
-0.031
0.039 [ 0.045 , 0.512 ]
stv ego eval
-0.022
0.035 [ 0.042 , 0.437 ]
stv similarity eval
0.298 *
0.125 [ 0.985 , 0 ]
sev alter eval
-0.050 †
0.028 [ 0.001 , 0.908 ]
sev ego eval
0.022
0.025 [ 0.318 , 0.086 ]
sev similarity eval
0.373 ***
0.117 [ 0.998 , 0 ]
donations change:
1st period rate
4.588 ** 1.699 *** 2.124 *** 5.070 *
1.730 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.264 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.275 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.102 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
13.137 * 4.069 *** 9.640 . 4.919 ***
5.777 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.068 [ 1 , 0 ] 4.940 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.575 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.405 *** -0.444 *** -0.408 *** -0.380 ***
0.054 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.066 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.053 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.052 [ 0 , 1 ]
avg similarity eval
-0.521 -0.494 -0.021 -0.054
0.788 [ 0.56 , 0.767 ] 0.914 [ 0.559 , 0.801 ] 0.765 [ 0.736 , 0.697 ] 0.769 [ 0.83 , 0.767 ]
effects from:
self-control eval
0.044 -0.004 0.008 0.062
0.065 [ 0.651 , 0.506 ] 0.080 [ 0.386 , 0.626 ] 0.063 [ 0.597 , 0.644 ] 0.053 [ 0.927 , 0.264 ]
resilience eval
-0.054 -0.030 -0.023 -0.027
0.052 [ 0.181 , 0.979 ] 0.066 [ 0.243 , 0.924 ] 0.059 [ 0.273 , 0.878 ] 0.054 [ 0.367 , 0.875 ]
openness to change eval
0.092 †
0.053 [ 0.957 , 0.082 ]
conservation eval
0.014
0.049 [ 0.887 , 0.304 ]
self-transcendence eval
0.104 *
0.050 [ 0.998 , 0.044 ]
self-enhancement eval
0.004
0.038 [ 0.907 , 0.576 ]
average alter effects:
self-control eval
0.070 0.164 0.070 0.017
0.371 [ 0.840 , 0.848 ] 0.345 [ 0.845 , 0.843 ] 0.634 [ 0.942 , 0.711 ] 0.547 [ 0.911 , 0.694 ]
resilience eval
0.008 0.193 0.421 0.268
0.368 [ 0.722 , 0.872 ] 0.364 [ 0.583 , 0.942 ] 0.521 [ 0.677 , 0.935 ] 0.506 [ 0.692 , 0.900 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.235 *** 0.239 *** 0.273 *** 0.252 ***
0.272 [ 41 , 26 ] 0.291 [ 40 , 24 ] 0.306 [ 38 , 25 ] 0.288 [ 42 , 27 ]
GOF (donations)
0.345 *** 0.311 *** 0.305 *** 0.315 ***
0.279 [ 41 , 34 ] 0.265 [ 40 , 33 ] 0.248 [ 38 , 31 ] 0.246 [ 42 , 37 ]
GOF (allocations)
[ 62 , 37 ] [ 61 , 36 ] [ 62 , 36 ] [ 60 , 36 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.31: Savings and (cognitive capacity) in friendship networks
self-transcendence self-enhancement conservation openness to change
(stv) (sev) (cov) (opv)
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship selection:
1st period rate
7.840 *** 7.472 *** 7.777 *** 7.574 ***
0.747 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.681 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.781 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.698 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
6.443 *** 6.779 *** 6.828 *** 7.289 ***
0.614 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.637 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.680 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.604 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.749 *** -1.702 *** -1.762 *** -1.717 ***
0.099 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.104 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.101 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.095 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.201 *** 1.211 *** 1.175 *** 1.177 ***
0.120 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.115 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.112 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.110 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.334 *** 1.406 *** 1.379 *** 1.368 ***
0.053 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.055 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.055 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.051 [ 1 , 0 ]
popularity eval
-0.105 *** -0.131 *** -0.111 *** -0.117 ***
0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.023 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.020 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ]
stv alter eval
0.042
0.042 [ 0.673 , 0.044 ]
stv ego eval
-0.025
0.037 [ 0.056 , 0.56 ]
stv similarity eval
0.387 ***
0.120 [ 0.999 , 0 ]
sev alter eval
-0.045
0.031 [ 0.002 , 0.846 ]
sev ego eval
-0.001
0.033 [ 0.066 , 0.109 ]
sev similarity eval
0.290 *
0.130 [ 0.966 , 0.001 ]
cov alter eval
-0.048
0.032 [ 0.011 , 0.926 ]
cov ego eval
-0.044
0.037 [ 0.01 , 0.398 ]
cov similarity eval
0.041
0.117 [ 0.665 , 0.302 ]
opv alter eval
-0.014
0.036 [ 0.154 , 0.458 ]
opv ego eval
-0.047
0.043 [ 0.008 , 0.467 ]
opv similarity eval
0.088
0.091 [ 0.79 , 0.25 ]
savings change:
1st period rate
7.747 *** 6.287 *** 7.064 *** 16.181 *
0.837 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.681 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.787 [ 1 , 0 ] 7.027 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
8.963 *** 7.212 *** 8.551 *** 10.248 ***
1.758 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.507 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.676 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.612 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.063 *** -0.072 *** -0.079 *** -0.067 ***
0.018 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.017 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.016 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
1.588 *** 1.328 ** 1.311 ** 1.281 ***
0.440 [ 0.995 , 0.001 ] 0.492 [ 0.988 , 0.001 ] 0.468 [ 0.978 , 0.001 ] 0.385 [ 0.999 , 0.001 ]
effects from:
financial literacy eval
-0.049 0.002 0.027 -0.002
0.049 [ 0.116 , 0.746 ] 0.043 [ 0.397 , 0.569 ] 0.045 [ 0.643 , 0.424 ] 0.040 [ 0.497 , 0.515 ]
mathematics eval
0.046 0.029 0.021 0.037
0.037 [ 0.969 , 0.327 ] 0.035 [ 0.827 , 0.391 ] 0.036 [ 0.802 , 0.521 ] 0.033 [ 0.944 , 0.35 ]
linguistics eval
0.035 0.054 0.059 † 0.054
0.038 [ 0.939 , 0.43 ] 0.034 [ 0.987 , 0.208 ] 0.031 [ 0.974 , 0.19 ] 0.034 [ 0.986 , 0.156 ]
self-transcendence eval
-0.052 †
0.027 [ 0.006 , 0.956 ]
self-enhancement eval
-0.021
0.018 [ 0.051 , 0.912 ]
conservation eval
-0.032
0.022 [ 0.102 , 0.971 ]
openness to change eval
-0.035 †
0.021 [ 0.081 , 0.99 ]
average alter effects:
financial literacy eval
-0.016 -0.086 -0.110 -0.014
0.259 [ 0.656 , 0.429 ] 0.241 [ 0.714 , 0.431 ] 0.230 [ 0.763 , 0.328 ] 0.206 [ 0.677 , 0.454 ]
mathematics eval
0.066 0.125 0.023 -0.009
0.208 [ 0.550 , 0.839 ] 0.239 [ 0.407 , 0.926 ] 0.200 [ 0.682 , 0.776 ] 0.257 [ 0.690 , 0.702 ]
linguistics eval
0.011 -0.117 0.121 -0.040
0.242 [ 0.707 , 0.716 ] 0.318 [ 0.830 , 0.616 ] 0.272 [ 0.533 , 0.906 ] 0.320 [ 0.717 , 0.719 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.278 *** 0.262 *** 0.277 *** 0.257 ***
0.301 [ 44 , 31 ] 0.288 [ 46 , 30 ] 0.287 [ 46 , 31 ] 0.296 [ 47 , 30 ]
GOF (savings)
0.271 *** 0.275 *** 0.287 *** 0.266 ***
0.279 [ 44 , 31 ] 0.267 [ 46 , 33 ] 0.266 [ 46 , 34 ] 0.257 [ 47 , 35 ]
GOF (allocations)
[ 62 , 37 ] [ 64 , 40 ] [ 63 , 38 ] [ 63 , 41 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.32: Consumption and (cognitive capacity) in friendship networks
conservation openness to change self-enhancement self-transcendence
(cov) (opv) (sev) (stv)
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship selection:
1st period rate
8.186 *** 7.815 *** 7.817 *** 8.385 ***
0.879 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.838 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.745 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.889 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
8.003 *** 7.317 *** 7.321 *** 7.871 ***
0.770 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.764 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.740 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.702 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.636 *** -1.654 *** -1.713 *** -1.661 ***
0.081 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.083 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.078 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.085 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.382 *** 1.361 *** 1.376 *** 1.313 ***
0.112 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.097 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.094 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.103 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.368 *** 1.374 *** 1.362 *** 1.380 ***
0.059 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.060 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.048 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.058 [ 1 , 0 ]
popularity eval
-0.147 *** -0.146 *** -0.137 *** -0.148 ***
0.024 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.021 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.021 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.022 [ 0 , 1 ]
cov alter eval
-0.046
0.036 [ 0.011 , 0.866 ]
cov ego eval
0.026
0.025 [ 0.957 , 0.05 ]
cov similarity eval
0.122
0.118 [ 0.834 , 0.114 ]
opv alter eval
-0.024
0.042 [ 0.065 , 0.602 ]
opv ego eval
-0.099 †
0.050 [ 0 , 0.852 ]
opv similarity eval
-0.034
0.095 [ 0.346 , 0.794 ]
sev alter eval
-0.060 †
0.031 [ 0.001 , 0.919 ]
sev ego eval
0.025
0.022 [ 0.854 , 0.124 ]
sev similarity eval
0.252 *
0.120 [ 0.971 , 0.005 ]
stv alter eval
0.004
0.045 [ 0.252 , 0.178 ]
stv ego eval
-0.083 †
0.044 [ 0 , 0.912 ]
stv similarity eval
0.276 *
0.112 [ 0.99 , 0.002 ]
consumption change:
1st period rate
8.177 *** 6.905 *** 6.817 *** 7.116 ***
1.277 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.189 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.126 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.276 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.139 *** 7.679 *** 8.099 *** 8.263 ***
1.204 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.164 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.314 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.249 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.053 *** -0.064 *** -0.056 *** -0.058 ***
0.017 [ 0.004 , 0.991 ] 0.020 [ 0 , 0.998 ] 0.017 [ 0.002 , 0.998 ] 0.017 [ 0.001 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
1.415 *** 1.475 *** 1.416 *** 1.152 **
0.423 [ 0.993 , 0.005 ] 0.415 [ 0.998 , 0.003 ] 0.407 [ 0.999 , 0.001 ] 0.411 [ 0.98 , 0.017 ]
effects from:
financial literacy eval
-0.046 -0.028 0.002 0.033
0.057 [ 0.08 , 0.653 ] 0.056 [ 0.173 , 0.536 ] 0.054 [ 0.327 , 0.386 ] 0.059 [ 0.553 , 0.131 ]
mathematics eval
-0.040 -0.050 -0.040 -0.031
0.032 [ 0.276 , 0.941 ] 0.033 [ 0.241 , 0.943 ] 0.031 [ 0.296 , 0.856 ] 0.031 [ 0.264 , 0.835 ]
linguistics eval
-0.036 -0.059 † -0.029 -0.025
0.032 [ 0.527 , 0.389 ] 0.032 [ 0.134 , 0.896 ] 0.030 [ 0.425 , 0.703 ] 0.031 [ 0.386 , 0.742 ]
conservation eval
0.028
0.026 [ 0.758 , 0.063 ]
openness to change eval
0.052
0.041 [ 0.664 , 0.011 ]
self-enhancement eval
0.027
0.019 [ 0.871 , 0.053 ]
self-transcendence eval
0.045
0.029 [ 0.895 , 0.016 ]
average alter effects:
financial literacy eval
0.023 0.069 0.118 0.060
0.251 [ 0.307 , 0.788 ] 0.252 [ 0.835 , 0.743 ] 0.220 [ 0.258 , 0.798 ] 0.243 [ 0.435 , 0.699 ]
mathematics eval
-0.390 -0.417 -0.317 -0.092
0.544 [ 0.893 , 0.450 ] 0.373 [ 0.967 , 0.313 ] 0.384 [ 0.838 , 0.566 ] 0.672 [ 0.604 , 0.779 ]
linguistics eval
0.165 -0.094 0.260 0.065
0.456 [ 0.596 , 0.791 ] 0.384 [ 0.771 , 0.657 ] 0.518 [ 0.567 , 0.841 ] 0.701 [ 0.594 , 0.778 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.260 *** 0.262 *** 0.269 *** 0.240 ***
0.297 [ 39 , 23 ] 0.311 [ 36 , 21 ] 0.316 [ 38 , 24 ] 0.300 [ 37 , 22 ]
GOF (consumption)
0.328 *** 0.330 *** 0.331 *** 0.308 ***
0.304 [ 39 , 29 ] 0.308 [ 36 , 27 ] 0.300 [ 38 , 30 ] 0.298 [ 37 , 26 ]
GOF (allocations)
[ 62 , 37 ] [ 64 , 40 ] [ 63 , 38 ] [ 63 , 41 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.33: Donations and (cognitive capacity) in friendship networks
openness to change conservation self-transcendence self-enhancement
(opv) (cov) (stv) (sev)
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship selection:
1st period rate
6.974 *** 7.845 *** 7.183 *** 8.504 ***
0.805 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.946 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.771 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.060 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
6.646 *** 7.380 *** 6.558 *** 7.518 ***
0.546 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.804 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.652 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.746 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.647 *** -1.655 *** -1.649 *** -1.648 ***
0.076 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.079 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.083 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.084 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.300 *** 1.237 *** 1.266 *** 1.166 ***
0.072 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.105 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.076 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.103 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.359 *** 1.389 *** 1.358 *** 1.316 ***
0.056 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.055 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.052 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.054 [ 1 , 0 ]
popularity eval
-0.141 *** -0.141 *** -0.129 *** -0.112 ***
0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.022 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.020 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.021 [ 0 , 1 ]
opv alter eval
-0.008
0.034 [ 0.227 , 0.457 ]
opv ego eval
-0.078 †
0.045 [ 0.001 , 0.741 ]
opv similarity eval
-0.016
0.092 [ 0.178 , 0.565 ]
cov alter eval
-0.023
0.038 [ 0.054 , 0.565 ]
cov ego eval
0.023
0.025 [ 0.624 , 0.059 ]
cov similarity eval
0.019
0.102 [ 0.752 , 0.472 ]
stv alter eval
-0.013
0.039 [ 0.147 , 0.381 ]
stv ego eval
-0.041
0.036 [ 0.015 , 0.691 ]
stv similarity eval
0.170
0.110 [ 0.901 , 0.037 ]
sev alter eval
-0.042 †
0.023 [ 0.017 , 0.949 ]
sev ego eval
0.039 †
0.024 [ 0.908 , 0.032 ]
sev similarity eval
0.344 **
0.130 [ 0.985 , 0 ]
donations change:
1st period rate
1.777 *** 1.629 *** 1.792 *** 1.542 ***
0.220 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.193 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.233 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.205 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
5.850 *** 13.559 5.094 *** 2.842 ***
1.503 [ 1 , 0 ] 8.394 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.231 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.542 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.401 *** -0.456 *** -0.414 *** -0.421 ***
0.054 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.071 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.054 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.064 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
0.195 0.002 0.542 0.011
0.837 [ 0.776 , 0.539 ] 0.911 [ 0.52 , 0.731 ] 0.800 [ 0.901 , 0.394 ] 0.791 [ 0.739 , 0.808 ]
effects from:
financial literacy eval
-0.022 -0.077 -0.042 0.006
0.103 [ 0.374 , 0.651 ] 0.124 [ 0.295 , 0.698 ] 0.114 [ 0.261 , 0.437 ] 0.110 [ 0.485 , 0.705 ]
mathematics eval
0.030 0.115 0.014 0.071
0.105 [ 0.731 , 0.656 ] 0.121 [ 0.876 , 0.424 ] 0.105 [ 0.699 , 0.587 ] 0.098 [ 0.766 , 0.548 ]
linguistics eval
0.079 0.071 0.094 -0.006
0.100 [ 0.752 , 0.344 ] 0.117 [ 0.63 , 0.624 ] 0.102 [ 0.777 , 0.422 ] 0.099 [ 0.48 , 0.613 ]
openness to change eval
0.074
0.057 [ 0.988 , 0.07 ]
conservation eval
0.026
0.051 [ 0.709 , 0.746 ]
self-transcendence eval
0.152 ***
0.053 [ 1 , 0.013 ]
self-enhancement eval
0.029
0.047 [ 0.933 , 0.338 ]
average alter effects:
financial literacy eval
-0.317 -0.222 -0.139 -0.719
0.540 [ 0.922 , 0.362 ] 0.587 [ 0.884 , 0.422 ] 0.486 [ 0.877 , 0.492 ] 0.694 [ 0.962 , 0.263 ]
mathematics eval
0.267 0.214 -0.032 -0.019
754 [ 0.353 , 0.858 ] 1.010 [ 0.433 , 0.688 ] 0.617 [ 0.638 , 0.377 ] 0.710 [ 0.577 , 0.795 ]
linguistics eval
-0.304 -0.028 -0.369 -0.148
0.418 [ 0.949 , 0.319 ] 0.365 [ 0.797 , 0.432 ] 0.400 [ 0.982 , 0.266 ] 0.333 [ 0.916 , 0.423 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.257 *** 0.261 *** 0.261 *** 0.258 ***
0.309 [ 42 , 25 ] 0.305 [ 43 , 25 ] 0.300 [ 43 , 26 ] 0.313 [ 40 , 23 ]
GOF (donations)
0.368 *** 0.364 *** 0.350 *** 0.333 ***
0.298 [ 42 , 36 ] 0.292 [ 43 , 37 ] 0.289 [ 43 , 37 ] 0.271 [ 40 , 33 ]
GOF (allocations)
[ 62 , 37 ] [ 64 , 40 ] [ 63 , 38 ] [ 63 , 41 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.34: Savings and (financial literacy) in friendship networks
self-transcendence self-enhancement conservation openness to change
(stv) (sev) (cov) (opv)
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship selection:
1st period rate
7.732 *** 7.684 *** 7.712 *** 7.333 ***
0.789 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.757 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.788 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.685 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
6.931 *** 6.943 *** 7.010 *** 6.962 ***
0.735 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.696 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.610 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.709 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.806 *** -1.779 *** -1.788 *** -1.800 ***
0.081 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.087 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.077 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.085 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.142 *** 1.155 *** 1.182 *** 1.196 ***
0.117 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.122 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.117 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.113 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.329 *** 1.324 *** 1.327 *** 1.350 ***
0.056 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.057 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.052 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.053 [ 1 , 0 ]
popularity eval
-0.090 *** -0.099 *** -0.097 *** -0.109 ***
0.017 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.017 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ]
stv alter eval
0.043
0.040 [ 0.685 , 0.035 ]
stv ego eval
-0.041
0.038 [ 0.017 , 0.691 ]
stv similarity eval
0.363 ***
0.121 [ 0.997 , 0 ]
sev alter eval
-0.034
0.036 [ 0.022 , 0.737 ]
sev ego eval
-0.010
0.033 [ 0.071 , 0.491 ]
sev similarity eval
0.385 **
0.140 [ 0.987 , 0 ]
cov alter eval
-0.028
0.029 [ 0.082 , 0.777 ]
cov ego eval
-0.020
0.034 [ 0.048 , 0.384 ]
cov similarity eval
0.044
0.131 [ 0.299 , 0.099 ]
opv alter eval
0.017
0.039 [ 0.413 , 0.138 ]
opv ego eval
-0.046
0.046 [ 0.009 , 0.387 ]
opv similarity eval
0.040
0.097 [ 0.514 , 0.445 ]
savings change:
1st period rate
7.851 *** 7.454 *** 12.405 *** 7.972 ***
0.899 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.897 [ 1 , 0 ] 3.320 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.898 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
9.783 *** 8.040 *** 14.037 *** 9.859 ***
1.647 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.659 [ 1 , 0 ] 3.663 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.610 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.081 *** -0.069 *** -0.088 *** -0.081 ***
0.022 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.020 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
1.665 *** 1.053 * 1.484 *** 1.175 *
0.473 [ 0.996 , 0.001 ] 0.492 [ 0.948 , 0.013 ] 0.485 [ 0.996 , 0 ] 0.479 [ 0.975 , 0.002 ]
effects from:
financial literacy eval
-0.046 0.016 -0.002 -0.014
0.061 [ 0.116 , 0.606 ] 0.047 [ 0.723 , 0.222 ] 0.045 [ 0.536 , 0.483 ] 0.052 [ 0.393 , 0.315 ]
time preferences eval
-0.021 -0.025 † -0.028 * -0.035 *
0.017 [ 0.03 , 0.957 ] 0.014 [ 0.053 , 0.983 ] 0.014 [ 0.011 , 0.973 ] 0.017 [ 0.033 , 0.974 ]
self-transcendence eval
-0.056 *
0.025 [ 0.002 , 0.989 ]
self-enhancement eval
-0.036
0.022 [ 0.035 , 0.999 ]
conservation eval
-0.033 †
0.019 [ 0.042 , 0.978 ]
openness to change eval
-0.045 *
0.023 [ 0.094 , 0.998 ]
average alter effects:
financial literacy eval
-0.016 -0.086 -0.110 -0.014
0.259 [ 0.656 , 0.429 ] 0.241 [ 0.714 , 0.431 ] 0.230 [ 0.763 , 0.328 ] 0.206 [ 0.677 , 0.454 ]
time preferences eval
0.055 0.077 0.136 0.126
0.097 [ 0.311 , 0.816 ] 0.087 [ 0.219 , 0.966 ] 0.102 [ 0.190 , 0.951 ] 0.091 [ 0.224 , 0.880 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.249 *** 0.252 *** 0.263 *** 0.239 ***
0.295 [ 46 , 28 ] 0.285 [ 48 , 30 ] 0.295 [ 44 , 27 ] 0.292 [ 49 , 30 ]
GOF (savings)
0.250 *** 0.249 *** 0.263 *** 0.248 ***
0.257 [ 46 , 31 ] 0.255 [ 48 , 33 ] 0.265 [ 44 , 32 ] 0.250 [ 49 , 35 ]
GOF (allocations)
[ 62 , 37 ] [ 64 , 40 ] [ 63 , 38 ] [ 63 , 41 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.35: Consumption and (financial literacy) in friendship networks
conservation openness to change self-enhancement self-transcendence
(cov) (opv) (sev) (stv)
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship selection:
1st period rate
8.565 *** 8.041 *** 8.190 *** 8.701 ***
0.961 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.834 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.833 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.911 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.639 *** 7.454 *** 7.533 *** 7.929 ***
0.916 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.796 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.818 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.665 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.602 *** -1.634 *** -1.636 *** -1.652 ***
0.098 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.080 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.088 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.091 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.357 *** 1.349 *** 1.363 *** 1.310 ***
0.130 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.098 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.105 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.107 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.326 *** 1.364 *** 1.368 *** 1.359 ***
0.058 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.057 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.057 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.057 [ 1 , 0 ]
popularity eval
-0.144 *** -0.141 *** -0.146 *** -0.146 ***
0.027 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.021 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.024 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.023 [ 0 , 1 ]
cov alter eval
-0.015
0.036 [ 0.109 , 0.615 ]
cov ego eval
0.017
0.027 [ 0.809 , 0.098 ]
cov similarity eval
0.174
0.124 [ 0.947 , 0.04 ]
opv alter eval
-0.011
0.039 [ 0.211 , 0.53 ]
opv ego eval
-0.090 †
0.051 [ 0 , 0.781 ]
opv similarity eval
-0.023
0.093 [ 0.48 , 0.723 ]
sev alter eval
-0.043
0.040 [ 0.007 , 0.669 ]
sev ego eval
0.029
0.026 [ 0.83 , 0.023 ]
sev similarity eval
0.243 †
0.136 [ 0.916 , 0.006 ]
stv alter eval
-0.009
0.046 [ 0.156 , 0.241 ]
stv ego eval
-0.081 †
0.049 [ 0 , 0.867 ]
stv similarity eval
0.245 *
0.122 [ 0.979 , 0.007 ]
consumption change:
1st period rate
7.508 *** 6.835 *** 6.849 *** 7.356 ***
1.391 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.177 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.194 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.367 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.712 *** 15.249 *** 7.979 *** 7.910 ***
1.229 [ 1 , 0 ] 3.972 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.341 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.258 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.044 * -0.054 ** -0.047 ** -0.060 ***
0.019 [ 0.012 , 0.955 ] 0.019 [ 0.001 , 0.986 ] 0.017 [ 0.01 , 0.989 ] 0.018 [ 0.001 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
1.110 * 1.330 *** 1.251 *** 0.971 *
0.454 [ 0.848 , 0.049 ] 0.421 [ 0.98 , 0.01 ] 0.402 [ 0.932 , 0.008 ] 0.424 [ 0.957 , 0.04 ]
effects from:
financial literacy eval
-0.037 0.006 -0.010 0.047
0.051 [ 0.199 , 0.694 ] 0.058 [ 0.401 , 0.321 ] 0.046 [ 0.489 , 0.565 ] 0.067 [ 0.614 , 0.102 ]
time preferences eval
0.024 0.019 0.023 † 0.021
0.020 [ 0.956 , 0.232 ] 0.020 [ 0.951 , 0.152 ] 0.016 [ 0.978 , 0.316 ] 0.021 [ 0.846 , 0.302 ]
conservation eval
0.038
0.024 [ 0.973 , 0.027 ]
openness to change eval
0.084 *
0.033 [ 0.888 , 0.001 ]
self-enhancement eval
0.018
0.018 [ 0.823 , 0.239 ]
self-transcendence eval
0.050 †
0.029 [ 0.941 , 0.015 ]
average alter effects:
financial literacy eval
0.023 0.069 0.118 0.060
0.251 [ 0.307 , 0.788 ] 0.252 [ 0.835 , 0.743 ] 0.220 [ 0.258 , 0.798 ] 0.243 [ 0.435 , 0.699 ]
time preferences eval
-0.064 -0.030 -0.044 -0.046
0.092 [ 0.783 , 0.729 ] 0.091 [ 0.835 , 0.743 ] 0.081 [ 0.794 , 0.668 ] 0.093 [ 0.754 , 0.644 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.250 *** 0.225 *** 0.255 *** 0.221 ***
0.305 [ 38 , 22 ] 0.291 [42 , 22 ] 0.307 [39 , 25 ] 0.293 [41 , 25 ]
GOF (consumption)
0.309 *** 0.301 *** 0.342 *** 0.267 ***
0.299 [38 , 25 ] 0.298 [42 , 31 ] 0.311 [39 , 0.29 ] 0.285 [41 , 28 ]
GOF (allocations)
[ 62 , 37 ] [ 64 , 40 ] [ 63 , 38 ] [ 63 , 41 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.36: Donations and (financial literacy) in friendship networks
openness to change conservation self-transcendence self-enhancement
(opv) (cov) (stv) (sev)
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
friendship selection:
1st period rate
6.698 *** 8.137 *** 7.977 *** 9.024 ***
0.752 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.942 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.051 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.101 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
6.288 *** 6.989 *** 6.692 *** 7.662 ***
0.638 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.668 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.614 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.732 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.652 *** -1.673 *** -1.691 *** -1.708 ***
0.078 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.085 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.083 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.094 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.307 *** 1.275 *** 1.303 *** 1.194 ***
0.069 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.104 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.092 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.103 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.325 *** 1.371 *** 1.301 *** 1.343 ***
0.057 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.055 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.054 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.054 [ 1 , 0 ]
popularity eval
-0.127 *** -0.137 *** -0.114 *** -0.107 ***
0.018 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.022 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.020 [ 0 , 1 ]
opv alter eval
0.006
0.034 [ 0.589 , 0.416 ]
opv ego eval
-0.039
0.046 [ 0.026 , 0.378 ]
opv similarity eval
-0.056
0.107 [ 0.152 , 0.614 ]
cov alter eval
-0.026
0.034 [ 0.041 , 0.566 ]
cov ego eval
0.005
0.028 [ 0.544 , 0.075 ]
cov similarity eval
0.006
0.102 [ 0.724 , 0.581 ]
stv alter eval
-0.005
0.047 [ 0.196 , 0.224 ]
stv ego eval
-0.017
0.039 [ 0.121 , 0.464 ]
stv similarity eval
0.188
0.120 [ 0.938 , 0.032 ]
sev alter eval
-0.031
0.024 [ 0.03 , 0.845 ]
sev ego eval
0.016
0.032 [ 0.133 , 0.062 ]
sev similarity eval
0.352 **
0.130 [ 0.985 , 0 ]
donations change:
1st period rate
1.587 *** 1.666 *** 1.607 *** 1.519 ***
0.217 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.209 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.231 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.201 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
4.729 *** 9.617 * 5.382 *** 3.088 ***
1.145 [ 1 , 0 ] 4.524 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.205 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.540 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.447 *** -0.450 *** -0.473 *** -0.491 ***
0.063 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.063 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.068 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.074 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
-0.492 -1.058 0.035 -0.369
0.930 [ 0.618 , 0.631 ] 0.821 [ 0.297 , 0.898 ] 0.920 [ 0.655 , 0.67 ] 0.892 [ 0.539 , 0.866 ]
effects from:
financial literacy eval
-0.170 -0.202 † -0.109 -0.081
0.126 [ 0.224 , 0.901 ] 0.115 [ 0.149 , 0.948 ] 0.127 [ 0.373 , 0.796 ] 0.159 [ 0.408 , 0.758 ]
time preferences eval
0.021 0.012 -0.002 -0.016
0.044 [ 0.54 , 0.56 ] 0.029 [ 0.506 , 0.777 ] 0.047 [ 0.425 , 0.568 ] 0.049 [ 0.368 , 0.741 ]
openness to change eval
0.061
0.055 [ 0.896 , 0.155 ]
conservation eval
0.039
0.039 [ 0.68 , 0.479 ]
self-transcendence eval
0.163 *
0.065 [ 0.999 , 0.016 ]
self-enhancement eval
0.000
0.040 [ 0.893 , 0.672 ]
average alter effects:
financial literacy eval
-0.317 -0.222 -0.139 -0.719
0.540 [ 0.922 , 0.362 ] 0.587 [ 0.884 , 0.422 ] 0.486 [ 0.877 , 0.492 ] 0.694 [ 0.962 , 0.263 ]
time preferences eval
-0.086 -0.067 0.003 0.029
0.146 [ 0.942 , 0.430 ] 0.126 [ 0.855 , 0.568 ] 0.128 [ 0.719 , 0.820 ] 0.202 [ 0.816 , 0.661 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.251 *** 0.256 *** 0.283 *** 0.271 ***
0.296 [ 44 , 26 ] 0.294 [ 44 , 26 ] 0.320 [36 , 22 ] 0.315 [42 , 25 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.326 *** 0.311 *** 0.305 *** 0.305 ***
0.280 [44 , 35 ] 0.266 [ 44 , 36 ] 0.248 [ 36 , 31 ] 0.272 [ 42 , 33 ]
GOF (allocations)
[ 62 , 37 ] [ 64 , 40 ] [ 63 , 38 ] [ 63 , 41 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
133
6.4.3 Finding Social Support in Adolescent Friendship and Advice Networks
Table 6.37: Extrinsic vs. intrinsic motivations for saving in friendship and advice networks
friendship networks advice networks
stv sev cov opv stv sev cov opv
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
network selection:
1st period rate
7.728 *** 7.441 *** 7.645 *** 6.858 *** 6.276 *** 6.104 *** 6.540 *** 5.844 ***
0.789 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.676 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.684 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.610 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.473 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.462 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.532 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.452 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.156 *** 7.459 *** 7.249 *** 7.051 *** 11.155 *** 11.516 *** 7.856 *** 7.593 ***
0.499 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.556 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.487 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.506 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.437 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.613 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.833 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.754 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-2.127 *** -1.958 *** -2.068 *** -1.998 *** -1.555 *** -1.447 *** -1.565 *** -1.486 ***
0.104 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.151 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.111 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.125 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.075 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.066 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.065 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.068 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.057 *** 1.153 *** 1.075 *** 1.149 *** 1.315 *** 1.239 *** 1.266 *** 1.210 ***
0.120 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.131 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.110 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.111 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.091 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.088 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.088 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.090 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.351 *** 1.384 *** 1.309 *** 1.357 *** 1.654 *** 1.599 *** 1.619 *** 1.561 ***
0.063 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.067 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.065 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.067 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.089 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.093 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.091 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.101 [ 1 , 0 ]
cyclicality eval
-0.429 *** -0.420 *** -0.452 *** -0.375 ***
0.080 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.074 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.078 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.072 [ 0 , 1 ]
popularity eval
-0.079 *** -0.088 *** -0.082 *** -0.089 *** -0.140 *** -0.141 *** -0.124 *** -0.137 ***
0.017 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.020 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.017 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.024 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.021 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.021 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.022 [ 0 , 1 ]
same age eval
-0.026 -0.098 -0.105 † -0.075
0.057 [ 0.131 , 0.651 ] 0.070 [ 0.001 , 0.757 ] 0.061 [ 0.003 , 0.93 ] 0.072 [ 0.005 , 0.758 ]
same gender eval
0.350 *** 0.355 *** 0.382 *** 0.312 ***
0.066 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.064 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.068 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.054 [ 1 , 0 ]
scp alter eval
0.111 *** 0.085 † 0.099 ** 0.083 *
0.038 [ 0.994 , 0.007 ] 0.046 [ 0.912 , 0.005 ] 0.038 [ 0.984 , 0.004 ] 0.038 [ 0.921 , 0.02 ]
scp ego eval
-0.096 . -0.044 -0.048 -0.098
0.053 [ 0.001 , 0.808 ] 0.062 [ 0.005 , 0.301 ] 0.059 [ 0.006 , 0.516 ] 0.061 [ 0.001 , 0.859 ]
scp similarity eval
0.149 0.344 ** 0.198 0.231 †
0.149 [ 0.848 , 0.065 ] 0.123 [ 0.992 , 0.001 ] 0.122 [ 0.95 , 0.022 ] 0.131 [ 0.911 , 0.038 ]
rsp alter eval
0.029 0.089 † 0.063 0.061
0.042 [ 0.569 , 0.099 ] 0.048 [ 0.864 , 0.001 ] 0.038 [ 0.888 , 0.005 ] 0.043 [ 0.843 , 0.017 ]
rsp ego eval
0.023 0.075 0.023 0.073
0.062 [ 0.221 , 0.03 ] 0.066 [ 0.457 , 0 ] 0.058 [ 0.161 , 0.017 ] 0.053 [ 0.74 , 0.006 ]
rsp similarity eval
0.152 0.130 0.087 0.184
0.126 [ 0.96 , 0.154 ] 0.142 [ 0.763 , 0.058 ] 0.122 [ 0.857 , 0.168 ] 0.129 [ 0.921 , 0.036 ]
sri alter eval
-0.026 0.033 -0.004 0.018
0.051 [ 0.455 , 0.783 ] 0.040 [ 0.028 , 0.638 ] 0.044 [ 0.139 , 0.123 ] 0.043 [ 0.1 , 0.356 ]
sri ego eval
-0.026 -0.074 * -0.002 -0.061 †
0.041 [ 0.633 , 0.180 ] 0.033 [ 0.953 , 0.533 ] 0.034 [ 0.445 , 0.676 ] 0.034 [ 0.776 , 0.167 ]
sri similarity eval
0.326 ** 0.281 ** 0.258 * 0.226 †
0.120 [ 0.004 , 0.998 ] 0.107 [ 0.012 , 0.999 ] 0.109 [ 0.020 , 0.991 ] 0.111 [ 0.022 , 0.969 ]
eri alter eval
-0.061 † -0.117 *** -0.105 *** -0.112 ***
0.036 [ 0.841 , 0.133 ] 0.034 [ 0.997 , 0.469 ] 0.030 [ 0.998 , 0.001 ] 0.034 [ 0.997 , 0 ]
eri ego eval
0.067 0.093 0.092 * 0.118 *
0.057 [ 0.012 , 0.676 ] 0.063 [ 0 , 0.384 ] 0.053 [ 0 , 0.658 ] 0.046 [ 0 , 0.960 ]
eri similarity eval
0.093 0.103 0.119 0.188
0.137 [ 0.092 , 0.726 ] 0.120 [ 0.074 , 0.726 ] 0.109 [ 0.068 , 0.820 ] 0.118 [ 0.032 , 0.916 ]
sav alter eval
0.017 0.026 † 0.025 † 0.023 †
0.017 [ 0.677 , 0.085 ] 0.015 [ 0.891 , 0.092 ] 0.014 [ 0.967 , 0.048 ] 0.014 [ 0.963 , 0.17 ]
sav ego eval
-0.008 -0.014 -0.009 -0.003
0.013 [ 0.257 , 0.837 ] 0.014 [ 0.121 , 0.928 ] 0.014 [ 0.15 , 0.779 ] 0.013 [ 0.295 , 0.901 ]
sav similarity eval
0.531 * 0.270 0.438 † 0.568 *
0.239 [ 0.994 , 0.008 ] 0.213 [ 0.869 , 0.168 ] 0.253 [ 0.895 , 0.035 ] 0.241 [ 0.965 , 0.017 ]
stv alter eval
0.024 0.062 †
0.037 [ 0.641 , 0.198 ] 0.038 [ 0.946 , 0.023 ]
stv ego eval
-0.044 -0.107 *
0.044 [ 0.011 , 0.605 ] 0.049 [ 0 , 0.97 ]
stv similarity eval
0.405 *** 0.265 †
0.140 [ 0.995 , 0 ] 0.155 [ 0.82 , 0.003 ]
sev alter eval
-0.045 -0.028
0.041 [ 0.005 , 0.54 ] 0.036 [ 0.011 , 0.329 ]
sev ego eval
0.007 0.005
0.034 [ 0.145 , 0.056 ] 0.035 [ 0.121 , 0.119 ]
sev similarity eval
0.230 † 0.128
0.138 [ 0.89 , 0.009 ] 0.121 [ 0.809 , 0.086 ]
cov alter eval
-0.025 -0.035
0.025 [ 0.101 , 0.911 ] 0.023 [ 0.189 , 0.854 ]
cov ego eval
-0.019 -0.078 ***
0.047 [ 0.01 , 0.067 ] 0.025 [ 0 , 0.968 ]
cov similarity eval
0.045 0.050
0.109 [ 0.417 , 0.319 ] 0.101 [ 0.906 , 0.255 ]
opv alter eval
-0.008 -0.016
0.036 [ 0.263 , 0.545 ] 0.052 [ 0.032 , 0.091 ]
opv ego eval
-0.069 0.007
0.048 [ 0.004 , 0.566 ] 0.056 [ 0.061 , 0.05 ]
opv similarity eval
0.044 0.223 †
0.099 [ 0.704 , 0.352 ] 0.118 [ 0.869 , 0.05 ]
behavior change:
1st period eval
8.393 *** 8.996 *** 7.810 *** 7.991 *** 7.248 *** 7.348 *** 7.504 *** 7.446 ***
0.862 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.085 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.848 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.828 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.976 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.981 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.966 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.961 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period eval
8.696 *** 13.839 *** 15.960 *** 15.139 *** 22.058 *** 8.028 *** 8.399 *** 22.847 ***
1.704 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.727 [ 1 , 0 ] 3.302 [ 1 , 0 ] 3.161 [ 1 , 0 ] 6.034 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.393 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.417 [ 1 , 0 ] 6.128 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.073 *** -0.084 *** -0.081 *** -0.078 *** -0.068 *** -0.065 *** -0.062 *** -0.072 ***
0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.017 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.014 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.014 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.014 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.013 [ 0 , 1 ]
avg similarity eval
1.067 * 1.132 * 1.300 *** 0.988 ** 1.627 *** 1.628 *** 1.710 *** 1.475 ***
0.442 [ 0.985 , 0.002 ] 0.450 [ 0.993 , 0.002 ] 0.375 [ 0.999 , 0.001 ] 0.360 [ 0.993 , 0.003 ] 0.477 [ 1 , 0.002 ] 0.426 [ 1 , 0.001 ] 0.453 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.448 [ 1 , 0.005 ]
effect from stv eval
-0.021 0.004
0.025 [ 0.074 , 0.686 ] 0.020 [ 0.238 , 0.681 ]
effect from sev eval
-0.017 -0.013
0.016 [ 0.114 , 0.933 ] 0.013 [ 0.382 , 0.966 ]
effect from cov eval
-0.024 -0.009
0.019 [ 0.11 , 0.958 ] 0.015 [ 0.489 , 0.851 ]
effect from opv eval
-0.033 † -0.010
0.019 [ 0.099 , 0.988 ] 0.017 [ 0.305 , 0.885 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.331 *** 0.315 *** 0.321 *** 0.291 *** 0.336 *** 0.328 *** 0.313 *** 0.291 ***
0.290 [ 36 , 28 ] 0.290 [ 39 , 29 ] 0.285 [ 37 , 27 ] 0.297 [ 38 , 27 ] 0.268 [ 38 , 33 ] 0.280 [ 38 , 32 ] 0.268 [ 40 , 33 ] 0.224 [ 39 , 34 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.311 *** 0.281 *** 0.286 *** 0.294 *** 0.266 *** 0.280 *** 0.278 *** 0.265 ***
0.301 [ 36 , 25 ] 0.284 [ 39 , 27 ] 0.284 [ 37 , 26 ] 0.297 [ 38 , 25 ] 0.278 [ 38 , 26 ] 0.288 [ 38 , 26 ] 0.269 [ 40 , 29 ] 0.267 [ 39 , 27 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.38: Extrinsic vs. intrinsic motivations for spending in friendship and advice networks
friendship networks advice networks
cov opv sev stv cov opv sev stv
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
network selection:
1st period rate
7.794 *** 7.629 *** 8.034 *** 7.540 *** 6.569 *** 6.000 *** 6.447 *** 6.518 ***
se 0.773 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.735 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.715 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.743 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.498 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.435 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.480 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.487 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.476 *** 7.224 *** 7.582 *** 7.032 *** 8.391 *** 7.721 *** 8.295 *** 8.473 ***
0.795 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.683 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.704 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.505 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.016 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.840 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.821 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.009 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.836 *** -1.828 *** -1.870 *** -1.915 *** -1.593 *** -1.525 *** -1.507 *** -1.579 ***
0.156 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.151 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.170 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.134 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.079 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.084 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.074 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.087 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.244 *** 1.237 *** 1.218 *** 1.189 *** 1.282 *** 1.284 *** 1.282 *** 1.265 ***
0.108 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.106 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.116 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.108 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.099 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.095 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.089 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.102 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.395 *** 1.383 *** 1.402 *** 1.383 *** 1.724 *** 1.724 *** 1.669 *** 1.700 ***
0.066 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.063 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.067 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.070 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.087 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.096 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.082 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.087 [ 1 , 0 ]
cyclicality eval
-0.432 *** -0.463 *** -0.436 *** -0.429 ***
0.084 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.071 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.075 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.086 [ 0 , 1 ]
popularity eval
-0.146 *** -0.132 *** -0.139 *** -0.140 *** -0.127 *** -0.138 *** -0.129 *** -0.128 ***
0.022 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.021 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.025 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.025 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.025 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.025 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.022 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.025 [ 0 , 1 ]
same age eval
0.029 0.011 0.020 0.065
0.055 [ 0.14 , 0.142 ] 0.050 [ 0.144 , 0.264 ] 0.063 [ 0.097 , 0.116 ] 0.049 [ 0.909 , 0.261 ]
same gender eval
0.317 *** 0.331 *** 0.362 *** 0.362 ***
0.059 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.052 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.064 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.062 [ 1 , 0 ]
scp alter eval
0.084 * 0.104 ** 0.102 * 0.104 *
0.040 [ 0.985 , 0.003 ] 0.039 [ 0.983 , 0.005 ] 0.042 [ 0.984 , 0.001 ] 0.041 [ 0.988 , 0.002 ]
scp ego eval
-0.055 -0.063 -0.038 -0.078
0.059 [ 0.011 , 0.335 ] 0.060 [ 0.007 , 0.432 ] 0.061 [ 0.013 , 0.188 ] 0.051 [ 0.008 , 0.617 ]
scp similarity eval
-0.003 -0.095 0.148 -0.017
0.135 [ 0.354 , 0.283 ] 0.142 [ 0.173 , 0.493 ] 0.145 [ 0.643 , 0.054 ] 0.142 [ 0.285 , 0.321 ]
rsp alter eval
0.031 0.028 0.020 0.020
0.034 [ 0.623 , 0.082 ] 0.048 [ 0.326 , 0.064 ] 0.038 [ 0.328 , 0.109 ] 0.034 [ 0.386 , 0.093 ]
rsp ego eval
0.079 0.139 *** 0.064 0.071
0.068 [ 0.297 , 0.002 ] 0.048 [ 0.928 , 0 ] 0.063 [ 0.321 , 0.003 ] 0.068 [ 0.378 , 0.003 ]
rsp similarity eval
0.185 0.116 0.139 0.143
0.143 [ 0.893 , 0.028 ] 0.129 [ 0.799 , 0.082 ] 0.139 [ 0.8 , 0.037 ] 0.129 [ 0.905 , 0.065 ]
sri alter eval
-0.047 0.007 -0.026 -0.032
0.045 [ 0.547 , 0.045 ] 0.050 [ 0.165 , 0.221 ] 0.045 [ 0.312 , 0.180 ] 0.046 [ 0.353 , 0.080 ]
sri ego eval
-0.037 -0.024 -0.050 -0.019
0.040 [ 0.742 , 0.274 ] 0.040 [ 0.357 , 0.461 ] 0.043 [ 0.720 , 0.223 ] 0.038 [ 0.330 , 0.244 ]
sri similarity eval
0.073 0.151 0.091 0.101
0.116 [ 0.196 , 0.703 ] 0.137 [ 0.058 , 0.743 ] 0.119 [ 0.131 , 0.833 ] 0.108 [ 0.177 , 0.859 ]
eri alter eval
-0.078 † -0.066 -0.085 † -0.073 †
0.037 [ 0.943 , 0 ] 0.043 [ 0.835 , 0.006 ] 0.047 [ 0.892 , 0 ] 0.042 [ 0.854 , 0.002 ]
eri ego eval
0.177 ** 0.136 * 0.167 † 0.134 *
0.063 [ 0 , 0.957 ] 0.056 [ 0 , 0.909 ] 0.075 [ 0 , 0.858 ] 0.053 [ 0 , 0.924 ]
eri similarity eval
0.172 0.288 † 0.197 0.107
0.131 [ 0.065 , 0.930 ] 0.153 [ 0.006 , 0.955 ] 0.127 [ 0.076 , 0.945 ] 0.115 [ 0.144 , 0.917 ]
con alter eval
0.002 -0.007 0.015 -0.000
0.019 [ 0.519 , 0.286 ] 0.019 [ 0.398 , 0.294 ] 0.018 [ 0.721 , 0.167 ] 0.024 [ 0.612 , 0.324 ]
con ego eval
-0.008 0.003 -0.006 0.015
0.014 [ 0.738 , 0.602 ] 0.014 [ 0.873 , 0.38 ] 0.015 [ 0.847 , 0.423 ] 0.017 [ 0.978 , 0.242 ]
con similarity eval
0.096 0.143 0.285 0.509 †
0.256 [ 0.824 , 0.191 ] 0.255 [ 0.898 , 0.12 ] 0.265 [ 0.956 , 0.117 ] 0.300 [ 0.983 , 0.04 ]
cov alter eval
-0.034 -0.017
0.033 [ 0.035 , 0.827 ] 0.023 [ 0.302 , 0.447 ]
cov ego eval
0.043 -0.073
0.032 [ 0.942 , 0.008 ] 0.045 [ 0 , 0.651 ]
cov similarity eval
0.177 † 0.256 *
0.106 [ 0.976 , 0.106 ] 0.127 [ 0.923 , 0.005 ]
opv alter eval
0.006 -0.024
0.039 [ 0.508 , 0.439 ] 0.053 [ 0.015 , 0.193 ]
opv ego eval
-0.059 -0.107 †
0.053 [ 0.006 , 0.451 ] 0.062 [ 0 , 0.866 ]
opv similarity eval
0.029 0.110
0.097 [ 0.725 , 0.562 ] 0.114 [ 0.803 , 0.109 ]
sev alter eval
-0.048 -0.037
0.034 [ 0.008 , 0.874 ] 0.033 [ 0.003 , 0.363 ]
sev ego eval
0.036 -0.007
0.025 [ 0.959 , 0.168 ] 0.040 [ 0.029 , 0.107 ]
sev similarity eval
0.154 0.148
0.134 [ 0.822 , 0.057 ] 0.107 [ 0.898 , 0.051 ]
stv alter eval
-0.012 0.045
0.043 [ 0.425 , 0.624 ] 0.035 [ 0.747 , 0.11 ]
stv ego eval
-0.054 -0.029
0.040 [ 0.021 , 0.768 ] 0.031 [ 0.149 , 0.675 ]
stv similarity eval
0.198 0.288 **
0.122 [ 0.98 , 0.024 ] 0.104 [ 0.999 , 0.005 ]
behavior change:
1st period eval
7.789 *** 7.293 *** 8.080 *** 7.355 *** 8.523 *** 8.424 *** 9.074 *** 8.104 ***
1.204 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.097 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.260 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.159 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.237 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.137 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.259 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.186 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period eval
16.184 *** 10.599 *** 8.344 *** 12.436 *** 9.482 *** 7.921 *** 16.382 *** 8.413 ***
3.384 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.751 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.299 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.812 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.666 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.083 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.839 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.338 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.051 *** -0.053 *** -0.067 *** -0.059 *** -0.066 *** -0.060 *** -0.063 *** -0.068 ***
0.016 [ 0.001 , 0.992 ] 0.018 [ 0.001 , 0.971 ] 0.016 [ 0 , 0.998 ] 0.017 [ 0 , 0.994 ] 0.015 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.015 [ 0 , 0.999 ] 0.013 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.016 [ 0 , 1 ]
avg similarity eval
0.862 * 1.218 *** 0.830 * 1.272 *** 1.130 * 1.797 *** 1.550 *** 1.143 *
0.373 [ 0.841 , 0.036 ] 0.375 [ 0.983 , 0.013 ] 0.395 [ 0.91 , 0.048 ] 0.368 [ 0.987 , 0.003 ] 0.502 [ 0.982 , 0.015 ] 0.605 [ 0.998 , 0 ] 0.521 [ 0.998 , 0 ] 0.542 [ 0.981 , 0.01 ]
effect from cov eval
0.032 † 0.013
0.018 [ 0.969 , 0.042 ] 0.015 [ 0.834 , 0.128 ]
effect from opv eval
0.047 0.006
0.031 [ 0.683 , 0.004 ] 0.033 [ 0.137 , 0.042 ]
effect from sev eval
0.016 0.018
0.018 [ 0.869 , 0.162 ] 0.013 [ 0.962 , 0.073 ]
effect from stv eval
0.022 -0.020
0.023 [ 0.769 , 0.085 ] 0.018 [ 0.209 , 0.706 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.331 *** 0.315 *** 0.321 *** 0.291 *** 0.336 *** 0.328 *** 0.313 *** 0.291 ***
0.290 [ 36 , 28 ] 0.290 [ 39 , 29 ] 0.285 [ 37 , 27 ] 0.297 [ 38 , 27 ] 0.268 [ 38 , 33 ] 0.280 [ 38 , 32 ] 0.268 [ 40 , 33 ] 0.224 [ 39 , 34 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.311 *** 0.281 *** 0.286 *** 0.294 *** 0.266 *** 0.280 *** 0.278 *** 0.265 ***
0.301 [ 36 , 25 ] 0.284 [ 39 , 27 ] 0.284 [ 37 , 26 ] 0.297 [ 38 , 25 ] 0.278 [ 38 , 26 ] 0.288 [ 38 , 26 ] 0.269 [ 40 , 29 ] 0.267 [ 39 , 27 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.39: Extrinsic vs. intrinsic motivations for donations in friendship and advice networks
friendship networks advice networks
opv cov stv sev opv cov stv sev
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
network selection:
1st period rate
7.834 *** 8.212 *** 8.311 *** 8.043 *** 6.936 *** 6.364 *** 6.180 *** 6.629 ***
0.812 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.836 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.804 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.804 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.504 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.486 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.347 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.607 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
6.821 *** 7.200 *** 7.513 *** 7.148 *** 7.549 *** 8.040 *** 7.855 *** 8.006 ***
0.438 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.429 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.484 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.505 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.746 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.842 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.787 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.849 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-2.005 *** -2.014 *** -2.104 *** -2.010 *** -1.466 *** -1.486 *** -1.365 *** -1.420 ***
0.093 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.091 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.091 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.113 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.064 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.066 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.067 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.075 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.113 *** 1.146 *** 1.011 *** 1.035 *** 1.252 *** 1.187 *** 1.163 *** 1.185 ***
0.091 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.102 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.075 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.092 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.084 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.087 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.086 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.095 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.326 *** 1.322 *** 1.313 *** 1.268 *** 1.555 *** 1.624 *** 1.620 *** 1.631 ***
0.067 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.062 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.069 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.063 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.087 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.097 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.084 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.074 [ 1 , 0 ]
cyclicality eval
-0.481 *** -0.398 *** -0.411 *** -0.426 ***
0.073 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.080 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.082 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.084 [ 0 , 1 ]
popularity eval
-0.099 *** -0.091 *** -0.092 *** -0.077 *** -0.121 *** -0.134 *** -0.150 *** -0.140 ***
0.016 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.017 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.016 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.017 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.024 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.022 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.024 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.022 [ 0 , 1 ]
same age eval
-0.005 -0.012 0.025 0.028
0.044 [ 0.416 , 0.521 ] 0.041 [ 0.479 , 0.707 ] 0.045 [ 0.731 , 0.289 ] 0.046 [ 0.654 , 0.377 ]
same gender eval
0.326 *** 0.337 *** 0.371 *** 0.404 ***
0.061 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.061 [ 0.998 , 0 ] 0.053 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.083 [ 1 , 0 ]
scp alter eval
0.078 * 0.047 0.049 0.077
0.034 [ 0.91 , 0.025 ] 0.043 [ 0.667 , 0.043 ] 0.046 [ 0.717 , 0.042 ] 0.050 [ 0.693 , 0.014 ]
scp ego eval
-0.116 * -0.096 * -0.121 *** -0.137 ***
0.045 [ 0 , 0.914 ] 0.044 [ 0.003 , 0.993 ] 0.041 [ 0.001 , 0.996 ] 0.044 [ 0 , 0.999 ]
scp similarity eval
-0.080 0.050 -0.030 -0.051
0.125 [ 0.213 , 0.38 ] 0.119 [ 0.829 , 0.188 ] 0.119 [ 0.653 , 0.336 ] 0.121 [ 0.654 , 0.5 ]
rsp alter eval
0.025 0.037 0.044 0.093 *
0.040 [ 0.584 , 0.037 ] 0.049 [ 0.442 , 0.031 ] 0.044 [ 0.429 , 0.04 ] 0.039 [ 0.941 , 0.012 ]
rsp ego eval
0.058 0.077 0.051 0.036
0.042 [ 0.743 , 0.022 ] 0.054 [ 0.741 , 0.009 ] 0.056 [ 0.656 , 0.02 ] 0.073 [ 0.31 , 0.009 ]
rsp similarity eval
0.307 * 0.254 † 0.147 0.377 *
0.138 [ 0.952 , 0.005 ] 0.151 [ 0.888 , 0.01 ] 0.151 [ 0.712 , 0.056 ] 0.173 [ 0.945 , 0.001 ]
sri alter eval
-0.004 -0.012 -0.018 -0.023
0.050 [ 0.201 , 0.119 ] 0.050 [ 0.174 , 0.071 ] 0.036 [ 0.322 , 0.111 ] 0.047 [ 0.255 , 0.065 ]
sri ego eval
0.011 0.001 -0.020 0.002
0.046 [ 0.171 , 0.652 ] 0.038 [ 0.416 , 0.620 ] 0.041 [ 0.350 , 0.242 ] 0.043 [ 0.233 , 0.443 ]
sri similarity eval
0.112 0.098 0.078 0.105
0.115 [ 0.260 , 0.897 ] 0.109 [ 0.273 , 0.943 ] 0.097 [ 0.173 , 0.809 ] 0.110 [ 0.302 , 0.916 ]
eri alter eval
-0.070 † -0.080 * -0.093 ** -0.084 *
0.035 [ 0.921 , 0.019 ] 0.033 [ 0.981 , 0.008 ] 0.032 [ 0.980 , 0 ] 0.034 [ 0.952 , 0.005 ]
eri ego eval
0.114 ** 0.135 ** 0.103 * 0.139 *
0.040 [ 0.007 , 0.955 ] 0.052 [ 0 , 0.883 ] 0.044 [ 0 , 0.853 ] 0.062 [ 0 , 0.759 ]
eri similarity eval
0.293 † 0.176 0.130 0.214 †
0.136 [ 0.006 , 0.940 ] 0.125 [ 0.039 , 0.806 ] 0.103 [ 0.055 , 0.828 ] 0.123 [ 0.019 , 0.895 ]
giv alter eval
0.013 0.020 -0.003 0.037
0.032 [ 0.666 , 0.378 ] 0.032 [ 0.678 , 0.371 ] 0.039 [ 0.506 , 0.424 ] 0.034 [ 0.828 , 0.274 ]
giv ego eval
0.039 0.045 0.050 0.061
0.038 [ 0.896 , 0.043 ] 0.047 [ 0.811 , 0.021 ] 0.035 [ 0.946 , 0.036 ] 0.041 [ 0.961 , 0.028 ]
giv similarity eval
0.498 † 0.523 † 0.426 0.599 †
0.302 [ 0.941 , 0.067 ] 0.307 [ 0.95 , 0.072 ] 0.281 [ 0.91 , 0.154 ] 0.311 [ 0.902 , 0.087 ]
opv alter eval
0.004 -0.060
0.041 [ 0.257 , 0.122 ] 0.036 [ 0.007 , 0.842 ]
opv ego eval
-0.030 -0.039
0.050 [ 0.01 , 0.189 ] 0.035 [ 0.028 , 0.701 ]
opv similarity eval
-0.008 0.186 †
0.107 [ 0.264 , 0.288 ] 0.110 [ 0.923 , 0.03 ]
cov alter eval
-0.022 -0.023
0.028 [ 0.116 , 0.712 ] 0.023 [ 0.159 , 0.819 ]
cov ego eval
0.045 -0.080 †
0.031 [ 0.855 , 0.014 ] 0.046 [ 0 , 0.609 ]
cov similarity eval
0.065 0.169
0.103 [ 0.493 , 0.515 ] 0.136 [ 0.647 , 0.016 ]
stv alter eval
-0.031 0.052
0.037 [ 0.054 , 0.709 ] 0.037 [ 0.913 , 0.026 ]
stv ego eval
-0.058 -0.088 **
0.044 [ 0.001 , 0.657 ] 0.032 [ 0.002 , 0.999 ]
stv similarity eval
0.272 * 0.110
0.128 [ 0.945 , 0.001 ] 0.128 [ 0.594 , 0.057 ]
sev alter eval
-0.041 -0.036
0.033 [ 0.011 , 0.701 ] 0.027 [ 0.081 , 0.8 ]
sev ego eval
0.043 † -0.018
0.026 [ 0.92 , 0.064 ] 0.034 [ 0.048 , 0.46 ]
sev similarity eval
0.340 ** 0.246 *
0.122 [ 0.99 , 0.001 ] 0.105 [ 0.992 , 0.057 ]
behavior change:
1st period eval
1.698 *** 1.818 *** 5.851 *** 1.890 *** 5.995 ** 1.905 *** 1.950 *** 2.064 ***
0.208 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.217 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.064 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.239 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.208 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.254 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.242 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.267 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period eval
5.291 *** 2.594 *** 2.346 *** 2.444 *** 2.526 *** 2.623 *** 6.661 *** 2.676 ***
1.670 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.496 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.488 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.475 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.422 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.532 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.263 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.494 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.354 *** -0.334 *** -0.344 *** -0.347 *** -0.303 *** -0.253 *** -0.269 *** -0.256 ***
0.047 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.045 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.044 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.045 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.050 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.045 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.044 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.042 [ 0 , 1 ]
avg similarity eval
-0.281 -0.901 -0.192 -0.209 -0.297 -0.139 0.520 -0.087
0.717 [ 0.483 , 0.799 ] 0.652 [ 0.152 , 0.979 ] 0.649 [ 0.583 , 0.831 ] 0.654 [ 0.605 , 0.894 ] 0.939 [ 0.489 , 0.866 ] 0.897 [ 0.451 , 0.883 ] 0.847 [ 0.902 , 0.53 ] 0.964 [ 0.639 , 0.705 ]
effect from opv eval
0.054 0.077 †
0.043 [ 0.925 , 0.123 ] 0.040 [ 0.941 , 0.069 ]
effect from cov eval
-0.004 0.016
0.034 [ 0.586 , 0.603 ] 0.036 [ 0.798 , 0.538 ]
effect from stv eval
0.065 0.053
0.043 [ 0.99 , 0.037 ] 0.041 [ 0.99 , 0.129 ]
effect from sev eval
-0.014 -0.016
0.035 [ 0.632 , 0.623 ] 0.032 [ 0.407 , 0.728 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.331 *** 0.315 *** 0.321 *** 0.291 *** 0.336 *** 0.328 *** 0.313 *** 0.291 ***
0.290 [ 36 , 28 ] 0.290 [ 39 , 29 ] 0.285 [ 37 , 27 ] 0.297 [ 38 , 27 ] 0.268 [ 38 , 33 ] 0.280 [ 38 , 32 ] 0.268 [ 40 , 33 ] 0.224 [ 39 , 34 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.311 *** 0.281 *** 0.286 *** 0.294 *** 0.266 *** 0.280 *** 0.278 *** 0.265 ***
0.301 [ 36 , 25 ] 0.284 [ 39 , 27 ] 0.284 [ 37 , 26 ] 0.297 [ 38 , 25 ] 0.278 [ 38 , 26 ] 0.288 [ 38 , 26 ] 0.269 [ 40 , 29 ] 0.267 [ 39 , 27 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.40: Social norms for saving in friendship and advice networks
friendship networks advice networks
stv sev cov opv stv sev cov opv
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
network selection:
1st period rate
7.531 *** 7.218 *** 7.335 *** 7.369 *** 6.682 *** 6.632 *** 5.947 *** 6.462 ***
0.721 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.684 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.767 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.731 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.602 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.547 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.508 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.502 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.061 *** 7.153 *** 7.010 *** 7.154 *** 7.600 *** 8.013 *** 7.687 *** 7.660 ***
0.440 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.434 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.469 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.442 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.798 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.783 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.806 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.716 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-2.197 *** -2.229 *** -2.204 *** -2.232 *** -1.594 *** -1.517 *** -1.576 *** -1.583 ***
0.113 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.128 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.120 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.129 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.076 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.067 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.077 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.082 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.147 *** 1.194 *** 1.148 *** 1.171 *** 1.287 *** 1.249 *** 1.259 *** 1.268 ***
0.127 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.145 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.125 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.139 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.098 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.087 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.097 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.086 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.361 *** 1.338 *** 1.290 *** 1.349 *** 1.649 *** 1.588 *** 1.653 *** 1.592 ***
0.068 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.077 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.075 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.077 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.107 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.092 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.096 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.090 [ 1 , 0 ]
cyclicality eval
-0.410 *** -0.443 *** -0.405 *** -0.397 ***
0.101 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.073 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.095 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.067 [ 0 , 1 ]
popularity eval
-0.094 *** -0.084 *** -0.080 *** -0.077 *** -0.131 *** -0.136 *** -0.132 *** -0.133 ***
0.020 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.020 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.021 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.024 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.020 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.023 [ 0 , 1 ]
same age eval
-0.015 -0.061 -0.061 -0.053
0.061 [ 0.138 , 0.542 ] 0.067 [ 0.064 , 0.767 ] 0.054 [ 0.119 , 0.87 ] 0.072 [ 0.044 , 0.684 ]
same gender eval
0.397 *** 0.439 *** 0.424 *** 0.408 ***
0.065 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.067 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.076 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.071 [ 1 , 0 ]
scp alter eval
0.046 0.067 0.049 0.051
0.052 [ 0.705 , 0.114 ] 0.045 [ 0.632 , 0.021 ] 0.049 [ 0.569 , 0.065 ] 0.037 [ 0.545 , 0.072 ]
scp ego eval
-0.109 † -0.039 -0.058 -0.030
0.064 [ 0.005 , 0.887 ] 0.062 [ 0.009 , 0.483 ] 0.071 [ 0.012 , 0.585 ] 0.058 [ 0.045 , 0.296 ]
scp similarity eval
0.075 0.163 0.139 0.069
0.181 [ 0.594 , 0.137 ] 0.129 [ 0.872 , 0.061 ] 0.163 [ 0.836 , 0.051 ] 0.145 [ 0.501 , 0.226 ]
rsp alter eval
0.047 0.057 0.051 0.041
0.040 [ 0.889 , 0.015 ] 0.046 [ 0.813 , 0.009 ] 0.040 [ 0.857 , 0.017 ] 0.042 [ 0.817 , 0.042 ]
rsp ego eval
-0.022 0.016 0.049 0.013
0.073 [ 0.163 , 0.308 ] 0.063 [ 0.307 , 0.066 ] 0.067 [ 0.589 , 0.103 ] 0.056 [ 0.511 , 0.149 ]
rsp similarity eval
0.185 0.183 0.138 0.115
0.152 [ 0.924 , 0.067 ] 0.149 [ 0.838 , 0.027 ] 0.141 [ 0.873 , 0.122 ] 0.136 [ 0.854 , 0.204 ]
sri alter eval
0.017 0.016 0.012 0.005
0.046 [ 0.275 , 0.097 ] 0.054 [ 0.253 , 0.056 ] 0.049 [ 0.158 , 0.049 ] 0.052 [ 0.156 , 0.092 ]
sri ego eval
-0.064 -0.077 † -0.016 -0.065 †
0.045 [ 0.031 , 0.574 ] 0.041 [ 0.06 , 0.805 ] 0.044 [ 0.284 , 0.349 ] 0.038 [ 0.147 , 0.788 ]
sri similarity eval
0.271 * 0.388 *** 0.402 *** 0.360 **
0.120 [ 0.999 , 0.009 ] 0.133 [ 1 , 0.006 ] 0.135 [ 1 , 0.001 ] 0.134 [ 0.999 , 0.003 ]
eri alter eval
-0.099 *** -0.090 * -0.105 *** -0.076 *
0.035 [ 0.015 , 0.985 ] 0.037 [ 0.009 , 0.94 ] 0.034 [ 0.005 , 0.994 ] 0.038 [ 0.019 , 0.903 ]
eri ego eval
0.090 0.138 * 0.065 0.096 †
0.063 [ 0.593 , 0 ] 0.066 [ 0.951 , 0 ] 0.060 [ 0.438 , 0.001 ] 0.053 [ 0.948 , 0.004 ]
eri similarity eval
0.140 0.197 0.155 0.084
0.140 [ 0.786 , 0.045 ] 0.158 [ 0.794 , 0.023 ] 0.126 [ 0.869 , 0.027 ] 0.136 [ 0.642 , 0.145 ]
sav alter eval
0.020 0.017 0.022 0.008
0.019 [ 0.744 , 0.072 ] 0.017 [ 0.727 , 0.202 ] 0.017 [ 0.825 , 0.113 ] 0.017 [ 0.68 , 0.353 ]
sav ego eval
-0.006 -0.004 0.003 -0.008
0.014 [ 0.193 , 0.847 ] 0.014 [ 0.163 , 0.828 ] 0.017 [ 0.194 , 0.454 ] 0.015 [ 0.169 , 0.92 ]
sav similarity eval
0.404 † 0.337 0.391 0.366
0.234 [ 0.975 , 0.08 ] 0.243 [ 0.955 , 0.151 ] 0.269 [ 0.962 , 0.091 ] 0.263 [ 0.966 , 0.103 ]
stv alter eval
0.020 0.027
0.036 [ 0.608 , 0.312 ] 0.044 [ 0.584 , 0.097 ]
stv ego eval
-0.071 -0.046
0.049 [ 0.001 , 0.738 ] 0.037 [ 0.021 , 0.629 ]
stv similarity eval
0.370 * 0.452 ***
0.152 [ 0.985 , 0 ] 0.125 [ 0.999 , 0 ]
sev alter eval
-0.054 -0.048
0.042 [ 0.006 , 0.789 ] 0.035 [ 0.005 , 0.627 ]
sev ego eval
-0.016 -0.007
0.039 [ 0.051 , 0.309 ] 0.039 [ 0.051 , 0.123 ]
sev similarity eval
0.185 0.124
0.154 [ 0.711 , 0.03 ] 0.129 [ 0.746 , 0.079 ]
cov alter eval
-0.030 0.009
0.035 [ 0.038 , 0.749 ] 0.028 [ 0.473 , 0.421 ]
cov ego eval
-0.045 -0.095 ***
0.050 [ 0.005 , 0.311 ] 0.032 [ 0.001 , 0.992 ]
cov similarity eval
0.055 0.206 †
0.162 [ 0.319 , 0.135 ] 0.122 [ 0.986 , 0.022 ]
opv alter eval
-0.007 -0.053
0.041 [ 0.207 , 0.524 ] 0.053 [ 0.001 , 0.243 ]
opv ego eval
-0.100 * 0.047
0.041 [ 0.009 , 0.859 ] 0.034 [ 0.36 , 0.206 ]
opv similarity eval
0.039 0.282 **
0.105 [ 0.705 , 0.393 ] 0.104 [ 0.971 , 0.007 ]
sat alter eval
-0.027 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 0.050 * 0.051 *** 0.025 0.045 *
0.020 [ 0.037 , 0.278 ] 0.024 [ 0.081 , 0.236 ] 0.019 [ 0.125 , 0.354 ] 0.023 [ 0.101 , 0.294 ] 0.021 [ 0.815 , 0.009 ] 0.016 [ 0.934 , 0.003 ] 0.023 [ 0.566 , 0.063 ] 0.018 [ 0.831 , 0.003 ]
sat ego eval
0.000 -0.015 -0.020 0.014 -0.001 -0.020 -0.034 0.000
0.040 [ 0.28 , 0.486 ] 0.047 [ 0.132 , 0.578 ] 0.041 [ 0.179 , 0.692 ] 0.040 [ 0.573 , 0.418 ] 0.037 [ 0.151 , 0.152 ] 0.029 [ 0.04 , 0.289 ] 0.029 [ 0.045 , 0.797 ] 0.025 [ 0.138 , 0.498 ]
sat similarity eval
0.229 0.290 * 0.256 † 0.198 0.043 -0.048 0.164 -0.049
0.154 [ 0.842 , 0.026 ] 0.146 [ 0.919 , 0.037 ] 0.140 [ 0.898 , 0.044 ] 0.145 [ 0.893 , 0.093 ] 0.169 [ 0.466 , 0.158 ] 0.121 [ 0.483 , 0.279 ] 0.157 [ 0.851 , 0.05 ] 0.126 [ 0.569 , 0.203 ]
I(same gender*ego sat) eval
0.049 0.073 0.071 † 0.041
0.044 [ 0.631 , 0.023 ] 0.047 [ 0.741 , 0.007 ] 0.043 [ 0.805 , 0.01 ] 0.045 [ 0.587 , 0.074 ]
I(same age*ego sat) eval
0.013 0.043 0.043 0.026
0.031 [ 0.764 , 0.377 ] 0.037 [ 0.856 , 0.066 ] 0.033 [ 0.891 , 0.121 ] 0.033 [ 0.789 , 0.321 ]
I(sav sim*ego sat) eval
-0.107 -0.018 -0.096 -0.082
0.157 [ 0.306 , 0.688 ] 0.146 [ 0.517 , 0.549 ] 0.158 [ 0.261 , 0.753 ] 0.150 [ 0.309 , 0.694 ]
I(stv sim*ego sat) eval
-0.017 -0.063
0.080 [ 0.2 , 0.591 ] 0.092 [ 0.171 , 0.392 ]
I(sev sim*ego sat) eval
-0.027 0.040
0.074 [ 0.273 , 0.654 ] 0.061 [ 0.707 , 0.187 ]
I(cov sim*ego sat) eval
-0.068 0.195 *
0.085 [ 0.087 , 0.508 ] 0.078 [ 0.882 , 0.005 ]
I(opv sim*ego sat) eval
-0.050 -0.005
0.069 [ 0.629 , 0.334 ] 0.066 [ 0.35 , 0.491 ]
I(scp sim*ego sat) eval
0.100 0.082 0.181 * 0.106
0.084 [ 0.907 , 0.211 ] 0.072 [ 0.866 , 0.243 ] 0.078 [ 0.973 , 0.027 ] 0.074 [ 0.966 , 0.167 ]
I(rsp sim*ego sat) eval
-0.039 0.026 -0.006 0.051
0.079 [ 0.43 , 0.85 ] 0.066 [ 0.501 , 0.691 ] 0.077 [ 0.628 , 0.751 ] 0.066 [ 0.693 , 0.623 ]
I(sri sim*ego sat) eval
0.042 0.047 0.041 0.022
0.072 [ 0.582 , 0.217 ] 0.087 [ 0.562 , 0.261 ] 0.066 [ 0.7 , 0.194 ] 0.085 [ 0.429 , 0.329 ]
I(eri sim*ego sat) eval
0.081 0.071 0.060 0.069
0.072 [ 0.824 , 0.173 ] 0.073 [ 0.817 , 0.347 ] 0.066 [ 0.824 , 0.304 ] 0.077 [ 0.833 , 0.154 ]
behavior change:
1st period rate
8.401 *** 8.384 *** 8.737 *** 8.378 *** 9.040 *** 8.073 *** 7.351 *** 7.623 ***
0.890 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.890 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.954 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.916 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.256 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.999 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.017 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.956 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
9.086 *** 9.963 *** 10.133 *** 11.217 *** 19.190 *** 18.718 *** 19.200 *** 10.501 ***
1.809 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.122 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.193 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.790 [ 1 , 0 ] 5.138 [ 1 , 0 ] 4.454 [ 1 , 0 ] 5.043 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.667 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.063 *** -0.067 *** -0.068 *** -0.067 *** -0.075 *** -0.064 *** -0.076 *** -0.074 ***
0.015 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.017 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.017 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.016 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.014 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.013 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.014 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.014 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
1.150 *** 0.896 * 0.946 * 0.976 ** 1.080 * 1.390 *** 1.227 ** 1.414 ***
0.385 [ 0.993 , 0.001 ] 0.374 [ 0.989 , 0.01 ] 0.371 [ 0.986 , 0.009 ] 0.372 [ 0.988 , 0.002 ] 0.492 [ 0.988 , 0.032 ] 0.423 [ 0.999 , 0.002 ] 0.473 [ 0.999 , 0.016 ] 0.439 [ 0.998 , 0.003 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.331 *** 0.363 *** 0.362 *** 0.324 *** 0.350 *** 0.336 *** 0.331 *** 0.322 ***
0.313 [ 34 , 29 ] 0.314 [ 32 , 28 ] 0.311 [ 32 , 26 ] 0.302 [ 33 , 28 ] 0.245 [ 37 , 33 ] 0.277 [ 40 , 36 ] 0.263 [ 39 , 34 ] 0.249 [ 40 , 37 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.298 *** 0.312 *** 0.300 *** 0.309 *** 0.263 *** 0.267 *** 0.258 *** 0.282 ***
0.301 [ 34 , 24 ] 0.305 [ 32 , 24 ] 0.302 [ 32 , 24 ] 0.298 [ 33 , 25 ] 0.271 [37 , 27 ] 0.298 [40 , 28 ] 0.270 [ 39 , 26 ] 0.284 [ 40 , 29 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.41: Social norms for spending in friendship and advice networks
friendship networks advice networks
cov opv sev stv cov opv sev stv
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
network selection:
1st period rate
7.794 *** 7.799 *** 7.953 *** 7.935 *** 5.878 *** 6.453 *** 5.704 *** 6.144 ***
0.757 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.715 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.836 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.822 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.418 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.505 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.373 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.460 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.346 *** 7.199 *** 7.307 *** 7.013 *** 8.061 *** 8.237 *** 7.849 *** 7.883 ***
0.704 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.695 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.775 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.674 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.933 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.852 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.873 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.791 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.919 *** -1.947 *** -1.972 *** -1.935 *** -1.617 *** -1.604 *** -1.553 *** -1.596 ***
0.178 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.177 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.187 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.186 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.094 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.092 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.094 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.085 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.217 *** 1.183 *** 1.242 *** 1.270 *** 1.235 *** 1.243 *** 1.235 *** 1.223 ***
0.123 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.107 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.130 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.133 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.101 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.096 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.094 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.093 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.388 *** 1.397 *** 1.422 *** 1.422 *** 1.618 *** 1.648 *** 1.689 *** 1.664 ***
0.078 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.073 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.080 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.080 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.091 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.085 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.088 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.087 [ 1 , 0 ]
cyclicality eval
-0.398 *** -0.429 *** -0.430 *** -0.453 ***
0.099 [ 0 , 0.996 ] 0.070 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.070 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.068 [ 0 , 1 ]
popularity eval
-0.137 *** -0.122 *** -0.141 *** -0.148 *** -0.116 *** -0.126 *** -0.141 *** -0.127 ***
0.026 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.028 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.028 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.025 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.023 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.025 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.024 [ 0 , 1 ]
same age eval
-0.015 0.020 0.033 0.009
0.054 [ 0.107 , 0.504 ] 0.065 [ 0.178 , 0.17 ] 0.074 [ 0.186 , 0.125 ] 0.054 [ 0.133 , 0.328 ]
same gender eval
0.328 *** 0.387 *** 0.337 *** 0.381 ***
0.062 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.060 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.059 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.065 [ 1 , 0 ]
scp alter eval
0.058 0.049 0.097 † 0.058
0.054 [ 0.802 , 0.026 ] 0.041 [ 0.739 , 0.032 ] 0.057 [ 0.909 , 0.004 ] 0.051 [ 0.805 , 0.015 ]
scp ego eval
-0.059 -0.035 -0.093 -0.123 *
0.084 [ 0.003 , 0.178 ] 0.063 [ 0.035 , 0.286 ] 0.073 [ 0.001 , 0.61 ] 0.048 [ 0.001 , 0.966 ]
scp similarity eval
0.173 0.023 0.065 -0.028
0.201 [ 0.745 , 0.059 ] 0.165 [ 0.377 , 0.112 ] 0.146 [ 0.648 , 0.095 ] 0.152 [ 0.465 , 0.195 ]
rsp alter eval
-0.018 -0.003 0.042 0.018
0.052 [ 0.078 , 0.145 ] 0.041 [ 0.452 , 0.096 ] 0.067 [ 0.195 , 0.017 ] 0.057 [ 0.171 , 0.017 ]
rsp ego eval
0.109 * 0.073 0.160 ** 0.077
0.051 [ 0.961 , 0.032 ] 0.060 [ 0.77 , 0.025 ] 0.059 [ 0.967 , 0 ] 0.074 [ 0.55 , 0.005 ]
rsp similarity eval
0.167 0.098 0.104 0.093
0.146 [ 0.852 , 0.072 ] 0.132 [ 0.691 , 0.115 ] 0.183 [ 0.466 , 0.069 ] 0.138 [ 0.73 , 0.194 ]
sri alter eval
-0.023 0.002 -0.024 -0.025
0.061 [ 0.07 , 0.24 ] 0.060 [ 0.081 , 0.081 ] 0.056 [ 0.165 , 0.236 ] 0.057 [ 0.036 , 0.208 ]
sri ego eval
-0.035 -0.034 -0.042 -0.043
0.047 [ 0.486 , 0.54 ] 0.042 [ 0.592 , 0.212 ] 0.047 [ 0.309 , 0.393 ] 0.042 [ 0.34 , 0.353 ]
sri similarity eval
0.083 0.137 0.172 0.141
0.130 [ 0.905 , 0.1 ] 0.124 [ 0.967 , 0.095 ] 0.135 [ 0.921 , 0.06 ] 0.123 [ 0.949 , 0.08 ]
eri alter eval
-0.051 -0.041 -0.079 -0.063
0.048 [ 0.041 , 0.815 ] 0.047 [ 0.035 , 0.717 ] 0.053 [ 0.005 , 0.859 ] 0.046 [ 0.007 , 0.801 ]
eri ego eval
0.137 * 0.111 † 0.173 † 0.134 *
0.066 [ 0.916 , 0.001 ] 0.059 [ 0.856 , 0.001 ] 0.091 [ 0.611 , 0 ] 0.062 [ 0.887 , 0 ]
eri similarity eval
0.039 0.145 0.215 0.207
0.139 [ 0.839 , 0.13 ] 0.151 [ 0.824 , 0.03 ] 0.167 [ 0.909 , 0.031 ] 0.154 [ 0.922 , 0.023 ]
con alter eval
0.010 -0.001 0.018 0.020
0.024 [ 0.525 , 0.266 ] 0.026 [ 0.276 , 0.248 ] 0.022 [ 0.717 , 0.207 ] 0.024 [ 0.741 , 0.105 ]
con ego eval
-0.018 -0.009 -0.022 -0.013
0.016 [ 0.599 , 0.531 ] 0.015 [ 0.734 , 0.418 ] 0.017 [ 0.599 , 0.733 ] 0.017 [ 0.618 , 0.533 ]
con similarity eval
0.268 0.179 0.313 0.417
0.306 [ 0.905 , 0.179 ] 0.284 [ 0.912 , 0.189 ] 0.314 [ 0.933 , 0.12 ] 0.302 [ 0.973 , 0.093 ]
cov alter eval
-0.011 0.005
0.040 [ 0.151 , 0.564 ] 0.030 [ 0.489 , 0.273 ]
cov ego eval
0.009 -0.112 ***
0.032 [ 0.724 , 0.305 ] 0.031 [ 0 , 1 ]
cov similarity eval
0.070 0.222
0.122 [ 0.797 , 0.277 ] 0.156 [ 0.801 , 0.023 ]
opv alter eval
0.016 -0.033
0.039 [ 0.516 , 0.373 ] 0.055 [ 0.009 , 0.124 ]
opv ego eval
-0.035 -0.025
0.055 [ 0.04 , 0.335 ] 0.052 [ 0.017 , 0.476 ]
opv similarity eval
0.037 0.164
0.103 [ 0.794 , 0.53 ] 0.128 [ 0.811 , 0.025 ]
sev alter eval
-0.074 * -0.030
0.033 [ 0.007 , 0.972 ] 0.038 [ 0.012 , 0.374 ]
sev ego eval
0.016 -0.034
0.029 [ 0.715 , 0.44 ] 0.045 [ 0.006 , 0.329 ]
sev similarity eval
0.122 0.137
0.182 [ 0.598 , 0.076 ] 0.134 [ 0.724 , 0.057 ]
stv alter eval
0.014 0.059
0.046 [ 0.487 , 0.289 ] 0.039 [ 0.923 , 0.042 ]
stv ego eval
-0.102 * -0.022
0.045 [ 0.001 , 0.911 ] 0.041 [ 0.093 , 0.507 ]
stv similarity eval
0.102 0.413 ***
0.132 [ 0.826 , 0.114 ] 0.131 [ 0.999 , 0 ]
sat alter eval
-0.002 -0.007 0.016 -0.020 0.008 0.017 0.017 0.006
0.021 [ 0.428 , 0.391 ] 0.018 [ 0.393 , 0.355 ] 0.020 [ 0.805 , 0.186 ] 0.026 [ 0.079 , 0.492 ] 0.028 [ 0.231 , 0.041 ] 0.023 [ 0.359 , 0.026 ] 0.023 [ 0.351 , 0.055 ] 0.024 [ 0.178 , 0.048 ]
sat ego eval
-0.040 -0.045 -0.041 -0.013 -0.019 -0.012 -0.022 0.010
0.053 [ 0.239 , 0.617 ] 0.055 [ 0.062 , 0.41 ] 0.060 [ 0.142 , 0.446 ] 0.054 [ 0.335 , 0.332 ] 0.032 [ 0.031 , 0.347 ] 0.031 [ 0.038 , 0.198 ] 0.032 [ 0.024 , 0.255 ] 0.032 [ 0.107 , 0.016 ]
sat similarity eval
0.328 * 0.398 *** 0.350 * 0.432 *** 0.102 0.077 0.220 0.136
0.133 [ 0.999 , 0.044 ] 0.132 [ 0.999 , 0.008 ] 0.147 [ 0.991 , 0.057 ] 0.140 [ 0.999 , 0.012 ] 0.187 [ 0.467 , 0.083 ] 0.168 [ 0.381 , 0.099 ] 0.175 [ 0.806 , 0.019 ] 0.173 [ 0.481 , 0.044 ]
I(same gender*ego sat) eval
0.067 0.034 0.078 0.036
0.056 [ 0.571 , 0.003 ] 0.050 [ 0.222 , 0.017 ] 0.058 [ 0.537 , 0.004 ] 0.059 [ 0.21 , 0.021 ]
I(same age*ego sat) eval
0.061 . 0.082 . 0.064 0.044
0.036 [ 0.859 , 0.074 ] 0.043 [ 0.929 , 0.007 ] 0.046 [ 0.807 , 0.04 ] 0.036 [ 0.768 , 0.071 ]
I(con sim*ego sat) eval
-0.072 0.037 -0.065 -0.066
0.175 [ 0.447 , 0.946 ] 0.165 [ 0.551 , 0.659 ] 0.179 [ 0.46 , 0.935 ] 0.175 [ 0.42 , 0.902 ]
I(cov sim*ego sat) eval
0.044 0.076
0.080 [ 0.454 , 0.283 ] 0.074 [ 0.769 , 0.255 ]
I(opv sim*ego sat) eval
-0.044 0.009
0.065 [ 0.443 , 0.491 ] 0.061 [ 0.385 , 0.624 ]
I(sev sim*ego sat) eval
-0.003 0.031
0.128 [ 0.123 , 0.16 ] 0.067 [ 0.439 , 0.436 ]
I(stv sim*ego sat) eval
0.004 -0.095 †
0.075 [ 0.679 , 0.532 ] 0.058 [ 0.063 , 0.9 ]
I(scp sim*ego sat) eval
0.134 0.149 0.116 0.120
0.094 [ 0.861 , 0.018 ] 0.095 [ 0.904 , 0.008 ] 0.095 [ 0.802 , 0.026 ] 0.087 [ 0.859 , 0.03 ]
I(rsp sim*ego sat) eval
0.058 0.081 0.069 0.061
0.070 [ 0.899 , 0.501 ] 0.066 [ 0.944 , 0.418 ] 0.068 [ 0.816 , 0.533 ] 0.066 [ 0.786 , 0.375 ]
I(sri sim*ego sat) eval
0.079 0.067 0.032 0.075
0.073 [ 0.84 , 0.103 ] 0.067 [ 0.71 , 0.117 ] 0.070 [ 0.681 , 0.224 ] 0.073 [ 0.696 , 0.103 ]
I(eri sim*ego sat) eval
0.033 0.069 0.085 0.059
0.073 [ 0.727 , 0.327 ] 0.083 [ 0.703 , 0.135 ] 0.078 [ 0.807 , 0.293 ] 0.084 [ 0.667 , 0.187 ]
behavior change:
1st period rate
8.326 *** 8.225 *** 7.835 *** 7.883 *** 9.001 *** 8.886 *** 9.067 *** 8.426 ***
1.249 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.167 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.240 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.224 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.392 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.312 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.256 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.221 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
8.546 *** 8.180 *** 8.059 *** 16.466 *** 8.897 *** 16.968 *** 15.818 *** 15.657 ***
1.335 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.119 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.251 [ 1 , 0 ] 4.247 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.640 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.951 [ 1 , 0 ] 3.014 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.881 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.064 *** -0.054 *** -0.066 *** -0.069 *** -0.057 *** -0.064 *** -0.071 *** -0.071 ***
0.016 [ 0 , 0.996 ] 0.017 [ 0 , 0.973 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 0.994 ] 0.016 [ 0 , 0.997 ] 0.015 [ 0.001 , 1 ] 0.014 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.014 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.014 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
0.755 * 0.802 * 0.507 0.659 † 1.777 *** 1.699 *** 1.270 * 1.397 *
0.367 [ 0.817 , 0.076 ] 0.354 [ 0.857 , 0.048 ] 0.444 [ 0.652 , 0.18 ] 0.386 [ 0.767 , 0.133 ] 0.623 [ 0.993 , 0 ] 0.550 [ 0.995 , 0 ] 0.564 [ 0.981 , 0.001 ] 0.580 [ 0.982 , 0 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.293 *** 0.316 *** 0.266 *** 0.308 *** 0.339 *** 0.299 *** 0.323 *** 0.319 ***
0.300 [ 30 , 22 ] 0.309 [ 30 , 22 ] 0.302 [ 26 , 18 ] 0.280 [ 29 , 21 ] 0.258 [ 31 , 29 ] 0.233 [ 32 , 30 ] 0.275 [ 34 , 32 ] 0.239 [ 32 , 31 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.359 *** 0.371 *** 0.331 *** 0.389 *** 0.377 *** 0.369 *** 0.368 *** 0.358 ***
0.292 [ 30 , 24 ] 0.289 [ 30 , 24 ] 0.290 [ 26 , 23 ] 0.278 [ 29 , 23 ] 0.352 [ 31 , 21 ] 0.332 [ 32 , 23 ] 0.333 [ 34 , 25 ] 0.330 [ 32 , 23 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.42: Social norms for donations in friendship and advice networks
friendship networks advice networks
opv cov stv sev opv cov stv sev
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
network selection:
1st period rate
7.020 *** 7.156 *** 7.109 *** 7.377 *** 7.128 *** 6.706 *** 6.778 *** 6.565 ***
0.792 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.797 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.776 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.752 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.581 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.582 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.557 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.498 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.051 *** 6.979 *** 6.889 *** 7.697 *** 8.567 *** 8.742 *** 7.687 *** 8.569 ***
0.538 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.522 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.469 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.534 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.833 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.962 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.684 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.813 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-2.169 *** -2.128 *** -2.150 *** -2.130 *** -1.425 *** -1.522 *** -1.489 *** -1.417 ***
0.119 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.120 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.116 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.112 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.066 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.072 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.070 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.066 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.125 *** 1.131 *** 1.242 *** 1.185 *** 1.145 *** 1.090 *** 1.133 *** 1.117 ***
0.103 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.100 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.109 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.112 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.082 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.086 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.089 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.081 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.316 *** 1.280 *** 1.330 *** 1.345 *** 1.555 *** 1.575 *** 1.559 *** 1.531 ***
0.071 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.075 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.072 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.069 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.089 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.091 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.096 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.092 [ 1 , 0 ]
cyclicality eval
-0.370 *** -0.384 *** -0.381 *** -0.388 ***
0.070 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.081 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.084 [ 0 , 0.999 ] 0.069 [ 0 , 1 ]
popularity eval
-0.096 *** -0.092 *** -0.109 *** -0.097 *** -0.141 *** -0.130 *** -0.140 *** -0.136 ***
0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.021 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.021 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.020 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.022 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.023 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ]
same age eval
0.043 0.030 0.046 0.061
0.059 [ 0.435 , 0.252 ] 0.053 [ 0.775 , 0.576 ] 0.051 [ 0.654 , 0.276 ] 0.052 [ 0.863 , 0.258 ]
same gender eval
0.496 *** 0.470 *** 0.433 *** 0.437 ***
0.060 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.067 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.055 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.060 [ 1 , 0 ]
scp alter eval
0.043 0.021 0.039 0.040
0.043 [ 0.452 , 0.12 ] 0.051 [ 0.309 , 0.072 ] 0.055 [ 0.487 , 0.052 ] 0.052 [ 0.365 , 0.045 ]
scp ego eval
-0.107 ** -0.094 * -0.150 *** -0.097 †
0.041 [ 0.001 , 0.999 ] 0.047 [ 0.003 , 0.988 ] 0.045 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.050 [ 0 , 0.976 ]
scp similarity eval
-0.104 -0.045 -0.076 0.015
0.122 [ 0.255 , 0.766 ] 0.125 [ 0.608 , 0.577 ] 0.131 [ 0.37 , 0.406 ] 0.120 [ 0.676 , 0.235 ]
rsp alter eval
0.034 0.027 0.031 0.033
0.047 [ 0.402 , 0.034 ] 0.045 [ 0.486 , 0.024 ] 0.055 [ 0.281 , 0.023 ] 0.055 [ 0.117 , 0.016 ]
rsp ego eval
0.037 0.028 0.017 0.066
0.046 [ 0.688 , 0.085 ] 0.051 [ 0.635 , 0.169 ] 0.056 [ 0.568 , 0.098 ] 0.048 [ 0.755 , 0.008 ]
rsp similarity eval
0.271 † 0.309 * 0.253 0.224
0.149 [ 0.906 , 0.009 ] 0.135 [ 0.898 , 0.005 ] 0.159 [ 0.884 , 0.02 ] 0.167 [ 0.785 , 0.011 ]
sri alter eval
0.041 0.010 0.002 0.033
0.055 [ 0.335 , 0.018 ] 0.062 [ 0.056 , 0.057 ] 0.058 [ 0.072 , 0.069 ] 0.052 [ 0.387 , 0.027 ]
sri ego eval
-0.008 0.002 -0.040 0.016
0.041 [ 0.731 , 0.479 ] 0.043 [ 0.719 , 0.434 ] 0.042 [ 0.189 , 0.322 ] 0.047 [ 0.663 , 0.267 ]
sri similarity eval
0.167 0.173 0.191 0.323 *
0.119 [ 0.985 , 0.094 ] 0.123 [ 0.985 , 0.049 ] 0.129 [ 0.968 , 0.021 ] 0.129 [ 0.998 , 0.01 ]
eri alter eval
-0.081 * -0.064 † -0.059 -0.117 ***
0.037 [ 0.008 , 0.98 ] 0.036 [ 0.026 , 0.968 ] 0.040 [ 0.026 , 0.883 ] 0.037 [ 0.001 , 0.99 ]
eri ego eval
0.146 * 0.179 *** 0.120 * 0.159 *
0.057 [ 0.967 , 0 ] 0.061 [ 0.977 , 0 ] 0.058 [ 0.848 , 0 ] 0.070 [ 0.861 , 0 ]
eri similarity eval
0.185 0.323 * 0.271 † 0.235 †
0.135 [ 0.843 , 0.038 ] 0.130 [ 0.974 , 0.004 ] 0.148 [ 0.949 , 0.005 ] 0.129 [ 0.941 , 0.019 ]
giv alter eval
0.029 0.027 0.010 0.027
0.043 [ 0.848 , 0.461 ] 0.038 [ 0.856 , 0.48 ] 0.039 [ 0.755 , 0.677 ] 0.037 [ 0.846 , 0.427 ]
giv ego eval
-0.004 -0.005 0.006 0.003
0.039 [ 0.832 , 0.482 ] 0.036 [ 0.711 , 0.647 ] 0.037 [ 0.818 , 0.425 ] 0.035 [ 0.838 , 0.644 ]
giv similarity eval
0.141 0.312 0.133 0.094
0.395 [ 0.746 , 0.532 ] 0.393 [ 0.769 , 0.354 ] 0.370 [ 0.668 , 0.527 ] 0.365 [ 0.548 , 0.573 ]
opv alter eval
0.039 -0.034
0.033 [ 0.868 , 0.185 ] 0.046 [ 0.004 , 0.266 ]
opv ego eval
-0.005 -0.012
0.068 [ 0.056 , 0.053 ] 0.040 [ 0.015 , 0.467 ]
opv similarity eval
0.082 0.277 *
0.117 [ 0.604 , 0.428 ] 0.109 [ 0.976 , 0.002 ]
cov alter eval
0.008 -0.014
0.028 [ 0.696 , 0.316 ] 0.024 [ 0.15 , 0.778 ]
cov ego eval
0.077 † -0.090 *
0.045 [ 0.904 , 0.002 ] 0.035 [ 0 , 0.97 ]
cov similarity eval
0.158 0.121
0.123 [ 0.683 , 0.156 ] 0.136 [ 0.488 , 0.052 ]
stv alter eval
-0.017 0.059
0.034 [ 0.394 , 0.668 ] 0.039 [ 0.908 , 0.005 ]
stv ego eval
-0.062 -0.076 *
0.062 [ 0.004 , 0.447 ] 0.033 [ 0.002 , 0.898 ]
stv similarity eval
0.119 0.362 **
0.141 [ 0.611 , 0.059 ] 0.136 [ 0.982 , 0 ]
sev alter eval
-0.040 -0.049 †
0.031 [ 0.023 , 0.82 ] 0.029 [ 0.005 , 0.807 ]
sev ego eval
0.030 -0.026
0.030 [ 0.743 , 0.122 ] 0.027 [ 0.024 , 0.559 ]
sev similarity eval
0.230 . 0.231 *
0.137 [ 0.872 , 0.031 ] 0.114 [ 0.938 , 0.019 ]
sat alter eval
-0.018 -0.019 -0.020 -0.016 0.018 0.013 0.004 0.023
0.019 [ 0.269 , 0.617 ] 0.017 [ 0.336 , 0.755 ] 0.016 [ 0.222 , 0.843 ] 0.016 [ 0.338 , 0.544 ] 0.018 [ 0.395 , 0.069 ] 0.018 [ 0.397 , 0.103 ] 0.021 [ 0.135 , 0.146 ] 0.017 [ 0.466 , 0.048 ]
sat ego eval
0.054 0.060 0.043 0.039 -0.015 -0.013 -0.010 -0.014
0.069 [ 0.459 , 0.025 ] 0.060 [ 0.666 , 0.018 ] 0.055 [ 0.478 , 0.032 ] 0.053 [ 0.374 , 0.043 ] 0.023 [ 0.058 , 0.636 ] 0.022 [ 0.076 , 0.661 ] 0.028 [ 0.065 , 0.35 ] 0.024 [ 0.041 , 0.47 ]
sat similarity eval
0.213 0.213 0.262 * 0.170 0.146 0.140 0.182 0.051
0.131 [ 0.969 , 0.211 ] 0.131 [ 0.963 , 0.283 ] 0.126 [ 0.989 , 0.081 ] 0.112 [ 0.969 , 0.239 ] 0.142 [ 0.738 , 0.025 ] 0.150 [ 0.623 , 0.026 ] 0.153 [ 0.681 , 0.013 ] 0.133 [ 0.605 , 0.104 ]
I(same gender*ego sat) eval
0.066 0.049 0.041 0.019
0.072 [ 0.119 , 0.001 ] 0.067 [ 0.123 , 0.006 ] 0.064 [ 0.109 , 0.004 ] 0.056 [ 0.122 , 0.03 ]
I(same age*ego sat) eval
-0.046 -0.036 -0.017 0.009
0.036 [ 0.153 , 0.726 ] 0.035 [ 0.171 , 0.866 ] 0.049 [ 0.139 , 0.236 ] 0.050 [ 0.362 , 0.088 ]
I(giv sim*ego sat) eval
-0.246 -0.230 -0.218 -0.142
0.185 [ 0.126 , 0.905 ] 0.183 [ 0.129 , 0.971 ] 0.159 [ 0.13 , 0.905 ] 0.150 [ 0.251 , 0.911 ]
I(opv sim*ego sat) eval
-0.020 0.003
0.082 [ 0.468 , 0.416 ] 0.058 [ 0.618 , 0.724 ]
I(cov sim*ego sat) eval
-0.017 0.070
0.093 [ 0.137 , 0.614 ] 0.078 [ 0.709 , 0.046 ]
I(stv sim*ego sat) eval
0.009 -0.011
0.074 [ 0.623 , 0.392 ] 0.088 [ 0.254 , 0.188 ]
I(sev sim*ego sat) eval
0.043 0.033
0.071 [ 0.599 , 0.329 ] 0.057 [ 0.612 , 0.311 ]
I(scp sim*ego sat) eval
0.137 † 0.157 * 0.164 † 0.119 †
0.073 [ 0.95 , 0.061 ] 0.066 [ 0.961 , 0.024 ] 0.085 [ 0.948 , 0.018 ] 0.069 [ 0.931 , 0.05 ]
I(rsp sim*ego sat) eval
0.118 † 0.071 0.065 0.046
0.063 [ 0.946 , 0.146 ] 0.066 [ 0.819 , 0.249 ] 0.068 [ 0.79 , 0.225 ] 0.071 [ 0.612 , 0.268 ]
I(sri sim*ego sat) eval
0.026 0.005 0.001 0.031
0.070 [ 0.573 , 0.625 ] 0.070 [ 0.658 , 0.661 ] 0.072 [ 0.538 , 0.776 ] 0.075 [ 0.629 , 0.639 ]
I(eri sim*ego sat) eval
0.070 0.083 0.051 0.063
0.072 [ 0.818 , 0.149 ] 0.063 [ 0.913 , 0.192 ] 0.078 [ 0.651 , 0.152 ] 0.072 [ 0.788 , 0.212 ]
behavior change:
1st period rate
2.219 *** 2.199 *** 2.005 *** 2.049 *** 2.122 *** 1.889 *** 2.044 *** 4.854 ***
0.336 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.321 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.269 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.286 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.254 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.229 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.248 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.460 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
4.311 *** 4.229 *** 2.903 *** 2.879 *** 2.724 *** 2.321 *** 5.520 *** 2.765 ***
1.068 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.043 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.629 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.626 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.456 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.416 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.487 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.446 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.372 *** -0.345 *** -0.371 *** -0.348 *** -0.248 *** -0.266 *** -0.244 *** -0.235 ***
0.053 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.045 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.048 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.045 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.041 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.049 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.040 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.039 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
-0.534 -0.463 -0.833 -0.960 1.706 1.794 1.043 1.673
0.648 [ 0.285 , 0.943 ] 0.671 [ 0.394 , 0.925 ] 0.642 [ 0.131 , 0.983 ] 0.626 [ 0.089 , 0.99 ] 2.403 [ 0.564 , 0 ] 2.499 [ 0.571 , 0 ] 1.626 [ 0.627 , 0 ] 2.236 [ 0.579 , 0 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.365 *** 0.357 *** 0.328 *** 0.361 *** 0.396 *** 0.414 *** 0.398 *** 0.448 ***
0.317 [ 33 , 25 ] 0.315 [ 35 , 27 ] 0.283 [ 34 , 26 ] 0.319 [ 36 , 29 ] 0.274 [ 35 , 34 ] 0.296 [ 34 , 33 ] 0.257 [ 34 , 33 ] 0.298 [ 36 , 33 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.360 *** 0.353 *** 0.346 *** 0.357 *** 0.322 *** 0.302 *** 0.339 *** 0.283 ***
0.256 [ 33 , 26 ] 0.255 [ 35 , 25 ] 0.248 [ 34 , 26 ] 0.252 [ 36 , 27 ] 0.259 [ 35 , 29 ] 0.255 [ 34 , 27 ] 0.274 [ 34 , 27 ] 0.252 [ 36 , 31 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.43: Effect of social norms for saving on life satisfaction
friendship networks advice networks
stv sev cov opv stv sev cov opv
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
network selection:
1st period rate
7.608 *** 7.321 *** 7.486 *** 7.372 *** 6.502 *** 6.522 *** 6.693 *** 6.245 ***
0.762 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.726 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.792 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.753 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.556 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.634 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.596 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.555 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.354 *** 7.155 *** 7.242 *** 7.019 *** 7.851 *** 8.025 *** 7.698 *** 8.103 ***
0.596 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.535 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.497 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.492 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.772 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.777 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.882 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.779 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-2.073 *** -2.049 *** -2.127 *** -2.005 *** -1.533 *** -1.534 *** -1.521 *** -1.502 ***
0.129 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.149 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.115 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.125 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.067 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.076 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.072 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.070 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.148 *** 1.143 *** 1.093 *** 1.111 *** 1.270 *** 1.202 *** 1.235 *** 1.247 ***
0.102 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.105 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.098 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.119 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.089 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.103 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.099 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.092 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.319 *** 1.310 *** 1.252 *** 1.328 *** 1.596 *** 1.471 *** 1.633 *** 1.574 ***
0.068 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.069 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.070 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.068 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.089 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.104 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.095 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.096 [ 1 , 0 ]
cyclicality eval
-0.423 *** -0.392 *** -0.349 *** -0.399 ***
0.072 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.081 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.090 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.078 [ 0 , 1 ]
popularity eval
-0.079 *** -0.087 *** -0.066 *** -0.072 *** -0.125 *** -0.101 *** -0.132 *** -0.139 ***
0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.021 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.015 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.022 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.023 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.024 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.022 [ 0 , 1 ]
same age eval
-0.059 -0.020 -0.037 -0.017
0.070 [ 0.008 , 0.649 ] 0.066 [ 0.124 , 0.407 ] 0.062 [ 0.17 , 0.604 ] 0.063 [ 0.146 , 0.452 ]
same gender eval
0.340 *** 0.345 *** 0.335 *** 0.280 ***
0.072 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.072 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.074 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.051 [ 1 , 0 ]
scp alter eval
0.089 * 0.105 * 0.134 *** 0.091 *
0.038 [ 0.986 , 0.012 ] 0.046 [ 0.931 , 0.009 ] 0.041 [ 0.999 , 0.002 ] 0.038 [ 0.919 , 0.016 ]
scp ego eval
-0.019 -0.032 -0.044 -0.073
0.055 [ 0.081 , 0.263 ] 0.086 [ 0.012 , 0.111 ] 0.068 [ 0.041 , 0.412 ] 0.057 [ 0.002 , 0.773 ]
scp similarity eval
0.129 0.261 0.212 0.293 *
0.156 [ 0.72 , 0.07 ] 0.171 [ 0.896 , 0.005 ] 0.140 [ 0.953 , 0.032 ] 0.137 [ 0.979 , 0.019 ]
rsp alter eval
0.020 0.041 0.085 * 0.048
0.040 [ 0.872 , 0.09 ] 0.050 [ 0.832 , 0.062 ] 0.038 [ 0.994 , 0.022 ] 0.043 [ 0.777 , 0.037 ]
rsp ego eval
0.101 † 0.076 0.077 0.081
0.061 [ 0.763 , 0.001 ] 0.061 [ 0.784 , 0.006 ] 0.071 [ 0.485 , 0.003 ] 0.053 [ 0.829 , 0.006 ]
rsp similarity eval
0.062 0.025 0.110 0.147
0.128 [ 0.743 , 0.186 ] 0.142 [ 0.613 , 0.415 ] 0.136 [ 0.798 , 0.245 ] 0.134 [ 0.872 , 0.093 ]
sri alter eval
-0.015 0.053 0.007 -0.005
0.042 [ 0.198 , 0.48 ] 0.056 [ 0.512 , 0.012 ] 0.054 [ 0.158 , 0.098 ] 0.049 [ 0.177 , 0.262 ]
sri ego eval
-0.046 -0.048 -0.009 -0.067 †
0.043 [ 0.093 , 0.642 ] 0.039 [ 0.293 , 0.834 ] 0.036 [ 0.728 , 0.486 ] 0.038 [ 0.175 , 0.822 ]
sri similarity eval
0.247 * 0.280 * 0.269 * 0.288 *
0.123 [ 0.993 , 0.039 ] 0.126 [ 0.997 , 0.033 ] 0.114 [ 0.999 , 0.024 ] 0.119 [ 0.999 , 0.038 ]
eri alter eval
-0.074 * -0.076 † -0.077 * -0.041
0.037 [ 0.056 , 0.939 ] 0.041 [ 0.02 , 0.914 ] 0.036 [ 0.017 , 0.974 ] 0.037 [ 0.259 , 0.902 ]
eri ego eval
0.071 0.046 0.099 0.094 †
0.064 [ 0.545 , 0.002 ] 0.065 [ 0.318 , 0.029 ] 0.067 [ 0.55 , 0 ] 0.049 [ 0.806 , 0.009 ]
eri similarity eval
0.134 0.115 0.204 0.164
0.125 [ 0.893 , 0.11 ] 0.133 [ 0.806 , 0.126 ] 0.131 [ 0.874 , 0.023 ] 0.128 [ 0.914 , 0.052 ]
sav alter eval
0.016 0.013 0.016 0.024 †
0.019 [ 0.804 , 0.101 ] 0.018 [ 0.708 , 0.202 ] 0.018 [ 0.778 , 0.139 ] 0.014 [ 0.964 , 0.119 ]
sav ego eval
-0.011 -0.020 -0.016 -0.012
0.014 [ 0.209 , 0.822 ] 0.015 [ 0.081 , 0.953 ] 0.015 [ 0.089 , 0.915 ] 0.014 [ 0.088 , 0.94 ]
sav similarity eval
0.490 † 0.429 0.570 † 0.617 *
0.292 [ 0.863 , 0.017 ] 0.270 [ 0.968 , 0.059 ] 0.297 [ 0.971 , 0.021 ] 0.250 [ 0.995 , 0.011 ]
stv alter eval
-0.010 0.016
0.038 [ 0.312 , 0.479 ] 0.036 [ 0.713 , 0.297 ]
stv ego eval
-0.046 -0.067
0.050 [ 0.013 , 0.609 ] 0.042 [ 0.011 , 0.915 ]
stv similarity eval
0.282 * 0.336 *
0.132 [ 0.984 , 0.006 ] 0.144 [ 0.963 , 0 ]
sev alter eval
-0.033 -0.040
0.044 [ 0.013 , 0.364 ] 0.034 [ 0.06 , 0.752 ]
sev ego eval
-0.010 -0.012
0.042 [ 0.058 , 0.127 ] 0.050 [ 0.064 , 0.135 ]
sev similarity eval
0.096 0.352 **
0.120 [ 0.782 , 0.255 ] 0.135 [ 0.961 , 0.016 ]
cov alter eval
-0.045 -0.018
0.032 [ 0.033 , 0.971 ] 0.027 [ 0.277 , 0.592 ]
cov ego eval
0.016 -0.093 ***
0.041 [ 0.339 , 0.072 ] 0.029 [ 0 , 1 ]
cov similarity eval
0.086 0.114
0.125 [ 0.517 , 0.33 ] 0.120 [ 0.952 , 0.174 ]
opv alter eval
-0.018 -0.066
0.036 [ 0.174 , 0.652 ] 0.047 [ 0.009 , 0.44 ]
opv ego eval
-0.056 0.024
0.049 [ 0.016 , 0.463 ] 0.043 [ 0.118 , 0.156 ]
opv similarity eval
0.090 0.249 *
0.105 [ 0.784 , 0.276 ] 0.120 [ 0.94 , 0.026 ]
behavior change:
1st period rate
6.882 *** 6.944 *** 7.038 *** 6.631 *** 6.655 *** 5.857 *** 6.602 *** 6.085 ***
0.821 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.859 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.836 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.785 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.935 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.958 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.029 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.889 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
10.398 *** 16.397 *** 11.421 *** 10.804 *** 21.762 *** 7.853 *** 17.803 *** 8.184 ***
2.091 [ 1 , 0 ] 3.844 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.188 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.905 [ 1 , 0 ] 5.669 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.439 [ 1 , 0 ] 5.448 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.398 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.086 *** -0.070 *** -0.076 *** -0.074 *** -0.068 *** -0.076 *** -0.065 *** -0.071 ***
0.023 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.015 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.021 [ 0.001 , 1 ] 0.017 [ 0.002 , 1 ] 0.017 [ 0 , 1 ]
save: average similarity eval
1.308 *** 1.216 *** 1.286 ** 1.220 *** 1.834 *** 2.252 *** 1.690 *** 2.025 ***
0.438 [ 0.999 , 0.006 ] 0.423 [ 0.999 , 0.004 ] 0.465 [ 0.998 , 0.007 ] 0.426 [ 0.994 , 0.005 ] 0.522 [ 1 , 0.003 ] 0.676 [ 1 , 0.005 ] 0.583 [ 1 , 0.008 ] 0.587 [ 1 , 0.004 ]
effect from sat eval
-0.002 -0.008 0.001 -0.010 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.011
0.013 [ 0.615 , 0.675 ] 0.013 [ 0.438 , 0.828 ] 0.014 [ 0.583 , 0.749 ] 0.012 [ 0.405 , 0.682 ] 0.012 [ 0.931 , 0.407 ] 0.017 [ 0.886 , 0.582 ] 0.012 [ 0.939 , 0.519 ] 0.014 [ 0.923 , 0.628 ]
I(avg sim*sat) eval
0.396 0.277 0.288 0.266 0.295 0.579 0.375 0.495
0.349 [ 0.995 , 0.213 ] 0.322 [ 0.971 , 0.373 ] 0.334 [ 0.979 , 0.336 ] 0.322 [ 0.931 , 0.419 ] 0.389 [ 0.987 , 0.362 ] 0.529 [ 0.992 , 0.252 ] 0.464 [ 0.982 , 0.393 ] 0.491 [ 0.992 , 0.434 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.331 *** 0.363 *** 0.362 *** 0.324 *** 0.350 *** 0.336 *** 0.331 *** 0.322 ***
0.313 [ 32 , 24 ] 0.314 [ 32 , 25 ] 0.311 [ 33 , 27 ] 0.302 [ 34 , 26 ] 0.245 [ 33 , 31 ] 0.277 [ 31 , 28 ] 0.263 [ 33 , 31 ] 0.249 [ 35 , 33 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.298 *** 0.312 *** 0.300 *** 0.309 *** 0.263 *** 0.267 *** 0.258 *** 0.282 ***
0.301 [ 32 , 22 ] 0.305 [ 32 , 22 ] 0.302 [ 33 , 22 ] 0.298 [ 34 , 24 ] 0.271 [33 , 25 ] 0.298 [31 , 21 ] 0.270 [ 33 , 24 ] 0.284 [ 35 , 25 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
140
Table 6.44: Effect of social norms for spending on life satisfaction
friendship networks advice networks
cov opv sev stv cov opv sev stv
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
network selection:
1st period rate
7.567 *** 7.139 *** 7.528 *** 7.896 *** 5.661 *** 5.716 *** 5.711 *** 6.426 ***
0.813 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.676 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.708 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.731 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.404 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.475 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.416 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.503 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
6.760 *** 6.693 *** 7.220 *** 7.266 *** 7.403 *** 7.623 *** 7.714 *** 8.301 ***
0.690 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.659 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.732 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.711 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.982 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.931 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.892 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.988 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.909 *** -1.788 *** -1.769 *** -1.841 *** -1.673 *** -1.646 *** -1.593 *** -1.660 ***
0.136 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.157 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.163 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.140 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.095 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.125 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.108 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.096 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.273 *** 1.295 *** 1.348 *** 1.263 *** 1.231 *** 1.261 *** 1.236 *** 1.251 ***
0.114 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.099 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.108 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.111 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.122 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.120 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.112 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.120 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.380 *** 1.357 *** 1.402 *** 1.442 *** 1.736 *** 1.649 *** 1.648 *** 1.694 ***
0.069 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.068 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.068 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.070 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.106 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.114 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.112 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.114 [ 1 , 0 ]
cyclicality eval
-0.455 *** -0.423 *** -0.425 *** -0.479 ***
0.078 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.078 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.078 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.079 [ 0 , 1 ]
popularity eval
-0.145 *** -0.137 *** -0.163 *** -0.153 *** -0.101 *** -0.107 *** -0.119 *** -0.099 ***
0.026 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.023 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.025 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.023 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.025 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.025 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.026 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.023 [ 0 , 1 ]
same age eval
0.057 0.030 0.011 0.069
0.051 [ 0.888 , 0.105 ] 0.055 [ 0.257 , 0.159 ] 0.069 [ 0.075 , 0.145 ] 0.049 [ 0.473 , 0.099 ]
same gender eval
0.332 *** 0.283 *** 0.354 *** 0.301 ***
0.063 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.046 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.055 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.045 [ 1 , 0 ]
scp alter eval
0.055 0.050 0.100 † 0.031
0.047 [ 0.828 , 0.071 ] 0.047 [ 0.866 , 0.046 ] 0.055 [ 0.957 , 0.012 ] 0.043 [ 0.749 , 0.099 ]
scp ego eval
-0.013 -0.005 -0.009 -0.055
0.079 [ 0.075 , 0.186 ] 0.066 [ 0.108 , 0.192 ] 0.077 [ 0.037 , 0.203 ] 0.045 [ 0.043 , 0.708 ]
scp similarity eval
-0.094 -0.082 0.050 -0.081
0.166 [ 0.32 , 0.281 ] 0.139 [ 0.188 , 0.55 ] 0.179 [ 0.505 , 0.105 ] 0.136 [ 0.33 , 0.38 ]
rsp alter eval
0.019 -0.007 0.013 -0.027
0.044 [ 0.815 , 0.156 ] 0.040 [ 0.619 , 0.354 ] 0.049 [ 0.503 , 0.159 ] 0.035 [ 0.388 , 0.614 ]
rsp ego eval
0.092 0.113 ** 0.133 † 0.064
0.065 [ 0.697 , 0.004 ] 0.043 [ 0.903 , 0.011 ] 0.068 [ 0.871 , 0 ] 0.058 [ 0.565 , 0.013 ]
rsp similarity eval
-0.056 -0.014 -0.040 0.019
0.167 [ 0.173 , 0.475 ] 0.153 [ 0.521 , 0.311 ] 0.173 [ 0.295 , 0.321 ] 0.133 [ 0.45 , 0.275 ]
sri alter eval
0.040 0.027 0.001 -0.018
0.060 [ 0.814 , 0.194 ] 0.054 [ 0.618 , 0.225 ] 0.052 [ 0.645 , 0.208 ] 0.048 [ 0.569 , 0.386 ]
sri ego eval
-0.068 -0.038 -0.121 * -0.076
0.070 [ 0.145 , 0.777 ] 0.053 [ 0.235 , 0.558 ] 0.058 [ 0.058 , 0.778 ] 0.067 [ 0.032 , 0.72 ]
sri similarity eval
-0.035 0.115 0.063 0.180
0.153 [ 0.663 , 0.579 ] 0.145 [ 0.817 , 0.366 ] 0.154 [ 0.566 , 0.439 ] 0.144 [ 0.912 , 0.183 ]
eri alter eval
-0.096 . -0.039 -0.101 † -0.078
0.054 [ 0.016 , 0.93 ] 0.056 [ 0.072 , 0.633 ] 0.059 [ 0.006 , 0.911 ] 0.054 [ 0.019 , 0.849 ]
eri ego eval
0.123 0.106 0.115 0.134 †
0.090 [ 0.756 , 0.005 ] 0.084 [ 0.665 , 0.005 ] 0.116 [ 0.249 , 0.002 ] 0.081 [ 0.804 , 0.001 ]
eri similarity eval
-0.038 -0.006 -0.028 0.018
0.161 [ 0.641 , 0.43 ] 0.182 [ 0.492 , 0.292 ] 0.185 [ 0.543 , 0.391 ] 0.157 [ 0.64 , 0.314 ]
con alter eval
0.010 -0.005 0.006 0.004
0.023 [ 0.547 , 0.237 ] 0.018 [ 0.531 , 0.417 ] 0.022 [ 0.434 , 0.231 ] 0.021 [ 0.574 , 0.213 ]
con ego eval
0.009 0.005 -0.010 -0.005
0.019 [ 0.85 , 0.254 ] 0.016 [ 0.921 , 0.31 ] 0.015 [ 0.726 , 0.475 ] 0.015 [ 0.696 , 0.594 ]
con similarity eval
0.414 0.244 0.200 0.419 †
0.287 [ 0.925 , 0.058 ] 0.275 [ 0.969 , 0.082 ] 0.270 [ 0.896 , 0.206 ] 0.256 [ 0.975 , 0.068 ]
cov alter eval
-0.036 -0.031
0.040 [ 0.077 , 0.783 ] 0.029 [ 0.28 , 0.753 ]
cov ego eval
0.011 -0.069 †
0.030 [ 0.711 , 0.155 ] 0.037 [ 0.018 , 0.841 ]
cov similarity eval
0.053 0.098
0.124 [ 0.771 , 0.285 ] 0.127 [ 0.822 , 0.223 ]
opv alter eval
-0.001 -0.039
0.039 [ 0.605 , 0.593 ] 0.055 [ 0.019 , 0.342 ]
opv ego eval
-0.062 -0.046
0.055 [ 0.008 , 0.65 ] 0.053 [ 0.012 , 0.764 ]
opv similarity eval
0.032 0.209 †
0.102 [ 0.827 , 0.628 ] 0.111 [ 0.974 , 0.046 ]
sev alter eval
-0.082 * -0.023
0.032 [ 0.001 , 0.98 ] 0.045 [ 0.021 , 0.216 ]
sev ego eval
0.042 -0.075 †
0.026 [ 0.967 , 0.165 ] 0.045 [ 0.001 , 0.89 ]
sev similarity eval
0.251 † 0.200
0.147 [ 0.942 , 0.012 ] 0.137 [ 0.9 , 0.059 ]
stv alter eval
0.018 0.047
0.045 [ 0.442 , 0.165 ] 0.036 [ 0.823 , 0.156 ]
stv ego eval
-0.082 -0.013
0.054 [ 0 , 0.801 ] 0.034 [ 0.413 , 0.654 ]
stv similarity eval
0.231 † 0.408 ***
0.130 [ 0.945 , 0.008 ] 0.112 [ 1 , 0 ]
behavior change:
1st period rate
5.640 *** 5.946 *** 6.185 *** 6.126 *** 7.121 *** 7.123 *** 6.980 *** 8.024 ***
0.940 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.933 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.880 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.966 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.150 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.135 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.131 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.330 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
6.493 *** 6.605 *** 6.629 *** 6.812 *** 15.423 *** 7.135 *** 13.550 *** 7.246 ***
1.059 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.090 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.066 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.068 [ 1 , 0 ] 3.221 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.266 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.830 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.168 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.060 *** -0.060 *** -0.060 *** -0.054 *** -0.078 *** -0.065 *** -0.060 *** -0.069 ***
0.019 [ 0.003 , 0.98 ] 0.018 [ 0.002 , 0.981 ] 0.020 [ 0.002 , 0.957 ] 0.019 [ 0.007 , 0.969 ] 0.024 [ 0 , 0.995 ] 0.020 [ 0.002 , 0.988 ] 0.018 [ 0.002 , 0.992 ] 0.020 [ 0.001 , 0.999 ]
average similarity eval
1.022 * 1.325 *** 0.933 † 1.285 * 1.685 * 0.999 0.660 0.901
0.485 [ 0.912 , 0.052 ] 0.446 [ 0.968 , 0.013 ] 0.526 [ 0.862 , 0.056 ] 0.528 [ 0.943 , 0.009 ] 0.799 [ 0.995 , 0.003 ] 0.634 [ 0.991 , 0.037 ] 0.599 [ 0.983 , 0.097 ] 0.631 [ 0.978 , 0.03 ]
effect from sat eval
-0.004 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.010 0.013 0.009 0.006
0.014 [ 0.403 , 0.867 ] 0.015 [ 0.518 , 0.775 ] 0.015 [ 0.393 , 0.837 ] 0.015 [ 0.511 , 0.789 ] 0.013 [ 0.675 , 0.711 ] 0.013 [ 0.838 , 0.591 ] 0.013 [ 0.784 , 0.73 ] 0.012 [ 0.723 , 0.77 ]
I(avg sim*sat) eval
-0.270 -0.304 -0.317 -0.563 -0.459 -0.381 0.073 -0.455
0.407 [ 0.591 , 0.782 ] 0.362 [ 0.308 , 0.972 ] 0.412 [ 0.446 , 0.858 ] 0.463 [ 0.356 , 0.912 ] 0.564 [ 0.096 , 0.855 ] 0.559 [ 0.141 , 0.809 ] 0.462 [ 0.825 , 0.733 ] 0.574 [ 0.073 , 0.82 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.293 *** 0.316 *** 0.266 *** 0.308 *** 0.339 *** 0.299 *** 0.323 *** 0.319 ***
0.300 [ 30 , 22 ] 0.309 [ 30 , 22 ] 0.302 [ 27 , 18 ] 0.280 [ 27 , 22 ] 0.258 [ 26 , 23 ] 0.233 [ 29 , 27 ] 0.275 [ 29 , 26 ] 0.239 [ 29 , 26 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.359 *** 0.371 *** 0.331 *** 0.389 *** 0.377 *** 0.369 *** 0.368 *** 0.358 ***
0.292 [ 30 , 26 ] 0.289 [ 30 , 27 ] 0.290 [ 27 , 24 ] 0.278 [ 27 , 24 ] 0.352 [ 26 , 20 ] 0.332 [ 29 , 21 ] 0.333 [ 29 , 22 ] 0.330 [ 29 , 23 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.45: Effect of social norms for donations on life satisfaction
friendship networks advice networks
opv cov stv sev opv cov stv sev
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
network selection:
1st period rate
7.946 *** 7.962 *** 7.759 *** 7.484 *** 6.998 *** 6.836 *** 7.150 *** 6.456 ***
0.737 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.664 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.681 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.618 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.658 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.638 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.661 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.496 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
6.624 *** 7.042 *** 7.052 *** 6.675 *** 10.033 *** 9.699 *** 9.431 *** 8.366 ***
0.430 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.451 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.454 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.463 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.122 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.099 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.997 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.816 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-2.123 *** -2.050 *** -2.117 *** -2.051 *** -1.448 *** -1.534 *** -1.519 *** -1.463 ***
0.095 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.089 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.097 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.104 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.071 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.071 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.071 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.078 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.078 *** 1.151 *** 1.126 *** 1.150 *** 1.086 *** 1.082 *** 1.066 *** 1.180 ***
0.096 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.093 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.106 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.102 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.098 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.103 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.094 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.099 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.295 *** 1.316 *** 1.314 *** 1.327 *** 1.607 *** 1.577 *** 1.602 *** 1.601 ***
0.060 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.060 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.065 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.060 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.104 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.109 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.094 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.103 [ 1 , 0 ]
cyclicality eval
-0.383 *** -0.377 *** -0.424 *** -0.418 ***
0.072 [ 0 , 0.999 ] 0.084 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.069 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.083 [ 0 , 1 ]
popularity eval
-0.080 *** -0.085 *** -0.081 *** -0.084 *** -0.115 *** -0.098 *** -0.107 *** -0.123 ***
0.014 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.015 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.015 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.014 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.023 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.023 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.022 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.022 [ 0 , 1 ]
same age eval
0.009 0.018 0.013 0.026
0.044 [ 0.671 , 0.42 ] 0.041 [ 0.844 , 0.494 ] 0.047 [ 0.612 , 0.357 ] 0.044 [ 0.753 , 0.369 ]
same gender eval
0.377 *** 0.363 *** 0.351 *** 0.388 ***
0.061 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.050 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.054 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.062 [ 1 , 0 ]
scp alter eval
0.071 0.094 * 0.078 † 0.126 **
0.044 [ 0.692 , 0.035 ] 0.042 [ 0.816 , 0.011 ] 0.042 [ 0.79 , 0.028 ] 0.047 [ 0.84 , 0.004 ]
scp ego eval
-0.090 -0.096 -0.106 * -0.130 *
0.057 [ 0.006 , 0.919 ] 0.059 [ 0.004 , 0.929 ] 0.053 [ 0.002 , 0.984 ] 0.053 [ 0.001 , 0.993 ]
scp similarity eval
0.018 -0.044 -0.051 0.017
0.125 [ 0.627 , 0.277 ] 0.130 [ 0.699 , 0.473 ] 0.127 [ 0.5 , 0.359 ] 0.132 [ 0.792 , 0.249 ]
rsp alter eval
0.092 * 0.020 0.046 0.042
0.044 [ 0.954 , 0.007 ] 0.041 [ 0.368 , 0.135 ] 0.040 [ 0.824 , 0.076 ] 0.054 [ 0.327 , 0.06 ]
rsp ego eval
0.064 0.020 0.012 0.050
0.076 [ 0.339 , 0.002 ] 0.070 [ 0.185 , 0.027 ] 0.078 [ 0.065 , 0.016 ] 0.091 [ 0.215 , 0.005 ]
rsp similarity eval
-0.004 0.098 0.107 0.131
0.196 [ 0.191 , 0.258 ] 0.177 [ 0.435 , 0.11 ] 0.179 [ 0.531 , 0.111 ] 0.176 [ 0.613 , 0.103 ]
sri alter eval
0.043 0.002 -0.011 0.041
0.044 [ 0.779 , 0.048 ] 0.049 [ 0.282 , 0.129 ] 0.041 [ 0.366 , 0.318 ] 0.040 [ 0.829 , 0.032 ]
sri ego eval
-0.011 -0.007 -0.003 0.008
0.046 [ 0.321 , 0.526 ] 0.041 [ 0.657 , 0.38 ] 0.059 [ 0.129 , 0.244 ] 0.044 [ 0.542 , 0.306 ]
sri similarity eval
0.135 0.136 0.116 0.161
0.117 [ 0.941 , 0.224 ] 0.120 [ 0.902 , 0.075 ] 0.118 [ 0.96 , 0.183 ] 0.116 [ 0.98 , 0.057 ]
eri alter eval
-0.055 -0.081 * -0.070 † -0.108 ***
0.040 [ 0.059 , 0.903 ] 0.034 [ 0.01 , 0.973 ] 0.037 [ 0.047 , 0.936 ] 0.036 [ 0.001 , 0.99 ]
eri ego eval
0.132 * 0.135 * 0.121 † 0.146 †
0.055 [ 0.918 , 0.001 ] 0.068 [ 0.718 , 0 ] 0.071 [ 0.752 , 0 ] 0.077 [ 0.63 , 0 ]
eri similarity eval
0.194 0.270 * 0.200 † 0.139
0.125 [ 0.893 , 0.066 ] 0.113 [ 0.97 , 0.03 ] 0.115 [ 0.952 , 0.056 ] 0.117 [ 0.843 , 0.103 ]
giv alter eval
0.009 0.001 0.003 0.012
0.032 [ 0.639 , 0.486 ] 0.030 [ 0.601 , 0.684 ] 0.032 [ 0.588 , 0.617 ] 0.032 [ 0.633 , 0.55 ]
giv ego eval
0.010 -0.003 0.012 0.002
0.031 [ 0.702 , 0.243 ] 0.030 [ 0.62 , 0.4 ] 0.032 [ 0.801 , 0.223 ] 0.031 [ 0.635 , 0.32 ]
giv similarity eval
0.360 0.247 0.341 0.382
0.308 [ 0.748 , 0.19 ] 0.296 [ 0.831 , 0.348 ] 0.302 [ 0.816 , 0.245 ] 0.313 [ 0.874 , 0.214 ]
opv alter eval
0.031 -0.104 *
0.035 [ 0.749 , 0.077 ] 0.047 [ 0 , 0.922 ]
opv ego eval
-0.030 0.006
0.045 [ 0.026 , 0.246 ] 0.041 [ 0.037 , 0.335 ]
opv similarity eval
0.028 0.337 *
0.097 [ 0.451 , 0.382 ] 0.136 [ 0.963 , 0.001 ]
cov alter eval
-0.023 -0.002
0.024 [ 0.143 , 0.702 ] 0.024 [ 0.513 , 0.343 ]
cov ego eval
0.034 -0.088 *
0.031 [ 0.607 , 0.018 ] 0.037 [ 0 , 0.981 ]
cov similarity eval
0.161 † -0.102
0.095 [ 0.799 , 0.125 ] 0.133 [ 0.081 , 0.669 ]
stv alter eval
0.015 0.031
0.033 [ 0.495 , 0.315 ] 0.034 [ 0.723 , 0.172 ]
stv ego eval
-0.073 * -0.067 †
0.035 [ 0.003 , 0.935 ] 0.035 [ 0.016 , 0.977 ]
stv similarity eval
0.247 † 0.302 *
0.131 [ 0.891 , 0.003 ] 0.149 [ 0.906 , 0 ]
sev alter eval
-0.006 -0.033
0.029 [ 0.177 , 0.445 ] 0.034 [ 0.045 , 0.615 ]
sev ego eval
0.036 -0.028
0.022 [ 0.637 , 0.061 ] 0.044 [ 0.023 , 0.375 ]
sev similarity eval
0.318 ** 0.375 ***
0.122 [ 0.99 , 0.001 ] 0.120 [ 0.999 , 0.004 ]
behavior change:
1st period rate
1.659 *** 1.659 *** 1.760 *** 1.674 *** 1.892 *** 1.795 *** 1.803 *** 1.903 ***
0.203 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.183 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.208 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.201 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.253 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.255 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.234 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.277 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
6.276 *** 2.543 *** 2.731 *** 2.408 *** 2.678 *** 6.664 *** 2.804 *** 2.927 ***
2.204 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.483 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.540 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.474 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.627 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.775 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.589 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.613 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.361 *** -0.385 *** -0.381 *** -0.359 *** -0.308 *** -0.230 *** -0.219 *** -0.235 ***
0.056 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.055 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.063 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.055 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.069 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.050 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.052 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.056 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
-0.487 -0.743 -0.701 -0.395 0.116 0.533 0.763 0.702
0.869 [ 0.566 , 0.925 ] 0.819 [ 0.338 , 0.972 ] 0.921 [ 0.499 , 0.928 ] 0.801 [ 0.697 , 0.887 ] 1.501 [ 0.566 , 0.887 ] 1.214 [ 0.673 , 0.812 ] 1.382 [ 0.735 , 0.69 ] 1.429 [ 0.71 , 0.775 ]
effect from sat eval
0.009 0.020 0.043 0.013 0.024 0.015 0.007 0.010
0.034 [ 0.885 , 0.727 ] 0.033 [ 0.948 , 0.711 ] 0.048 [ 0.926 , 0.65 ] 0.033 [ 0.892 , 0.76 ] 0.047 [ 0.916 , 0.666 ] 0.037 [ 0.925 , 0.611 ] 0.037 [ 0.907 , 0.688 ] 0.037 [ 0.911 , 0.644 ]
I(avg sim*sat) eval
-0.239 0.160 0.026 -0.231 0.180 0.085 0.042 0.236
0.570 [ 0.723 , 0.738 ] 0.566 [ 0.902 , 0.617 ] 0.907 [ 0.812 , 0.677 ] 0.575 [ 0.649 , 0.846 ] 0.992 [ 0.72 , 0.888 ] 0.796 [ 0.74 , 0.893 ] 0.897 [ 0.707 , 0.893 ] 0.925 [ 0.751 , 0.842 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.365 *** 0.357 *** 0.328 *** 0.361 *** 0.396 *** 0.414 *** 0.398 *** 0.448 ***
0.317 [ 35 , 27 ] 0.315 [ 35 , 29 ] 0.283 [ 34 , 26 ] 0.319 [ 37 , 28 ] 0.274 [ 21 , 20 ] 0.296 [ 24 , 22 ] 0.257 [ 23 , 23 ] 0.298 [ 22 , 21 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.360 *** 0.353 *** 0.346 *** 0.357 *** 0.322 *** 0.302 *** 0.339 *** 0.283 ***
0.256 [ 35 , 32 ] 0.255 [ 35 , 32 ] 0.248 [ 34 , 31 ] 0.252 [ 37 , 33 ] 0.259 [ 21 , 19 ] 0.255 [ 24 , 22 ] 0.274 [ 23 , 21 ] 0.252 [ 22 , 19 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.46: Social norms for saving in co-evolution with friendship and advice networks
friendship networks advice networks
stv sev cov opv stv sev cov opv
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
primary network selection:
1st period rate
7.946 *** 8.192 *** 7.946 *** 7.442 *** 6.555 *** 6.154 *** 7.448 *** 7.152 ***
0.949 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.965 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.838 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.770 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.668 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.554 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.905 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.843 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.529 *** 7.541 *** 7.686 *** 7.171 *** 8.050 *** 8.912 *** 8.448 *** 8.794 ***
0.662 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.659 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.632 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.608 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.091 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.159 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.054 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.333 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-2.207 *** -2.170 *** -2.088 *** -2.133 *** -2.204 *** -2.243 *** -2.371 *** -2.398 ***
0.138 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.142 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.154 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.164 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.130 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.149 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.136 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.145 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.148 *** 1.181 *** 1.168 *** 1.186 *** 0.880 *** 0.910 *** 0.908 *** 0.868 ***
0.087 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.086 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.084 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.087 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.105 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.113 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.108 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.110 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.545 *** 1.548 *** 1.565 *** 1.529 *** 1.569 *** 1.694 *** 1.591 *** 1.566 ***
0.085 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.085 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.081 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.085 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.107 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.118 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.108 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.122 [ 1 , 0 ]
cyclicality eval
-0.169 * -0.222 *** -0.186 ** -0.171 * -0.472 *** -0.509 *** -0.463 *** -0.446 ***
0.071 [ 0.023 , 0.859 ] 0.070 [ 0.008 , 0.99 ] 0.069 [ 0.009 , 0.897 ] 0.073 [ 0.027 , 0.858 ] 0.079 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.079 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.079 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.088 [ 0 , 1 ]
popularity eval
-0.116 *** -0.109 *** -0.116 *** -0.104 *** -0.106 *** -0.101 *** -0.095 *** -0.113 ***
0.028 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.026 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.025 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.024 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.020 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.023 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.021 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.023 [ 0 , 1 ]
same age eval
-0.002 0.028 -0.047 -0.078 -0.103 . -0.048 -0.054 -0.069
0.083 [ 0.188 , 0.423 ] 0.073 [ 0.521 , 0.403 ] 0.090 [ 0.025 , 0.527 ] 0.095 [ 0.013 , 0.71 ] 0.059 [ 0.024 , 0.984 ] 0.071 [ 0.2 , 0.906 ] 0.066 [ 0.071 , 0.853 ] 0.062 [ 0.122 , 0.892 ]
same gender eval
0.325 *** 0.305 *** 0.304 *** 0.307 *** 0.382 *** 0.394 *** 0.406 *** 0.415 ***
0.057 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.059 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.057 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.057 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.054 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.057 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.054 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.063 [ 1 , 0 ]
scp similarity eval
-0.074 -0.077 -0.187 -0.199 0.029 -0.018 -0.041 0.030
0.140 [ 0.25 , 0.776 ] 0.147 [ 0.273 , 0.753 ] 0.147 [ 0.084 , 0.874 ] 0.158 [ 0.129 , 0.881 ] 0.144 [ 0.631 , 0.366 ] 0.150 [ 0.475 , 0.408 ] 0.180 [ 0.402 , 0.274 ] 0.153 [ 0.73 , 0.192 ]
rsp similarity eval
0.096 0.082 0.053 0.074 -0.007 0.035 0.007 0.011
0.162 [ 0.901 , 0.271 ] 0.161 [ 0.866 , 0.268 ] 0.145 [ 0.878 , 0.281 ] 0.163 [ 0.862 , 0.276 ] 0.140 [ 0.637 , 0.645 ] 0.148 [ 0.747 , 0.562 ] 0.141 [ 0.452 , 0.548 ] 0.157 [ 0.439 , 0.545 ]
sri similarity eval
0.054 0.045 0.145 0.221 0.307 * 0.219 0.267 † 0.223
0.152 [ 0.482 , 0.486 ] 0.140 [ 0.502 , 0.549 ] 0.140 [ 0.739 , 0.258 ] 0.153 [ 0.815 , 0.186 ] 0.133 [ 0.986 , 0.053 ] 0.146 [ 0.936 , 0.184 ] 0.139 [ 0.973 , 0.038 ] 0.148 [ 0.946 , 0.103 ]
eri similarity eval
0.304 * 0.266 † 0.343 ** 0.324 * -0.108 -0.290 -0.208 -0.131
0.136 [ 0.971 , 0.03 ] 0.136 [ 0.933 , 0.041 ] 0.130 [ 0.987 , 0.01 ] 0.136 [ 0.957 , 0.031 ] 0.161 [ 0.059 , 0.729 ] 0.193 [ 0.004 , 0.916 ] 0.139 [ 0.022 , 0.964 ] 0.153 [ 0.151 , 0.863 ]
sav similarity eval
0.373 0.392 0.237 0.216 0.153 0.295 0.158 0.091
0.273 [ 0.911 , 0.051 ] 0.271 [ 0.947 , 0.069 ] 0.313 [ 0.561 , 0.109 ] 0.327 [ 0.537 , 0.111 ] 0.327 [ 0.699 , 0.742 ] 0.319 [ 0.799 , 0.575 ] 0.280 [ 0.807 , 0.532 ] 0.332 [ 0.597 , 0.659 ]
stv similarity eval
0.319 * 0.277 †
0.162 [ 0.971 , 0.006 ] 0.149 [ 0.91 , 0.013 ]
sev similarity eval
0.147 0.159
0.152 [ 0.819 , 0.076 ] 0.145 [ 0.81 , 0.161 ]
cov similarity eval
0.030 -0.021
0.122 [ 0.489 , 0.57 ] 0.125 [ 0.513 , 0.562 ]
opv similarity eval
-0.043 0.155
0.118 [ 0.6 , 0.563 ] 0.160 [ 0.737 , 0.137 ]
sat similarity eval
0.201 0.308 † 0.237 0.235 0.068 0.135 0.007 0.034
0.175 [ 0.641 , 0.056 ] 0.164 [ 0.835 , 0.03 ] 0.158 [ 0.787 , 0.052 ] 0.165 [ 0.777 , 0.048 ] 0.125 [ 0.654 , 0.367 ] 0.140 [ 0.783 , 0.146 ] 0.122 [ 0.433 , 0.502 ] 0.129 [ 0.741 , 0.443 ]
advice networks friendship networks
stv sev cov opv stv sev cov opv
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
secondary network selection:
1st period rate
3.731 *** 4.117 *** 3.756 *** 3.883 *** 8.457 *** 8.604 *** 9.346 *** 8.827 ***
0.542 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.576 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.482 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.545 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.625 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.681 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.645 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.679 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
3.887 *** 7.706 *** 4.446 *** 3.899 *** 8.490 *** 8.905 *** 9.346 *** 8.695 ***
0.430 [ 1 , 0 ] 2.531 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.526 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.375 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.558 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.568 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.630 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.511 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.532 *** -1.515 *** -1.466 *** -1.512 *** -0.413 *** -0.400 *** -0.407 *** -0.400 ***
0.108 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.106 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.106 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.107 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.109 [ 0 , 0.544 ] 0.117 [ 0 , 0.382 ] 0.113 [ 0 , 0.502 ] 0.127 [ 0 , 0.312 ]
reciprocity eval
0.777 *** 0.748 *** 0.721 *** 0.827 *** 0.914 *** 0.892 *** 0.928 *** 0.951 ***
0.174 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.158 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.152 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.151 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.102 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.111 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.119 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.133 [ 1 , 0 ]
transformation to eval
0.427 † 0.476 † 0.470 * 0.367 † 0.964 *** 0.884 *** 0.934 *** 1.045 ***
0.259 [ 0.991 , 0.023 ] 0.256 [ 0.992 , 0.014 ] 0.230 [ 0.997 , 0.007 ] 0.218 [ 0.994 , 0.018 ] 0.131 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.153 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.165 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.159 [ 1 , 0 ]
friendship networks advice networks
stv sev cov opv stv sev cov opv
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
behavior change:
1st period rate
7.902 *** 7.546 *** 7.682 *** 7.905 *** 7.817 *** 8.069 *** 7.767 *** 7.984 ***
0.956 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.928 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.904 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.918 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.955 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.085 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.998 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.067 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
27.377 *** 18.270 *** 24.809 *** 26.162 *** 20.553 *** 20.616 *** 8.893 *** 8.806 ***
8.333 [ 1 , 0 ] 4.154 [ 1 , 0 ] 8.082 [ 1 , 0 ] 7.781 [ 1 , 0 ] 6.083 [ 1 , 0 ] 6.526 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.465 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.425 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.071 *** -0.076 *** -0.071 *** -0.070 *** -0.076 *** -0.077 *** -0.081 *** -0.061 ***
0.017 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.017 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.016 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.016 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.015 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.016 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.017 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
1.298 ** 1.396 ** 1.435 *** 1.178 *** 1.467 *** 1.658 *** 1.930 *** 1.777 ***
0.480 [ 0.99 , 0.001 ] 0.527 [ 0.99 , 0.001 ] 0.427 [ 0.998 , 0.001 ] 0.411 [ 0.996 , 0.002 ] 0.482 [ 1 , 0.007 ] 0.541 [ 0.999 , 0.007 ] 0.600 [ 0.993 , 0.007 ] 0.535 [ 1 , 0.002 ]
effect from sat eval
-0.016 † -0.018 † -0.018 † -0.018 † -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.006
0.010 [ 0.062 , 0.927 ] 0.009 [ 0.048 , 0.973 ] 0.010 [ 0.035 , 0.945 ] 0.010 [ 0.028 , 0.919 ] 0.009 [ 0.212 , 0.905 ] 0.010 [ 0.368 , 0.923 ] 0.010 [ 0.219 , 0.844 ] 0.010 [ 0.359 , 0.76 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.301 *** 0.317 *** 0.314 *** 0.299 *** 0.276 *** 0.323 *** 0.292 *** 0.274 ***
0.287 [ 38 , 27 ] 0.295 [ 37 , 27 ] 0.292 [ 37 , 29 ] 0.287 [ 38 , 29 ] 0.250 [ 29 , 26 ] 0.280 [ 31 , 28 ] 0.251 [ 32 , 28 ] 0.242 [ 33 , 28 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.286 *** 0.299 *** 0.298 *** 0.305 *** 0.304 *** 0.324 *** 0.298 *** 0.287 ***
0.302 [ 38 , 25 ] 0.312 [ 37 , 23 ] 0.305 [ 37 , 26 ] 0.304 [ 38 , 25 ] 0.297 [ 29 , 22 ] 0.304 [ 31 , 23 ] 0.297 [ 32 , 23 ] 0.295 [ 33 , 24 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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Table 6.47: Social norms for spending in co-evolution with friendship and advice networks
friendship networks advice networks
cov opv sev stv cov opv sev stv
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
primary network selection:
1st period rate
8.177 *** 8.147 *** 8.620 *** 8.298 *** 5.958 *** 5.683 *** 6.239 *** 6.197 ***
0.799 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.775 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.677 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.887 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.558 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.523 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.597 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.564 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.624 *** 7.537 *** 8.625 *** 8.033 *** 7.250 *** 7.199 *** 7.276 *** 8.537 ***
0.622 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.615 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.709 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.601 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.906 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.924 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.973 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.155 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-2.041 *** -2.039 *** -2.172 *** -1.979 *** -2.249 *** -2.382 *** -2.382 *** -2.202 ***
0.166 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.163 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.149 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.152 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.167 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.165 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.173 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.171 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.387 *** 1.396 *** 1.253 *** 1.398 *** 0.988 *** 0.993 *** 1.008 *** 1.011 ***
0.107 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.103 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.098 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.091 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.122 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.121 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.129 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.119 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.471 *** 1.462 *** 1.524 *** 1.490 *** 1.731 *** 1.744 *** 1.769 *** 1.699 ***
0.079 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.082 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.074 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.091 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.124 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.130 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.145 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.130 [ 1 , 0 ]
cyclicality eval
-0.186 ** -0.208 *** -0.253 *** -0.195 ** -0.495 *** -0.445 *** -0.473 *** -0.473 ***
0.071 [ 0.007 , 0.926 ] 0.070 [ 0.004 , 0.955 ] 0.059 [ 0 , 0.998 ] 0.071 [ 0.009 , 0.943 ] 0.083 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.089 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.090 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.092 [ 0 , 1 ]
popularity eval
-0.124 *** -0.116 *** -0.118 *** -0.142 *** -0.100 *** -0.107 *** -0.123 *** -0.114 ***
0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.019 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.024 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.028 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.030 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.034 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.030 [ 0 , 1 ]
same age eval
0.028 0.022 0.063 0.005 -0.010 -0.047 -0.031 -0.093
0.069 [ 0.109 , 0.249 ] 0.065 [ 0.121 , 0.302 ] 0.046 [ 0.406 , 0.097 ] 0.067 [ 0.119 , 0.469 ] 0.078 [ 0.371 , 0.444 ] 0.068 [ 0.476 , 0.864 ] 0.072 [ 0.616 , 0.814 ] 0.065 [ 0.228 , 0.974 ]
same gender eval
0.374 *** 0.351 *** 0.363 *** 0.320 *** 0.378 *** 0.392 *** 0.386 *** 0.417 ***
0.055 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.057 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.049 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.053 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.062 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.063 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.069 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.065 [ 1 , 0 ]
scp similarity eval
-0.137 -0.123 -0.135 -0.123 -0.047 -0.121 -0.140 -0.090
0.136 [ 0.248 , 0.796 ] 0.132 [ 0.298 , 0.803 ] 0.108 [ 0.386 , 0.921 ] 0.138 [ 0.317 , 0.806 ] 0.208 [ 0.172 , 0.422 ] 0.223 [ 0.135 , 0.31 ] 0.233 [ 0.076 , 0.432 ] 0.211 [ 0.09 , 0.597 ]
rsp similarity eval
0.079 0.151 0.054 -0.007 0.074 -0.133 -0.146 -0.068
0.198 [ 0.432 , 0.082 ] 0.186 [ 0.685 , 0.077 ] 0.148 [ 0.52 , 0.106 ] 0.179 [ 0.474 , 0.273 ] 0.193 [ 0.436 , 0.239 ] 0.182 [ 0.113 , 0.791 ] 0.174 [ 0.126 , 0.798 ] 0.173 [ 0.305 , 0.644 ]
sri similarity eval
0.155 0.168 0.106 0.150 0.372 * 0.466 *** 0.482 *** 0.354 *
0.132 [ 0.84 , 0.343 ] 0.133 [ 0.827 , 0.311 ] 0.103 [ 0.877 , 0.442 ] 0.136 [ 0.782 , 0.34 ] 0.164 [ 0.972 , 0.007 ] 0.158 [ 0.994 , 0.004 ] 0.165 [ 0.99 , 0.003 ] 0.158 [ 0.979 , 0.011 ]
eri similarity eval
0.444 *** 0.396 *** 0.309 ** 0.312 * -0.181 -0.207 -0.241 -0.209
0.131 [ 0.999 , 0.003 ] 0.132 [ 0.994 , 0.007 ] 0.115 [ 0.998 , 0.004 ] 0.141 [ 0.995 , 0.045 ] 0.165 [ 0.114 , 0.731 ] 0.174 [ 0.095 , 0.735 ] 0.176 [ 0.081 , 0.865 ] 0.176 [ 0.103 , 0.755 ]
con similarity eval
0.126 0.092 0.180 0.170 0.165 0.390 0.295 0.282
0.251 [ 0.816 , 0.28 ] 0.237 [ 0.788 , 0.309 ] 0.230 [ 0.915 , 0.235 ] 0.276 [ 0.819 , 0.216 ] 0.332 [ 0.546 , 0.699 ] 0.366 [ 0.641 , 0.498 ] 0.373 [ 0.493 , 0.631 ] 0.345 [ 0.593 , 0.676 ]
stv similarity eval
0.148 -0.080
0.120 [ 0.805 , 0.105 ] 0.178 [ 0.163 , 0.4 ]
sev similarity eval
0.046 0.173
0.106 [ 0.853 , 0.517 ] 0.130 [ 0.842 , 0.21 ]
cov similarity eval
0.289 * 0.241
0.121 [ 0.989 , 0.001 ] 0.160 [ 0.905 , 0.121 ]
opv similarity eval
0.219 † 0.411 ***
0.124 [ 0.987 , 0.059 ] 0.138 [ 0.995 , 0.007 ]
sat similarity eval
0.284 * 0.267 * 0.319 ** 0.271 * 0.137 0.221 0.233 0.216
0.121 [ 0.987 , 0.012 ] 0.124 [ 0.985 , 0.022 ] 0.121 [ 0.978 , 0.001 ] 0.127 [ 0.979 , 0.021 ] 0.135 [ 0.781 , 0.216 ] 0.141 [ 0.935 , 0.051 ] 0.148 [ 0.924 , 0.057 ] 0.133 [ 0.91 , 0.069 ]
advice networks friendship networks
cov opv sev stv cov opv sev stv
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
secondary network selection:
1st period rate
3.432 *** 3.497 *** 4.449 *** 3.582 *** 9.934 *** 9.188 *** 9.803 *** 9.469 ***
0.378 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.371 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.465 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.390 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.811 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.732 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.820 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.667 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
8.429 ** 9.181 * 4.713 *** 10.028 * 10.180 *** 9.585 *** 9.782 *** 10.039 ***
3.232 [ 1 , 0 ] 4.016 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.532 [ 1 , 0 ] 4.207 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.664 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.590 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.577 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.476 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.662 *** -1.665 *** -1.567 *** -1.625 *** -0.465 *** -0.547 *** -0.457 *** -0.471 ***
0.089 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.083 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.074 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.102 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.091 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.077 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.078 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.078 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.129 *** 1.145 *** 0.996 *** 1.020 *** 0.982 *** 1.087 *** 1.044 *** 0.987 ***
0.128 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.121 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.124 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.159 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.106 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.093 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.100 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.095 [ 1 , 0 ]
transformation to eval
0.279 0.224 0.506 ** 0.330 0.864 *** 1.020 *** 1.013 *** 0.866 ***
0.208 [ 0.987 , 0.028 ] 0.190 [ 0.992 , 0.054 ] 0.185 [ 1 , 0.002 ] 0.226 [ 0.975 , 0.029 ] 0.189 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.194 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.209 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.198 [ 1 , 0 ]
friendship networks advice networks
cov opv sev stv cov opv sev stv
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
behavior change:
1st period rate
7.662 *** 7.922 *** 8.695 *** 7.941 *** 8.524 *** 7.585 *** 8.429 *** 7.922 ***
1.313 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.331 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.140 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.397 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.496 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.319 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.609 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.522 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
21.093 *** 20.514 *** 9.334 *** 8.278 *** 8.145 *** 8.337 *** 7.965 *** 7.000 ***
6.417 [ 1 , 0 ] 5.591 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.547 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.350 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.395 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.580 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.555 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.193 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.064 *** -0.073 *** -0.050 *** -0.058 *** -0.068 *** -0.073 *** -0.066 *** -0.053 ***
0.018 [ 0 , 0.999 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.013 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.018 [ 0.001 , 0.998 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 0.999 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 0.998 ] 0.018 [ 0.001 , 0.997 ] 0.017 [ 0.002 , 0.982 ]
average similarity eval
1.073 * 0.999 * 1.540 *** 1.326 ** 1.984 *** 1.740 * 1.723 * 2.027 ***
0.495 [ 0.887 , 0.003 ] 0.483 [ 0.906 , 0.007 ] 0.443 [ 0.997 , 0 ] 0.485 [ 0.962 , 0.002 ] 0.704 [ 0.992 , 0.001 ] 0.713 [ 0.985 , 0 ] 0.750 [ 0.985 , 0 ] 0.717 [ 0.997 , 0 ]
effect from sat eval
0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.005 -0.010 -0.011 -0.008 -0.014 †
0.010 [ 0.407 , 0.529 ] 0.010 [ 0.337 , 0.723 ] 0.009 [ 0.477 , 0.54 ] 0.010 [ 0.476 , 0.464 ] 0.008 [ 0.196 , 0.965 ] 0.008 [ 0.128 , 0.973 ] 0.008 [ 0.136 , 0.92 ] 0.008 [ 0.076 , 0.987 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.319 *** 0.276 *** 0.312 *** 0.299 *** 0.298 *** 0.284 *** 0.273 *** 0.304 ***
0.312 [ 31 , 22 ] 0.292 [ 33 , 21 ] 0.314 [ 32 , 23 ] 0.300 [ 32 , 23 ] 0.244 [ 31 , 28 ] 0.226 [ 31 , 27 ] 0.243 [ 32 , 27 ] 0.251 [ 31 , 27 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.383 *** 0.340 *** 0.369 *** 0.366 *** 0.345 *** 0.360 *** 0.340 *** 0.314 ***
0.289 [ 31 , 28 ] 0.290 [ 33 , 27 ] 0.297 [ 32 , 27 ] 0.292 [ 32 , 26 ] 0.313 [ 31 , 23 ] 0.311 [ 31 , 24 ] 0.305 [ 32 , 26 ] 0.301 [ 31 , 23 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
144
Table 6.48: Social norms for donations in co-evolution with friendship and advice networks
friendship networks advice networks
opv cov stv sev opv cov stv sev
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
primary network selection:
1st period rate
8.345 *** 8.690 *** 8.289 *** 8.418 *** 6.941 *** 7.411 *** 7.561 *** 7.124 ***
1.062 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.057 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.115 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.076 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.444 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.608 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.640 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.558 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
7.249 *** 7.486 *** 7.115 *** 7.454 *** 7.494 *** 8.903 *** 8.087 *** 7.500 ***
0.618 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.585 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.571 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.605 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.880 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.155 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.038 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.945 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-2.107 *** -2.129 *** -2.093 *** -2.191 *** -2.259 *** -2.215 *** -2.124 *** -2.206 ***
0.125 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.118 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.130 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.133 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.129 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.117 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.125 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.130 [ 0 , 1 ]
reciprocity eval
1.304 *** 1.261 *** 1.231 *** 1.237 *** 0.956 *** 0.834 *** 0.835 *** 0.870 ***
0.101 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.104 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.098 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.096 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.109 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.097 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.101 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.103 [ 1 , 0 ]
transitivity eval
1.413 *** 1.445 *** 1.425 *** 1.431 *** 1.578 *** 1.601 *** 1.592 *** 1.624 ***
0.079 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.082 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.083 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.086 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.110 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.096 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.103 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.118 [ 1 , 0 ]
cyclicality eval
-0.265 *** -0.254 *** -0.292 *** -0.308 *** -0.515 *** -0.425 *** -0.420 *** -0.447 ***
0.070 [ 0.002 , 1 ] 0.065 [ 0.001 , 1 ] 0.071 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.069 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.072 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.074 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.076 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.076 [ 0 , 1 ]
popularity eval
-0.087 *** -0.089 *** -0.069 *** -0.074 *** -0.085 *** -0.096 *** -0.100 *** -0.114 ***
0.018 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.017 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.017 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.017 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.024 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.018 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.021 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.024 [ 0 , 1 ]
same age eval
0.050 0.087 0.077 0.106 . -0.030 -0.043 -0.007 -0.005
0.054 [ 0.851 , 0.451 ] 0.053 [ 0.947 , 0.203 ] 0.058 [ 0.897 , 0.242 ] 0.060 [ 0.955 , 0.081 ] 0.060 [ 0.38 , 0.743 ] 0.052 [ 0.359 , 0.829 ] 0.055 [ 0.526 , 0.699 ] 0.059 [ 0.545 , 0.584 ]
same gender eval
0.296 *** 0.333 *** 0.294 *** 0.283 *** 0.390 *** 0.342 *** 0.333 *** 0.354 ***
0.052 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.058 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.055 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.063 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.063 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.057 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.061 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.064 [ 1 , 0 ]
scp similarity eval
-0.157 -0.152 -0.190 -0.195 -0.187 -0.030 -0.024 -0.013
0.136 [ 0.12 , 0.941 ] 0.130 [ 0.147 , 0.944 ] 0.141 [ 0.094 , 0.957 ] 0.141 [ 0.134 , 0.965 ] 0.157 [ 0.101 , 0.64 ] 0.126 [ 0.723 , 0.401 ] 0.129 [ 0.534 , 0.587 ] 0.143 [ 0.655 , 0.274 ]
rsp similarity eval
-0.022 0.079 0.002 -0.084 0.109 0.201 0.165 0.149
0.177 [ 0.533 , 0.398 ] 0.168 [ 0.725 , 0.181 ] 0.186 [ 0.555 , 0.269 ] 0.189 [ 0.324 , 0.388 ] 0.193 [ 0.507 , 0.125 ] 0.197 [ 0.603 , 0.024 ] 0.190 [ 0.686 , 0.058 ] 0.216 [ 0.51 , 0.05 ]
sri similarity eval
-0.060 -0.079 -0.165 -0.134 0.256 † 0.306 * 0.343 ** 0.336 *
0.142 [ 0.312 , 0.769 ] 0.134 [ 0.231 , 0.822 ] 0.167 [ 0.111 , 0.857 ] 0.156 [ 0.143 , 0.872 ] 0.132 [ 0.992 , 0.057 ] 0.124 [ 0.997 , 0.011 ] 0.125 [ 0.997 , 0.008 ] 0.138 [ 0.991 , 0.009 ]
eri similarity eval
0.233 † 0.314 * 0.221 0.233 -0.029 -0.117 -0.178 -0.065
0.136 [ 0.988 , 0.058 ] 0.144 [ 0.986 , 0.006 ] 0.140 [ 0.967 , 0.049 ] 0.146 [ 0.942 , 0.047 ] 0.155 [ 0.317 , 0.571 ] 0.130 [ 0.096 , 0.867 ] 0.162 [ 0.04 , 0.764 ] 0.153 [ 0.153 , 0.776 ]
giv similarity eval
0.118 0.159 0.149 0.169 0.162 0.083 0.072 0.253
0.194 [ 0.71 , 0.399 ] 0.183 [ 0.794 , 0.276 ] 0.202 [ 0.717 , 0.265 ] 0.196 [ 0.842 , 0.29 ] 0.195 [ 0.78 , 0.4 ] 0.190 [ 0.612 , 0.497 ] 0.187 [ 0.569 , 0.57 ] 0.209 [ 0.79 , 0.334 ]
stv similarity eval
0.056 -0.122
0.125 [ 0.796 , 0.155 ] 0.149 [ 0.066 , 0.657 ]
sev similarity eval
0.090 -0.079
0.117 [ 0.589 , 0.411 ] 0.145 [ 0.064 , 0.544 ]
cov similarity eval
0.196 0.171
0.172 [ 0.839 , 0.03 ] 0.126 [ 0.919 , 0.031 ]
opv similarity eval
0.517 * 0.238 †
0.207 [ 0.96 , 0 ] 0.126 [ 0.958 , 0.117 ]
sat similarity eval
0.363 * 0.362 ** 0.316 † 0.232 0.055 0.078 0.035 -0.033
0.147 [ 0.959 , 0.009 ] 0.130 [ 0.966 , 0.004 ] 0.176 [ 0.864 , 0.009 ] 0.200 [ 0.592 , 0.017 ] 0.114 [ 0.895 , 0.268 ] 0.121 [ 0.757 , 0.138 ] 0.123 [ 0.694 , 0.208 ] 0.121 [ 0.582 , 0.493 ]
advice networks friendship networks
opv cov stv sev opv cov stv sev
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
secondary network selection:
1st period rate
3.881 *** 4.290 *** 4.077 *** 3.875 *** 10.149 *** 9.357 *** 9.468 *** 9.486 ***
0.604 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.702 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.737 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.628 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.870 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.793 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.836 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.843 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
3.290 *** 5.789 *** 6.167 *** 5.599 *** 9.429 *** 8.953 *** 9.181 *** 9.137 ***
0.438 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.411 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.773 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.448 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.612 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.612 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.596 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.593 [ 1 , 0 ]
density eval
-1.550 *** -1.567 *** -1.522 *** -1.503 *** -0.383 *** -0.379 *** -0.344 *** -0.364 ***
0.107 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.105 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.116 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.108 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.083 [ 0 , 0.986 ] 0.080 [ 0 , 0.99 ] 0.082 [ 0 , 0.983 ] 0.082 [ 0 , 0.987 ]
reciprocity eval
0.994 *** 1.050 *** 0.898 *** 0.907 *** 0.878 *** 0.907 *** 0.842 *** 0.856 ***
0.156 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.151 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.170 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.152 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.096 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.095 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.092 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.097 [ 1 , 0 ]
transformation to eval
0.135 0.188 0.173 0.286 0.773 *** 0.845 *** 0.805 *** 0.857 ***
0.209 [ 0.943 , 0.164 ] 0.205 [ 0.938 , 0.129 ] 0.226 [ 0.853 , 0.17 ] 0.252 [ 0.939 , 0.043 ] 0.153 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.121 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.128 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.148 [ 1 , 0 ]
friendship networks advice networks
opv cov stv sev opv cov stv sev
effect function
µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p µθ fisher’s p
σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p σθ fisher’s [l,r] p
behavior change:
1st period rate
1.588 *** 1.618 *** 1.683 *** 1.696 *** 1.615 *** 1.931 *** 1.672 *** 1.869 ***
0.218 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.222 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.269 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.263 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.200 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.234 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.217 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.247 [ 1 , 0 ]
2nd period rate
3.087 *** 2.618 *** 2.466 *** 1.953 *** 2.290 *** 5.047 *** 2.241 *** 2.360 ***
0.670 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.562 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.585 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.416 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.427 [ 1 , 0 ] 1.416 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.468 [ 1 , 0 ] 0.487 [ 1 , 0 ]
linear eval
-0.360 *** -0.373 *** -0.355 *** -0.336 *** -0.332 *** -0.328 *** -0.285 *** -0.311 ***
0.056 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.057 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.059 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.057 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.065 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.059 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.057 [ 0 , 1 ] 0.065 [ 0 , 1 ]
average similarity eval
-0.875 -0.717 -0.714 -0.185 -0.161 -0.285 0.303 0.120
0.741 [ 0.233 , 0.939 ] 0.816 [ 0.26 , 0.937 ] 0.812 [ 0.325 , 0.819 ] 0.814 [ 0.546 , 0.77 ] 1.107 [ 0.542 , 0.756 ] 0.932 [ 0.458 , 0.883 ] 1.013 [ 0.622 , 0.734 ] 1.066 [ 0.67 , 0.786 ]
effect from sat eval
0.023 0.021 0.015 0.006 -0.001 0.011 -0.000 0.004
0.027 [ 0.745 , 0.127 ] 0.027 [ 0.753 , 0.139 ] 0.029 [ 0.641 , 0.196 ] 0.028 [ 0.52 , 0.265 ] 0.022 [ 0.908 , 0.565 ] 0.020 [ 0.913 , 0.267 ] 0.022 [ 0.829 , 0.416 ] 0.021 [ 0.813 , 0.483 ]
goodness of fit:
µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test µp χ
2 test
σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ] σp [ converge / fit ]
GOF (outdegree)
0.365 *** 0.357 *** 0.328 *** 0.361 *** 0.396 *** 0.414 *** 0.398 *** 0.448 ***
0.317 [ 33 , 25 ] 0.315 [ 35 , 27 ] 0.283 [ 34 , 26 ] 0.319 [ 36 , 29 ] 0.274 [ 35 , 34 ] 0.296 [ 34 , 33 ] 0.257 [ 34 , 33 ] 0.298 [ 36 , 33 ]
GOF (behavior)
0.360 *** 0.353 *** 0.346 *** 0.357 *** 0.322 *** 0.302 *** 0.339 *** 0.283 ***
0.256 [ 33 , 26 ] 0.255 [ 35 , 25 ] 0.248 [ 34 , 26 ] 0.252 [ 36 , 27 ] 0.259 [ 35 , 29 ] 0.255 [ 34 , 27 ] 0.274 [ 34 , 27 ] 0.252 [ 36 , 31 ]
***p < 0.01, **0.01 < p < 0.05, *0.05 < p < 0.1, †p < 0.1
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6.5 Discussions
Figure 6.4: Susceptibility to normative financial decision making practices vs. density in friendship
networks: Based on the results of the meta analyses in Appendices 6.22, 6.23 and 6.24
y-Axis: Estimations for average similarity effects on the class level, interpretation of positive ef-
fects as susceptibility or convergence towards social norms and negative effects as reactance or divergence
from social norms concerning allocations of financial resources to spending, savings or donations.
x-Axis: Estimations for the change in density on the class level.
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